Mr. Khosla, after four years of inquiry, arrived at conclusions which he set down in the Report of the Commission as 'Findings'. These findings are based exclusively on the evidence of 18 Japanese witnesses. He discarded evidence of about 204 Indian and Taiwanese witnesses as nothing but mere 'hearsay' stories. Out of the Japanese witnesses he preferentially selected evidence of four who claimed to have had travelled in the same plane with Netaji and characterised them as 'most important witnesses'. Another witness, a Japanese doctor, also claimed that he treated Netaji in Taihoku Military Hospital. This doctor too appeared to Mr. Khosla as a 'witness of convincing truth'. Two other Japanese witnesses, one of whom was described by Mr. Khosla as 'Netaji's co-passenger' and the other as a doctor belonging to the same Taihoku hospital, did not receive his attention as their evidence proved too irreconcilable with the evidence of others. In fact, Mr. Khosla altogether relied on the evidence of only five Japanese, and used other Japanese evidence as lending support to the testimonies of these chosen few.

Did the Japanese witnesses produce any document to substantiate authenticity of their evidence? No.—none of them could produce any kind of document, direct or indirect, in verification of what they said before Khosla Commission. Nevertheless, these
five Japanese witnesses received absolute credence of Mr. Khosla, whereas evidence of confidential secretary of Netaji, his security chief, former Ministers of Azad Hind Government, Generals of INA, many trusted associates of Netaji and other witnesses of similar importance were discarded by him as ‘unreliable’ telling stories like ‘gullibles’.

A RESUME OF THE STORY OF NETAJI’S DEATH

Four days before Japanese surrender, a special Japanese envoy, Mr. Negishi, rushed to Seramban in Malay on August 12, 1945 with a secret message from the Imperial Headquarters to meet Netaji and communicate to him the undisclosed terms of Japanese surrender. He was further directed to request Netaji to reach Saigon immediately for moving out of the area of South East Asia. Spurning the Japanese request Netaji promptly moved from Seramban to Singapore and Negishi also accompanied him. At Singapore Netaji held series of Cabinet meetings to decide the future course of action to be followed by his Government after Japanese surrender. He withdrew Government funds from the Azad Hind Bank to pay three months’ advance salary to INA. On the evening of August 14, he calmly attended a cultural function of the Jhansi Regiment without disclosing to them what was going to happen next day. As Netaji did not arrive at Saigon, Gen. Isoda, the Chief of the Hikari Kikan and Mr. Hachia, Japanese Ambassador to Netaji’s Government, anxiously flew to Singapore on August 12 to persuade him to leave for Saigon without any further delay, but Netaji again refused to leave Singapore. It appeared that initially Netaji decided to surrender separately to the British authority at Singapore with his Cabinet Members and INA officers.

On August 15, another special messenger from Imperial Headquarters reached Singapore with another special message for Netaji. Netaji had exclusive meetings with this messenger, Col. Sakai, and finally decided to leave Singapore next day. Nobody knew exactly what transpired in these meetings with Sakai. However, in one of such meetings, he asked Col. Habibur Rahman to attend and then, asked him to hand over the charge of
his office of the Deputy Chief of the Staff of the INA to Major General M. Z. Kiani.

Next day, i.e., on August 16, Netaji left Singapore with Gen. Isoda, Negishi, Sakai, Col. Habibur Rahman, S. A. Iyer, Debnath Das, Pritam Singh, Major Hassan, Gulzara Singh and others for Bangkok. At Bangkok Netaji had secret consultation with Gen. Isoda and another special envoy from F. M. Terrauchi’s headquarters, Col. Tada. This meeting was attended only once, and that too for a short time, by Col. Habibur Rahman. Here Netaji’s plan to move out of Saigon area was finally chalked out but what it actually was, he did not disclose to anybody except perhaps partly to Col. Rahman.

On the morning of August 17, Netaji accompanied by Isoda, Hachia, Negishi, S. A. Iyer, Debnath Das, Pritam Singh, Gulzara Singh, Abid Hassan and Habibur Rahman flew to Saigon in two separate planes, one of which was his own aircraft. At Saigon also Netaji held some secret discussions with Isoda. Netaji’s colleagues vaguely knew that their leader was going to Tokyo and they were kept guessing as if they would also be asked to accompany Netaji. A few hours before the final flight, Netaji was informed by Gen. Isoda that only one seat will be available in a plane bound for Tokyo, but after some time, another seat was also provided. After a meeting with his colleagues, and having their consent, Netaji boarded the plane in the evening with only Col. Habibur Rahman along with him. A few bags, full of gold bars and jewelleries, were also placed in the plane.

The plane with Netaji, Lt.Gen. Shidei, Col. Habibur Rahman and some other Japanese military officers left Saigon at 5 p.m. It was said that Gen. Shidei was going to Dairen to assume charge of the Kwantang Army in Manchuria. Although Netaji did not say anything categorically to his colleagues about his destination, they presumed that their leader was going to Russia. The plane reached Tourane, city in North Vietnam, after dusk on the same day.

Next day, i.e., on August 18 the plane left Tourane in the morning for Taichoku (Taipei) in Formosa and landed there at
about 2 p.m. When the plane took off from Taihoku after re-fuelling, it crashed almost immediately. Lt.-Gen. Shidei and some of the members of the crew died instantly and Netaji and Col. Habibur Rahman and five other Japanese co-passengers were injured. These injured persons were taken to military hospital at Taihoku. Netaji had third degree burns and he died in the midnight on the same day. His body was cremated in Taihoku crematorium by the Japanese and the ashes carried to Tokyo during the first week of September, 1945. In Tokyo the ashes were secretly kept in a small temple, known as Renkoji temple in the vicinity of Tokyo and it is said the ashes are still preserved there.

This is, in brief, the story of Netaji’s flight from Saigon, air crash at Taihoku, funeral of his alleged body at Taihoku crematorium and preservation of his ashes at the Renkoji temple as was commonly told by the Japanese witnesses before Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission.

Now, how reliable or ‘truthful’ the evidence is of the Japanese witnesses, especially of the evidence of five ‘most important’ witnesses of Mr. Khosla’s description? It was not difficult to give out similar outlines of the broad features of the story commonly told by the Japanese witnesses before the Inquiry Commission. However, whether their story was true or tutored, depended on whether they succeeded in narrating all the details about the different events connected with the whole story more or less uniformly and generally in identical terms while these witnesses were subjected to cross-examination. In order to ascertain the extent of reliability of the versions of the Japanese witnesses, 45 relevant questions, relating to different parts of the story of Netaji’s flight from Saigon and his reported death at Taihoku have been posed and their answers sought from the documents and evidentiary materials found in possession of Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission. It will be found, even after a casual reading of these questions and answers how the Japanese witnesses, from the beginning to the end, made a ridiculous mess of their narration of the story and how miserably they contradicted themselves in describing some
events which they claimed to have experienced while they travelled with Netaji and of what happened at Taihoku.

The following are the questions and answers which cover the whole story of alleged death of Netaji:

1. What was the type of the plane which carried Netaji from Saigon to Taihoku?

The identification of the type of the plane is very important to understand and ascertain the nature and cause of the alleged air crash at Taihoku airport. Lt.-Gen. Isoda, the Chief of Hikari Kikan, who was known to have had played a key role in preparing Netaji's plan of escape from Saigon, told Shah Nawaz Committee as well as the Khosla Commission that the plane was a 'brand new bomber'.

Lt.-Col. Nonogaki, Lt.-Col. Sakai, Major Tara Kuno, Major Takahashi and Capt. Arai, who survived the reported air crash, all said before Shah Nawaz Committee that the plane was of the 'newest type'. However, during cross-examination, Lt.-Col. Nonogaki changed to say that it was an old plane. Gen. Isamaya, the Chief of the Japanese Formosan Army, said differently that the 'engine of the plane was worn out'. The ground engineer, Capt. Nakamura, alias Yemamoto of Taihoku airport added a new story. He said that while testing the engine of the plane at Taihoku airport before its take-off, the chief pilot Takizawa told him that the 'port engine had been replaced by a brand new one at Saigon.'

Finding so many contradictions regarding the description of the plane, Shah Nawaz Committee observed: 'There is divergence of opinion on whether it was a new or an old plane'.

Lt.-Col. Nonogaki published an article in a Japanese paper, Emuri Shimbun in which he wrote: 'In 1945, the Air-force wing of the 7th Army was disbanded. We had only one 97-model heavy bomber. General Siragassi, the Chief of the 7th Army, asked us to fly the plane to Japan. It was not easy to fly such a plane to Japan, and, as such, we decided to fly it to Japan via China. In our first hop from Malan, we reached Singapore and then from Singapore to Saigon. We stayed at
the Headquarters of the Southern Army". [Khosla Commission Exhibit (K.C.E.)]

However, this very Nonogaki told Khosla Commission afterwards "I was told by Major Li that three months before the air crash, the same plane, when it began to land at Saigon, had overstripped the runway and fell in a ditch near the airport and the propellers were broken. At that time the propellers were bent, but there was no replacement of the propeller at Saigon and the propellers were not repaired or replaced. Then the same plane was given to us."

It is clear from these different versions that nobody could say definitely what type of plane it was,—whether it was a brand new bomber, or its engine was damaged or it was replaced. It should also be noted that one of the 'most important witnesses' in Mr. Khosla's view, Col. Nonogaki, gave three different versions about the condition of the plane at different times, i.e., to Shah Nawaz Committee, Emuri Shimbun and Khosla Commission. Thus the story of the air crash started with irreconcilable discrepancies from the very beginning. Mr. Khosla kept completely silent in his Report about the type of the plane or its condition before it took off from Saigon.

2. From where did the Plane come?

Lt.-General Isoda, a principal architect of Netaji's plan, categorically told both Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission that the plane which airlifted Netaji from Saigon was 'already stationed at Saigon airport' as it was a 'brand new bomber'.

Nonogaki earlier wrote in Emuri Shimbun that the plane came from Malan to Singapore and from there, it moved to Saigon. However, later he told Khosla Commission that the plane came from Manila. But during cross-examination he admitted, "I was going to Tokyo on transfer from Saigon".

Except Nonogaki, who contradicted himself thrice, no other Japanese witness said that the plane came from Manila but in his findings, Mr. Khosla wrote that the plane came from Manila to Saigon, relying exclusively on the self-contradictory state-
ment of Nonogaki. It will be seen later why Mr. Khosla deliberately utilised the patently unfounded statement of Nonogaki to use it as a major point in justification of his argument that there was no definite or pre-fixed plan to assist Netaji to move out of Saigon.

3. Who were the Chief Pilot and Navigator of the Plane?

Shah Nawaz Committee recorded in its report in 1956 that "The crew consisted of five or six persons: Chief Pilot, Major Takizawa, Co-pilot W/o Ayoagi, Navigator Sergeant Okista, Radio Operator, Tominaga". Before Shah Nawaz Committee, Nonogaki claimed that he was the Chief Pilot and Tara Kuno similarly claimed that he was the Navigator. In support of his claim Nonogaki wrote in Emuri Shim bun in 1969: "Lt.-General Shidei had been my instructor in Army Academy. He asked me to operate the plane, so I became the Chief Pilot of the bomber".

Mr. T. Hayashida, who was attached to Hikari Kikan, wrote in his book, which Mr. Khosla quoted in his Report, that W/o Ayoagi was Chief Pilot and Sgt. Okista (Okita) its Navigator. He also mentioned that there was also a gunner in the plane.

Thus, it becomes difficult to say who were actually the pilot and navigator of the plane. But in this case Mr. Khosla discarded the claim of his 'most important witness', Nonogaki and accepted the version of Tara Kuno, although none else said that Tara Kuno was the Navigator. Here also we find discrepancies in ascertaining who was Chief Pilot and who was Navigator, but in his Report Mr. Khosla mentioned Takizawa as the Chief Pilot and Tara Kuno as its Navigator. We shall see later, how miserably Tara Kuno falsified his claim as functioning as the Navigator when he described the alleged incident of air crash.

4. Who were the passengers inside the plane?

Shah Nawaz Committee listed the names of the passengers as "Major Takizawa, W/o Ayoagi, Sgt. Okista, N.O. Tominagu, all crew; and five Japanese military officers Lt.-Col. Sakai, Lt.-Col. S. Nonogaki, Major Tara Kuno, Major Takahashi
and Capt. Arai, and Lt.-Gen. Shidei, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and Col. Habibur Rahman”—altogether 12 in number. However, the Japanese witnesses said that the total number of passengers was 13 or 14. Shah Nawaz Committee frankly admitted that there were “one or two other engineers whose names have not come out”.

Sergeant Okista and two other survivors could not be produced either before Shah Nawaz Committee or Khosla Commission, nor could anyone say who were the other persons and what happened to them.

Mr. Khosla avoided this very important issue of identification of the 13/14 passengers and in his Report, he only mentioned that “Bose, Habibur, Lt.-Col. Sakai, S. Nonogaki, Tara Kuno, and Takabashi, Takizawa, General Shidei and Ayoagi,—all three of whom were killed” and there were “some others, whose names need not be mentioned” as if he knew the identities of the rest of the passengers and could mention their names if he so wanted!

It would be seen later, how laboriously Mr. Khosla argued that these passengers were so important that none could be dropped to accommodate any other associate of Netaji except Habibur Rahman. He attached extra-ordinary importance to the list of the passengers who boarded the plane without even knowing their names and designations. It was obvious that neither Shah Nawaz Committee nor Khosla Commission, nor the Japanese witnesses could correctly and completely identify the whole list of 13/14 passengers.

5. **Who were these military officers in the plane?**

In his report Mr. Khosla assumed on the basis of variable information given by Nonogaki that the plane came from Manila loaded with military officers who were going on urgent assignment to either Dairen or Tokyo. The plane came to Saigon to carry only Lt. Gen. Shidei, who was to take immediate charge of the most prestigious Japanese Army,—the Kwantang Army,—on the Manchurian Front, where fighting with the Russian army was continuing even after August 15, 1945. The plane was so heavily loaded that it could somehow manage to provide
only two additional seats, one for Netaji and the other for Habibur Rahman.

This assumption of Mr. Khosla is totally contradicted by the Report of Shah Nawaz Committee. It said that Tara Kuno was waiting for a few days at Saigon for availing a seat to fly to Tokyo. It also informed that Lt.-Col. Sakai was attached to the Burmese Army. Further, according to information of Nonogaki, given to *Emuri Shimbun*, the 7th Air Division was disbanded in July, 1945. Tara Kuno who belonged to this Air Force could not, therefore, come from Manila. Strangely, an important man like Isoda, told the Khosla Commission that he did not know who else besides Netaji, Gen. Shidei and Habibur Rahman were in the plane. Capt. Arai, another reported co-passenger, said that he was a ground engineer attached to Saigon Headquarters. He also, thus, did not come from Manila.

Shah Nawaz Committee never said that the plane came from Manila with 6 or 7 military officers. But Mr. Khosla on the basis of the self-contradictory statements of Nonogaki assumed that the plane came from Manila loaded with unspecified number of military officers who were to move urgently to either Dairen or Tokyo. Why Mr. Khosla made such a motivated assumption will be understood later.

6. What about the flight chart or boarders’ list?

Capt. Arai told Shah Nawaz Committee that a bomber during the war days did not carry boarders’ list. Mr. Khosla did not accept this theory and wishfully recorded in his Report that ‘the flight chart might have been burnt at Taihoku’.

However, Shah Nawaz Committee says that the flight chart was secured by H.K. Roy, an intelligence officer of the Government of India. It wrote: “Soon after the end of the hostilities, the Government of India sent two parties of Intelligence Officers (Police) headed by Messrs. Finney and Davies to the Far East to inquire about the whereabouts of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, and arrest him if possible. The Police Officers,
who were in those parties, Mr. H. K. Roy and Mr. P. K. De, appeared before us and gave evidence. Mr. H. K. Roy worked in Mr. Davies’ party and proceeded first to Saigon and then to Taihoku in September, 1945. He says that they interviewed Japanese Military Officers in charge of Saigon aerodrome, and obtained a list of the passengers of the plane. It was the only plane which left Saigon on August 17, 1945. The last two names in the list were of Chandra Bose and H. Rahman’.

Both H. K. Roy and P. K. De appeared before the Shah Nawaz Committee and P. K. De before Khosla Commission as well. A part of Finney’s Report was submitted to both Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission. A few vital questions, naturally, arise in this connection. Why P. K. De mentioned only the names of Netaji and Rahman and not the whole list of the passengers? Whether Netaji’s name was written as ‘Chandra Bose’ or ‘T’? It was known from the Japanese signals and other Japanese documents produced before the Commission that the Japanese authorities always used the code name of Netaji as ‘T’ in all their secret notes. Again why the two teams sent by the Government of India did not visit Tokyo to interrogate Sakai, Nonogaki, Tara Kuno, Takahashi, Arai and Okista—if their names were found in the passengers’ list? Why they did not try to get the full list of boarders and verify the story of the air crash from them? Why Mr. Khosla did not ask the witness, P. K. De, to furnish the list of the passengers? Why the Chief of Hikari Kikan, who was almost constantly with Netaji till he left Saigon, expressed his complete ignorance about the other names of the passengers except that of Netaji, Gen. Shidei and Rahman? Further, if the list was found by P. K. De, such a vital document must have been included in Finney’s Report, and if so, why either Shah Nawaz Committee or Khosla Commission did not ask the Government of India to supply the full Report of Finney including the list of passengers? Lastly, what happened to Okista, Tominaga and two other reported passengers who appeared to have simply vanished out of the purview of the Committee or the Commission?
In the absence of any satisfactory answers to these questions, the issue of the list of passengers remained fishy. Whether the so-called air crash survivors actually travelled with Netaji or were planted in the unspecified list, is a very relevant question, as it will be found later that in the whole story, i.e., from take-off stage from Saigon to alleged air crash at Taihoku—the evidence of no two Japanese witnesses concurred, rather their evidence ridiculously differed from one another.

However, the judicial mind of Mr. Khosla did not bother to find answers to any of the above questions. He gullibly believed, without any evidentiary support whatever, the versions of Nonogaki, Sakai, Tara Kuno and Takahaishi.

7. When and how Netaji entered into the plane at Saigon?

Gen. Isoda, S. A. Iyer and other INA Officers who claimed that they were present at Saigon airport said that Netaji and Rahman came in a car from the city and hurriedly entered the plane, when its propellers were already in motion. But one of the ‘most important witnesses’ of Mr. Khosla, Major Tara Kuno said—‘No, Chandra Bose and Shidei talked in German, and while boarding the plane Shidei followed Netaji’. Nonogaki, supporting Tara Kuno, further added that Col. Tada, a very important staff officer at Terauchi’s headquarters, identified Netaji to him but at the same time he cautioned him not to address ‘Chandra Bose’ by his real name but only by the code name. All other Indian and Japanese witnesses told Khosla Commission that Col. Tada was not at all present at the airport.

Nonogaki gave another piece of interesting information. He told Mr. Khosla that Bose did not come to the airport by a car but ‘Chandra Bose and Shidei landed in the airstrip from a plane an hour before the take-off of the plane’. However, every other witness said that Netaji hurriedly came to the airfield by a car straight from the city of Saigon.

Except Takahashi, none of the ‘claimed passengers’ ever personally knew Netaji or saw him before. But the smart witnesses of Mr. Khosla—Nonogaki and Tara Kuno—to make
their fancied story reliable, informed Mr. Khosla that they
came to know from the Saigon airfield officer who Chandra
Bose was.

It is, thus, found that the Japanese witnesses gave out
completely contradictory accounts about when and how Netaji
came to Saigon airport and how he got into the plane.

8. What were the arrangements of seats inside the plane?

About the sitting arrangements inside the plane every
Japanese witness gave his own version completely different
from the other. As the plane was a bomber, it had no seat or
seat-belt, and, necessarily every passenger had to squat on the
floor of the plane. Shah Nawaz Committee at least, honestly
admitted that there were serious discrepancies in the evidence
of the Japanese witnesses in regard to sitting arrangements.
It noted: “They say the same thing about the relative position
of Netaji, General Shidei and Col. Habibur Rahman. There
are, however, some discrepancies as to the number of crew,
some say it was four, others say it was five. There is, how-
ever, an important difference regarding Major Tara Kuno.
According to Col. Habibur Rahman and Capt. Arai, Major
Kuno was at the rear, but Major Kuno says, “he sat ahead
of Netaji and talked to Netaji during the flight”.

Major Kuno claimed before the Khosla Commission that
he was the Navigator of the plane and Khosla believed it. If
he was a Navigator, his place would have been inside the cock-
pit of the plane. Besides, can it be believed that a junior
officer of the rank of a major would sit before Netaji, a recog-
nised Head of a State and General Shidei, the Commander-
in-Chief-designate of the Manchurian Army? Netaji was
known to everybody for his extremely reserve nature, and
could it be possible for Tara Kuno, without any earlier intro-
duction to Netaji, to have continued talks with him, sitting
close to Gen. Shidei, in utter violation of military discipline?
Other witnesses said that Netaji was found, on occasions, to
talk only to Shidei and Rahman.

Shah Nawaz Committee considered the sitting arrangement
as an ‘important’ matter to note, as it would provide a clue, who among the passengers got chance to escape uninjured and who were otherwise seriously injured.

But Mr. Khosla was so prepossessed with the evidence of Tara Kuno and Nonogaki that he considered it not worthwhile to take any notice of the contradictory sitting arrangement of the passengers. He simply skipped over this very important yet vexatious issue.

[See the various sketches of the sitting arrangements.]

9. When the plane left Saigon and reached Tourane and which route it followed thereafter?

Shah Nawaz Committee felt constrained to observe: “There is some difference about the exact time but most witnesses say that the plane took off between 5 p.m. and 5-30 p.m.” However, Nonogaki said before Khosla Commission that a plane arrived at Saigon with Chandra Bose and Gen. Shidei at 4 p.m. and soon after the Taihoku bound plane took off.

But Mr. Khosla found no discrepancies about the take-off time from Saigon. In his Report he wrote that the plane punctually took off from Saigon at 5 p.m.

According to Habibur Rahman the plane reached Tourane, in North Vietnam, before dusk, but all other Japanese witnesses said, it reached there after dusk.

Shah Nawaz Committee recorded in its Report: “The plane was to follow the following route: Saigon—Tourane—Heito (Formosa)—Taihoku (Formosa)—Dairen (Manchuria)—Tokyo”.

However, Habibur Rahman said that the plane was scheduled to go straight to Tokyo and not to Dairen. But why the plane then by-passed Heito airport? Nonogaki said that they received a wireless message that the Russian Army had already reached Port Arthur, and in an attempt to reach Dairen at the earliest, Heito airport was bypassed. But according to war documents, the Russian Army reached Port Arthur five
days later. There was, thus, no satisfactory explanation why Heito airport was avoided.

By-passing all these divergent views, Mr. Khosla straight-way wrote in his Report: "The plane left Saigon at 5 p.m. carrying Bose and Rahman and 8 or 9 Japanese officers (Shah Nawaz Committee: passengers—13 or 14) who were to go to Manchuria and arrived at Tourane at 7-45 p.m."

10. Where Netaji had his night-halt at Tourane?

Habibur Rahman told Shah Nawaz Committee that Netaji stayed in a hotel on 17th August night at Tourane, but he failed to mention the name of the Hotel. According to Shah Nawaz Committee’s Report: "The witnesses examined by the Committee could not give the name of the hotel. There is reason to believe that the hotel in question was Morin Hotel, which the Committee visited". However, the Committee admitted that the owner of the hotel did not confirm it.

The Japanese witnesses told Shah Nawaz Committee as well as Khosla Commission that they were unable to say definitely where Netaji stayed at Tourane. Some said he stayed in the army barracks, while others said perhaps he passed the night at the airport or he might have stayed in a hotel. Nonogaki first said that "Chandra Bose and Gen. Shidei stayed in the army barracks" but in the course of cross-examination he told "no, they stayed in a hotel". Tara Kuno admitted that he did not know where Netaji stayed.

Strangely, no Japanese witness said either before Shah Nawaz Committee or Khosla Commission that they saw Netaji boarding the plane on the morning of August 18, 1945, when it left for Taihoku.

Nobody also knew where Netaji and Gen. Shidei stayed at night at Tourane nor did any one of them mention whether they saw either of them boarding the plane on 18th August, morning.

[Why this matter proved very vital will be discussed later.]
11. When the plane left Tourane?

Habibur Rahman told Shah Nawaz Committee that the plane left Tourane at 7 a.m. But Nonogaki said before Khosla Commission that the plane left Tourane before dawn at about 5 a.m., whereas Takahashi, contradicting Nonogaki, told Khosla Commission that the plane really left Tourane at 8 a.m. But Tara Kuno, the Navigator of the plane of Mr. Khosla’s description, was cautious in giving the time of leaving Tourane. According to him, as the time of flight from Tourane to Taihoku took six hours, the plane, therefore, left Tourane at 6 a.m.

Mr. Khosla showed mathematical exactitude in noting timings of different flight charts of the plane as he wrote in his Report: “the plane left Saigon at 5 a.m., reached Tourane at 7:45 a.m. and arrived at Taihoku at 2 p.m.” but he carefully avoided mentioning the time of departure of the plane from Tourane, and he simply mentioned in his Report that “on the morning of August 18, the bomber left Tourane.” It was necessary for him to avoid the discrepancies about the timing of departure of the plane from Tourane as, he wanted to prove that the plane reached Taihoku (Taipei) exactly at 3 p.m.

12. When the plane reached and left Taihoku (Taipei)?

Shah Nawaz Committee recorded the time of arrival of the plane at Taihoku as: “The landing time has been stated by different witnesses to be between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m.” Nonogaki and Tara Kuno told Khosla Commission that the plane reached Taihoku at 12 noon but Sakai recorded it as 11 a.m. and Takahashi as 11:30 a.m. However, Habibur Rahman said that the plane arrived at Taihoku at 2 p.m. He said that the plane left Tourane at 7 a.m. and reached Taihoku at 2 p.m. i.e., the flight took 7 hours but other Japanese witnesses said flight from Tourane took about 5 or 6 hours to reach Taihoku.”

When the plane took off from Taihoku and how long the plane halted there? About it also the statements of the witnesses were so divergent that the Shah Nawaz Committee remarked: “Different witnesses have given time of halt at Taihoku airfield from half-an-hour to two hours”. Nonogaki first told the
Khosla Commission that the plane halted at Taihoku for half-an-hour and then during cross-examination he changed it to one and half hours and finally he said, "no, the plane halted at Taihoku for two and a half hours". All other Japanese witnesses also peculiarly wavered in giving the time of halt at Taihoku.

Shah Nawaz Committee at least took notice of these divergent views about the timing of arrival and halt at Taihoku, but Mr. Khosla simply overlooked it, and discarded the evidence of his 'most important witnesses' Nonogaki, Tara Kuno, Sakai and Takahashi and strangely recorded in his Report what no other Japanese witness but only Habibur Rahman said that the plane reached Taihoku, at 2 p.m. and took off at 2-30 p.m.—although Khosla refused to take into consideration the recorded statement of Rahman on the plea that he did not appear before the Commission.

13. Did any military or civil dignitary come to receive Netaji and General Shidei at the Taihoku airport?

All the Japanese witnesses, including Habibur Rahman, said that nobody, not even any airport official, came to receive Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, the Head of a State recognised by Japan, or even Lt.-Gen. Shidei,—the Chief of the General Staff of the Burmese Army in 1945 and the commander-in-chief-designate for the most prestigious Kwantang Army of Japan. According to Nonogaki only a few airport guards were present there. How could there be such an unusual breach of elementary protocol? Did not the airport authority receive any advance information about the arrival of the plane? Nonogaki told Khosla Commission that no such information was received by the airport authority, but his close friend Tara Kuno, converting Nonogaki's statement said during cross-examination: "Yes, we had sent information in advance. We had also sent the number of our plane and arrival time as 12 noon."

Mr. Khosla recorded in his Report: "Shigetaka Suriure (Witness No. 66), a staff intelligence officer posted at Taipei, says that he received advance information of the arrival of the
bomber in which Bose was travelling on August 18, 1945". But, although "he heard about the air crash, he did not see it, nor did he go to the hospital afterwards to see the injured persons. The importance of the evidence of this witness is that he had advance information of Bose’s arrival at Taipei and he deposed before the Commission that the air crash took place the same afternoon".

Shigetaka did not say that Bose was travelling in the plane. Notwithstanding this fact, Mr. Khosla inferred from his evidence that "Bose was travelling in the plane". Further, he did not himself see the air crash, nor did he on receipt of the report visit the airport—yet, Khosla took it as an ‘important’ corroborative evidence to conclude that "the air crash took place the same afternoon".

Why Netaji was not received at the airport, offering an explanation for this lapse of protocol without, however, any evidentiary support, Mr. Khosla wrote in his Report: "The war had come to an end so had Bose’s usefulness to the Japanese ended. They were willing to give some little help to him with a means of escape, but beyond this they were not willing to do anything." He added further that, "after the surrender of Japan conditions were chaotic," and, therefore Mr. Khosla inferred, that "the behaviour of the Japanese command was not unusual".

What about Lt.-Gen. Shidei? The Japanese Army in the mainland of Japan and Formosa were intact till the second week of September, 1945. General Shidei was, in his rank, superior to Gen. Isamaya, Chief of the Formosan Army. He could, if Mr. Khosla’s argument is considered plausible so far as Netaji was concerned, avoid attending him, but how could he violate military protocol in regard to General Shidei? Mr. Khosla conveniently, overlooked this vital issue.

Shah Nawaz Committee, however, critically observed at two places: "General Tanaka, Chief of the General Staff, Burmese Army, passed through Taihoku a week later en route to Tokyo with Dr. Ba Maw of Burma." Shah Nawaz Committee noted that General Isamaya, Chief of the General Staff of the Formosan Army, and General Ando and others ‘went’ to Taihoku
airport and "received Dr. Ba Maw, the President of Burma, and General Tanaka... who were on their way to Tokyo". Shah Nawaz Committee, in expressing its surprise, added a critical note to its Report: "The explanation does not appear very convincing... as the plane carried distinguished persons like Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and General Shidei".

Was the status of Dr. Ba Maw higher than Netaji? Did General Tanaka hold higher rank than General Shidei? Nobody except Mr. Khosla could think so. Mr. Khosla's theory of chaotic conditions was also unacceptable to Shah Nawaz Committee. If the situation after a week permitted General Isamaya and Gen. Ando to go to the airport to receive Dr. Ba Maw and Gen. Tanaka, conditions a week before could not be more chaotic to prevent them to follow similar protocol in regard to Netaji and Gen. Shidei.

Absence of any important person to receive Netaji and Gen. Shidei is an intriguing issue. It could not happen, under any circumstances, if Netaji and Gen. Shidei really arrived at Taihoku. It, therefore, appears as very doubtful, if Netaji and Gen. Shidei did at all go to Taihoku. Facts, stated later, further deepened this suspicion. But such probing questions mattered little with Mr. Khosla. Shah Nawaz Committee felt very much constrained over the matter, but for Mr. Khosla, the question of protocol appeared a very trivial or irrelevant issue to attach any importance. If Netaji and Gen. Shidei really arrived at Taihoku on August 18, 1945, the Formosan authority could hardly ignore it.

14. What happened to the plane after take-off?

Nonogaki told Khosla Commission: "When we were testing the engine, when it exceeded 2000 rotations, there were vibrations in the left engine. We stopped the engine and then checked it but we could not find any defect." Except Tara Kuno, no other Japanese witness, not even Habibur Rahman supported the evidence of Nonogaki. All other Japanese witnesses said that normal propeller motion test was done and nothing wrong was noticed.
It has been said that after running about three-fourths of the runway, the plane made a steep take-off almost vertically. What happened then? Habibur Rahman told Shah Nawaz Committee: "After getting airborne about 500 ft. above, the plane circled over the airport and after 5/6 minutes he heard a terrible noise of explosion as if some enemy had hit our plane by a cannon shot. Within a few seconds the plane nose-dived and crashed on the ground".

None, not even Nonogaki, Tara Kuno, Sakai, Takahashi or Arai agreed at all with Habibur Rahman. They categorically said there was no sound of any explosion. Two of them further said that a propeller and an engine fell down. Capt. Nakamura alias Yemamoto, who claimed to have served as a ground engineer at Taihoku airport in 1945, told the Shah Nawaz Committee: "Immediately on taking-off, the plane tilted to its left side and I saw something fell down from the plane, which I found later to be a propeller." According to Shah Nawaz Committee: "Capt. Nakamura who had the best view had estimated the height between 30 and 40 metres." Other Japanese witnesses, however, said that the plane reached the height of about 20 to 30 metres.

Lt.-Col. Sakai said before the Khosla Commission: "There was no explosion. I saw the rear wheel broke away." During cross-examination before Khosla Commission Nonogaki said: "Immediately after we took off, the propeller of the left engine fell out and then the engine itself broke off and the plane crashed." Takahashi told Mr. Khosla, "I heard noise like crashing, then I thought the plane leaned towards left and crashed on the ground." Tara Kuno supported the version of Nonogaki.

How divergent the descriptions are! Firstly, nobody said, except Habibur Rahman, that the plane reached a height of 500 ft. and circled over the airfield for about 5/6 minutes but they said that it rose almost vertically to 20—40 metres height and then nose-dived immediately within a few seconds. Secondly, nobody supported the version of Habibur Rahman that there was a loud report as though of a cannon shot. Nonogaki and
Tara Kuno said propeller of the left engine and then the left engine itself fell down, but Nakamura said only a propeller fell down. Takahashi said nothing about any fall of either propeller or engine, but according to him, only the plane leaned towards left side and crashed. Thirdly, Sakai gave a completely different story. He said that he saw the rear wheel broke away. Fourthly, if the left propeller and engine fell down the plane would have leaned or tilted towards right side and not to the left side according to invariable law of dynamics.

Now, whom to believe and what to believe from such totally contradictory statements? The question naturally arises was there any air crash at all? But these contradictory versions did not create any curiosity in the mind of Mr. Khosla. Discarding the evidence of all witnesses, he built up his own theory to conclude in his findings: "The plane took off at 2.15 p.m. but within a few seconds one of the engine flew out and the plane crashed."

15. How the plane fell and how the Japanese witnesses came out?

Habibur Rahman told Shah Nawaz Committee that "after the noise like cannon shot" within a few seconds "the plane nose-dived making a wailing sound."

Lt.-Col. Sakai told Khosla Commission: "The plane leaned towards the ground. Although I am not an expert in navigation, I looked outside to see what had happened. At that time I saw the ground was coming up, so I thought it was forced landing, may be inevitable under such circumstances. Then the rear wheel of the plane struck the ground hard and I saw it moving towards left side. As soon as I saw the rear wheel breaking away, as I was seeing from the cock-pit of the window, I hit the ceiling of the cockpit and became unconscious. I felt very hot and recovered my senses, when I found myself lying on the ground."

Nonogaki told Khosla Commission that the propeller of the left side broke away and fell on the ground. He further said the plane did not nose-dive or fell vertically, but it fell inclined
towards the right. He also fell unconscious, but after regaining consciousness, he jumped out of the plane.

Tara Kuno told the Commission: "The left propeller broke off and the left engine was also torn off and the plane leaned towards right and nose-dived. The plane hit the right wing against the dyke . . . . . I broke the window above and got out and stood on the left wing of the plane just above the broken engine."

Takahashi did not say a word as to whether the plane nose-dived or not, but told Mr. Khosla that "the plane leaned towards the left side and broke. I lost consciousness". During cross-examination, however, he said the plane "nose-dived but after falling on the ground it stood in natural position" enabling him to "crawl out of the plane". It is to be noted that earlier Takahashi had told Shah Nawaz Committee that "after losing consciousness when he regained sense, he found himself thrown out of the plane". During cross-examination he told Mr. Khosla that his statement to Shah Nawaz Committee "was wrong".

Now, analysing the evidence of the ‘most important witnesses’ of Mr. Khosla’s choice what a confusing picture about the fall of the plane and escape of the Japanese passengers out of it emerge! Firstly, Nonogaki and Tara Kuno earlier said that the left engine, and its propeller broke off and the plane fell leaning towards left. During cross-examination they said, no, it leaned on the right side. Secondly, Sakai earlier said to Shah Nawaz Committee that he saw from inside the cockpit that the rear wheel of the plane broke off, but to Mr. Khosla he said that the rear wheel touched the ground and then broke away. Sakai was not a member of the crew, so how could he get into the cockpit and which version of his statement about the rear wheel was right? Thirdly, Nonogaki first said that the plane leaned towards left and also fell leaning towards left, but controverting his earlier statement he told Mr. Khosla,—no, the plane leaned towards right and fall on the ground in that position. Fourthly, Tara Kuno similarly changed his version like Nonogaki and made an absurd statement to say that he came out of the burning plane by breaking the window of the
cockpit and stood on the left wing which must have stood vertically inclined upwards making his statement obviously ridiculous. Further Tara Kuno said earlier that the left engine and the propeller broke off, but later he said it broke but did not fly off. Fifthly, Takahashi controverting the statements of Nonogaki, Tara Kuno and Sakai, said that the plane neither leaned right nor left, but it fell down making a belly-like crash-landing and stood in natural position on the ground. Sixthly, most of them said that they fell unconscious and were thrown out of the plane, but later Takahashi said—no, he normally crawled out of the plane. Seventhly, Tara Kuno who earlier claimed that he was sitting before Netaji, displayed his smartness so much that although after the propeller and the engine broke away and the plane fell down within 2½ minutes, he succeeded not only in having a look at the relative position of the passengers of the crashed aircraft but he also managed to rush into the cockpit to switch off the engine. What a fantastic claim indeed!

But the most important issue is related to the nature of the crash. Only Habibur Rahman said that after the explosion, the plane nose-dived in terrific speed. But all the four star witnesses of Mr. Khosla said ambivalently that the plane did not exactly nose-dive but fell like crash-landing, either leaning towards left or right or stood on the ground after the fall almost in natural position. But during cross-examination all of them straightway said that the plane nose-dived and crashed on the ground.

It has been told by all witnesses at the time of cross-examination that the plane nose-dived. If the plane did nosedive, in such a situation, the plane would have fallen with a terrific speed, by sheer force of the gravity, with the heaviest part of the plane—i.e., the cock-pit with the engines and other machine facing vertically downward. In that eventuality, in a plane having no seats or seat-belts, all the passengers with their baggage would have faced an inevitably chaotic condition and got jumbled before the cock-pit. If this common sense view is accepted, then the statements of all the passengers appear as sheer nonsense. The plane would have perished and perished
instantly to pieces leaving little chance of survival of any of
the 14 passengers.

[We shall see later the inquiry report of the non-
official committee of the Japanese experts regarding
this aspect of the plane crash].

Mr. Khosla used neither common sense nor legal sense or
any other sense at all to analyse the reported incident of the
plane crash. Had he done so, he would have been left with
no option but to discard the statements of all his four 'important' witnesses as nothing but cock and bull story. Mr. Khosla,
therefore, conveniently by-passed the whole issue without making
any reference whatsoever about the nature of the air crash
except preferring to conclude that the plane indeed crashed at
Taihoku airport.

16. Where did the plane crash?

Before Shah Nawaz Committee, Habibur Rahman said :
“the plane crash took place one or two miles outside the aero-
drome”. Nonogaki said : “the plane crashed on the concrete
runway”. Nakamura, the reported ground engineer, said that
“the plane crashed about 100 metres beyond the runway”. Sakai told : “the plane fell about 20 to 30 metres beyond the
runway”, while Takahashi informed : “crash took place just
outside the concrete runway but within the boundary of the
aerodrome.” But the most vocal witness, Tara Kuno, whom
Shah Nawaz Committee described as a very “alert witness” kept
silent about it. Habibur Rahman and some other Japanese
witnesses also indicated that the plane crashed near the Japanese
temple.

Except on one point, that the plane crashed at or beyond
the south-end of the aerodrome, no two witnesses made identical
statement about the location of the crash spot. After the alleged
plane crash at least 7 survivors waited for quite some time near
the crashed plane until rescue team came. Yet they differ so
widely from one another in locating the exact crash-spot!

Tara Kuno, who did not say anything about it before Shah
Nawaz Committee, told Khosla Commission : “The plane
hit the right-wing against the dyke within the compound of the airport,” Takahashi added a new point that “he saw big trees towards the right side” indicating that the plane crashed near the Japanese temple, as on other sides of the airfield, no trees were to be found. Nonogaki also added to say: “the plane crashed at the end of the runway in a bomb crater” and not against a dyke as was told by Tara Kuno.

Thus, it will be seen that neither before Shah Nawaz Committee nor Khosla Commission the Japanese witnesses could uniformly identify the spot where the plane crashed. But all the witnesses agreed on one point i.e., the plane allegedly crashed either within or beyond the south-end of the runway, facing the Japanese temple.

A Taiwanese Lai Min Yee, who worked in the Japanese transport section, told Khosla Commission that “the plane hit the wall of a temporary railway track and got wholly smashed, and it was stretched towards the Kee Lung river”. Other Taiwanese witnesses also corroborated his statement. Mr. Khosla also visited this spot and recorded the inspection report.

We have already discussed in the earlier chapter that a Taiwanese witness said that a plane crashed over the old railway track while it was landing but not during the time of take-off. And again according to him, the plane crashed not in August 1945, but some time in September-October in the year 1944. About 10 other witnesses agreed to confirm it before the Commission, but Mr. Khosla refused to record their evidence. In that chapter, we have also discussed in details the report of the meteorological expert of Taipei airport. According to the weather charts of the month of August every year, no plane could have crashed at the south-end of the runway during take-off. If there had been any such incident, it must have taken place at the north-end of the runway. But all Japanese evidence, including that of Habibur Rahman point out that the plane crashed within or outside the south-end of the runway. Although Mr. Khosla refused to accept the meteorological report of the Taipei airport, yet he himself noted down an inspection of the airport in the proceedings of the Commission next day.
But discarding expected judicial discretion, Mr. Khoala, simply preferred to ignore all evidence of the Japanese witnesses regarding the identification of the crash-spot i.e., the evidence of the Taiwanese witness who identified the crash-spot on or near old railway track, the evidence of the Taiwanese witness who told that a plane crashed over the old railway track not in 1945 but in 1944, and even his own inspection report of the alleged crash-spot. Most surprisingly, he completely ignored the report of the meteorological officer of the Taipei airport and his own inspection report about it as well. Why did he ignore all these evidence and inspection reports? Because, if he discussed them with open judicial mind the whole story of the air crash in 1945 at Taihoku airport itself would have crashed totally.

17. What was the condition of the plane after crash?

In his written statement submitted to Shah Nawaz Committee, Habibur Rahman recalled: "Immediately the plane crashed on the ground and caught fire on both the front and the rear". However, during cross-examination he said: "the plane split in the front" and then added: "it broke into two parts." Nonogaki and Tara Kuno said: "on crashing on the ground the plane broke into two" and "split parts went in different directions on the ground".

However, Nakamura, who according to Shah Nawaz Committee, "had the best view of the accident", told the Commission: "He was positive that the plane was intact and its body was not broken". Takahashi said: "the plane crashed and stood in normal position".

Before Khoala Commission Sakai said: "the rear wheel of the plane terribly hit the ground".

Nonogaki wrote in Emuri Shimbun, "When the plane crashed on the ground, a rear part of it broke away" but before Khoala Commission he said, "the plane split into two parts."

Tara Kuno told Mr. Khoala: "The plane was broken into three parts.

Takahashi told the Commission: "The plane was broken,
and the doors were open". But during cross-examination he changed his earlier statement to say that the plane broke into two parts.

Now, again what to believe and whom to believe? Habibur Rahman first said that the plane was intact and the front and rear of the plane caught fire, but then he said it broke in two parts. Nonogaki said the rear wheel broke away and then added—no, it broke into two parts. Tara Kuno also said—yes, it broke into two parts. Takahashi said that only its doors were broken and the plane remained in normal standing position. But discarding all evidences 'the most alert witness' of Shah Nawaz Committee, Nakamura said—'no, no, I am positive that the plane was intact'.

Now, if the plane really crashed, could the description of the crashed plane differ so widely? Does it not appear that every witness fancied an accident to give his own version of what happened to the plane after the alleged crash?

Does it, or does it not create an impression that the witnesses were labouring hard to describe a plane crash which was more imaginary than real? But for Mr. Khosla, such contradictory descriptions about the condition of the crashed plane meant nothing. He simply overlooked all these contradictory evidences and maintained his belief that a plane really crashed at Taihoku.

18. How most of the survivors came out of the crashed plane?

In order to understand how the survivors could get out of the crashed plane, the inner picture of the plane should be kept in mind. As the bomber had no seats or scat-belts and as finally all witnesses said that the plane nose-dived in terrific speed, by force of sheer gravity all passengers and luggage must have jumbled into a chaotic mess near the cock-pit. Keeping this realistic picture in mind, let us see what the witnesses said before Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission.

Nonogaki always claimed that he was the pilot, and naturally his place would have been inside the cock-pit but at the time
of crash, as he told Shah Nawaz Committee, he was not in the
cock-pit but in the "turret" of the plane, and as such, he was
fortunate enough to be thrown out of the plane almost unhurt,
because fortuitously for him the plane broke into two parts
exactly at the place where the 'turret' was. Does any kind of
turret exist in a plane, almost at the middle portion? But he
first non-challengingly, told Shah Nawaz Committee that he was
thrown out of the plane and then changed to say during cross-
examination that: "he got up and ran away from the burning
plane and took shelter behind a pile of stones, against which
the wrecked plane came to halt". However it should be
remembered that he told Khosla Commission that the plane
crashed into a bomb crater.

Again, Nonogaki told Khosla Commission, "I came out
walking down, because the plane broke into two parts exactly at
the place where I was sitting." Further, he told Mr. Khosla:
"I saw the pilot coming out but I did not see Takizawa and
the three members of the crew".

How contradictory are his various statements! He first said
that he was thrown out of the plane, then he said he ran away
from its turret, and finally told Mr. Khosla that he walked
down from the plane. Then he said that soon after the crash,
the plane caught fire and yet he was neither hurt nor burnt.
Thirdly, if the plane nose-dived, how could he be sitting at the
turret where he said he was? He told Shah Nawaz Committee,
however, that he was not in his seat but in the turret. Fourthly,
Nonogaki said he saw the pilot coming out, but although Shah
Nawaz Committee and Mr. Khosla identified Takizawa as the
pilot of the plane, he could not say whether Takizawa was that
man. Fifthly, we shall soon see that according to Tara Kuno's
evidence pilot Takizawa was hit in his face and forehead and
died in the cock-pit.

Shah Nawaz Committee observed in its report: "Major
Kuno was clearly the alert and observant person. At the
moment of crash, instead of being flustered, he had his wits
about him and noticed what others were doing. He saw Major
Takizawa was hit in his face and forehead by the steering which
he was operating. N.C.O. Ayoagi was hit in his chest, which was bleeding and he leaned forward." He further told Shah Nawaz Committee that: "he switched off the engine" and "there was an engineer between me and Ayoagi. I do not know what happened to him".

He told Khosla Commission and Shah Nawaz Committee as well: "During this time the fire spread greatly and the heat became unbearable. I broke open the plastic cover on the top of the plane and escaped through it. While escaping, the fire was so strong that I had to protect my eyes by covering them with my hands, which as a result, got burnt and my legs and face were also burnt. I got splashed by petrol which was coming out from a pipe which connected the petrol tank with the engine that had been brought down".

Now let us see what this alert man told Mr. Khosla. He said: "I saw many baggages flying against me from the rear. Lt.-Gen. Shidei was sitting by my side and behind him there was a fuel tank, which was broken and hit over the head of Gen. Shidei and I found him dead. Pilot Takizawa had hit his face against the steering-handle and he was injured in the face and he also died. To the left of me there was pilot Ayoagi. He had his both legs stuck in the broken parts of the plane and he was unable to move. Afterwards, I tried to pull out Ayoagi but I could not do it. I think it was 2-3 minutes while I was looking about persons in this way when the plane caught fire and the fire spread towards my side. So, I broke the window shelve and got out from there. When I jumped out from that part of the wing, I had the splash of gasoline on me from the broken engine and caught fire."

Let us examine Kuno's evidence. A junior officer of major's rank like him claimed to have been sitting before Netaji and by the side of Gen. Shidei. All the witnesses on the contrary said that he along with Sakai, Takahashi and Arai sat at the rear and Shah Nawaz Committee also recorded it similarly. But although the plane nose-dived, he almost miraculously came to the cockpit to do many heroic acts. According to his own version, he was sitting by the side of Shidei over
whose head the petrol tank fell and yet he had not any splash of gasoline on him but he was soaked with gasoline only while he was jumping out by forcibly breaking the plastic window. He claimed, he remained inside the plane 2-3 minutes to see Shidei hit over his head, to switch off the engine, to see that Takizawa was pressed by the handle of the steering and was hurt, and he tried even to pull Ayoagi out of the clutches of the broken parts of the cock-pit and after doing all these heroic things, he succeeded in breaking off the very hard plastic cock-pit window and then jumped out. Could any human being do all these things within 2 or 3 minutes inside a plane which nose-dived at terrific speed?

Habibur Rahman and Nonogaki said that the plane caught fire instantaneously after the crash. But although the petrol tank fell by Tara Kuno’s side, he had no sprinkling of petrol on him and he did all these heroic acts without being caught by the fire, and later he got burnt only while escaping. The plastic window of cock-pit of any plane is not so fragile as could be broken by a single blow. If his story had any truth in it, he was required to hit it several times to make a hole through the plastic window to pass through it. He did not tell Shah Nawaz Committee that he found Gen. Shidei dead but he told it to Mr. Khosla. Further, he told Shah Nawaz Committee that fire started when he jumped out of the plane, but on the contrary he told Mr. Khosla that the plane was on fire when he was inside it.

Pointing to such incoherent, inconsistent and self-contradictory statements of Tara Kuno it can be rightly said that only gullible fools could believe such story. (What Mr. Khosla said about the evidence of Indian witnesses).

Absurdity of the story of Tara Kuno did not arouse any doubt in the mind of either Shah Nawaz Khan or Khosla. Shah Nawaz Khan in his report not only praised the wit and alertness of Tara Kuno, but he was so much impressed by seeing the burnt nails of the fingers of Kuno’s hands that he took a photograph of his two hands as a testimonial in support of the plane crash story. It did not occur to either Shah Nawaz Khan or Khosla
to inquire from him or from the war records of Japan if during 5 years of active service Tara Kuno had met with any other accident.

Other three claimants as travelling in the same plane, made statements to Shah Nawaz Committee, according to which ‘Sakai, Takahashi and Arai became senseless the moment the plane crashed and found themselves on the ground soon after and moved away from the burning plane’. But in describing the sitting arrangement, Shah Nawaz Committee was told that Sakai, Takahashi, Arai and Tara Kuno had their seats in the rear side of the plane, but at the time of being thrown out of the plane in senseless condition, they avoided to include the name of Kuno. Again Takahashi told Shah Nawaz Committee at another place : ‘As I was seeing from the aeroplane’s cockpit window, I hit the ceiling of the window and became unconscious’. How could then he be thrown out of the cock-pit, as, according to Tara Kuno, he saw only Takizawa and Ayoagi inside the cockpit and none else and for his escape from inside the cockpit, he had to break open the plastic window ? If Tara Kuno is to be believed, how Takahashi was thrown out of the cockpit unconscious ?

Let us probe further what this truthful witness Takahashi told Khosla Commission : ‘The plane was broken and the door was open. I lost my consciousness and when I regained my consciousness, I was sitting over the luggage inside the plane. When I got up, the plane was burning. I had my left leg fractured and I crawled out’.

This man had told Shah Nawaz Committee that he was thrown out of the plane unconscious. But before Khosla Commission he said he crawled out of the plane through the open door. However, Habibur Rahman’s statement before Shah Nawaz Committee contradicts Takahashi’s statement as Rahman said : ‘We (Netaji and Rahman) could not get through the entrance door as it was all blocked and jammed by packages and other things.’

But such palpably ridiculous contradictions and discrep-
ancies in the evidence of the Japanese witnesses were of no concern to the Chairman of the Judicial Commission, Mr. Khosla. These witnesses said that the plane crashed and they were in it, and that was enough for Mr. Khosla to conclude that the plane did crash at Taihoku.

19. How Netaji came out of the plane?

Habibur Rahman said before the Shah Nawaz Committee: "'Within a few seconds, the plane crashed on the ground and the fore portion of the plane split and caught fire. Netaji turned towards me,—I said, 'Please get out through the front, there is no way out in the rear . . . (Augey say nikaleay pichhey say rasta nahin hai).’" We could not get through the entrance door as it was all blocked and jammed by packages and other things . . . So Netaji got out through fire, actually he rushed through the fire’’.

Takahashi said the entrance door was open and Tara Kuno told that the front was closed. Now, the question arises, how Netaji got out through the front? What exit door did he use? Habibur Rahman did not say whether Netaji walked down or jumped out of the plane. There was no staire-case, how then could he get out of the plane? Habibur Rahman remained silent on all these points.

Tara Kuno said that he could not see Netaji as the petrol tank fell before him. But he said earlier that Shidei sat behind Netaji and Kuno had his seat near Shidei. Yet Kuno said he did not see Netaji. If Kuno’s earlier statement was to be believed then Netaji sat just before him. But in another place he said, he sat in front of Netaji. He had told Shah Nawaz Committee that he could not see ‘Chandra Bose’, although he claimed that he keenly observed what happened inside the plane after crash.

Nonogaki, Sakai and Takahashi said they could not say anything about what happened to Netaji inside the plane. But Takahashi said earlier, that he was thrown out of the plane unconscious, and yet he told Mr. Khosla: ‘‘I had my left leg fractured, and I crawled out of the plane. I saw Bose coming
out of the other door. I do not exactly remember whether it was the broken portion of the plane. He came down walking with clothes on fire". How could he walk down of a plane which crashed on the nose?

Neither Habibur Rahman, nor any other witness answered this question, and even the most flippant among the witnesses, Nonogaki and Tara Kuno, also kept silent about it. Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission also did not consider it worthwhile to examine the issue.

20. What happened to Netaji after he came out of the plane?

In his statement before Shah Nawaz Committee Habibur Rahman said: "Netaji got through the fire: I followed him through the same flames. He was not wearing sweater. He was wearing khaki drill. His clothes were on fire. I rushed and experienced great difficulty in unfastening his bush shirt belt. His trousers were not so much on fire and it was not necessary to take off. I laid him down on the ground and noticed a very deep cut on his head, probably on the left side. His face had been scorched by fire and singed. The cut in his head was a long one, about four inches. I tried to stop the bleeding with handkerchief."

Both before Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission, however, Nonogaki, Tara Kuno, Takahashi and Nakamura gave completely different versions. Nonogaki said: "I did not see any fire on the body of Netaji". Tara Kuno said he was standing 30 metres away, when he saw Netaji standing "erect with his hands still, like guardian God in Buddhist shrines—only a couple of metres away from the flame". And that was not all what he said. He went further to refute the statement of Habibur Rahman. He claimed—"No, not Habibur Rahman, but I helped Netaji when he was trying to take off his coat".

Takahashi came forward to refute both Habibur and Kuno. Although his legs were fractured, as he told earlier, he claimed that he "went up to Netaji and made him roll on the ground and managed to put out fire from his clothes".
But how can Nakamura, the ‘best witness’ of Shah Nawaz Khan could miss the opportunity of making some heroic effort to save Netaji? He knocked down the statements of Habibur Rahman, Kuno and Takahashi to say—‘no, no! none else but it was only he who ‘rescued the passengers from the burning plane and specially Netaji’. He further said, it was none else but he who ‘stripped off Netaji’s clothes from his body’.

Then again Nonogaki, Tara Kuno Takahashi and Dr. Yoshimo, who claimed to have medically treated Netaji in the hospital—all said, challenging the statement of Habibur Rahman, that Netaji had no trousers, “he was completely naked and was wearing only shoes”.

We shall discuss in a separate chapter all the recorded statements of Habibur Rahman to show how faithfully he stuck to his planned story to tell and retell the same story in order to give an air of credence to the reported death of his leader with a view to providing cover to his leader’s going underground.

Here we shall raise only one point, if the air crash did really take place and Netaji was involved in it, how and why each witness could give his version quite different from the other? Whether Netaji had his trousers on or he was stripped completely naked,—how on this vital point those who were themselves involved in it—at the same time and same place of occurrence of the accident, could so irreconcilably differ? Does it not create the suspicion that there was no plane crash at all, what to speak of Netaji’s being involved in it?

But these contradictions in various statements of the witnesses did not rouse any question in the mind of Shah Nawaz Khan. And for Khosla? He preferred, as he did in case of other vital questions, to keep completely silent, as it was very difficult for him to explain away these intriguing issues by any kind of ingenuous argument.

21. Who died in the plane crash?

Who died and who survived after the allegedly nose-dived
air crash? According to the list furnished by Shah Nawaz Committee—‘(1) Lt.-Col. T. Sakai, (2) Lt.-Col. S. Nonogaki (3) Major T. Kuno, (4) Major Takahashi, (5) Capt. K. Arai, (6) Sergeant Okista and (7) Col. Habibur Rahman’’ survived the alleged air crash. The name of the fifth survivor according to Shah Nawaz Committee, remained unknown and along with him Navigator Okista vanished into unknown. No Japanese witness could say what exactly happened to them and neither Shah Nawaz Committee nor Khosla Commission could trace or cared to trace them. The Government of Japan also could not provide any clue to find them.

Who died in the plane crash? According to Shah Nawaz Committee ‘‘(1) Pilot Takizawa, (2) Co-pilot Ayoagi, (3) Navigator Okista, (4) another crew Tominaga, (5) General Shidei and (6) Netaji died in the air crash or as a sequel to it’’.

How w|o Ayoagi died? Tara Kuno said both before Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission that although he tried to save Ayoagi, he could not be dragged out as he was trapped by broken parts of the cockpit. Takahashi also supported him. They, therefore, presumed, and Shah Nawaz Committee also believed that Ayoagi died inside the plane along with Takizawa.

But Nakamura ‘‘definitely said,’’ according to the Report of Shah Nawaz Committee that ‘‘Pilot Takizawa and co-pilot Ayoagi perished along with Gen. Shidei’’.

However, contraverting all this evidence, Dr. Yoshimi, the doctor of the Taihoku Hospital, told Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission that Ayoagi did not perish inside the plane. He was brought alive to the hospital, where he was treated by him but he died afterwards in the hospital.

Now, let us analyse the list of the dead and the survivors. In a nose-dived air crash it is quite logical to imagine that all the passengers, having no seat belts and no arrangement of seats, were likely to be jumbled up into a chaotic mess before the cockpit. This means that every passenger equally faced similar situation of either being killed or survived.
But who died? The pilot Takizawa, Co-pilot Ayoagi, Navigator Okista and Tominaga—all the four crew and with them died Gen. Shidei and Netaji. Four crew were absolutely essential to fly the plane to Dairen—and Gen. Shidei, who was specially chosen by the Imperial Headquarters to escort Netaji to Manchuria. Finally to complete this list of deads—died also the principal figure of the whole story—Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose. All the other non-essential persons, who had no direct function to discharge—all survived and survived with them the aide of Netaji, Col. Habibur Rahman, to confirm the story of air crash and Netaji’s death.

Such extra-ordinary and fortuitous selection of the list of dead and the list of survivors, even the Providence perhaps would not have dared to plan! But it appeared to Shah Nawaz Khan or Khosla as nothing intriguing or unnatural. They found nothing suspicious in the narration of selective deaths and selective survivals, they simply accepted the list of dead and survivors as factual. No curiosity was roused in them by the story of miraculous death and survival, which baffles the understanding of even a common man!

22. Whether the actual hilly features around the Taihoku (Taipei) airport and the hilly features shown in the three pictures of the ruined planes were compared?

The Government of Japan produced three pictures of the ruined plane, purported to be the pictures of a single plane which crashed on August 18, 1945 at Taihoku airport. They were first given to Figgess Team and were then handed over respectively to Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission, and, as such, they formed part of the Commission’s exhibits as well.

Shah Nawaz Committee was not permitted by the Indian Government to visit Taipei, so this Committee had no opportunity to verify whether they were actually three pictures of a single ruined plane or not. Khosla Commission visited the airport of Taipei (Taihoku), but when during field inspection it was found that under no circumstances these three pictures
could be the pictures of a single plane, even if they were photographed from different directions, Mr. Khosla bluntly refused to record this inspection report, about which we have already discussed in the preceding chapter.

Mr. Khosla, thus, deliberately avoided to record an extremely valuable piece of direct evidence which clearly contradicted the story of air crash.

**23. What are the views of aeronautical experts on the report of the plane crash?**

Shah Nawaz Committee asked Mr. A. M. N. Shastri, an Aircraft Inspector, Accident Investigation Branch of Government of India, to "reconstruct" and not to analyse the probability of such an air accident, as was reported by the Japanese witnesses and Habibur Rahman. Mr. Shastri observed: "It is not possible to establish the exact cause as to how the propeller came off from the engine from the available data. In the absence of details of construction of engine and various control systems and maintenance records, and without examining the wreckage, it is not possible to trace the exact defect causing the crash". He further added: "It is difficult to predict anything accurately as far as survival of passengers in an aircraft accident is concerned".

Shah Nawaz Committee, while accepting the report of the air crash as correct, asked Mr. Shastri to "reconstruct" the cause and the effect of the alleged plane crash. But even within this restricted ambit, what Mr. Shastri gave as his expert opinion amounts to virtual rejection of the story of the cause of air crash and possibility of survival of the passengers as rather doubtful, but Shah Nawaz Committee gave no importance to the opinion of this aeronautical expert.

Khosla Commission asked Air Vice Marshal, D.A.R. Nanda to appear before the Commission who also failed to give any clear opinion about the cause of the alleged air crash, as the picture appeared to him from the various versions of the crash as too hazy.
Mr. Hayashida and Frad Saito, co-authors of the book ‘A Beacon Across Asia’, "asked a number of leading aeronautical experts of Japan with full knowledge of and experience of flying and maintenance of war-time combat planes to compare the varied versions and try to reconstruct the accident factually’’.

According to the opinion of this non-official Japanese Expert Committee: ‘‘In case of heavy bomber, normally the tail gets lifted half-way down the runway, but in this case according to Nakamura, the tail was not lifted off the ground until it ran three-fourth down the runway. The plane took off and made steep ascent when a loud explosion was heard, and the plane tilted to the left. The propeller and port engine fell out and the plane dived to the ground. . . . Panel of Experts termed this version as completely irrelevant and illogical’’.

The Panel of Experts observed further: ‘‘Type 97-2 bombers, fully loaded, normally took off to the air after running approximately three-fourth of the runway. For two-engined bombers, it was physically impossible to make steep ascent immediately after take-off’’.

The Panel of Experts then commented: ‘‘That 13 men with personal effects did not exceed the load limit was proven by the standard 7-hour flight from Tourane to Taipei (Taihoku). Russia’s airborne troops began entering Port Arthur on August 22, that is, four days after the accident occurred and Pilot Ayoagi was fully experienced after having flown from Taipei many times in his career’’.

The Panel concluded: ‘‘The entire Japanese air-operations before and during Pacific war did not record any other case of propeller falling out during take-off. If the plane dived to the ground, it could have only smashed itself into bits, killing all aboard instantly’’.

The Panel of Japanese non-official experts, thus, totally rejected all the evidence either of the Japanese or of Habibur Rahman as untenable, stating that if their evidence were to be believed the plane would have smashed itself into bits, killing
all aboard instantly. What more authoritative opinion is required to reject the whole story of air crash as nothing but fictitious! However, Mr. Khosla never cared to consider the opinion of the Japanese experts.

24. What happen to Lt. Gen. Shidei?

Mr. Khosla tried to make us believe that as Netaji was treated as a "dispensable ally for the Government of Japan after surrender", they did not bother much to show particular concern for Netaji, but could they show similar indifference to Gen. Shidei!

Gen. Shidei was appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Burmese Army in place of Gen. Kwabe and he was on transfer to Manchuria as Chief of the General Staff of the most prestigious Kwantang Army of Japan. His status was junior only either to Gen. Sugïama of the Imperial Headquarters or Field Marshal Terauchi of Saigon Headquarters. But what happened to such a great General of Japan?

Only Tara Kuno gave an unbelievable story that Gen. Shidei died instantaneously due to fall of a petrol tank on him from the ceiling of the plane during the alleged air crash. However, neither Shah Nawaz Committee, nor Khosla Commission cared to know how Kuno could imagine that a petrol tank of a bomber was placed openly on such an odd position of Kuno's description.

No other Japanese witness mentioned anything about Gen. Shidei, except Nakamura alias Yemamoto. Only a very Junior Officer like him—a Ground Engineer of Taiboku airport—gave an account of what happened to Gen. Shidei. According to Shah Nawaz Committee: "Capt. Nakamura definitely says that pilot Takizawa and co-pilot Ayaogi perished along with Gen. Shidei, and he helped to bury them and their entrails and put their ashes in three boxes."

Gen. Isamaya, Chief of the General Staff of the Formosan Army and Gen. Ando of the same Army told Shah Nawaz Committee that they "did not know anything about the
plane accident till the next day". Is it to be believed that the body of a very high ranking Gen. like Shidei could be buried or burnt by an officer of the Engineering Corps of the rank of a Captain? Gen. Isamaya and Gen. Ando went to receive Gen. Tanaka, who took charge of the Burmese Army after Shidei on August 22, 1945, but they did not care to know how his body was cremated, what to speak of showing any funeral honour to him. Could such a story be reasonably believed?

Since lack of any kind of report about Gen. Shidei was likely to raise serious doubts, the Government of Japan produced a death certificate of Gen. Shidei, stating that he died at Taihoku. It was such a fishy document that in course of argument by Shri Gobindo Mukhoty, Khosla himself admitted that it looked like a 'fraud' document.

[We shall discuss it later.]

The story of Netaji’s death is inseparably linked with the story of Shidei’s death and funeral. If Shidei’s death proved to be fishy, the story of Netaji’s death was also equally fishy. Shah Nawaz Committee at least casually mentioned about it, while Justice Khosla, although he called the death certificate of Gen. Shidei as fraud, did little either to probe in depth to find what exactly happened to Gen. Shidei or analyse the logical implications of the lack of information about him. In his Report, however, Mr. Khosla reproduced this fraudulent death certificate of Gen. Shidei as a proof of the alleged air crash.

25. Did the Japanese co-passengers know Netaji before?

Japanese authorities in their telegraphic messages or in secret documents always used Netaji’s code name as ‘T’. Netaji’s travel from Saigon was an extremely secret matter—only General Terauchi, Col. Tada of his staff, Lt.-Gen. Isoda, the Chief of the Hikari Kikan, Mr. Hachia, Japanese Ambassador to Netaji’s Government and Negishi, a Japanese diplomat, who carried the secret message of Japanese surrender to Netaji knew about Netaji’s departure, besides Netaji’s own Ministers who were present at Saigon. Even his Ministers did not exactly know where Netaji was going. All this information is found in Khosla Commission’s documents.
Except Takahashi, who had earlier met Netaji only once, all other witnesses told both Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission that they did not know Netaji earlier. Even Takahashi suppressed the fact that he ever knew Netaji.

However, Nonogaki told Mr. Khosla that Col. Tada identified Netaji to him, but at the same time he gave him a warning that he should mention only Netaji’s code name, which he could not remember. But Col. Tada was not at all present at the Saigon airport. Nonogaki also falsely claimed that he was the Chief pilot of the plane, but none else believed it or mentioned a word about it at any time. It means that Nonogaki told blatant lies to Mr. Khosla.

Major Taka Kuno claimed to be the Navigator of the plane, but Shah Nawaz Committee categorically mentioned on the positive evidence of the Japanese that Sgt. Okista was the Navigator. In his description about the air crash Kuno himself dismissed that he was really the Navigator. He was not introduced to Netaji, yet a very junior officer like him claimed to have had his seat before Netaji and Shidei and had continued talk with Netaji.

According to authentic report, Netaji and Habibur Rahman entered the plane when its propellers were in motion and when all other passengers had boarded. Yet, all the Japanese witnesses claimed to know him when Netaji reached Tourane.

However, Mr. Khosla believed the story of the Japanese witnesses that they knew Netaji and travelled with him, although the movement of Netaji was treated by the Japanese authority as a guarded secret.

26. Was any document produced either before Shah Nawaz Committee or Khosla Commission to prove that the plane carrying Netaji and Gen. Shidei either reached Taihoku or left it?

No paper of any kind—a flight chart or a take-off and air crash record—no document whatsoever to prove that the plane carrying Netaji and Gen. Shidei reached Taihoku or took off from its airport or any plane crashed on August 18, 1945—was
produced either before Shah Nawaz Committee or Khosla Commission. Only a news agency, like the Domei Agency, reported the air crash after 5 days and, the Intelligence Bureau of Formosa released a Press Note after 7 days about such an incident.

But Mr. Khosla accepted the oral evidence of Nonogaki, Tara Kuno, Sakai and Takahashi as very truthful without any kind of document to support their stories as very reliable.

27. How injured Netaji was taken to hospital?

Even Shah Nawaz Committee critically remarked: "Whether Netaji was taken in a car, or jeep or truck or 'shidosha' and who travelled in which vehicle and who arrived first",—no definite information was available. However, Mr. Khosla did not care to bother about this missing link of the story.

28. In which room of the Nonmon hospital (South-Gate Military Hospital) Netaji was kept?

Habibur Rahman said that he only shared a room with Netaji in the Nonmon Hospital but others said there were other patients also in that room. Habibur Rahman told that Netaji was taken to an operation theatre immediately after he was brought to the hospital, but Dr. Yoshimi who claimed to have treated him said that Netaji was not at all removed to any operation theatre.

Nonogaki claimed that he was all along by the side of 'Bose' but Takahashi told Khosla Commission that "Sakai, Nonogaki and myself were in the next room". Nonogaki's friend Tara Kuno on the other hand said, "that very night he was taken to Hokatu Army hospital, where Nonogaki was also taken".

However, Mr. Khosla believed that Nonogaki really stayed by the side of Netaji till he breathed his last.

29. How the doctors gave medical aid to Netaji?

Dr. Yoshimi claimed that, assisted by Dr. Tsuruta, he gave all kinds of medical aids to Netaji. He further said that Netaji was brought completely naked to the hospital only with
shoes on his feet. But Habibur Rahman, in all his statements, repeatedly said that Netaji was never stripped off his trousers, only his bush shirt was taken off. He further said that Netaji’s face was scorched, his bush shirt had caught fire and he had a 4-inch cut on his head.

However, Dr. Yoshimi said that Netaji’s naked body was found wholly turned grey due to severe burns, but he had no cut on his head. Dr. Yoshimi claimed that he bandaged the whole body of Netaji except his face and he recorded his temperature as 39 degree C and pulse beat as 120. As to when Netaji was brought to the hospital, he gave out different times to different investigating agencies—ranging from 12.30 p.m. to 4 p.m. We shall discuss in the next chapter how the ‘most truthful witness’ of Mr. Khosla—Dr. Yoshimi—made ridiculously contradictory statements.

30. How long Netaji was conscious?

Dr. Yoshimi told Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission that when Netaji was brought to hospital he was completely in his senses. But at another place Dr. Yoshimi said that Netaji was all along inquiring whether some telegrams had been sent and whether inquiries made about his other colleagues. Dr. Yoshimi added that Netaji lost consciousness at 7 p.m., but Takamaya, another Japanese witness, wrote in _Emuri Shim bun_ in 1969 that he talked to Netaji between 8 and 9 p.m. Dr. Yoshimi, also wrote same thing in the same paper.

How Netaji talked to Dr. Yoshimi or others? An interpreter named Nakamura (not Capt. Nakamura) was brought to interpret Netaji’s English into Japanese. But controverting Dr. Yoshimi, this Nakamura told Shah Nawaz Committee: “Netaji spoke only three times—the first time, inquiring about other INA officers’ arrival at Taihoku, the second time when he was feeling acute pain in his head, and about the third time he did not mention anything.”

Habibur Rahman said that Netaji asked for water once or twice and asked once whether Hasan (Abid) was there. He also told Shah Nawaz Committee that before he breathed his
last, he dictated a message to him for the Indian people. But during cross-examination by Shah Nawaz Committee he said that he was lying in the next bed, when a nurse told him that Netaji died at 9 p.m.

[Habibur Rahman’s various statements will be discussed later.]

What did Nonogaki say? He told Shah Nawaz and Khosla that all along he was by the side of Netaji and talked to him many times, but Tara Kuno said that Nonogaki and others were removed to another hospital.

Discarding all these contradictory statements, Mr. Khosla believed only the statement of Dr. Yoshimi.

31. When Netaji’s reported death took place?

Shah Nawaz Committee recorded: “Dr. Yoshimi said that Netaji breathed his last after 8 p.m. Dr. Yoshimi, Dr. Tsuruta two nurses, Col. Habibur Rahman, Mr. Nakamura and one military policeman were present at his bed side at the time of Netaji’s death. According to Dr. Tsuruta the time was 7 p.m. or 8 p.m. Col. Habibur Rahman mentioned the time as 9 p.m. Dr. Yoshimi, when he was in detention in Stanley jail in Hongkong in 1946, gave the time of death as 11 p.m. to the British Intelligence Officers. According to telegram sent by the Chief of the Staff, Southern Command to O. C. Hikari Kikan on August 20, 1945, the death took place at mid-night. Nonogaki and Tara Kuno said that they were removed to another hospital that same night. Takahashi could only say that Netaji died the same night. Only Captain Arai said that he heard from a nurse that Netaji died at 10 p.m.

Habibur Rahman in his signed statement, which was kept all along with the casket carrying the alleged ashes of Netaji, recorded the time of death as 9 p.m. After the Intelligence Bureau of Formosa in its Press release noted the time of death as ‘O’ hour of August 19, 1945, Habibur Rahman changed the time to 12 mid-night, and said so to the Figgess team at Tokyo six weeks thereafter. During his interrogation in Red Fort he
said that he was not present by the side of Netaji when he died, but a nurse told him that he had passed away the same night.

[More about Habibur Rahman in a separate chapter.]

Baffled by such contradictory statements Shah Nawaz Committee observed: “The evidence of the fellow injured persons does not help to establish the correct hour. So the time of death cannot be established with accuracy; it could be anytime between 8 p.m. and midnight of August 18, 1945.”

Now what about Khosla Commission’s report? Although the over-smart witness, Nonogaki, told Shah Nawaz Committee that he and others were removed the same evening to another hospital, he boldly came forward to tell Khosla Commission that he was present at the time of Netaji’s death and it was 11 p.m. Nay, he claimed further that it was he who reported it to the South-East Asia Headquarters at Saigon, as if, he was in charge of the Military Headquarters of Taihoku. No other witness supported his claim.

Takahashi told the Commission that he and Nonogaki were in Nonmon hospital, i.e., where Netaji was reported to be hospitalised till August 27, 1945. But Tara Kuno told Shah Nawaz Committee that Nonogaki, himself and others were removed to Hokatsu hospital on the same night. But Tara Kuno promptly told Mr. Khosla that Netaji died at 7 p.m. although he told Shah Nawaz Committee that along with other injured persons he heard the news next day. Again this man said during cross-examination that he heard the news of Netaji’s death on August 20, 1945.

Lt.-Col. Shibuya told Shah Nawaz Committee that when he visited the hospital on August 18, in the evening he found Netaji lying dead in his bed. But the same honest gentleman told Khosla Commission that he heard the news about Netaji’s death next day. Dr. Yoshimi and Dr. Tsuruta wrote in Emuri Shim bun in 1969 that Netaji died at 10 p.m. However, Dr. Yoshimi told Khosla Commission that Netaji was brought to hospital at 12-30 p.m. and he lived for 12 hours i.e., he died at 11-30 p.m. Dr. Yoshimi claimed that he exactly remembered that Netaji was running 39 degree C temperature and his pulse
beat was 120 and he also recollected how many times he gave injections and administered what medicines to Netaji but could not remember the exact time of death of Netaji. Dr. Yoshimi changed the time of death not less than on six occasions as to be any time between 7 p.m. to 11-30 p.m.

Inconsistencies and discrepancies regarding this vital information about the time of Netaji's death were found to be so baffling that Shah Nawaz Committee felt constrained to make sharply critical remarks about it. But it caused little concern to Mr. Khosla. He meticulously recorded in his Report that "the plane left Saigon exactly at 5 p.m., reached Tourane at 7-45 p.m., arrived at Taihoku at 2 p.m. and took off at 2-30 p.m." but about timing of alleged death of Netaji, he vaguely noted in his findings that 'Bose' died at 'midnight'.

32. How the Formosan Army Headquarters received the report of Netaji's death?

What happened after Netaji was reported to have died? According to Shah Nawaz Committee: "Dr. Yoshimi informed the Military Headquarters of the sad event." But according to the same Report "no general, not even a lieutenant colonel but only a junior officer of the rank of major, named Nagatomo, was sent down from the Headquarters to the hospital. He came and saw Netaji's body lying on the hospital bed. Major Nagatomo posted soldiers to guard the body".

The Report further recorded: "The Chief of the General Staff of the Formosan Army, General Isamaya, was candid enough to say that he learnt of the accident when he went to his office next morning. Although Lt.-Col. Nonogaki named two headquarters staff officers who came on receipt of the information when Netaji was alive, the staff officers themselves, namely Col. Miyata and Major Nagatomo said that they arrived after Netaji died. Major Nagatomo says that immediately after receiving information General Ando, Commander of the Formosan Army, went to the hospital to see Netaji. He also says that General Ando attended the subsequent funeral ceremony".
But listen to what General Isamaya said about it! According to the same Shah Nawaz Committee’s Report, “General Isamaya, Chief of the General Staff, gives a completely different story. He says that neither he nor Gen. Ando went either to the hospital to pay respect to Netaji’s body or attended any funeral ceremony. He goes on to say that the Army Commander had shut up himself in his house from the day of surrender of Japan and did not come out”.

Gen. Isamaya told the Committee that he received the news of accident next day when he was going to office as if he had shut himself up in his room only up to the particular date of August 18. This unsatisfactory plea provoked Shah Nawaz Committee to resentfully remark: “That explanation does not appear very convincing when he himself said that a week later, after the alleged air crash, he went to receive Dr. Ba Maw, President of Burma and General Tanaka, Chief of the General Staff of the Burmese Army, who were on their way to Tokyo. Apparently no particular interest was taken by the local Army Command as to what happened to Netaji’s body. A comparatively junior officer was detailed, and thereafter no further interest apparently was taken.”

Dr. Yoshimi said further, according to Shah Nawaz Committee, that the doctors, nurses and Habibur Rahman wept and wreaths were placed on the body and they saluted Netaji, but the same Report commented that “however, Habibur Rahman gave no details” about such story.

It is evident from the Report of Shah Nawaz Committee that General Isamaya, Dr. Yoshimi, Major Nagatomo indulged in deliberate lies.

How strange was it that the Formosan Headquarters did not know anything about the air crash and the report of death of Netaji and Gen. Shidei? They might not care for ‘Chandra Bose’ as Mr. Khosla assumed that after surrender the Japanese had not shown even scanty regard for Netaji. But what about Gen. Shidei? If the air crash really took place and Gen. Shidei and Netaji died, could the Headquarters be kept uninformed and when, they received the news of their death later, could they
ignore Gen. Shidei? These are simple yet very pertinent
questions,—nevertheless, they roused no queries either in the
mind of Shah Nawaz or Khosla!

33. Where the alleged body of Netaji was kept?

Dr. Yoshimi told Shah Nawaz Committee: "The body
was removed to one corner of the room and a screen was put
around it, and according to Japanese customs flowers and
candles were placed by its side, and Major Nagatomo posted
soldiers to guard the body". But the Committee observed that
Habibur Rahman kept completely silent about such details.

How could Major Nagatomo exercise the right of posting
guard without instructions from the Army Headquarters?
General Isamaya and General Ando said that they knew
nothing about Netaji on August 18. Does it not appear as
strange that a Major knew about the arrival of Netaji and his
death afterwards but not the Headquarters of Formosa?

Mr. Khosla quoted Chang Chuen of Taiwan (Witness No.
207) in his report, as a proof of Netaji's death. He wrote: Chang Chuen was ordered to go to the hospital and stand guard
on Bose's coffin on which was written the name of 'Chandra Bose'. He also saw some injured persons there. On the
following day a truck came and carried the body to the
crematorium."

This story contradicts Dr. Yoshimi's evidence. Firstly, Dr.
Yoshimi said that the reported body of Netaji was kept in a
corner behind the cover of a curtain. Secondly, he said to Shah
Nawaz: "His lieutenant (Habibur) went away with the body
next day." Dr. Yoshio Ishii also told Mr. Khosla that the next
morning the body was taken away in a truck.

Now, to suit his convenience, Mr. Khosla quoted only a
part of Chang Chuen's evidence and skipped other vital parts
of the same. Chang Chuen said that he was posted as a
guard on August 19; secondly, the coffin was placed in the
middle of the room; thirdly, there were no flowers, or candles
around the coffin, and fourthly, the coffin was taken away the
next day. The other part of his evidence, we shall discuss later. But all this information given by him wholly contradicted the evidence of Dr. Yoshimi and Dr. Yoshio Ishii.

Mr. Khosla not only suppressed other parts of the evidence of Chang Chuen, it did not even strike him that if he was to believe Chang Chuen, why the coffin, instead of being kept in a mortuary or in a corner covered by a curtain, as told by Dr. Yoshimi, was so demonstratively kept in the middle of the room among other patients? Why ‘Chandra Bose’ was written in big Japanese letters on the coffin? Was it intended to make people believe that the body in the coffin was that of ‘Chandra Bose’—although none saw whose body it was? No such pertinent question troubled Mr. Justice Khosla, he simply recorded it as a proof of Netaji’s death.

[More about it later.]

34. Which is the date of cremation of the alleged dead body?

Shah Nawaz Committee’s Report noted: “In his statement before us Habibur Rahman had given the date of cremation as August 20, but in a statement signed by him dated August 24, 1945, the date was given August 22.”

Was it an inadvertent mistake on the part of Habibur Rahman: Facts show that it was not. The Imperial Headquarters at Tokyo, in their telegrams to Formosan and Saigon Headquarters mentioned the alleged date of cremation as August 20. It can be presumed that to avoid contradiction with the date announced by the highest authority, Habibur Rahman suitably changed the date later to August 20. If Netaji had really died, could such a sacrilege be committed by his most trusted aide? And this is not all, Habibur Rahman did more. At Tokyo, he told the Counter Intelligence Corps of Figgess that the body was cremated on August 21. But during interrogation by the British Intelligence at Red Fort in October, 1945, he said the body was cremated on August 23.

Now, according to the Japanese Headquarters telegram, cremation date was noted as August 20, but although the Military Intelligence Bureau issued a press release for publica-
tion on August 25, it intriguingly avoided the date of cremation.

What about evidence of others? Dr. Yoshimi and Dr. Yoshio Ishi fixed the date as August 20 in corroboration with the date of Imperial Headquarters. Nakamura also supported them. Major Nagatomo, who was said to have been detailed to look after the body and its funeral said that the body was cremated on August 19. And the Taiwanese witness Chang Chuen noted the date as August 21, 1945.

S. A. Iyer was flown to Formosa, along with Col. Tada with an assurance that he would be shown the body of Netaji, but it was not done, although he reached Formosa on August 20, 1945. It means, if really the reported body was there till August 20, it was not cremated.

Then again in Tokyo broadcast on August 23, 1945, it was stated that Netaji's body was flown to Tokyo. Intriguingly, although the Imperial Headquarters' telegram noted the date of cremation as August 20, yet why it was not mentioned in the Tokyo broadcast?

In the face of such glaring discrepancies Shah Nawaz Committee haltingly made only a vague remark: "The cremation is likely to have taken place sometime later i.e., later than the date, on receipt of second telegram from Imperial Headquarters on August 19, 1945".

According to various evidences, the date of cremation could be August 19, 20, 21, 22 or 23, 1945. Mr. Khosla did not feel any necessity whatsoever in resolving this puzzling issue of such vital importance. These contradictory versions did not rouse any suspicion in his mind. He faithfully corroborated the unconvincing date indirectly given by the Imperial Headquarters. He wrote in his Report: "Bose succumbed to his injuries the same night" and "two days later Bose's body was cremated."

35. Who attended the alleged funeral?

According to the recorded report of Shah Nawaz Committee: "In one or two trucks the body was carried to the crematorium and Col. Habibur Rahman, Major Nagatomo, J.
Nakamura (interpreter), a Buddhist priest and the crematorium attendant Mr. Chu Tsan were present”. Shah Nawaz Committee included the name of Chu Tsan from the evidence of Harin Shah who appeared before it and produced a photograph to identify the crematorium. When shown the photograph of the crematorium, the son of Chu Tsan declared in the presence of Mr. Khosla that it was not his father’s photograph,—Mr. Khosla noted it in his inspection report of the crematorium. Again, according to Khosla Commission’s Taiwanese witness, Chang Chuen, no senior officer attended the funeral; no priest was there; no honour of any kind was shown; no flowers were placed and no Indian was there when the blanket wrapped body with the coffin was placed into the furnace. Habibur Rahman also told the British Intelligence in the course of his interrogation, according to the evidence of B. C. Chakravarty before the Khosla Commission, that he did not accompany the body to crematorium.

Now, what about the four star witnesses of Mr. Khosla? Although they claimed that they were present in every scene of the story, they conveniently cut themselves off from the funeral scene. Even Lt.-Col. Shibuya, who claimed that he was directed to look after the body, said that he did not attend the funeral. Major Nagatomo said that General Ando attended the funeral, but General Ando denied it before Shah Nawaz Committee.

The same mystery shrouded the reported funeral of General Shidei as well. Only Capt. Nakamura claimed that he buried Gen. Shidei. Similarly Nagatomo claimed that he alone conducted the funeral of ‘Chandra Bose’. This extraordinary story did not rouse any question in the judicial mind of Mr. Khosla. He ignored it completely as a matter of no consequence!

36. Did anybody see the reported body of Netaji?

Habibur Rahman told the interrogating Intelligence Officer at Red Fort in October, 1945 that he was neither allowed to see the body nor allowed to accompany it during funeral.

Mr. Khosla only noted one portion of the evidence of the
Taiwanese witness, Chang Chuen but deliberately suppressed the other very significant portion of his evidence in which he said that they were strictly prohibited from seeing the body, or uncovering it. According to his evidence, the whole body was covered with white clothes and then wholly wrapped by blanket, and it was put into the furnace in the same covered condition. Nagatomo, who claimed that he conducted the funeral and cremation function, also said that the body was not opened and the whole coffin, as it was, put into the furnace, for which the opening of the furnace had to be widened.

The photograph of the covered body, said to be that of Netaji's, corroborated this evidence. This photograph, which was produced by the Government of Japan, looked like a completely covered bundle of an unidentifiable object from which nobody could find or identify whose body it contained.

Why the dead body was not allowed to be shown to anybody? Why the police guards were strictly forbidden to make any attempt to see the dead body? It was an extraordinarily intriguing step. But it evoked no query in the mind of either Mr. Shah Nawaz Khan or Mr. Khosla. They accepted it as fact that Netaji's body was cremated at Taihoku.

[We shall discuss later why the body was not allowed to be seen by anybody.]

37. Why a photograph of the reported body of Netaji was not taken?

The Government of Japan, as documentary proofs of air crash and Netaji's death at Taihoku, produced five photographs,—three photographs of the wreckage of the alleged crashed plane, one photograph of Habibur Rahman sitting beside a casket said to be containing Netaji's ashes and one photograph of a covered object stated to be the body of Netaji.

Habibur Rahman's photograph with that of a casket does not prove in any way that the casket really contained the alleged ashes of Netaji.

As to the photograph of the object said to be that of the
dead body of Netaji, it showed nothing but a canvas-covered object, which could be anything. An inescapable question arises, why a photograph of the body of Netaji was not taken if he had really died? Dr. Yoshima argued that taking of photograph of a dead body was against Japanese custom. But it is a self-defeating argument, as a photograph of a covered object said to be that of Netaji’s dead body was already taken and produced before the investigating team of Figgess.

Habibur Rahman said that he did not allow taking of a photograph of the body as the face was swollen and it got disfigured. But Dr. Yoshimi told that he bandaged the whole body of Netaji, except his face. Had the face been disfigured due to injury, it would also have been bandaged, but it was not. Again, Habibur Rahman in his statement to Shah Nawaz Committee said Netaji had no injury on his face, only it was scorched by heat of the flames. Therefore, Habibur Rahman’s argument also did not stand anywhere. Further, he told the British Intelligence at Red Fort that two photographs of the body of Netaji were taken. But both of them proved to be fictitious, or otherwise the Japanese Government would have surely produced them. Further, Habibur Rahman said that he asked the Japanese to carry the body either to Saigon or Singapore, but it was not agreed to.

One single photograph of the body of Netaji, if he really died at Taihoku, would have set at rest all controversies about the air crash and allegedly subsequent death of Netaji. A photograph of the face, disfigured or swollen, would have provided opportunity for scientific identification of the body, if it was really that of Netaji but only a photograph of an unidentifiable bundle was produced.

Japan took special care to take 5 other photographs but avoided the main object, i.e., the alleged dead body of Netaji which unavoidably strengthened the suspicion that they really tried to hide the fact about the story of Netaji’s death.

These five photographs were accepted by Shah Nawaz Committee as reliable documents and they were produced as well before Khosla Commission by the Government of India and
Mr. Khosla admitted them as Commission’s exhibits. But in his report Mr. Khosla observed:

"The five photographs submitted with Figgess (CSDIC) letter of November 17, 1945, were produced before the Shah Nawaz Committee and formed part of the records of its proceedings. The same photographs were produced before the present Commission, but as they are not relied upon in the absence of who accepted them as part of evidentiary material and all their depicts, they cannot be held to have been proved. Moreover, they are inadmissible in evidence as they do not constitute direct or primary evidence either of air crash or Bose’s death."

Figgess team accepted them and Shah Nawaz Committee also accepted them as part of evidentiary materials and all their reports formed part of the exhibits of the Khosla Commission, which he very often quoted as and when they served his convenience to support his findings. But on further scrutiny, as these photographs were likely to explode the whole story of the air crash and Netaji’s death, Mr. Khosla on a very fragile legal pretence refused to recognise them as admissible in evidence. No other judge perhaps would have taken recourse to such immoral subterfuge to scuttle an inquiry, which involved the greatest hero of Indian freedom.

38. Why a wrong report of carrying Netaji’s body to Tokyo was circulated by the Imperial Headquarters and why Tokyo Radio had broadcast it?

The Tokyo broadcast on August 23, 1945, categorically stated that Netaji in injured condition was flown to Tokyo and he died in Japan. Imperial Headquarters of Tokyo informed Terauchi’s Headquarters and the Chief of the Hikari Kikan, Lt.-Gen. Isoda, in a secret message that Netaji’s body was flown to Tokyo.

However, neither General Isamaya, nor General Ando but a very junior officer like Capt. Nakamura told Shah Nawaz Committee that on receipt of a second telegram from Tokyo Headquarters the body was cremated at Taihoku. A childish plea for not sending the body to Tokyo was also offered by
stating that no plane was found suitable enough to carry the big coffin containing the body of Netaji to Tokyo.

Lt.-Gen. Isoda, on the basis of Imperial Headquarters’ message, insisted during his interrogation by the Anglo-American Intelligence in September, 1945, that Netaji’s body was indeed flown to Tokyo and it was not cremated at Taihoku.

According to Imperial Headquarters’ indirect report, the body was cremated at Taihoku on August 20, 1945, but even then, why Tokyo broadcast on August 23, stated that Netaji’s body was flown to Tokyo and he died in Japan!

[The mystery about such misleading report discussed later.]

The story immediately creates the impression that General Isoda, who was a party to Netaji’s plan of escape, persistently said till mid-September, 1945, that Netaji’s body was flown to Tokyo, because it was the original plan to so announce. But Khosla attached little importance to this intriguing report from Tokyo that Netaji died in Tokyo.

39. Why S. A. Iyer was not taken to Taihoku?

Col. Tada, a Staff Officer of Terauchi’s Headquarters and Lt.-Gen. Isoda, Chief of the Hikari Kikan were the two principal architects of Netaji’s plan of escape from Saigon. Mr. Khosla also did not refute the fact that Isoda and Tada had secret consultation with Netaji before his departure from Saigon.

On August 19, Col. Tada asked S. A. Iyer to fly with him to Tokyo to meet Netaji there. At about 5 p.m., when the plane landed at Canton, Col. Tada told Iyer that Netaji died in an air crash on August 18, 1945. Iyer was completely upset by this unexpected news and he asked Tada that unless he was shown the dead body, no Indian could believe this report. Tada agreed to take him to Taihoku to show him the body of Netaji.

When the plane reached Formosa on August 20, Iyer was surprised to find that it was not Taihoku but Taichu, another airport in Formosa. Iyer flared up in anger, when Tada
consoled him by saying that as it was not safe to land at Taihoku after dusk, and the plane was, therefore, diverted to Taichu airport and he would be taken to Taihoku next day. But next day Iyer was flown not to Taihoku but directly to Tokyo.

Why Iyer was not taken to Taihoku? He could have seen the body of Netaji and the crashed plane as well if taken to Taihoku. But, although Tada assured him earlier, Iyer was flown not to Taihoku but to Tokyo.

If Netaji really died at Taihoku, Col. Tada would not have deliberately played false with Iyer. He would have been straightway taken to Taihoku and shown the dead body of Netaji. This behaviour of the Japanese with Iyer will create doubts even in the mind of a layman about the veracity of the air crash report and Netaji’s death, but it created no reaction in the legal mind of Mr. Khosla.

40. Why no official communiqué was issued by the Imperial Headquarters regarding the report of death of Netaji and Gen. Shidei?

It was obligatory on the part of the Imperial Headquarters of Tokyo to announce, even just in one line, in an official communiqué the news, if not of the death of Netaji, at least of Gen. Shidei, if that really happened. The text of August 23 radio-broadcast was reported to have been circulated by the Domei News Agency but startlingly, S. A. Iyer disclosed later, that actually the news was not circulated by that Agency, but on being asked by the Imperial Headquarters, it was Iyer who drafted the text of the news which was falsely circulated in the name of the Domei News Agency. Iyer had no knowledge whether Netaji died in any air crash or not. Yet he was asked to draft the text of the broadcast. Further, according to instructions of the Tokyo Authorities, the broadcast, again falsely stated five days after the alleged crash that Netaji died in Japan.

At Taihoku also, the Formosan Headquarters did not issue any official communiqué, but a press briefing was circulated by the Intelligence Bureau. It is further seen from the text that the news was prepared by the Bureau on August 22, but it was
published on August 25, and that too, giving version of the alleged air crash and death of Netaji and Shidei differently from the version of the Tokyo broadcast.

It is obvious that for reasons of their own, the Imperial Headquarters did not want to directly involve themselves to confirm the report of the alleged death of either Netaji or Gen. Shidei.

41. Why death news was disclosed five days later and that too falsely?

Netaji reportedly died on August 18, 1945: The Imperial Headquarters had sent secret message to Saigon Headquarters about the alleged incident on August 19. And yet, why the news was disclosed by the Tokyo Radio five days after and that too falsely telling the Anglo-Americans that Netaji died in Japan?

The Formosan Intelligence Bureau drafted the news on August 22, yet, why the news was given to the press after 7 days of the reported death of Netaji and Shidei? Why the news about cremation at Taihoku was suppressed?

It created suspicion in the minds of the British, as noted by Wavell in his Viceroy's Journal, that it was deliberately done to provide sufficient time to Netaji to reach his secret underground destination.

42. Who carried the 'ashes' from Taihoku to Tokyo and then to Renkoji temple?

Shah Nawaz Committee recorded: "General Shidei's ashes were sent to Tokyo a week after, through General Tanaka en route to Tokyo with Dr. Ba Maw." How could Shah Nawaz believe it? According to his own report, no body except Capt. Nakamura, a very junior officer claimed that he cremated Gen. Shidei and entrail his ashes in a box.

According to evidence before Shah Nawaz Committee, Habibur Rahman, Sakai and Hayashida carried the alleged ashes of Netaji to Tokyo on September 5, 1945. Here too three witnesses, according to the report of the Committee, gave three
different versions as to how the alleged ashes were carried to Renkoji temple at Tokyo.

Ramamurthi, the Chief of Indian Independence League, told Shah Nawaz Committee that the alleged ashes were taken to the Renkoji temple on September 12 or 13, 1945. But Shah Nawaz Committee disbelieved it. Relying on the report of another junior person, I. Murti, the Committee, noted that, “all the Tokyo INA Cadets, J. Ramamurthi and his brother, Mrs. Sahay and her family members, INA broadcasting unit and Mr. Iyer took the ashes in a procession to the Renkoji temple. About 10 or 15 Japanese military officers and civilians were also present in the procession”.

However, the present priest of the Renkoji temple told the Convener of the National Committee that some time in the first week of September, only three or four persons after dusk came in a rickshaw and requested him to keep the casket, telling him further to keep it secretly for which he would be rewarded in future. He also mentioned three names—‘Naraina, Virik and Hayashida’ who carried the ashes. This was told to the Commission by the Convener during his deposition before it.

Hayashida, on being contacted by the Convener flatly denied it in presence of Gen. Kawabe, Gen. Yakuru and Mrs. Imori, saying that he was then in jail.

Virik in his deposition before the Commission said that he alone carried the ash-casket to the Renkoji temple. ‘Naraina’ could not be contacted or identified.

Even regarding the final chapters of the story, Shah Nawaz Committee had to remark, “It is true that such precautions as are necessary to prove indisputable identity (i.e., of ashes) were not taken. At no stage was the casket containing the ashes sealed, no formal receipt issued, nor again continuous watch kept over it. So, although there cannot be absolute certainty, nevertheless, it can be said that in all probability the ashes kept in Renkoji temple are the ashes of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose”.

What a strange observation! Without absolute certainty,
the ashes could be said 'in all probability to be that of Netaji,' as if the identity of ashes of a person like Netaji could be left to be a matter of probability! Mr. Khosla paid no attention, whatsoever, to this point.

43. What happened to the treasures?

It has been told by INA witnesses to the Khosla Commission that before leaving Singapore, Netaji withdrew 9 out of 10 crores yen from the Azad Hind Bank deposits. 15,00,000 yen were sent to Tokyo Independence League, and a large part of it was paid to the men and officers of INA and the Azad Hind Government employees as their advance salaries. Netaji carried with him a large amount of yen and four bags of gold and jewellery.

It has been reported that some jewellery were found scattered over the Taihoku aerodrome, and these were collected and deposited with J. Ramamurthi in Tokyo.

Regarding this treasure Mr. Khosla wrote: "I do not propose to say anything about valuables or INA treasures, which Bose was carrying with him. This matter was not inquired into".

If Khosla had a mind to pursue the alternative line of investigation, namely Netaji's safe escape after the fake air crash story, the exact amount of treasure found at Taihoku, would have given him a clue to verify, whether Netaji was really involved in a plane crash or not.

44. Why the crematorium certificate produced by the Government of Japan was rejected by Khosla Commission?

Mr. Harin Shah produced a copy of death certificate and a copy of cremation permit issued by the Municipal Bureau of Taihoku (Taipei). The National Committee also produced photostat copies of these two certificates to Khosla Commission at Taipei.

The Government of Japan produced before the Shah Nawaz Committee a copy of cremation permit giving in writing that it was an authentic copy.
But Mr. Khosla straightway refused to consider it as a valid document. Why? Because, on translation of the Japanese script, it was found that if this certificate was accepted as an official document of the Government of Japan then the whole story of Netaji's death would have turned to be fictitious.

45. Why either the Imperial Headquarters or the Formosan Headquarters did not hold any inquiry at all?

Shah Nawaz Committee's Report resentfully recorded, "Unfortunately, no formal inquiry into the air crash was carried out by the Japanese authorities at that time. . . One would have expected a formal inquiry into an air crash which is more or less a routine matter. More so, as the plane carried persons like Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and Lt.-Gen. Shidei".

Shah Nawaz Committee asked General Isamaya, the Chief of the General Staff of the Formosan Army, why a formal or even a routine inquiry was not made? General Isamaya first said, "Since the aeroplane in question did not belong to Formosan Army, the Headquarters of the Formosan Army had no responsibility to hold inquiry into the matter." The General realised soon that it was a very unconvincing reply and he then hastened to add: "It was the duty of the Commander within whose area an air crash took place to enquire and report to the higher authorities. In this case, a report was submitted to the Imperial Headquarters by my Staff Officer, Lt.-Col. Shibuya through me".

Shah Nawaz Committee also examined Lt.-Col. Shibuya, but Shibuya flatly "denied knowledge of any such inquiry, and said that the responsibility of holding it lay with the Air Division concerned."

Shah Nawaz Committee pursued the matter further with the Foreign Office of Japan. On behalf of this office, the Committee was informed on June 4, 1956, "As a result of investigation made at the Operation Section, Repatriation Relief Bureau, Ministry of Health and Welfare, it has been revealed that no
official inquiry Commission to determine the causes of the accident was held so far”.

It is to be noted that a man like Gen. Isamaya, who was the Chief of the General Staff of the Formosan Army, told lies on two occasions. Firstly, he untruthfully said, that Lt.-Col. Shibuya held an inquiry, and secondly, he falsely implicated the Imperial Headquarters to say that the report of the inquiry was sent to the highest authority through him.

It cannot be taken as a worthwhile excuse to say that inquiry could not be held due to chaotic conditions prevailing either in Japan or Formosa. MacArthur landed at Tokyo on or about September 7, 1945 and even thereafter, except overall control of the Government authority of Japan by him, the administration and military organisation remained in the hands of the Japanese for quite a long time. Formosa was occupied by the Americans and the Chinese much later. It becomes obvious that the Imperial Headquarters did not deliberately hold any inquiry about the alleged air crash at Taihoku either of formal or routine in nature.

MOCKERY OF TWO INQUIRIES

The above chronological analysis of the alleged events connected with the story of Netaji’s death in the form of 45 questions and answers, based on the documents and evidence recorded by Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission expose irrefutably how superficially these investigations about the fate of the epic hero of the Indian freedom were made and how they turned to be nothing but mere mockery of inquiries.

Contradictions, discrepancies, divergences and incongruities in the evidence of the Japanese witnesses were so innumerable, attempts at suppression or distortion of facts were so vivid and the narration of the story of flight and alleged death of Netaji appeared so incoherent and fancied that Shah Nawaz Committee could not desist from making many critical observations about the evidence and peculiar behaviour of the Japanese witnesses and that of Habibur Rahman particularly.
It was found that even men like Gen. Isamaya, the Chief of the General Staff of the Formosan Army and General Ando of the Local Formosan Command, did not hesitate to indulge in deliberate lies before Shah Nawaz Committee.

However, Shah Nawaz Committee, although raised many pertinent questions in regard to the veracity of the evidence of the Japanese witnesses, did not logically pursue the matter to unearth the intriguing causes that led them to make so manifestly contradictory or false statements.

Shah Nawaz Committee, it appeared, did not dare to controvert the public statement of Pandit Nehru in Parliament in which he had categorically stated that the story of ‘Netaji’s death was a settled fact beyond doubt’.

The Shah Nawaz Committee queerly concluded that ‘although there cannot be absolute certainty, nevertheless, it can be said, in all probability that the ashes kept in the Renkoji temple, Tokyo, are the ashes of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose... If the ashes are to be genuine, Renkoji temple cannot obviously be the final resting place’. Although the Committee could not be absolutely certain about the identity of the ashes except considering it to be a matter of probability and although the Committee itself questioned that if the ashes were genuine,—nevertheless, it did not feel any constraint to illogically and abruptly conclude that ‘Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose died ten years ago’.

The terms of reference of the Khosla Commission were not restricted to inquire into ‘alleged death of Netaji’, but ‘to probe into the circumstances of disappearance of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose’. Its terms were quite comprehensive, and more-over, it was not a ‘Committee’ like that of Shah Nawaz Committee, but it was constituted as a ‘Judicial Commission’ with all the powers and judicial authorities of a court vested in it. But the performance of this ‘Judicial Commission’ turned to be worse than the earlier ‘Committee’.

Mr. Khosla did not notice even a single instance of contradiction or discrepancy or incongruity in the evidence of the
Japanese witnesses, nor did he find any lapse of duty on the part of the war-time Government of Japan in regard to their strange manner of broadcasting the story of Netaji’s death. He made no critical comment about the intriguing contradictions found in the evidence of the Japanese witnesses in any part of his report. Rather, most solicitously he came forward to offer alibi after alibi to explain away things which appeared as manifestly inexplicable.

In arriving at his findings, Mr. Khosla relied on the hearsay evidence of 18 Japanese, who simply said that they heard about the news of Netaji’s death.

The four pillars of the edifice of his findings are the four Japanese witnesses—Lt.-Col. Nonogaki, Lt.-Col. Sakai, Major Tara Kuno and Major Takahashi,—who claimed without any documentary proof that they travelled in the same plane with Netaji. There was a fifth Japanese witness, named Capt. Keikichi Arai, who also claimed to have travelled in the same plane, but as his evidence proved rather very inconvenient to Mr. Khosla, he was left out of the list of his ‘most important Japanese witnesses’. The fifth Japanese witness, whom he called ‘a witness of convincing truth’ was Dr. Yoshima. Here also he dropped the evidence of two other doctors, namely of Dr. Tsuruta and Dr. Yoshio Ishi, who also claimed to have medically treated Netaji at the Nonmon Hospital at Taihoku, as their versions appeared equally inconvenient to Mr. Khosla.

In this chapter it has been shown how truthful and how important these five Japanese witnesses were in deposing before the Khosla Commission. Each of these witnesses contradicted himself ridiculously and belied the evidence of one another on innumerable counts. But these facts of contradiction, falsehood and fancied versions proved to be of no consequences to the judicial discretion of Mr. Khosla, as he was more impressed by the ‘frank demeanour’—proverbially enigmatic demeanour of Mongolian homosapiens—than the irreconcilably contradictory version of their evidence.

What these five witnesses really told Khosla Commission? They unanimously told the same story— outline of which ap-
peared in every press in Japan. They said that a plane left Saigon with Netaji and Gen. Shidei on August 17, 1945 in the evening and reached Tourane after the dusk the same evening. It resumed its flight next morning and reached Taihoku at noon and while it was taking off for its next destination to Dairen or Tokyo, it instantly crashed resulting in injury to Netaji, who was immediately taken to Nonmon Hospital where he died on August 18, 1945.

Any Japanese newspaper reader could tell this story before Shah Nawaz Committee, or Khooola Commission. The veracity of their evidence depended in their capacity to give similar details about the different scenes or aspects of the story. But as it happens in the case of a cooked up story or of a plot of conspiratorial incident—that the tutored witnesses fail to give similar account of the story, and falter, vacillate or prevaricate in the course of cross-examination in regard to details about the happenings of various aspects of such an articulated story—these five Japanese witnesses failed more than miserably to give any concurrent account of any one aspect of the story of flight and death of Netaji. Each witness contradicted his own version of evidence or one contradicted the evidence of another during their cross-examination. Such contradictions, divergence, discrepancies and incongruities in their evidence should have led to the inevitable conclusion that they gave out nothing but fancied or tutored stories in support of the alleged report of Netaji’s death.

Even a casual reading of the contradictions in the evidence of the Japanese witnesses, as factually quoted in this chapter from the records of the Shah Nawaz Committee and Khooola Commission, will convince anybody that from the beginning to the end—from A to Z—the whole report of Netaji’s death was nothing but a cooked-up story. After brilliantly analyzing the evidence of the Japanese witnesses, continuously for 25 days, the counsel of the National Committee, Shri Gobindo Mukhoty, felt so exasperated by the manifestly queer evidence of the Japanese witnesses that he could not desist from observing in course of his concluding remark: "What to speak of your Lordship, Sir,
even a fool will not believe these stories!" However, a fool may not believe them, but His Lordship, the ex-ICS Chief Justice of the Punjab High Court, varily believed them as 'evidence of convincing truth'!
Mr. Khosla wrote in justification of his 'findings': "I reached the conclusion that the story of the air crash at Taihoku airfield in Taiwan and subsequent death of Bose . . . must be believed. The story is substantiated by the testimony of wholly independent witnesses, four of whom were Bose's co-passengers in the plane which crashed, and one is the doctor who attended him and signed his death certificate . . . Most of the witnesses who gave evidence impressed me by their frank and honest demeanour. The doctor, too, appeared to be a most convincing witness of truth".

Mr. Khosla arrived at his findings verily on reliance of the story of four-plus-one. The four witnesses are Lt.-Col. Nonogaki, Lt.-Col. Sakai, Major Tara Kuno and Major Takahashi, who claimed to have travelled in the same plane with Netaji. The fifth very important witness who impressed him most is Dr. Yoshimi who described himself as the doctor of the Nonmon Hospital. But unfortunately for Capt. Arai who also claimed to be Netaji's co-passenger and Dr. Tsuruta and Dr. Ishii who claimed as well to have treated Netaji along with Dr. Yoshimi, they could not impress Mr. Khosla by the frankness of their demeanour. Therefore, their testimony which contradicted the testimony of Mr. Khosla's chosen five, was totally rejected by him.
Scanning the evidence of these chosen five of Mr. Khosla, we have shown how 'truthful' and 'convincing' their evidence proved to be. Dr. Yoshimi has been indeed described by Mr. Khosla as some kind of a *prima dona* witness. His evidence, therefore, needs further scrutiny. But before taking up his testimony, let us keep a few things in mind to see how 'frank and honest' the chosen four-plus-one appeared to be.

*First*, none of the so-called four co-passengers of Netaji could produce a single piece of paper of any kind in support of their claim that they really travelled in the same plane with Netaji.

*Second*, Dr. Yoshimi failed to produce any document to prove that he really attended Netaji in Nonmon Hospital. Dr. Yoshimi did not sign the death certificate, but he signed the cremation permit of a man named as Ichiro Okura.  

[The mystery about it will be discussed in the last Chapter.]

*Third*, the four comparatively very junior military officers could not show any document to justify their claim that they accompanied Gen. Shidei on very urgent assignment either to Dairen or Tokyo. Only Gen. Shidei was going to Manchuria to assume the command of the Kwantang Army,—and, he had no necessity to take officers of the ranks of Lt.-Col., Major or Captain with him. Such officers were found in hundreds in Manchuria.

*Fourth*, none of these junior officers knew Netaji before except Takahashi, nor they had any knowledge of English. Yet they claimed to identify Netaji and have had talks with him during the flight from Saigon to Taihoku and also after the alleged accident.

*Fifth*, all these five chosen witnesses read out some statements, prepared in advance, before Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission.

*Sixth*, at least two of the five witnesses admitted during cross-examination that they had consultations among themselves prior to appearing before Khosla Commission.
Seventh, these five witnesses published written statements in *Emuri Shim bun* in 1969 giving account of this story of the air crash in advance.

Eighth, none of these ‘most important witnesses’ as Mr. Khosla described them, were arrested or interrogated by the Anglo-American investigating teams, except Dr. Yoshimi.

Ninth, the Japanese Government did not produce any document in verification of their testimony.

Tenth, Mr. Khosla did not give any reason why he totally rejected the evidence of Capt. Arai, Dr. Tsuruta and Dr. Ishii.

**STATEMENTS IN EMURI SHIMBUN**

It is particularly noteworthy why after 25 years, Lt.-Col. Nonogaki, Lt.-Col. Sakai, Major Tara Kuno, Dr. Yoshimi and Yoshio Ishii made statements almost simultaneously and in the same paper *Emuri Shim bun* in the last part of 1969. Debates on the issue of formation of a fresh Commission were going on in the Parliament of India, and it became almost clear by the middle of 1969 that the Government of India was going to form a judicial commission to inquire into Netaji mystery. It was obvious that these Japanese witnesses wanted either to forestall institution of such a commission or if such a commission was formed, they wanted to inform all probable Japanese witnesses what should be their line of evidence before the Commission. A little probe by Khosla Commission could have discovered the unseen hands of the Foreign Office of Japan in such a concerted move to publish statements in advance by those witnesses who appeared before Shah Nawaz Committee and as such, were likely to be invited as witness by the expected Judicial Commission also.

**MEASURES OF JUDICIAL TRUTHFULNESS**

How many lies, told on oath by a witness, make him ‘a convincing witness of truth’? Had Mr. Khosla defined in the preamble of his report any norm of judicial truthfulness it
would have been easier to understand the reasonings behind his findings.

Each of these five ‘star’ witnesses, whom Mr. Khosla described in his report as ‘most important and truthful witnesses’ indulged in countless lies in fabrication of their stories. Indeed, each proved himself as nothing but falsehood personified before the Commission.

Let us take the case of Lt.-Col. Nonogaki who claimed to have played an important role in each and every scene of the story, except the last one i.e., the alleged funeral scene of ‘Chandra Bose’. He claimed the status of chief pilot of the plane, but both Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission recorded that Major Takizawa was the chief pilot. He told that the plane came from Malan via Singapore to Saigon, but later said—no, it came from Manila.

He found Netaji and Gen. Shidei landing at Saigon airport at 4 p.m. from a small aircraft,—even Khosla did not accept this story.

He claimed that Col. Tada disclosed to him the code-name of Netaji at the airport, but Tada was not at all present at the airport.

He first said that Netaji and General Shidei spent the night at Tourane in the army barrack and then changed it to say—‘no, they stayed in a hotel’.

He denied that any advance message of the flight of the plane to Taihoku airport was sent, but contradicting him the Taihoku airport officer admitted that he received such a message. He gave a description of the air crash and identified the spot of the crash, differently at different times, which other witnesses did not corroborate.

Although all along he claimed to have acted as chief pilot of the plane, at the time of the crash, he claimed to find himself at a convenient place in the turret inside the plane so that he could justify his escape from the accident unhurt.

He appeared to assume the role of almost a supercommand
of Formosa Headquarters to send the message of plane crash from Taihoku to Saigon, but it was found that actually the Imperial Headquarters of Tokyo had sent such a message.

He further claimed that he was present by the side of Netaji till he breathed his last, but neither Shah Nawaz Committee, nor Khosla Commission agreed with him.

This Nonogaki said that he informed the Formosan Army Headquarters about the plane crash and death of Netaji and that General Ando came to see Netaji at the hospital but both these claims of Nonogaki proved totally false.

Nonogaki further said that he, Tara Kuno and Takahashi were shifted to Hokotu Hospital on August 18, but Takahashi told the Commission,—no, he (Takahashi) and Nonogaki were kept at Nonmon Hospital till August 27, 1945.

British Intelligence seriously doubted Lt.-Col. Nonogaki’s story so much so that after five years i.e., in 1950, he was examined by them at Tokyo. But, unfortunately, Mr. Khosla made no effort to get this important report of the British Intelligence. A serious question arises here, why after five years, the British Intelligence examined Nonogaki. But the answer remained a mystery, and Mr. Khosla took no notice of it. More instances of such chain of lies indulged in by Lt.-Col. Nonogaki can be added, but the few given above are enough to show how truthfully he gave his evidence before Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission.

EVIDENCE OF TARA KUNO AND OTHERS

Shah Nawaz Committee described Major Tara Kuno as ‘the most alert and observant witness’. Let us analyse the evidence of Tara Kuno and see how far he deserved to be so described. Tara Kuno said that he saw Netaji and Gen. Shidei talking at the Saigon airport before getting into the plane, and Netaji was the first to enter the plane, but none else corroborated his version. Most other witnesses said that Netaji and Habibur Rahman rushed to the plane when the propellers started moving. Kuno claimed that he was the navigator of the plane, but Shah Nawaz Committee recorded that Sergeant Okista was the navigator.
Like Nonogaki, Tara Kuno also gave out different stories about Netaji’s stay at Tourane. While he claimed to be the navigator of the plane, yet instead of sitting inside the cockpit to discharge the navigator’s duty, he told both Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission that at the time of air crash, he was with other passengers and, although his rank was that of a Major, he sat in the front row of the plane before Netaji and Gen. Shidei and talked to them many times during the air journey from Saigon to Taihoku.

All witnesses said that the plane instantly caught fire after the crash, but Kuno found at least 2-3 minutes’ time to see in what position other passengers were inside the plane when it nose-dived and crashed on the ground in terrific speed. No, these are not all,—he did other heroics also. He tried after the air crash to pull out Ayoagi, the co-pilot who was caught by broken parts of the cockpit, but failing that he broke open the hard plastic window of the cockpit and jumped out of it easily,—although he said in his earlier statement that the plane had split in the front portion.

Kuno told the Commission that he was very badly burnt and injured but claimed that he alone helped Netaji to put out the fire all over his body. About hospital scenes, he gave different versions to Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission.

Tara Kuno’s close friend Nonogaki claimed that Tara Kuno, Takahashi and himself were shifted to Hokuto hospital that very night of August 18, but Tara Kuno said that they were not shifted from Nonmon hospital till August 27, 1945. It is needless to add more instances of ‘truthfulness’ of Major Tara Kuno as well.

Lt.-Col. Sakai and Major Takahashi did not claim to have played very significant roles during the flight. However, they also differed in major points in telling the story of the flight and crash of the plane. Nonogaki said that the plane left Tourane before dawn, but Takahashi said it took off at 8 a.m. Col. Sakai first told Khosla Commission that he saw the rear wheel of the plane broke away and then correcting his earlier version,
he said,—no, the propeller of the left engine and the engine itself fell and the plane nose-dived. However, Takahashi said that the plane belly-landed and stood in normal position on the ground. To avoid the complications to describe what happened inside the plane, both Sakai and Takahashi said that they fell unconscious and finally found themselves thrown out of the plane almost uninjured.

Takahashi told the Commission that the plane broke into two parts and the doors were open, but all other witnesses said that the doors were closed and jammed.

Sakai first told the Commission that he saw the rear wheel breaking away from the plane, but before the same Commission he told later, that after the crash the rear wheel struck the ground.

Sakai further told Shah Nawaz Committee that while looking outside through the cockpit-window he struck its ceiling and fell unconscious and was thrown out of the plane. But earlier, in describing the arrangement of seats, he had fixed a rear seat for himself.

However, Sakai told Khosla Commission that at first he fell unconscious but then found himself sitting over the baggages with his left leg fractured and yet he managed to crawl out through the door of the crashed plane.

Habibur Rahman said that he alone came forward to put out the flames burning over the bush-shirt of Netaji, but Tara Kuno said—no, not Habibur Rahman, but he did it. On the contrary, Takahashi cancelling claims of both of them, told Khosla Commission that he alone helped Netaji to roll down on the ground to put out the flames burning all over his dress.

Habibur Rahman said that Netaji’s trousers were not much affected by the flames, but Nonogaki, Tara Kuno and Takahashi said that Netaji’s trousers and bush-shirt were almost completely burnt and Netaji was made completely naked.

Sakai and Takahashi had themselves cut off from the other scenes of the story, except Takahashi saying that he and Nonogaki were not shifted to Hokuto hospital that day, but remained
in the Nonmon hospital till August 27, 1945. About the time of crash they gave different timings ranging from 12 p.m. to 3 p.m. to both Shah Nawaz Committee and Khosla Commission.

Let the reader judge, how 'truthful' and 'convincing' these four 'most important witnesses' proved to be. Nevertheless Mr. Khosla came to his conclusion almost exclusively believing the story of the four-plus-one Japanese witnesses. Now, let us see how Dr. Yoshimi projected himself, in the image of 'most convincing witness of truth' as Mr. Khosla depicted him.

THE EVIDENCE OF THE PRIMA DONA WITNESS

Dr. Yoshimi made three statements, first one to the Allied Intelligence while he was in Stanley Jail in Hongkong in 1945, second to Shah Nawaz Committee in 1956, and the third to Khosla Commission in 1971.

Shah Nawaz Committee mentioned that in Stanley Jail in Hongkong in 1945, Dr. Yoshimi told the Allied Intelligence that Netaji died at 11 p.m. on August 18, 1945. Although Japanese witnesses had told Shah Nawaz Committee that a number of Japanese and Formosan nurses were present when Netaji died at Nonmon hospital, Shah Nawaz Committee observed, "None of the Japanese nurses could be traced. Formosan nurse Tsan Pi Shan, who made an 'important' statement before an Indian journalist, Mr. Harin Shah of Indian Free Press Journal in 1946 could not be examined as the Committee did not find it possible to visit Formosa". However, during Khosla Commission's visit to Formosa, the National Committee tried hard to find out if any nurse by the name of Tsan Pi Shan was there, but none could be traced. [See Chapter 4]

According to Dr. Yoshimi's statement before the Shah Nawaz Committee, "At 2 p.m. on August 18, 1945, Dr. Yoshimi received a telephonic message from Taihoku aerodrome and afterwards Netaji was brought to the hospital completely naked. He found that Netaji had severe burns all over his body and all of it had taken a greyish-colour-like-ash. Even his heart had burnt and his face was swollen. In Dr. Yoshimi's opinion his burns were of severe type i.e., of third degree. There was
no injury on his body and no blood came out of it. His eyes were also swollen. He could see, but had difficulty in opening the eyes. He was in his senses when he was brought in. He was in high fever,—his temperature was 39° centigrade. His pulse rate was 120 per minute. The condition of his heart was very weak”.

Now let us see what Habibur Rahman said before Shah Nawaz Committee. He told that Netaji’s trousers were not much affected by flames,—only his bush-shirt caught fire. But Dr. Yoshimi said that his whole body was burnt so severely that it turned like greyish ash. If the trousers were not burnt much, how the whole body turned greyish!

According to Dr. Yoshimi, Netaji had third degree burns and his temperature was as high as 39° centigrade and pulse beat 120, yet he was in his senses. Is it not a miracle in medical science that such an injured person remained in his senses and continued talking with the doctors and nurses for hours?

Habibur Rahman said Netaji was taken to the operation theatre, but Dr. Yoshimi denied it. Dr. Yoshimi told that Netaji talked to him many times, and of course, to translate into Japanese what Netaji said to Dr. Yoshimi an interpreter named I. Nakamura was promptly called in.

Dr. Yoshimi further told that “Netaji’s burns were dressed by Dr. Tsuruta, who applied a white ointment and bandaged him all over his body. He administered four injections to Netaji for stimulating his heart—‘one after another of Vita-Camphor and two injections of Digitamene. He also gave him three intravenous injections of Ring Solution of 500 cc each.’”

Dr. Yoshimi and Dr. Tsuruta said that only Netaji and Habibur Rahman were in one room. Habibur Rahman said—no, another person was also there: Major Takahashi and Major Kuno said Netaji was kept in a separate room, but Lt.-Col. Nonogaki said—no, all the injured persons were given beds in the same room. In this connection, it should also be kept in mind that Nonogaki claimed that in the hospital he was all along by the side of Netaji. Again, the interpreter, I. Nakamura, told
Shah Nawaz Committee that besides Netaji and Col. Rahman, three other Japanese officers were also in the same ward. Now, whom to believe,—Dr. Yoshimi alone, or all other witnesses?

Dr. Yoshimi added in his statement "In the case of severe burns of third degree, the blood gets thicker and there is high pressure on the heart. In order to relieve pressure, approximately 200 cc. of Netaji's blood was let out and 400 cc blood transfusion was given to him, and this blood was obtained from a Japanese soldier. This blood transfusion was made between 4 and 5 p.m. that day".

What Dr. Tsuruta said about the blood transfusion? He said, "no blood transfusion was given". Habibur Rahman also did not see, if any blood transfusion was 'given. Now, again whom to believe,—Dr. Yoshimi or Dr. Tsuruta in such a vital matter of blood transfusion for a patient having third degree burns?

Dr. Yoshimi told Shah Nawaz Committee that Netaji died at 8 p.m. but Dr. Tsuruta said that the time should be between 7 p.m. and 8 p.m. However, Dr. Yoshimi told the Allied Intelligence in Stanley Jail at Hongkong in 1946 that Netaji died at 11 p.m. but wrote in Emuri Shimbun in 1969 that he died at 10 p.m. Dr. Yoshimi, whose memory appeared to be proverbially so sharp that he could keep in mind exactly the temperature, pulse beat, quantity of blood let-out and blood transfusion, names of medicines and how many injections were given to Netaji,—all such details so correctly—but within a few months he forgot the vital point, i.e., the time of death of Netaji.

Again all the doctors and nurses were said to have wept after Netaji expired according to the Shah Nawaz Committee's report, but none attended the funeral of Netaji, nor could they say exactly what happened to his body after August 18, 1945. Strangely, none of the nurses could be found either in Japan or in Formosa. But what matters, whether any such nurses existed or not,—they were seen to weep at the time of Netaji's death! However, according to Shah Nawaz Committee's report Habibur Rahman did not confirm this mourning scene.
Dr. Yoshimi made three statements successively before (i) the Allied Intelligence in 1946, (ii) Shah Nawaz Committee, and (iii) Khosla Commission. A comparative study of these statements, regarding a few vital points will make it evident how ridiculously Dr. Yoshimi contradicted himself in matters of essential information relating treatment of Netaji.

1. When Was Netaji Brought To The Hospital ?

Dr. Yoshimi told the Allied Intelligence in 1946 that on August 18 at 5 p.m. Bose with 6 or 7 persons were brought to the hospital.

To Shah Nawaz Committee he said that on August 18, at about 2 p.m. he received a telephonic message from the airport intimating him about the news of air crash, and 20 minutes thereafter Bose with 13 or 14 persons was brought to the hospital.

The same doctor told Khosla Commission that before noon he received a telephone call from the airport and 7 persons including 2 Indians, arrived at the hospital at about 12-30 p.m. (But Mr. Khosla recorded in his Report that air accident took place exactly at 2-30 p.m.)

2. Who Dressed And Applied Ointment ?

Dr. Yoshimi told the Allied Intelligence (A.I.) in 1946 that he personally cleaned Bose’s injuries with oil and dressed them.

To Shah Nawaz Committee (S.N.C.) he said,—no, not he, but Dr. Tsuruta applied white ointment on Netaji’s burns and bandaged him.

According to his statement to Khosla Commission (K.C.) Dr. Yoshimi said that he treated Netaji’s burns all over his body and bandaged him after applying plaster.

3. What Was The Condition Of Netaji’s Burns ?

To A.I. : Bose was suffering from extensive burns over the whole body,—so much so that very little was left for his identification.
To S.N.C.: Bose was severely burnt. It looked greyish colour like ash. Even his heart was burnt. He had third degree burns. His face and eyes were swollen. He was in high fever, his temperature was 39° centigrade. His pulse rate was 120 per minute.

To K.C.: “Chandra Bose” suffered general burns all over the body.

Now, firstly, during cross-examination before Khosla Commission, he told that he made a mistake in his signed statement made before Shah Nawaz Committee to write that Bose’s heart was burnt. Secondly can anyone remain conscious after third degree burns? But Dr. Yoshimi said that Netaji was conscious for hours, although he had 120 pulse-beat. Thirdly, is it possible to remember so precisely the temperature and pulse beat after so many years? But Dr. Yoshimi remembered them quite well, although in all other vital matters he forgot to remember what exactly happened.

Dr. Yoshimi made another wonderful exhibition of his truthfulness before Khosla Commission. He admitted earlier that he had never seen Bose before and told Mr. Khosla that when he was brought to the hospital “very little was left of his identification” and “his eyes were swollen, and body turned greyish”, but when he was shown a picture of Netaji by one of the National Committee Counsels Shri Amar Chakravarty in the course of cross-examination at Tokyo, he promptly said,—yes, yes, he is the person whom he treated in the hospital!

4. When Netaji Died?

To A.I.: Dr. Yoshimi said that Netaji died after 9 p.m., Bose was sinking into unconsciousness, he was in a coma and regained his consciousness and died at 11 p.m. But Habibur Rahman said that Netaji regained his consciousness before he breathed his last and talked to him to dictate his last message to the Indian people. [More about it later.]

To S.N.C.: Shortly after 8 p.m. Bose breathed his last.
He tried to give artificial respiration to Bose but without success.

To K.C.: He was conscious for 7 or 8 hours. Mr. Bose survived in the hospital for 12 hours and died in his presence.

Now, firstly, he did not say either to Allied Intelligence or Khosla Commission that he tried to revive Bose by giving artificial respiration. Secondly, he told Khosla Commission that his statement before Shah Nawaz Committee that Bose died at 8 p.m. was not correct. Thirdly, he told Allied Intelligence that Bose lapsed into coma after 9 p.m., but the same person told Khosla Commission that he was conscious for 7½ hours after being brought to the hospital.

5. **When Habibur Rahman left Nonmon Hospital?**

To A.I.: Dr. Yoshimi said that after 10 days i.e., on August 28, Habibur Rahman was sent to Hokuto hospital carrying Bose’s ashes with him.

To S.N.C.: He said that Habibur Rahman left Nonmon hospital on August 19 and never came back. He also did not know where he went or whether he took with him Bose’s ashes.

To K. C.: He told that Habibur Rahman left the hospital with Bose’s body day after his death,—and he never came back. No, he further said during cross-examination before the same Commission that the dead body was removed on the morning of August, 19. During cross-examination he told Khosla Commission that he was not sure which of his own statements was correct.

6. **Was Blood Transfusion Given?**

*And, if so, by whom?*

To A.I.: Dr. Yoshimi did not mention anything about blood transfusion.

To S.N.C.: Dr. Yoshimi said that he himself let out approximately 200 cc of blood and transfused 400 cc fresh blood into Bose’s body.
To K.C. : He did not give blood transfusion and did not let out blood from Bose’s body.

However, another physician, Dr. Tsuruta, who claimed that he was all along present by the side of Netaji said,—no! no blood transfusion at all was given to Bose. Secondly, it was then stated by Dr. Yoshimi that an Army Headquarters doctor gave blood transfusion when he found that the nurse failed to find out Bose’s vein—however, without knowing anything about treatment of Bose. But who was the doctor who gave blood transfusion to Netaji, without any instruction from either Dr. Yoshimi or Dr. Tsuruta? None of these doctors could identify either the nurse or the doctor who was said to have given blood transfusion to Netaji.

7. WAS DR. YOSHIMI PRESENT ALL THE TIME
BY THE SIDE OF BOSE?

Dr. Yoshimi told Shah Nawaz Committee that he and Dr. Tsuruta were present all the time by the side of Netaji, but later told—no, he was not present there all the time. When Bose’s condition deteriorated he came to see him after being informed by Dr. Tsuruta.

HOW TRUTHFUL IS DR. YOSHIMI?

Let the reader judge what kind of "most important witnesses" are the four Japanese who appeared before the Commission and how ‘truthful’ is Dr. Yoshimi, whom Mr. Khoala described as a ‘witness of convincing truth’. Lt.-Col. Nonogaki, Major Tara Kuno, Col. Sakai, Major Takahashi and Dr. Yoshimi indulged in lies, scores of unabashed lies, whenever they were confronted with any question regarding details of any aspect of the story. Palpably they were tutored only to tell about the broad outlines of the story that was cooked up by the war-time Japanese authorities. The story they told was wholly fictitious, and that explained why they proved ludicrously incoherent during cross-examination. They tried to apply their imagination to answer questions regarding details, and one lie led them to indulge in another lie and
finally each witness differed materially from the other. But who cares for these lies! Neither Shah Nawaz Committee, nor Khosla Commission made any effort to scan the statements of the Japanese witnesses to resolve the mystery why they contradicted themselves so ridiculously in the course of their cross-examination. These five Japanese told Mr. Khosla that they either had known or seen Netaji dead, and that was enough for him to come to the conclusion that Netaji indeed died at Taihoku hospital!