IV. SULTAN NASIRUDDIN MAHMUD

G E N E A L O G Y

Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud was the grandson of Shamsuddin Iltutmish, and not his son, as is often erroneously stated. Isami, whose ancestors were officers of the Delhi court, is very clear about the matter: ‘When Shahzada Nasiruddin, son of Iltutmish, the conqueror of Hind, died at Lakhnauti, he left a son who was born after his death.’ Ferishta speaks in the same strain. ‘The name of the eldest son of Sultan Shamsuddin Iltutmish was Nasiruddin. After he (Shahzada Nasiruddin) had died in the territory of Lakhnauti, this son (Sultan Nasiruddin), who was Shahzada Nasiruddin’s youngest son, was born. Out of love (for his deceased son) Iltutmish gave him the same name and strove to educate him.’ Iltutmish obviously wanted the young baby to be considered his son and not his grandson for dynastic reasons; so we should not be surprised at the fact that he was called the son (ibn) of Iltutmish all his life. Minhaj writes: ‘Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud, son of the Sultan, partner (qasim) of the Amirul Muminin, was born after the death of (Shahzada) Nasiruddin at Delhi. Iltutmish gave him the name and title of his eldest son and sent his mother to live in a palace in the village of Loni, so that she may bring him up there.’ Sultan Iltutmish could not have put away his wife for bearing him a son. Nasiruddin Mahmud’s mother married a Turkish officer, Qutlugh Khan; this could hardly have been possible for a widow of Iltutmish.

A C C E S S I O N, P O L I C Y A N D C H A R A C T E R

We do not know when Nasiruddin was taken from the Loni palace to be interned in the Daulat Khana; if his government of Bahraich was good, the credit must go to the officers in charge, for he was too young to govern a district. Born in 1229, he must have been sixteen or seventeen when the Turkish maliks invited him to Delhi. His mother gave out that he was sick and that she was taking him to the capital for treatment. She put him in her own litter during the day, but at night he put on a veil and rode on a horse. So

1 Isami (Dr. Mehdi Hasan’s edition), 140.
2 Ferishta, I, 70. Ferishta obviously implies that Shahzada Nasiruddin had left other sons also. Shahzada Jalaluddin, to whom references are made hereafter, was probably a step-brother of Sultan Nasiruddin.
3 Minhaj, 201-2.
accompanied by a few horsemen and footmen he reached Delhi as soon as possible and only those involved in the conspiracy knew of his coming. On 23 Muharram 644/27 May 1246 he ascended the throne at the Qasr-i Sabz; two days later he held a durbar in the audience hall of Qasr-i Firuzah and the people pledged allegiance to him.

Sultan Nasiruddin is generally painted as a man of saintly disposition, who had little interest in political or administrative affairs, being all the time devoted to prayers and religious observances. This assessment ignores the basic facts of his life. A deeper analysis of the pulls and pressures of the time leads us to the conclusion that if he turned to religious devotions and rites, it was to escape from the terrors of political life. He was essentially political in outlook, and that he could keep his head on his shoulders for twenty years under these circumstances is no mean compliment to his political tact and adroitness.

During the decade that had passed since Iltutmish's death (1236-46) four princes of the royal dynasty had been placed on the throne and then deposed and put to death. It was a warning to the young man of sixteen; the Shamsi maliks were his sole support; they were also his only source of danger. He was prepared to obey them for he had no other choice. 'He sought the goodwill of the leaders of the army,' Isami tells us, 'and was from his heart the well-wisher of every one of them.' The surrender was absolute. 'He expressed no opinion without their prior permission; he did not move his hands or feet except at their order. He would neither drink water nor go to sleep except with their knowledge.' This led at least to one good result. 'He reigned (or seemed to reign) like a free man and not like the (previous) harassed Shahzadas.' So long as the Shamsi maliks

4 Minhaj attributes to the king every martial, administrative and religious virtue he can think of, but the following sentence with which he ends his praises proves that he did not wish us to take him seriously. 'According to the unanimous opinion of contemporaries (these virtues) were not found in any sultan of the post or in any of the emperors (mu'lik) of ancient times.' (207). Minhaj had to praise both his patrons; so we find him giving the title of 'Sultan' to Bahauddin Balban and of 'Sultanus Salatin' to Nasiruddin Mahmud. In the fifteenth year of the reign Minhaj remarks: 'Though according to the Traditions of the Prophet, Ulugh Khan has the status of a father with reference to the king, he is more obedient and submissive than a thousand newly-purchased slaves.' (320).

5 Isami, unlike Minhaj, does not talk as if there were two sovereigns and the picture he gives is sufficiently clear. 'I have heard', he says, 'that Ulugh Khan served the king and controlled all his affairs; the king lived in the palace and Ulugh Khan governed the empire.' The long list of religious virtues attributed to Nasiruddin by tradition is first put together by Isami. The Sultan took nothing from the public revenue but earned his livelihood by making copies of the Quran and selling them.
were united, Nasiruddin had no difficulty; he would sit on the throne and give the orders they recommended to him. But his difficulties would arise if the Shamsi maliks were broken into two nearly balanced parties and he would be risking his neck if he did not join the winning group. But in the early years of his reign his path was clear. Bahauddin Balban was the chief malik at the capital and the Sultan just did what Balban asked him to do. Among other things it was Balban’s policy to take the royal standards (which included the Sultan) for a campaign every winter against the Mongols, independent Hindu chiefs or rebellious maliks. Minhaj recounts the events year by year for the first fifteen years and it will be convenient for us to do the same with some necessary digressions.

**FIRST REGNAL YEAR, 644 (19 MAY 1246-47)**

Bahauddin Balban decided on a military demonstration on the north-western frontier. There was no enemy to fight, but the Khokar chief had acted as a guide to the Mongols, ‘for the simple reason that the government of Delhi was unable to protect the Indus frontier’. The royal standards started from Delhi in Rajab (November/December 1246) and the Ravi was crossed on 10 March 1247. The royal standards remained at the Sodra river, but Bahauddin Balban was sent forward to plunder the Salt Range (Koh-i Jud) and the precincts of Ninduna. He reached the Indus but had to return as no cultivated village or town had been left anywhere and no provisions could be obtained for the army. The Sultan started back from the Sodra on 15 March 1247. Balban and his troops probably returned later.

**SECOND REGNAL YEAR, 645 (8 MAY 1247-48)**

There was a civil war among the Mongols; so Bahauddin Balban decided on a campaign in the Doab. A fort called Talsindah, built by a Hindu chief in the Kanauj district, was taken after a stiff fight. The royal standards reached Kara on 17 March 1248. From here Balban was sent against a Hindu chief, whose name is incorrectly written as ‘Dulki wa Mulki’. ‘He was a rana in the territory between secretly. ‘He was one of the chosen people of God, always absorbed in thoughts of Allah... Some people say he was a saint, while others put him among the prophets... I have heard so many good things of this famous king that I cannot recount them all’ (150-1).

We have no business to question the sincerity of Nasiruddin’s religious devotions; where Isam after the passage of a century saw so much smoke, there must have been some fire. But no one claims that Nasiruddin, like the Umayyad Caliph Umar II, considered administrative matters on the basis of any religious principles or that he had any influence on the policy of the state,
the Jumna and Kalinjar.” The rana defended his place from morning to sunset and fled at night. What he could not take away fell into Balban’s hands. The royal standards reached Delhi on 20 May 1248. Minhaj says that he wrote a short book of verse on the campaign, called Nasir-i Namah; and in reward for it the king gave him an annual in’ām (gift), which he had been getting regularly, and Balban gave him a village in Hansi, the income of which was 30,000 fitals. Jalaluddin Mas’ud Shah, the king’s step-brother, who was the muqta of Kanauj, came to see him and was granted the iqta of Sambhal and Badaun. But after some time a sudden fear seized him and he fled from Sambhal to Santurgarh in the Sirmur hills, where he could expect the protection of the rana of the place.

THIRD REGNAL YEAR, 646 (26 APRIL 1248-49)

The king did not go far, but Balban and the maliks were sent with a large army to attack Ranthambhor and to plunder the Kohpayah of Mewat and the territories of Bahar Deva, who was ‘the greatest of the rais of Hindustan’. Minhaj’s account does not hide the fact that the campaign was a failure. Malik Bahauddin Aibek was killed by the Hindus at the foot of the Ranthambhor fort while Balban was fighting on another side. The discomfited army reached Delhi on 18 May 1249.

Charges were brought against the chief qazi of the empire, Imaduddin Shafurqani, and he was dismissed from his post at the Qasr-i Safed on 29 March 1249; Qazi Jalal Kashani was appointed in his place on 11 June 1250.

FOURTH REGNAL YEAR, 647 (16 APRIL 1249-50)

There was, according to Minhaj, a general desire that the daughter of Bahauddin Balban should be the queen or malka-i jahan; so she was married to the king on 2 August 1249. The following appointments were made on 16 October 1249. Bahauddin Balban was given the office of regent or naib-i mamlakat ‘with full power to control the army and the administration’, and in consonance with his new post his status was raised from that of a malik to that of a ‘Khan’. The title Ulugh Khan or Premier Khan was considered most appropriate. Ulugh’s younger brother, Saifuddin Aibek, who had formerly been amir-i akhur, was appointed to the post of amir-i haft, now vacated by Ulugh and enrolled among the Khans with the title of Kashli Khan. Malik Tajuddin Tabar Khan was appointed naib-i amir-i haftib and Alauddin Ayaz Raihani (son of the historian Minhaj) was appointed naib-i vakildar. Ikhtiyaruddin Aibek Mui-daraz (of the long hair) was promoted from the post of naib-i amir-i akhur to that of
amir-i akhur. These appointments along with others, which Minhaj has not recorded, must have made Ulugh Khan all-powerful at the centre. It was high time for his rivals to move also. His early achievements, according to Minhaj, had made other (Turkish) maliks envious of him and the thorns of jealousy were rankling in their hearts.6

STRUGGLE OF IZZUDDIN BALBAN KISHLU KHAN WITH SHER KHAN

At the accession of Alauddin Mas'ud, Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan7 (also known as Balban-i Buzurg and Balban-i Zar, 'Balban of the White Hair') had given up his right to the throne, such as it was, in return for the territories of Nagaur, Mandor and the Siwaliks. When Ulugh Khan led Alauddin Mas'ud and his forces to the frontier and drove away the Mongol Mankutah, he assigned Multan to Kishlu Khan, and Lahore and Tabarhinda (Bhatinda) to his own uncle's son, Malik Nusrutuddin Sher Khan Sanqar. Fershta, on the authority of Barani, credits Sher Khan with the construction of the forts of Bhatinda and Bhatnir.8 Uchch, for the time-being, seems to have been left in the hands of the officers of the extinct Ayazi dynasty.

Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan came to Delhi and demanded Uchch and Multan in return for Nagaur and the Siwaliks. The king acceded to his demand, but after seizing Uchch and Multan he refused to hand over Nagaur, and the Sultan and Ulugh Khan had to march against him to secure his submission.

Nasiruddin Hasan Qarleigh, whose position as the successor of Jalaluddin Mankarni had been extremely difficult, attacked Multan by way of Bunyan but died during the struggle.9 His followers, however, kept his death a secret and succeeded in persuading Kishlu Khan to hand over Multan to them peacefully. When Kishlu found out their deception, it was too late, for the fort was in the hands of the Qarlhigs. Sher Khan, however, succeeded in seizing the fort from the Qarlhigs and put his own officers in charge of it. Kishlu

6 Minhaj, Tabaqat 22 on the Turkish Maliks, No. 24, Biography of Ulugh Khan.
7 To prevent confusion between the two Balbans, some medieval historians refer to Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan as Balban-i Buzurg or the senior Balban and to Bahauddin Balban Ulugh Khan (later Sultan Ghayasuddin Balban) as Balban-i Khurd or the junior Balban. It is more convenient to refer to them by the titles they held as Kishlu Khan and Ulugh Khan. Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan must be carefully distinguished from Ulugh Khan's younger brother, Saifuddin, who had the title of Kashi Khan.
8 Vol. I, 70.
9 Bunyan is often referred to in the course of this reign. It was probably a town in Afghanistan, which has now disappeared.
retaliated by laying siege to Multan for two months in 1250 but his failure was complete. Sher Khan then laid siege to Uchch; the garrison closed the gates and prepared to fight. But Kishlu Khan, who happened to be outside Uchch at the time, went straight to Sher Khan’s camp, relying upon that tie of brotherhood among the Shamsi maliks, which demanded that they should deal fairly with each other ‘since they were of one family and of one “nest.”’ Sher Khan treated him well but would not set him free till he had ordered his officers in Uchch to hand over the citadel to Sher Khan. When this had been done, Sher Khan allowed him to proceed to Delhi. Ulugh gave to Kishlu Badaun as his iqta. The Siwaliks in future years are referred to as the iqtas of Ulugh Khan.

**Fifth and Sixth Regnal Years, 648-649 (5 April 1250-52)**

Qazi Jalaluddin Kashani died in February 1251, and on 31 July 1251, Minhaj was appointed Head Qazi for a second time and also given the judicial government (masnad-i hukumat) of Delhi. ‘On 25 Sha‘ban A.H. 649 (12 November 1251) the royal standards moved towards Gwalior, Chanderi, Narnol and Malwa. Malwa was nearly reached during this campaign. Jahar (Deva) of Ijar, the greatest rai of the region, who had five thousand horsemen and two lakhs of footmen, was defeated and the fort of Narnol, which he had constructed, was conquered and destroyed.’ It was a mere plundering raid and does not seem to have destroyed Jahar Deva’s power.

The position at the end of 1250 was briefly as follows. The central government was under the control of Ulugh Khan as naib-i mamlakat and his younger brother, Kashli Khan, as amir-i hajib; the whole of Sind had come within the power of their cousin, Sher Khan, while distant Lakhnauti was in the hands of an erratic and disloyal officer, Yuzbek Tughril Khan, for whose appointment Ulugh Khan had been responsible. Apart from his over-all control of the empire, Ulugh Khan had been assigned the territories of Hansi and the Siwaliks and some minor regions; Nagaur, taken from Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan, had been assigned to Ulugh Khan’s younger brother, Saifuddin Kashli Khan. What then of the rights of other

10 Minhaj tells us that he received a letter from his sister, who was somewhere in Khurasan, telling him of her distress. The king and Ulugh Khan provided him with 40 slaves and 100 ass-loads of goods to send to his sister. He had to proceed in the summer of 1250 to arrange for their transport from Multan to Khurasan. He met Sher Khan somewhere on the Bias. On the day he reached Multan, Izzuddin Balban also arrived to besiege it. He had no alternative but to remain in Izzuddin’s camp. ‘The heat was intense.’ (290).
Turkish slave-officers?11 Surely too much political power and territory had been monopolized by one family group and its allies, and it seemed to many Turkish officers that a readjustment was necessary.

SEVENTH REGNAL YEAR, 650 (14 MARCH 1252-53)

The chief topic of the remaining nine years of Nasiruddin's reign, of which Minhaj has left us an account, is the struggle of the two groups of Turkish khans and maliks for power, and it is necessary to examine his approach to the problem. 'Gratitude is a necessary virtue', he says, and since he owed more to Ulugh Khan than to any one else, he naturally praises Ulugh Khan more than others. But he was under obligations to almost all Turkish maliks, and so far as possible he overlooks their crimes even when they amounted, as in the case of Sher Khan and Kishlu Khan, to an attempt to deflect the Mongol invasions from Persia and China to northern India. Further, since he proposed to publish his book during his life-time, he had to protect himself and the interests of his family against any unforeseen changes in the Turkish political regime. On the other hand, he was under no obligation to Imaduddin Raithan, an Indian political adventurer, who had no following either among the Turkish officers or the public, and had been dead for about eight years when Minhaj brought his book to a close. The great maliks of the opposition party, though defeated, were still alive, and Minhaj had no desire to be unfair to them. But the dead Raithan could be blamed for all their faults and nobody was concerned to defend him.

The chief opponent of Ulugh Khan was Husamuddin Qutugh Khan, son of Alauddin Jani, Iltutmish's governor of Bihar; he was considered by many to be the most senior of the Turkish maliks. Qutugh's chief supporter was his son-in-law, Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan, whom Sher Khan had deprived of his frontier provinces. The rest were trimmers, who were induced in the end to cast their lot with Ulugh Khan. It must be added that both parties realized that the position of the Turkish slave-officers in northern India was so insecure that they could not undertake the risk of a civil war.

EIGHTH REGNAL YEAR, 651 (3 MARCH 1253-54)

'On 22 Shawwal a.h. 650 (27 December 1252) the royal standards started in the direction of Ghazni and Lahore by way of Uchch and Multan... In this campaign all the maliks and khans of the provinces joined the royal standards. Qutugh Khan from Bayana and Izzuddin Kishlu Khan from Badaun accompanied them till the Bias.' The

11 Ibid., 215-16.
object was not to fight an enemy but to solve a domestic problem. Minhaj tells us that ‘Imaduddin Raihan in secret changed the attitude of the Sultan and the maliks towards Ulugh Khan’. Whether he was commissioned for the enterprise by Qutlugh and Kishlu or offered them his services on his own initiative cannot now be discovered. But he certainly could not have started the enterprise off his own bat. Minhaj says that an attempt to assassinate Ulugh failed. But this suspicion seems unfair. Till that time the idea of assassination as a political weapon had not entered the mind of either party; what the opposition wanted was an equitable distribution of posts and territories. ‘Since they could not achieve what they wanted, they agreed together, came to the royal pavilion and requested: “Ulugh Khan should go to his iqta.”’ The Sultan, who was then at Rohtak, ordered Ulugh Khan to depart and Ulugh Khan left for Hansi on the last day of Muharram A.H. 651 (1 April 1253).

In obeying peacefully the orders of the young Sultan of twenty-three, Ulugh Khan took the wisest course possible. Qutlugh, Kishlu and Raihan had got a temporary advantage, but the opinion of the Shamsi maliks on second thoughts was sure to change in Ulugh’s favour. Raihan, according to Minhaj, insisted that Ulugh Khan should vacate Hansi and go to Nagaur so that the post of amir-i hajib along with the iqta of Hansi may be given to Shuhammad Ruknuddin.12 Again Ulugh Khan obeyed. His younger brother, Kashli Khan, was deprived of the office of amir-i hajib and sent to govern the iqta of Kara. The post of wazir was assigned to Malik Muhammad Nizam Junaidi in June or July 1253. The post of Head Qazi was taken from Minhaj and given to Qazi Shamsuddin Bahraichi (22 September 1253). Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan became naib-i amir-i hajib; Raihan was appointed vakildar. ‘All appointments made by Ulugh Khan were changed or overthrown and the stable condition of the government was upturned owing to the improper judgement of Raihan.’ Minhaj forgets to tell us what office or territory was given to Qutlugh Khan. Bahar Deva, the Rai of Ranthambhor—the greatest, noblest and highest of the rais of Hindustan—fought a battle with Ulugh Khan, but Ulugh won the battle and returned victorious to Nagaur.

The problem of Sher Khan, who held the Sind provinces, still remained. ‘At the beginning of Shawwal (3 November 1253) the royal standards started for the conquest of Uchch, Tabarhinda and Multan.’ But the Sultan remained on the Bias and an army was sent against Tabarhinda. Sher Khan, like his cousin, decided not to fight.

12 He was the son of Sultan Nasiruddin, and must have been a minor.
He left India and went to Mangu Qa-an. Minhaj assures us that he was received by Mangu with honours, but the Mongol high command had already drawn up its extensive plans for expansion in China in the east and in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt in the west. Sher Khan could not change these plans, but his going to the Mongol court rendered him unfit in all eyes for holding charge of India's frontier provinces after he had returned from his futile mission. His Indian iqtas were assigned by the reigning group to Malik Arsalan Khan Sanjar in February 1254; Sher Khan's officers seem to have offered no resistance.

Concerning the party now in eclipse, it is best to let Minhaj describe it:

"The condition of the oppressed, who were subjected to dismissal and tyranny owing to the absence of Ulugh Khan and were driven to a corner, was like that of fish out of water and of the sick without sleep; from morn to night and night to morn they prayed to God that Ulugh Khan may return to power again, and that the darkness of Raihan may be turned into the sunlight of Ulugh Khan. The prayers of the distressed were accepted, and the victorious banners of Ulugh Khan moved towards the capital. The reason for it was this. The maliks and officers of the court were either Turks of pure birth or high-born Taziks. Raihan was an unworthy eunuch from the tribes of Hindustan; nevertheless, he commanded high-born officers. All were offended and could not bear the disgrace any longer. Owing to the minions of Raihan it was impossible for the author for six months or more to come out of his house or go to the Juma prayers. What must have been the condition of others, every one of whom was a Turk, a world-conquering malik and a commander accustomed to overthrowing his opponents?"

The attitude of the Qutlugh-Kishlu group was probably more liberal towards the Indian Musalmans and the Hindu chiefs as some future events were to show. But this fact must have gone against them among the closed circle of Turkish slave-officers. In any case, Ulugh Khan, working from Nagaur, succeeded in winning over the majority of Turkish officers, including even those appointed by the Qutlugh-Kishlu group, to his side. The scales were no longer evenly balanced.

**Ninth Regnal Year, 652 (21 February 1254-55)**

Towards the fag end of the winter the Sultan marched to the source of the Rahib or Ramganga. The Hindus of Katehr (Rohil-

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khand), who had killed Razial Mulk Izzuddin Damishi, were severely punished. On 27 April 1254, the wizarat was given to Najmuddin Abu Bakr for a second time.

After the rainy season news came of ‘the gathering of the maliks’. ‘In short, the (Turkish) maliks of Hindustan, from the territory of Kara and Manikpur and the city of Awadh, which is in the north, to Badaun, and from Tabarhinda, Sunam and Samana and the Siwaliks, requested Ulugh Khan to return to the capital. Arsalan Khan marched with his army from Tabarhinda and Ban Khan from Sunam and Mansurpur. Ulugh Khan collected his army in Nagaur and the Siwaliks, and Jalaluddin Mas’ud Shah joined them from Lahore. They moved towards the capital.’ We are left to conclude that, in case no agreement was reached, Sultan Nasiruddin could be replaced by his step-brother, Jalaluddin.

The Sultan, under Raihan’s guidance, moved from Delhi to Sunam while Ulugh Khan and the opposition maliks were at Tabarhinda. Raihan, who had already put his neck in the noose, may have urged the Sultan to fight, but the Sultan and the Turkish maliks with him had no such intentions. The two armies in their movements took care not to come within fighting distance but to remain near enough to negotiate. The Sultan’s attitude, if one may attempt to interpret it, was one of non-concern; the two Turkish parties must decide their policy and he would accept any arrangement they desired. ‘A number of amirs from the two sides began to talk of peace; the mischief-maker for both sides was Raihan.’

Minhaj tells us how the negotiations took place. ‘Qirrat Qimar, a special slave-officer of Ulugh Khan, came from his army. Husamuddin Qutlugh (Khan), the malik of the black banner famed for his age, was appointed to discuss every matter in full with him and Qutbuddin Hasan Ali (Ghuri).’ Both parties agreed that Raihan should be dismissed from the court and sent to govern Badaun. Qutlugh may have promised Raihan his personal protection, but both parties joined in compelling him to leave the court. The other terms of the agreement are not given by Minhaj. It seems probable that Qutlugh Khan was promised the governorship of Awadh and Kishlu Khan his former iqtas of Uchch and Multan; Ulugh Khan was to return to Delhi and hold his former post of naih-i mamlkat with full powers, and his control of the central policy left both opponents and neutrals at his mercy. ‘To complete the arrangement, Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan was sent to the camp of Ulugh Khan on 15 December 1254, and Ban Khan Aibek Khitai came to the royal camp.’ On 29 December Minhaj was commissioned to give the promises necessary to all opposition Turkish officers. Next day Ulugh Khan and officers of
both parties came and kissed the royal hands. Delhi was reached on 21 January 1255.

TENTH REGNAL YEAR, 653 (10 FEBRUARY 1255-56)

Minhaj says that the new year began with ‘a strange event in the haram of the Sultan and no one knew of the secret’. But from what he proceeds to state this event could only have been the marriage of the Sultan’s mother with Qutlug Khan.\textsuperscript{14} ‘The mind of the Sultan was alienated from his mother, the Malka-i Jahan, and as she was the wife of Qutlug Khan, they were assigned the iqta of Awadh and ordered to go there (16 February 1255).’ Minhaj was appointed Chief Qazi of the empire and given the judicial administration of Delhi for the third time (2 May 1250).

The most shocking event at the court was the public assassination of Malik Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri at Ulugh Khan’s order. Minhaj was driven to utter an official lie, but Isami gives us the correct facts. Isami’s grandfather, Izzuddin, who had brought him up under his fostering care, had been a sipahsalar in Sultan Balban’s army, and his great grandfather, Zahiruddin Isami, was a vakildar of Sultan Nasiruddin. A canopy or chahar in those days was one of the symbols of royal authority, and Ulugh Khan, returning to power once more, wanted Sultan Nasiruddin to hand over the royal chahar to him. He feigned to have fallen ill and did not come to the court for a few days. The Sultan became anxious and sent a hajib to inquire about his welfare. Ulugh Khan replied that he had fallen ill owing to his longing for the chahar, and that he wanted a white chahar with a willow-wand under it and a gold cup at the top in place of an eagle. The Sultan, whom circumstances had reduced to a nonentity, readily agreed to part with his chahar and humbly replied; ‘I am prepared to part with my own chahar; do whatever you like.’ The next day Ulugh Khan appeared in the court with a chahar over his head. This horrified the old nobility, and Malik Qutbuddin\textsuperscript{15} Hasan Ghuri made some sarcastic remarks. Ulugh Khan was incensed and made up his mind to set an example by punishing the insolent malik. One day he brought some assassins with him, and when Qutbuddin Hasan

\textsuperscript{14} It is difficult to guess the reasons for the lady’s behaviour, for Qutlug Khan was a man of advanced age. But a court dominated by Ulugh Khan and his daughter may not have been to her liking.

\textsuperscript{15} Since the murder of Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri was a well-known fact, Minhaj had to use his words with care and throw suspicions on the wrong quarters. ‘During Rabi II they conveyed statements of Qutbuddin Hasan Ali, who had been naib-i mamalikat, to the royal ear. Since these statements were against the royal wishes, he was arrested on 23 Rabi II a.h. 653 (1 June 1255) and imprisoned and put to death.’ (220).
entered the palace for a formal court assembly, they tore him to pieces. The Sultan asked Ulugh Khan what the tumult was about. 'Do not be afraid of this noise,' the latter replied, 'There was a thorn that was doing permanent injury to the garden of the kingdom; I ordered it to be torn up and thrown down from the royal roof.' 'The king was deeply pained,' Isami writes, 'but he could say nothing in the presence of Ulugh Khan.' \[16\] This is the first recorded political assassination of which Ulugh Khan was guilty. When the Chengizi Mongols attacked Firuz Koh, Qutbuddin Hasan, son of Ali, was the most senior prince of the Churid or Shansabani dynasty. Minhaj in his *Tabaqā* (Chapter) on the Mongols gives some account of his attempts to resist the Mongols and of his reaching India after many hair-breadth escapes. Among the officers of the Delhi sultanat he was distinguished by his noble origin. He never took part in any intrigue, and was generally respected and trusted. Not being a Turkish slave-officer, he was unable to reach the status of a khan, but at the time of his assassination he held the *iqta* of Meerut, which was transferred to Kashli Khan.

\[\text{\textbullet\quad Malik Tajuddin Mah Peshani had been assigned Bahraich and for this reason he had been arrested and imprisoned by Qutlugh Khan. But Tajuddin set himself free by a manly trick, crossed the Ghagra on a boat and marched against Bahraich with a few horsemen. Divine destiny had ordered the good fortune of the Turks to rise and of the Indians to decline. Raihan was defeated, captured and put to death in Rajab 653 (August/September 1255). His death ruined Qutlugh Khan's plans.}\[17\]

Nevertheless, Qutlugh Khan, as governor of Awadh, refused to obey the royal commands, which he knew to be the orders of Ulugh Khan, and other Turkish officers also joined him. The royal command finally transferred him from Awadh to Bahraich, but he disobeyed it also. An army was sent against him under Tajuddin Tabar Khan and Bektam Aur Khan; the two armies came face to face at Samramau in the Badaun district; Aur Khan was killed; Tabar retreated to Delhi and was appointed governor of Awadh. But Awadh had still to be conquered and it was obvious that the whole royal army would be needed for the enterprise. Ulugh Khan collected all the soldiers he could and reached Awadh in Muharram 654 (February 1256). Qutlugh and his officers retreated before the royal army, crossed the Ghagra and disappeared into the unknown. Ulugh's pursuit of them proved fruitless.

\[16\] Isami, Mehdi Hassan's text, 152-53.

\[17\] Minhaj, *Tabaqā* 22, No. 12 (Biography of Balban).
ELEVENTH REGNAL YEAR, 654
(13 JANUARY 1256-57)

As soon as the royal army had returned to Delhi, Qutlugh reappeared. ‘But as he was unable to establish his power in Hindustan,’ Minhaj says,

‘he retreated to Santurgarh and established his power in the Sirmur hills. Everyone served him for he was a great malik and had claims on all officers of the court and the Turkish maliks. Wherever he went, they honoured him on account of favours received in the past and with an eye to the future. When he sought refuge in Sirmur, Rana Dilpat Hindi, who had a great position among the Hindus, consented to serve him for it is their custom to protect the innocent.’

Ulugh Khan succeeded in capturing Santurgarh, but both the Rana and Qutlugh Khan escaped and the latter moved westwards to join Kishlu Khan, who had rebelled.

TWELFTH REGNAL YEAR, 655
(19 JANUARY 1257-58)

After getting Uchch and Multan as the result of the settlement of 1255, Kishlu had got into touch with Halaku Khan through Malik Shamsuddin Kert of Ghur. He gave his son as a hostage and asked for a Mongol shuhna to be sent to his court. But Halaku was in no position to give him any assistance, and Kishlu decided to rebel against Delhi on his own responsibility. He was joined by Qutlugh Khan; ‘they turned towards Sunam and Samana and began to appropriate territories’. Ulugh Khan with his brother, Kashli Khan, and his cousin, Sher Khan, marched from Delhi with the whole army of the kingdom; by an unfortunate oversight, Delhi was left quite defenceless. Somewhere in the precincts of Samana and Kaithal the armies came so near that there was a distance of 10 karohs only between them. All well-wishers of the Turkish regime were frightened at the idea of a conflict. ‘The armies that came face to face’, writes Minhaj, ‘consisted of brothers and friends—two forces from one court, two armies from one house, two linings from one garment.’ Ulugh Khan divided his army into two parts—one led by Kashli Khan and the other by Sher Khan. But at the same time he began negotiating with the opposition maliks; he was prepared to accede to their demands for offices and territories on condition of obedience and loyalty.

18 Ibid., Tabaqā 22, No. 12 (Biography of Balban).
But while war and peace were pending in the balance, some political ulama (dastarbunds), like Shaikhul Islam Qutbuddin and Qazi Shamsuddin Bahrachi along with some state-officers (kulahdars), wrote secret letters to Qutlugh and Kishlu, asked them to march on Delhi and promised to hand over the gates to them; simultaneously they began to canvass for them in Delhi 'and took an oath on the right hand from every one'. Their message, as given by Minhaj, seems to be substantially correct: 'The gates are in our hands. You should come to the capital. There is no army in Delhi. You are high officers of the court and there are no strangers in-between. If you come here and join the royal court, Ulugh Khan will remain with the army outside and matters will be settled according to your wishes.'

'How can a secret be kept', asks the Persian poet, Hafiz, 'to discuss which meetings have been called?' Ulugh Khan's agents informed him of what was happening and he sent urgent messages asking that the writers of the letters be expelled from Delhi. This was done and the city-gates were closed. Alauddin Avaz Zinjani, the naib-i amir-i hajib, Ulugh-bek, the kotwal, Jamaluddin Naishapuri, and the officers of the ministry of war did all they could to protect the city. On the most critical night even the amirs, sarkhails and the distinguished men of the city were asked to defend the ramparts.

When the letters from Delhi reached them, Kishlu and Qutlugh started immediately for Delhi. In spite of the summer heat, they rode about 100 karohs (some 200 miles) and reached the suburbs of Delhi on 21 June 1257. But they found the gates closed; their supporters had been expelled from the city two days before. They encamped between the Jud gardens, Kailugarhi and the city during the night and next day they went round the ramparts. But there was nothing they could do and they decided to return. Some opposition maliks went to the Siwaliks; Qutlugh Khan seems to have sought refuge with Arsalan Khan Sanjar in Awadh; Kishlu Khan returned with 200 or 300 horsemen to Uchch by way of the Siwaliks. But the rest of their soldiers sought and found service with the Sultan. The Indian soldier in the service of the Turkish slave-officers was not a politician but a wage-earner, and he could not afford to follow officers who were unable to pay his wages. Towards the end of the year the Mongols under Salin Noyan came from Khurasan to Uchch and Multan; Kishlu Khan made an agreement with them and joined the camp of Salin.

**Career of Ikhtiyaruddin Yuzbek Tughril Khan**

During these years of tension, Delhi had lost control of the eastern provinces and this gave Yuzbek, the governor of Lakhnauti,
an opportunity for his misdeeds. Yuzbek, a Qipchak Turk, had started his career as a slave of Iltutmish. He took a leading part in the slaughter of Tazik officers at Tarain during the reign of Ruknuddin Firuz. He was thrown into prison by Bahram Shah but was set free on his fall. Alauddin Mas'ud appointed him to Lahore and Tabarhinda for a time, but he quarrelled with one of his fellow-officers, Nasiruddin Muhammad Bandar, and began to oppose the king. In 1246 Ulugh Khan brought him to Delhi and recommended to the Sultan that his past offences be forgiven. After some time Awadh was assigned to him, but he came to Delhi and got the assignment of Lakhnauti in its place. 'Fury and love of domination', says Minhaj, 'were ingrained in Yuzbek's mind.'

Yuzbek fought three indecisive battles with the army of Jajnagar, but Minhaj says that he succeeded in the fourth battle. He conquered the territory of Armardun; the Rai fled and all he had fell into the hands of Yuzbek.

'On returning to Lakhnauti he began opposition to the king, and raised three canopies (chaits), red, black and white (over his head). He brought his army from Lakhnauti to the city of Awadh and had his khutba recited under the title of "Sultan Mughisud-din". After two weeks a royal contingent in Awadh sent a Turkish amir running to him to frighten him with the report that the whole royal army had arrived. Yuzbek was disheartened; he got into a boat and returned to Lakhnauti. All the inhabitants of Hindustan—Hindus and Musalmans, religious scholars and state-officers—considered this act of Yuzbek to be unpleasant. He had been guilty of treason and rebellion against his own king. Inevitably the result of this evil deed overtook him and he was overthrown root and branch.'

Yuzbek next decided to attack Kamrup. The Rai of Kamrup was in no position to resist him and retired to a corner while Yuzbek plundered the city and captured the Rai's hereditary treasures. The Rai sent messengers promising to pay a heavy tribute, if he was reinstated; he was also prepared to keep the coinage and the Khutba in Yuzbek's name, but Yuzbek would not hear of a compromise. Then the Rai tried another trick, which seems odd, but we have to remember that Yuzbek was a very odd man. The Rai ordered all his soldiers and subjects to offer their allegiance to Yuzbek on condition that he would sell them his corn at any price he may fix. The trick succeeded and Yuzbek sold away all his corn. Before the rabi crop could be cut,
the Rai and his subjects revolted. They also opened all the river-dams. Left without any food, the Lakhnauti army decided to retreat. But the Hindus had closed all routes by water as well as the open plain. Yuzbek found a Hindu guide to lead them by the foot of the hills. But here too the Hindus blocked their progress. Yuzbek while riding an elephant was mortally wounded on the breast by an arrow, and his family and followers were captured. Brought before the Rai, Yuzbek asked for a last favour—to have a look at his son. The favour was granted; Yuzbek looked at his son and gave up the ghost.

**Thirteenth Regnal Year, 656**

(8 January 1258-59)

Sher Khan wanted to seize Tabarhinda from Arsalan Khan, to whom it had been legally assigned and who was prepared to defend it. Both were summoned to Delhi for a settlement. Arsalan Khan was given Awadh and Sher Khan was given Tabarhinda for the time-being. But the conflict between him and Arsalan Khan continued. Both had been in touch with the Mongol high command and Ulugh Khan was not prepared to trust either of them with a frontier province. So next year (February 1259) he called Sher Khan to Delhi for a second agreement. The frontier town of Bhatinda was given to Nusrat Khan Sanqar Sufi, and Sher Khan was given the territories of Koil, Bayana, Bilaram, Jalesar, Mihr, Mahahan and the fort of Gwalior. He was in possession of these lands when Minhaj finished his book in June or July 1260.

**Fourteenth Regnal Year, 657**

(28 December 1258-59)

In the previous year there had been fear of a Mongol invasion and all officers had been summoned to Delhi. Report was brought that Arsalan Khan and Qutlugh Khan had delayed in coming. The Indian summer had set in but Ulugh Khan insisted on marching against them in spite of the heat. Qutlugh and Arsalan dispersed their soldiers among the villages, and sent a message that if the royal army was withdrawn, they would present themselves as loyal officers at the court. True to their promise, Qutlugh and Arsalan appeared before the Sultan on 27 May 1258. In spite of the opposition and the disturbance of the territories of which they had been guilty, Ulugh Khan received them with great honour and dignity.20 Further, on his recommendation, Lakhnauti was assigned to Qutlugh Khan and Kara to Arsalan Khan within two months. But, as Ferashta rightly

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remarks, the end of Qutlug Khan is hidden behind a veil. He may have died a natural death, but it is more likely that, in consonance with Ulugh’s new policy of doing away with the rivals who had harassed him for a long time, he was either poisoned or assassinated. Minhaj makes two statements about Lakhnauti which completely ignore Qutlug’s appointment and existence. ‘On 18 December 1258 the territory of Lakhnauti was assigned to Malik Jalaluddin Mas‘ud Jani.21 On 8 June 1259 a treasure, cash, plenty of costly vessels with two elephants came from Lakhnauti to the court; Ulugh Khan acknowledged the service and sent to Izzuddin Balban Uzbek, who had despatched the elephants and treasure, a misal for the whole territory of Lakhnauti.’22

Ulugh Khan’s younger brother, Kashli Khan, who was governor of Meerut, died in June or July 1259; his post and territories were granted to his son, Alauddin, generally known as Malik Chajju. On 19 September 1259, a son was born to the Sultan from the daughter of Ulugh Khan.

FIFTEENTH REGNAL YEAR, 658
(18 DECEMBElR 1259-60)

The main event of this year was the arrival of Halaku’s envoys.23 Ulugh Khan ordered them to be kept waiting at Marutha till he had prepared a proper spectacle for them—a mass of devoted soldiers and inhabitants and a large number of human heads and corpses to show the two aspects of the power of the state.

21 Ibid., 225-26.
22 Ibid., 318.
23 The coming of the Mongol envoys had no political or diplomatic purpose, but since they had come, a proper reception for them had to be arranged. The curious circumstances that led to their coming are thus explained by Minhaj.

Nasiruddin Hasan Qarligh wanted his daughter to be married to Ulugh Khan’s son. Ulugh considered the matter to be of sufficient importance for the despatch of a special envoy, Jamaluddin Ali Khalji, for the purpose. Jamaluddin was captured by Kishlu Khan’s officers and taken to his court. There, in the presence of the Mongol envoys, he declared that he was going to Halaku and his envoys informed Halaku of Jamaluddin’s coming. Consequently, Nasiruddin Qarligh at Bunyan had no alternative but to write a letter to Halaku in the name of Ulugh Khan, but of course without his knowledge, and send Jamaluddin with some presents to Halaku. Halaku at Tabriz welcomed this envoy from a distant land. When Jamaluddin was returning, Halaku ordered the shuhna of Bunyan, the son of Amir Yaghri, a well-known Musalmam, to go with him (to Delhi). He also ordered that no Mongol horse under the control of Salin Noyan was to step into the territory of Sultan Nasiruddin, and if any horse did so, its hands and feet were to be cut off. This was an order to Salin Noyan only; it was not a treaty and it was not binding on Salin’s successors.

This account raises one difficulty. Nasiruddin Hasan Qarligh had died at the siege of Multan before 1250. Why did Halaku’s envoys take such a long time in coming?
‘In the hill-tracts round the city,’ Minhaj tells us, ‘there lived wicked men who robbed travellers, plundered the Musalmans and desolated the villages of Haryana, the Siwaliks and Bayana.’\textsuperscript{24} Three years before this, Malka, a Hindu of gigantic stature, had stolen the camels belonging to Ulugh Khan’s officers and distributed them up to Ranthambhor. Ulugh Khan was unable to do anything at the time owing to the fear of a Mongol invasion. Now he went to this hill-tract and plundered it for twenty days. His public offer was one tanka for a severed head and two tankas for a live rebel. In addition to this 250 notables were captured along with 142 horses; and six bags of tankas, amounting to 30,000, were seized from the rais and ranas. After Delhi had been ornamented in the Mongol fashion with sufficient severed heads and corpses stuffed with straw, and 200,000 footmen and 50,000 horsemen had also been collected, the Mongol ambassadors were taken from Kailugarhi (or Shahr Nau) to the Qasr-i Sabz, where the Sultan was holding his audience. The public stood in twenty rows, shoulder to shoulder, on both sides of the street.

The show, which probably took place in April 1260, led to no public treaty or understanding. But it certainly showed Ulugh Khan’s capacity for controlling affairs.

Minhaj before closing his work in the summer of 1260 records that Izzuddin Kishlu Khan had gone to Halaku’s court and returned, that he was sending messengers to Delhi and it was to be hoped that all would be well.\textsuperscript{25} Isami, however, tells us that Ulugh Khan marched to Multan and captured it.\textsuperscript{26} Kishlu Khan had gone to the Punjab, leaving Multan in charge of his son, Muhammad. Ulugh treated the young man well, but he fled to his father after three or four days. Kishlu decided that it would be unwise for him to challenge the army of Delhi in the Punjab. So he established himself at Bunyan and from here, with Mongol help, he made two unsuccessful attempts to reconquer his old iqta; these attempts failed and we hear no more of Kishlu Khan. This was the end of Ulugh Khan’s second great rival. His control of the Delhi sultanat seems to have been complete.

\textbf{END OF THE SHAMSI DYNASTY;}

\textbf{ACCESSION OF BALBAN}

When Ulugh Khan compelled Sultan Nasiruddin to hand over the royal chair or canopy to him and arranged for the assassination of Malik Qutbuddin Ghuri during a public meeting at the palace, he

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Ibid.}, 318.
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.}, \textit{Tabaqat} on the Shamsi Malikhs (No. 10).
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Futuhus Salatin}, 148-50 (Dr. Mehdi Hasan’s edition). Here, as elsewhere, Isami makes an error about the sequence of events.
was, in fact, giving notice to all persons connected with the court and the government that his ambitions were not to be trifled with. But knowledge of his designs for the throne was not confined to politicians only. Amir Khurd in his Siyarul Aulia, while referring to Ulugh Khan’s visit to Shaikh Farid at Ajudhan during Nasiruddin’s reign, says that ‘in those days Ulugh Khan Balban had an excessive desire to acquire kingship.’\textsuperscript{27} Unfortunately, we have no contemporary political history either for the last six years of Nasiruddin’s reign or for the whole reign of Balban, though we have contemporary records of some events, like the death of Balban’s son, Khan-i Shahid. Balban’s power as naib-i mamlakat was very great but insecure, and he felt this painfully. Why then did he stay his hands for six years? Several reasons suggest themselves. He was afraid of the Mongol power, but Iltakhu’s defeat at the hands of the Egyptians and his subsequent death must have brought relief to Ulugh. Mangu had died in China in 1260 and with him the central power of the great Mongol empire had vanished. Ulugh had crushed Qutlugh and Kishlu, but he had to make sure of the attitude of the other Turkish slave-officers whose consent was necessary for the legality of his accession.

Ziauddin Barani is silent about the mode of Sultan Nasiruddin’s death; presuming on this silence, the Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi declares that the Sultan died of an illness, and this comfortable conclusion has been accepted by most medieval writers. But this statement, first, leaves unexplained the complete physical annihilation of all the descendants of Shamsuddin Ilutmish. Secondly, two authorities now available were unknown to our medieval historians. Ibn-i Battuta, who in his Rehla gives a brief account of the preceding sultans of Delhi, explicitly states: ‘Subsequently his naib (i.e. naib-i mamlakat) killed him (Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud) and became king.’\textsuperscript{28} Isami, whose Futuhus Salatin was not properly studied by any medieval historian, emphatically declares that Sultan Nasiruddin was poisoned, and that this fact was known to the citizens of Delhi.

It must be remembered in this context that when Saffah and Mansur killed all living members of the Ummayad dynasty in order to make their own Abbasid dynasty secure, they were setting the pattern for all later Muslim dynastic revolutions. It is not known how

\textsuperscript{27} Siyarul Aulia, 79.

\textsuperscript{28} Rehla, Arabic text, Vol. II, 22. It was perhaps not explained to Ibn-i Battuta by his Indian friends that the word naib here does not mean deputy or lieutenant but indicated a special office like the wazir-i mutlaq or absolute wazir of the Abbasids—a wazir whom the king could appoint or dismiss but with whose work he could not interfere.
far Ulugh Khan's knowledge of Islamic history went, but he had no alternative but to follow that pattern.

By 1266 Sultan Nasiruddin had probably reached his thirty-sixth year. Ulugh Khan was twenty or perhaps twenty-four years older. Nasiruddin had four sons—Malik Ruknuddin Firuz Shah, Malik Shihabuddin Muhammad Shah, Malik Tajuddin Ibrahim Shah and Malik Saifuddin Bahram Shah. Whether the son whom Ulugh Khan's daughter bore the Sultan in 1259 is included in this list is not known. When in 1253 the Qutlugh-Kishlu group came into power, they appointed Shahzada Ruknuddin as amir-i hajib, but since he was too young, the duties of the office were to be performed by Kishlu Khan as naib-i hajib. When Ulugh Khan returned to power, the young shahzada was deprived of his office. In addition to these four shahzadas, many other descendants of Iltutmish must have been living at the time (1266-67).

Isami says that the two young sons of the Sultan used to go about enjoying life with the two young sons of Ulugh Khan. Once while drinking together in a garden, the sons of Ulugh claimed that their father was 'the wisest and the most prudent man of the age.' Though he has the maturity of age and we are inexperienced,' the two shahzadas replied, 'we can by a trick make him alight from his horse.' A bet of eighty dinars was made. Some days later when one of the shahzadas was riding in the field with Ulugh Khan, he dropped his whip, as if by accident, and then looked helplessly at the Khan. The Khan jumped down from his horse, picked up the whip and gave it to the shahzada. Later on when his sons informed him of the bet, he ordered the eighty dinars to be paid. But he began to reflect—as he must have reflected a thousand times before. He said in his heart', Isami tells us, 'that the sons of the king have begun to resort to tricks. One day by trickery and deceit they will arrest me, bind me and put me to death.' It was a question of survival between him and the Shamsi dynasty and its well-wishers. He reflected over the matter day and night', Isami continues, 'and I have heard that after careful planning he carried out a wicked design. Poison was administered to the king, there was a tumult all over the city, but the king died in A.H. 665 (1266-67).'

Both Minhaj and Barani give a list of the Sultan's sons, near relations and high officers at the beginning of every important reign, but owing to the negligence of the copyists difficulties arise in interpreting them. Thus with reference to the four names here, some copies say 'abna' (sons) while others say 'agaba' (relations), but since Minhaj refers to Ruknuddin as Shahzada in the text itself and has added the suffix of Shah to the names, the word 'abna' (equal to shahzadas) is obviously correct.

Isami, 156-57,
But whatever the tumult in Delhi, Ulugh Khan had no difficulty in ascending the throne with the title of 'Ghiyasuddin Balban'. He took all necessary steps to extinguish the old dynasty. 'Overtly or secretly', Fenishta tells us, 'he killed many of the descendants of Shamsuddin Iltutmish whom he considered to be his rivals for the throne.'

When Ulugh Khan ascended the throne,' Isimi remarks, 'the teeth of the officers were broken; they all came under his control without any argument or reasoning.' Many khans and maliks, who had figured so prominently in the former reign, are not referred to now. We do not know what happened to Minhaj and his son, Ayaz, and to 'the earthly goods' Minhaj had collected so carefully.

Ghiyasuddin Balban, on his part, began to talk and behave like a superman and a hereditary king, a descendant of the mythical Afrasiyab, who by a gift of God was above 'all those ills that flesh is heir to'.

31 Fenishta, Vol. I, 76,
V. SULTAN BALBAN AND QAIQUBAD

PROBLEMS FACING BALBAN AFTER HIS ACESSION

Balban was confronted with a number of problems after his accession to the throne. As a matter of supreme policy, he had to make those very weapons, which he had used for his rise to power, ineffective and blunt, so that no one else may be tempted to use them again. This necessitated a complete readjustment of the relations of the Sultan with his nobility. The maliks and amirs were to be taught that kingship was beyond them and that there was absolutely no question of rivalry or competition between the crown and the nobility. He had to close a long chapter of the tussle of the Turkish slave-officers, in which he himself had played a very prominent role in a capacity which he was not prepared to recognize now. Apart from everything else it necessitated the reestablishment of the power and dignity of the Delhi sultan and—*for India*—a new, if transient, theory of kingship.

The second and more immediate problem before Balban was the restoration of law and order. As *naib-i mamlakat* he had attempted to maintain peace by erratic and wholesale killings; he could not have failed to realize that law and order could only be maintained by a permanently established military and police regime, but either a Mongol invasion or the rebellion of a malik had prevented him from doing the needful. Balban realized that his position as a sultan would be judged by the peace—or, as he preferred to call it, the justice—he gave to the country. With respect to law and order, there were four problem-areas before Balban—the suburbs of Delhi; the Doab; the trade-routes, specially the road to Awadh; and the rebels of Katehr (Rohilkhand). Concerning the first three, the disorder that prevailed and the measures taken by Balban are graphically described by Barani.

I have heard from reliable narrators that Sultan Balban devoted the first year of his reign to cutting the forest round Delhi and suppressing the Meos. He came out of the city, pitched his army-camp and considered the suppression of the Meos the most important of state enterprises. Owing to the worthlessness...of the successors of Ilutmish and the weakness of Sultan Nasiruddin, who had reigned for twenty years, the Meos in the neighbourhood of Delhi had grown in power and multiplied in numbers. They came into the city at
night, broke through the walls into the houses and molested the people in other ways. The people of Delhi were unable to sleep owing to the fear of the Meos, who had also plundered all the inns in the neighbourhood of Delhi. And just as the Meos had multiplied and become bolder, so jungles of thick and large trees had also grown all round Delhi. Mischief-makers in the Doab and on the side of Hindustan boldly indulged in robbery. The roads (to Delhi) were closed on all sides, and it was impossible for caravans and traders to come and depart. Finally, owing to the fear of the Meos, the western gates of the city were closed at the time of the afternoon prayer, and no one had the courage to go out of the city after that time either to visit the sacred tombs or to enjoy by the side of the Sultani (Shamsi) tank. But even before the afternoon prayers (the Meos) molested the water-carriers and slave-girls, who went to fetch water from the tank; they took off their clothes and left them nude.

'Balban devoted a whole year to suppressing the Meos and cutting the forest round Delhi. He put many Meos to the sword; he built a fort at Gopalgir and established many thanas (military posts) and assigned them to the Afghans; the land (allotted for the maintenance) of the thanas was made tax-free. In these conflicts Yak Lakhi, a favoured slave of the Sultan, was killed by the Meos. The Sultan with his sword secured many people of God from being molested and plundered by the Meos. From that time till now the city has been secure from the Meos.'

After suppressing the Meos, the Sultan turned towards the Doab. 'The towns (qasbas) and the territories of the Doab were assigned to iqtedars, who had the requisite means. Balban ordered the villages of the disobedient to be totally destroyed; the men were to be killed and their women and children were to be seized as spoils. The forests were to be cut down completely. Some great amirs with their enormous armies sat down to accomplish this task. They annihilated the disobedient, cut down the forests, removed the mischief-makers and reduced the ra‘iyyat of the Doab to obedience and submission.'

Barani continues:

'After completing the Doab enterprise, Balban twice marched out of the city to open the road to Hindustan (Awadh). He went to Kampil and Patiali and stayed in those territories for five or six months. He put robbers and rebels unhesitatingly to the sword; the route to Hindustan was opened and caravans and merchants could come and go in peace. A lot of the plunder of that region came to Delhi, where slaves and cattle became cheap. At Kampil, Patiali and

1 Barani, 59.
PROBLEMS FACING BALBAN AFTER HIS ACCESSION

Bhojpur, which were the great centres of robbers on the road to Hindustan, strong forts and high and spacious mosques were constructed. The Sultan assigned all the above-mentioned three forts to the Afghans and the arable land attached to the forts was made tax-free (mafruz). Owing to the Afghans and other Musalmans enjoying, tax-free land, the towns (of the region) were made so strong that highway robbery and plunder of travellers were totally removed from the route to Hindustan. From that time till now some three generations (qarns) have passed, and owing to the construction of the forts and the stability of the military posts (thanias) the route to Hindustan has become a well-trodden path and robbery has been totally suppressed. Also during this campaign the fort of Jalali was constructed and assigned to the Afghans; thus the houses of robbers became a military post. The land of Jalali was also made tax-free. Jalali, which had formerly been the home of robbers, who plundered, now became the homeland of the Musalmans and of the guardians of the roads—and has remained so since then.’

While the Sultan was busy with these enterprises, it was continuously brought to his notice that the rebels of Katehr had grown in numbers. They plundered and desolated the villages of the ra'iyyat and molested the territories of Badaun and Amroha; their insolence was a public fact; they had become so powerful that they ignored the authority of the iqta'dars of Badaun and Amroha, and owing to their strength the walis (rulers) of the neighbouring districts could not interfere.’ Balban decided that the suppression of Katehr was a task for the imperial army. He returned from Kampil and Patiali to Delhi and ordered the contingents of the central army to get ready, giving out that he would go hunting to the hill-tract (Kohpayah). But when the army was ready, he marched towards Katehr and reached the place after two nights and three days. Barani writes as if Balban ordered a general massacre of all male population. But this is absurd, for the Sultan had gone there to protect the peasant against those who plundered him. However, Balban remained in the territory for a few days. The blood of the mischief-makers (mufridan) of Katehr flowed on the ground; corpses were piled up before every village, and the stench of the decomposing corpses reached the bank of the Ganges... From that time to the end of Jalaluddin’s reign, no rebel raised his head in Katehr.”

Later Balban marched to the foot of the Jud hills (the Salt Range) and punished the rebels there. As a result of these military operations he got so many horses that their price went down in the market and

2 Ibid., 55-59.
a horse could be purchased for 30 to 40 tankas. Thus within a few years the Sultan created peaceful conditions in every disturbed area and made all recalcitrant elements obedient to his authority.

CONSOLIDATION PREFERRED TO EXPANSION

As soon as law and order was established in all parts of his kingdom, Balban had to choose between ‘consolidation’ and ‘expansion’ as the guiding principle of his administrative policy. Though every inch an imperialist, he preferred to adopt a policy of consolidation. This decision was based on a realistic appraisal of the situation. (1) The Hindu chiefs within the empire were on the look out for an opportunity to overthrow the yoke of the Delhi sultan; their activities had to be watched and they had to be brought under the control and hegemony of Delhi. (2) The Mongol presence so close to Delhi as the Bias was a source of grave concern, and if effective checks were not created, the storm could burst any moment. When his generals, Adil Khan and Tamar Khan, suggested to him the conquest of ‘Gujarat, Malwa and other provinces of Hindustan which had been under the sway of Aibek and Iltutmish’, Balban thus stated his policy:

'It will not be an act of wisdom to leave Delhi and to go on distant campaigns in these days of turmoil and insecurity, when the Mongols have occupied all the lands of Islam, devastated Lahore, and made it a point to invade our country once every year... If I move out of the capital, the Mongols are sure to avail themselves of the opportunity by sacking Delhi and ravaging the Doab. Maintaining peace and consolidating our power in our own kingdom is far better than invading foreign territories, while our own dominion is insecure. Further, the newly-conquered areas will require competent officers and well-equipped armies, which I am unable to spare at the present juncture. I have, therefore, made up my mind to face the Mongols with strong and organized forces; but if I get an opportunity, I shall undoubtedly subdue the rest of Hindustan and extend the frontiers of my kingdom.'

Balban devoted all his energies to the consolidation of areas already under his control and never allowed his imperialistic ambitions to gain the upper hand.

THEORY OF KINGSHIP

Balban is perhaps the only sultan of Delhi who is reported to have discussed at length his views about kingship. He never missed

3 Ibid., 60.
4 Ibid., 50-51.
an occasion for saying something about the exalted office of the sultan and the obligations of the king. That this was necessary in order to place the crown on a high and dignified pedestal and eradicate all possibilities of conflict and contest with the nobility can hardly be denied, but one cannot fail to discern the complicated working of an inferiority complex and guilty conscience behind these frequent exhortations. By dinning into the ears of his maliks and amirs, most of whom were his quondam colleagues, again and again that kingship was something divinely ordained, he wanted to wash off the stigma of being a regicide and impress upon their minds that it was Divine Will that had brought him to the throne and not the poisoned cup and the assassin's dagger. Besides, the absence of any reference to his manumission in the pages of Minhaj and Barani is significant. Perhaps he was never manumitted and this basic legal disqualification to rule over the people, he tried to cover under a shrewdly designed mask of 'divine commitment' of regal authority.5

Balban's theory of kingship derived its form and substance from Sassanid Persia, where kingship had been raised to the highest possible level, and its supernatural and divine character was publicly accepted, so that only a member of the Sassanid imperial dynasty could ascend the throne. He looked to the legendary heroes of Persia as his political ideals and tried to emulate them as best as he could. The basic elements of his theory of kingship were the following:

(1) Kingship is the vice-regency of God on earth (niyabat-i khudai), and in its dignity it is next only to prophethood. The king is the shadow of God (zilullah) and his heart is the repository of divine guidance and radiance.6 In the discharge of his kingly responsibilities, he is at all time inspired and guided by God. The actual implication of this concept was that the source of a king's power lay, not with the nobles or the people, but with God only, and consequently his actions could not be the subject of public scrutiny. This was a subtle religious device to sanctify the exercise of his despotic authority.

(2) External dignity and prestige were emphasized as essential for kingship.7 Balban maintained throughout his reign a great distance from the masses, and carried it to such lengths that he firmly refused to talk to the common people. A rich man of Delhi, Fakhr Baoni, bribed the officers of the that household to secure him an audience

5 Ibid., the substance of Balban's theory of kingship will be found in his advice to Sultan Muhammad (68-80) and to Bughra Khan (92-106).
6 Ibid., 70.
7 Ibid., 33-35.
with the Sultan, but the Sultan turned down the request of his officers.  

(3) His emphasis on the dignified parts of kingship made him a stickler for decorum. He never appeared in the court without his full regalia and royal paraphernalia. Even his personal servants never saw him without his royal apparel, socks and cap.

(4) A distinction between the high-born and the low-born was constantly emphasized by Balban, and any contact with low-born people or their appointment to any office in the administration was considered by him as derogatory to the dignity of a ruler. He dismissed low-born persons from all important offices and sharply rebuked his courtiers for having selected Kamal Mahiyar, a convert to Islam, for the post of mutasarrif of Amroha. When I happen to look at a low-born person, every artery and vein in my body begins to agitate with fury, he is reported to have remarked.

8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 33.

10 Barani (36-37) gives us an idea of how Balban behaved on such occasions. As soon as Kamal Mahiyar confessed that he was 'the son of a Hindu slave', Balban got up in wrath and retired from the court to his private chamber. Everyone was afraid of what would happen. First, Adil Khan Shamsi Ajami, Tamar Khan, Malikul Umara Fakhiruddin Kotwal and Imadul Mulk Rawat-i Arz were called to the royal presence; after them the five officers (kardaran)—Alauddin Kashli Khan, Malik Nizamuddin Bazghala, the naib-i amir-i haji, the naib-i vakildar and khas haji Isami—who were concerned in making the recommendation, were also summoned and asked to sit. 'Today', Balban said, addressing the first four high officers, 'I have tolerated in my brother's son, Kashli Khan, and Nizamuddin Bazghala something I would not have tolerated in my own father; they have brought the low-born son of a slave before me with the recommendation that he should be given the khwa'igi of Amroha on the ground that he is capable and efficient in office-work.' Then he turned to Adil Khan and Tamar Khan and added: 'You are old friends and comrades of mine. You know very well that I am a descendant of Afrasiyab and that the genealogy of my ancestors can be traced to him. I know that God has created me with the quality that I cannot bear the sight of a mean and low-born man in a government office of responsibility and trust.'

One has to admit that power is never ridiculous—while it lasts. But power based on such foundations does not last long.

11 Ibid., 36-37. Saiyyid Ashraf Jahangir Samnani (ob. 1405) gives the name of the officer involved in the recommendation of Muhammad Mahiyar and says that he was an expert in audit and accounts (ilm-i muhasiba wa hindusa) and was selected for appointment to Chanderni. (Maktubat-i Ashrafi, Aligarh Ms. f. 67a).

Barani is our only source of information for Balban's theory of kingship and of his views about the high-born and the low-born. Isami does not say a word about the subject. Since Barani himself held similar views concerning birth, it is difficult to determine as to how far he has attributed his own views to Balban. It should not be forgotten that in his Fatwa-i Jahandari he has mentioned all these views as his own. (See English translation: The Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate, by Prof. Habib
(5) Genealogy became a fad with Balban. He traced his own genealogy to the mythical Afrasiyab of Firdausi’s Shah Nama and mentioned it in his court with a deep sense of pride and arrogance.\textsuperscript{12} Saliyyid Ashraf Jahangir Samnani writes in one of his letters that Balban made very thorough inquiries about the families of all his officers and government servants. Expert genealogists had assembled in Delhi from all parts of the country to help him in determining the family status of these persons.\textsuperscript{13}

(6) Balban believed that kingship was not possible without emulating Persian customs and ways of life. In every detail of his family and public life he meticulously followed Persian traditions. To his sons born before his accession to the throne he gave the names of Mahmud and Muhammad, but his grandsons, born after his accession, were named Kaiqubad, Kaikhusrau and Kaikaus after the Persian kings.

Balban looked upon the administration of justice as one of the foremost duties of a king.\textsuperscript{14} This was one of the redeeming features of his despotic government and must have won the affection and admiration of the common man. Whenever any case of injustice or harshness towards the common man came to his knowledge, he flew into a rage and did not hesitate to punish his officers or even his relatives. His barids (intelligence officers) kept him fully posted with the activities of the imperial officers in different parts of the empire.\textsuperscript{15}

If a barid failed to report any act of high-handedness on the part of the local officers, an exemplary punishment was inflicted upon him. A barid of Badaun was executed and his body was exhibited on a gibbet for such a dereliction of duty.\textsuperscript{16} Malik Baq Baq, father of Qara Beg, the iqtdar of Badaun, and Haibat Khan, father of Malik Qiran, the iqtdar of Awadh, were severely dealt with—the former being put to death and the later being forced to pay 20,000 tankas as diyat (mulct or compensation money for murder) for killing menial servants.\textsuperscript{17}

But though just in disputes concerning individuals, Balban threw

and Dr. Afsar S. Khan, 97-101). The probability cannot be ruled out that what Barani presents as the contemptuous treatment of the low-born by Balban was really the treatment of non-Turks, which Barani twisted in order to suit his theory of birth.

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 37, 39. For Afrasiyabi Turks, see Raverty, 900-10 footnote; JRAS, 1898, 467-502.

\textsuperscript{13} Maktubat-i Ashrafi, (Ms.), f. 76a.

\textsuperscript{14} Barani, 40, 44.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 45.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 40.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 40-41. Both Qara Beg and Qiran had distinguished careers under Alauddin Khalji.
overboard all his principles concerning justice and fairplay when cases of an individual versus the state came before him, or where his own personal and dynastic interests were involved. In such cases he cared neither for justice nor for fairplay nor for the sharifat, and acted in the most unscrupulous manner.\textsuperscript{18}

Very often Balban referred to the need of obtaining sanction from the Caliph for the exercise of political authority. He knew about the fall of Baghdad and the fate of the Caliph, but he insisted on the recognition of political authority from the Caliph, as the supreme head of the Muslim political community. The name of the deceased Khalifa was inscribed on his coins and read before the congregation in the Khutba. 'It was', observes Dr. R. P. Tripathi, 'a sort of challenge to the Mughal Khqaan, for it amounted to: "The Khalifa is dead, long live the Khalifa."'\textsuperscript{19}

**Balban's Court**

Balban organized his court on the Iranian model and emulated the etiquette and ceremonials of the Sassanids meticulously in all details.\textsuperscript{20} With his face bright as the sun and his beard shining like camphor,\textsuperscript{21} he sat on his throne with the dignity of the great Sassanian kings. A sixteenth century writer, Fazuni Astarabadi, says that he had a long face, a long beard and a very high crown so that from the tip of his beard to the top of his crown it measured nearly a yard.\textsuperscript{22} To the effect of this awe-inspiring personality were added the grandeur of the court and the meticulous adherence to minor details of etiquette and ceremonial. Hajibs, salahdars, jandars, chaushes, naqibs, etc. stood around him in solemn silence. The Sultan insisted on sijda (prostration) and paibos (feet-kissing) being performed by all enjoying the privilege.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 47. 'I have also heard from the narrators of the Balbani regime, that in spite of his generosity and justice and lots of prayer and fasting, which have already been described, Balban was a cruel tyrant in punishing rebels and opponents. He would annihilate a whole army and city for the crime of rebellion. In meting out punishment to rebels he did not waver a needle's breadth from the traditions of tyrants. In establishing the awe and prestige of kingship, he showed no fear of God. In killing and binding bold rebels, he threw aside all the principles of religion and did whatever he considered to be beneficial for his few days of kingship, whether permitted by the sharifat or not. The love of power totally overcame him when punishing rebels. May be, he got secretly poisoned in their wine or sharbat many Shamsi khans and maliks, whom he considered to be his partners in the kingdom and a danger to the throne, but killing them publicly would have earned him a bad reputation and reduced his prestige.'

\textsuperscript{19} Some Aspects of Muslim Administration in India, 36-37.

\textsuperscript{20} Barani, 25, 50.

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 30.

\textsuperscript{22} Buhatra (printed at the press of Mirza Amanullah, Iran, A.H. 1328), 12.
of appearing before him. No joke or loose talk was possible in his presence. \(^{23}\) Only a few trusted maliks and confidants sat behind the throne; all others kept standing before him in order of their rank and position. The Sultan maintained the dignity of his exalted office by his grim and serious looks. Nobody ever saw him laughing or talking in a light mood. Storms of personal grief came in his life with unexpected fury but, though they killed the man in him, they could not disturb the routine of the Sultan. \(^{24}\) To the last moments of his life this stickler for court-decorum scrupulously followed every detail of that exacting programme which he had set for himself.

On festive occasions the court presented a gala appearance. Embroidered carpets, brocade curtains, variegated cloths and gold and silver vessels dazzled the vision of the spectators. The voice of the ushers went as far as two karo hs. ‘For days after these festivals’, writes Barani, ‘people talked about the decorations of the court.’ Emissaries of foreign countries were dazed and bewildered when they visited his court. When the Sultan rode out in procession, Sistani soldiers accompanied him with unsheathed swords. The shining of the sun, the glittering of the swords and the brightness of his face all taken together made a remarkable show.’ The shouts of ‘Bismillah’, ‘Bismillah’ (In the name of God), rent the atmosphere as the royal cavalcade moved out. This display of power, authority and dignity, which was inseparably associated in his mind with his theory of kingship, made the most recalcitrant elements in the country submissive and struck awe and terror into the hearts of the people.

A chip of the same block, Balban knew fully the strength as well as the weakness of the Turkish governing class. His strength lay in the support of this class, but he had to guard against three things: (a) Repetition of the earlier story of the tussle between the crown and the nobility; (b) Competition between his sons and the Turkish nobles for the crown of Delhi after his death; and (c) Monopolization of power by the Turkish nobles in the frontier areas. The methods that he used for this purpose proved quite disastrous in the larger interests of the Turkish governing class in India. (1) He mercilessly killed every member of Iltutmish’s family. (2) He made free use of both poison and dagger in order to remove talented Turkish nobles who might challenge his descendants. (3) He delivered a death blow to the group of ‘Forty’ (Turkan-i Chihalgani) to which he himself belonged, killed

\(^{23}\) Barani, 33.
\(^{24}\) Ibid., 110.
its leading members and completely destroyed its corporate life, which, despite mutual rivalries and jealousies, could have been successfully used in times of conflict with the non-Turkish elements. (4) He killed his own relatives, like Sher Khan, on grounds of pure jealousy. Barani, who does not seem to have had the Tabaqat-i Nasiri of Minhaj within his reach, depicts Sher Khan as a valiant defender of the Indian frontier against the Mongols. This is absurd. Minhaj does not refer to any battle in which Sher Khan fought the Mongols. Worse than that, he had gone to Mangu Qa-an. The Mongols offered him no immediate assistance, but very naturally there was a suspicion that he had sold himself to them. Balban, who was then nāib-i mamlakat, rightly decided that Sher Khan could not be trusted with frontier provinces like Uchch and Multan, and gave him in return extensive territories round about Delhi, where he would be under the eyes of the central government. Sher Khan did not come to Delhi at Balban’s accession and during the next four or five years. Then Balban had him poisoned.25

Anxious to secure his personal and family interests, he completely ignored the interests of the Turkish governing class. He destroyed the talent amongst the Turkish nobles so ruthlessly that when the Khaljīs entered the field as competitors for the throne against them, they were completely outmanoeuvred and defeated. Balban’s responsibility for the fall of the Turkish power in India cannot be denied. His consolidation programme, no doubt, ensured the continuance of the Delhi sultanat and paved the way for the further expansion of the sultanat under the Khaljīs, but his attitude towards the Turkish nobility crippled it and reduced its life-span.

Reorganization of the Army

Balban’s political experience had taught him that the army was the main pillar of the government; hence it had to be reorganized before any other department of the state.26 The traditions established by Iltutmish had received a setback and, therefore, a complete reorganization of the army was necessary.

(1) Balban increased the numerical strength of the forces and appointed several thousand loyal and experienced officers in the central contingents (qalb-i a’ala) of his army. Their salaries were increased and villages were assigned to them in lieu of their salaries.27

(2) Enhancement of the emoluments of the soldiers and keeping

25 Ibid., 65.
26 Ibid., 29.
27 Ibid., 29.
them happy and satisfied was an essential part of Balban's military policy. He advised his son Bughra Khan: 'Consider no expense for the army as too great and let your ariz (muster-master) engage himself in maintaining the old and recruiting new troops and keeping himself informed about every expenditure in his department.'

(3) To keep the army vigilant and active, he emphasized the need of frequent military exercises. Every winter, in the early hours of the morning, he proceeded towards Riwari under the pretext of going for a hunt, took with him a thousand horsemen and a thousand archers on foot, and returned late at night. This may be correct. But Barani very stupidly adds that information of what Balban did was carried to Halaku, that Halaku complimented Balban on his foresight and that Balban was happy at the compliment. It is unfortunate that our historian (Ziauddin Barani), who claims that no history like his had been written for a thousand years, should have been ignorant of the fact that Halaku had died before Balban's accession. He makes a similar error, but more preposterous, when he says that Halaku (then dead) invited Balban's nephew, Alauddin Kashli Khan, to enter his service and promised him half the revenue of Iraq.

(4) Balban kept the object of all campaigns a close secret and nobody knew beforehand about his movements or targets. It was only on the night previous to his march that he called the outstanding maliks and disclosed his aims to them.

(5) When his armies were on the march, he took particular care to see that no harm was done to poor and helpless persons. He would himself sit and wait with his army and give preference to old and sick persons in crossing rivers, bridges and marshes. Thus while his army was used as a powerful instrument for the liquidation of rebels, it won the golden opinion of the common man.

(6) Balban appointed men of exceptional integrity and devotion to look after the army.

Balban's qazi-i lashkar was a man of integrity and honesty, whom the Sultan and the public respected. But we know very little about him. Barani fortunately gives us a somewhat detailed account of Imadul Mulk, who was the maternal grandfather of the poet, Amir Khusrau. Imadul Mulk, generally called 'Rawat-i Arz', started his career as a slave-officer of Iltutmish and rapidly rose to the post of arz-i mamalik (minister of war). During the thirty troubled years following Iltutmish's death, Imadul Mulk kept this important post.

28 Ibid., 101-2.
29 Ibid., 55, 114.
30 Ibid., 60.
31 Ibid., 45.
Balban confirmed him on his accession. He enjoyed his master's full confidence on account of his honesty, integrity and loyalty. He was made independent of the financial control of the wazir. The prosperous condition of the army during the reign of Balban was, in no small measure, due to him. He used to reward the officers of his ministry from his own pocket and took a very keen and conscientious interest in their welfare. Very often he entertained his office-staff and requested it to abstain from taking bribes from the representatives of the iqdatars and not to misappropriate any portion of the salary of the soldiers.32

(7) Balban had an old and experienced contingent of one thousand soldiers from his khanate days, which he always kept with him. Even when he went on hunting excursions these soldiers accompanied him. Barani says that Balban recognized by his face every one of the soldiers of this unit.33

(8) Balban was against purposeless campaigns. He deliberated in his mind long before undertaking any military expedition. All preparations were made well in advance—without disclosing the target—and a year before the actual campaign orders were issued to the diwan-i wizarat and the diwan-i arz to keep the forces alert and ready and to expedite production of war material in the karkhanas.34

RESUMPTION OF 'IQTAS' IN THE DOAB

As a part of his programme for the reorganization of the army, Balban instituted an inquiry into the conditions and tenures of iqtaš given to Turkish soldiers.35 Ilutmish had granted iqtaš, big and small, on a large scale. Among others, two thousand Turkish soldiers were given iqtaš in the Doab. The purpose of the grant was two-fold: first, to reward the Turkish soldiers for the military services they had rendered to the Turkish government in India, and, secondly, to utilize them for the consolidation of Turkish rule in the most prosperous part of the empire. These assignments carried neither any administrative duties nor any financial responsibilities to the central exchequer. These small iqdatars were permitted simply to realize revenue from some portion of the land in lieu of military service. The dangers inherent

32 Ibid., 114-16. Barani would have us believe that the office-staff of the Rawat-i Arz got its midday meal at his cost. The minister was also very fond of pan; he was constantly asking for more and more pans to be brought, and since good manners required that persons who came to transact business with the minister should be offered pans in the same way, some fifty or sixty slaves were kept busy in preparing and serving pans (betel-leaves).
33 Ibid., 55.
34 Ibid., 60.
35 Ibid., 62 et seq.
in the system were eliminated by Ilutmish's careful and vigilant control of the administrative machinery, but during the years of anarchy that followed his death, the entire iqta administration broke down and the iqtdars adopted an attitude of defiance towards the central authority. The institution of iqtas, which had been adopted in order to accelerate the process of centralization, now tended to disintegrate and decentralize the political authority. This state of affairs was incompatible with Balban's ideals of a centralized government. He instituted an inquiry into the terms and tenures of the iqtas given to two thousand Turkish soldiers in the Doab. Many of the original grantees had died by this time, and those who survived were too old and infirm to render any military service. With the connivance of the diwan-i arz, they retained their hold on the iqtas and claimed hereditary rights over them. Balban's view was that these iqtas were given in lieu of military service; when the grantees discontinued to perform their part of the obligation, the contract on the basis of which they held these iqtas became null and void. The iqtdars were probably inspired by the Seljuq traditions in claiming hereditary rights over these iqtas, but Balban, who looked to Sanjar for guidance in many other matters, refused to be guided by this example in the matter of the grant of iqtas.

After a thorough inquiry, Balban issued orders for the resumption of these iqtas with payment of some compensation to the holders. He assigned 20 to 30 tankas as pension to infirm and old soldiers, while those who were young and able-bodied were enlisted as soldiers in the regular army and were granted cash salaries. As was natural, this order created a great commotion among the grantees concerned. Some of the Turkish leaders approached Malik Fakhruddin, the famous kotwal of Delhi, to secure the withdrawal of the imperial order. They had brought presents for Fakhruddin, but he declined to accept them saying: 'My words will carry no weight if I accept any bribe from you.' On going to the court, he stood at his place with a melancholy and sad face. When the Sultan enquired about the reason for his worry, he explained: 'I have heard that old people are being dismissed from the ministry of war. It makes me gloomy to think of my own fate on the Day of Judgement, if old people are to be expelled from the favour of God.' The Sultan understood what Fakhruddin meant. Tears trickled down his eyes and he withdrew the entire order.36

36 Dr. Habibullah says that only the order concerning the old iqtdars was rescinded. The rest appears to have been enforced (Foundation, new edition, 166). But Barani is quite clear in stating: 'The rights of all iqtdars were preserved as they stood.' (64).
'Nature had sewn the gown of kingship on the body of Sultan Balban', remarks Barani describing the administrative achievements of the Sultan. When he ascended the throne of Delhi, every official was in a defiant mood and the entire administrative machinery was out of gear. He screwed up all its loose joints and made the bureaucracy loyal and subservient to the royal authority.

Balban's government, like most medieval governments in east and west, was half civil and half military; this was due to the medieval conditions of warfare, for government officers could not function unless they combined both civil and military capacities. Military training has become a highly specialized subject now owing to the development of modern science. During the middle ages the art of wielding the sword and the pen had often to be taught simultaneously.

Balban checked with an iron hand the fissiparous trends that prevailed in all spheres of political life. He believed in a centralized political authority. Most official appointments were directly made by him or with his approval. That an almost insignificant appointment in Amroha could attract his attention shows that he kept a strict watch over the entire bureaucratic machinery. Provincial governors had to submit periodical reports to him. A very efficient audit system controlled the financial activities of the governors. In view of the difficult position of the frontier provinces, Multan and Lakhnauti, he ultimately appointed his sons as governors of these regions. Balban was not prepared to give an opportunity to any noble or officer to consolidate his position in a sensitive part of the empire and give him the trouble that Tughril had done. If the wardenship of the western marches was to be a stepping-stone to kingship, none except his eldest son was to be in charge of that area.

Since Balban himself had been once instrumental in devising institutions—like the naib-i mamlakat—for curtailing the power of the monarch, he saw to it that there was no great concentration of power in the hands of any officer. He reduced the position of the wazir by taking away the military and the financial powers from him. The appointment of Khwaja Hasan as wazir was an indication of his attitude towards the institution of the wizarat and the type of functions that a wazir was expected to perform. With the separation of financial and military authority, the chances of usurpation of power by any government functionary were totally eliminated.

37 Barani, 32.
38 Ibid., 36.
Balban felt that a despotic government needed the services of an efficient and loyal spy system for its smooth functioning. His secret reporters kept him well posted with all that happened in every part of the kingdom. The activities of his sons, relatives, provincial governors, army officers, government servants and the public were watched and reported by the spies. Balban took particular care in the appointment of barids (intelligence officers). It was only after a thorough investigation about his character, integrity and even genealogy that a person was appointed as barid. The successful maintenance of barids, who were officers known to the public, as well as secret spies, without creating demoralization and distrust among the people, required great tact on the part of the Sultan. On this point Balban thus advised his son: 'Informers and spies should not be allowed to come anywhere near the court, for their closeness to the ruler terrifies obedient and trustworthy friends and their confidence in the king—which is the basis of good government—vanishes.'

Balban’s political views and administrative principles may be gleaned from the two long discourses to his sons, from which Barani has extensively quoted. The following principles emerge from these exhortations:

(1) A government should promulgate protective laws and safeguard the interests of the weak against the high-handedness of the strong.

(2) Moderation should be the watchword of government. There should be neither harshness nor leniency in dealing with the people. Taxes should be neither so heavy as to make people poor and helpless nor so light as to make them disobedient and insolent.

(3) The government should see that enough grain is produced for the requirements of the people.

(4) Government orders should be firmly enforced and there should not be frequent changes in government decisions.

(5) The finances of the state should be properly planned and managed. Only half the annual revenue should be spent; the other half should be put aside for a rainy day.

(6) A government should strive to keep the merchants prosperous and satisfied.

(7) The salaries of the soldiers should be regularly paid and the army should be kept happy and contented.

39 Ibid., 81.
40 Ibid., 45.
Within the framework of these basic principles Balban built up a strong and efficient administrative structure and gave to the people ‘peace and justice’ for which they had been longing for decades. Barani’s account of the Sultan leaves upon one’s mind a clear impression of the fact that while Balban was harsh and exacting towards his maliks and amirs, from whose ranks he had risen, he was extremely kind and considerate towards the common man. He displayed ‘paternal concern’ for the welfare of the people—in spite of his contempt for the low-born.

REBELLION OF TUGHRI AT LAKHNAUTI

Balban’s army was a good show-piece, with its Sistani and Turkish soldiers. But Indians, whether Hindus or Muslims, had no prospects in his army and its officers were not recruited from the people at large. Would it stand a military test? It had to meet this test both in the east and the west. Ilutmish and his son, Shahzada Nasiruddin, had no difficulty in suppressing the rebellions of the rulers and governors of Bengal. Balban, his officers and his army, faced with the same problem, proved themselves extraordinarily inefficient and clumsy. They won but after more than six years of struggle and through sheer weight of numbers. In the west the position was different. In spite of the great care Balban had taken about the army, his son and his officers completely collapsed before the army of a Mongol frontier officer.

Barani, who knew nothing of conditions in Persia, talks as if Halaku was still alive and he (or his successors) were a danger to the existence of the Delhi sultanat. This is absurd. Persian histories make it quite clear that Halaku’s power had been completely shattered after his defeat at the hands of the Egyptians and Baraka, the Mongol head of the Juji clan, who had become a Musalman. Since the Mongols had massacred most of the peasants of northern Persia, specially the wonderfully fertile south Caspian region, the financial resources of Halaku’s successors, called the ‘Il Khans’, were very meagre. They could never balance their budget and, in spite of their efforts, the Egyptians drove them out of Syria. Under these conditions the governors of the Il Khan-i frontier provinces could only maintain themselves by plundering the neighbouring lands. Delhi itself was never in danger till the organization of the Dawa-Qaidu empire in the time of Alauddin Khalji.

Of course, the ‘Il Khan’ officers had a more efficient conception of strategy and tactics than the generals recruited from the decreasing number of Turkish slave-officers in India. These facts should be kept in mind concerning the two military events of Balban’s reign.

Tatar Khan, son of Arsalan Khan, who was governor of
Lakhnauti, sent Balban sixty-three elephants in the year of Balban's accession. Tughril, who succeeded Tatar Khan as governor of Lakhnauti, was a slave of Balban. He was known for his cleverness, courage, generosity and enterprise. According to Isami, Tughril rebelled against Balban in the eighth year of the Sultan's reign (A.D. 1275). This was probably the first major rebellion of a slave of the Sultan; apart from everything else, it was an indication of the cracking of the whole institution. If a slave could rebel with success, the whole imperial Turkish slave-system became quite useless.

What encouraged Tughril in his contumacious designs was his successful Jainagar campaign. He obtained from there considerable treasures and many elephants and appropriated them. He did not send anything to the Sultan, thinking that he was too old and too preoccupied with the Mongol problem to chastize him. He proclaimed himself king of Lakhnauti with the title of 'Sultan Mughisuddin', and assumed also all the emblems of sovereignty, including the canopy of state, the Khutba and the issue of currency. His generosity attracted the people to his fold and 'they forgot the wrath and ruthlessness of Balban'.

The report of this rebellion came as a shock and a surprise to Balban. He was so deeply upset at the news that he could neither eat nor sleep at night. He immediately despatched the governor of Awadh, Malik Aitigin Mui-daraz (of the long hair), entitled Amin Khan, to Lakhnauti with a large army and a number of other experienced maliks and officers, like Tamar Khan Shamsi and Malik Tajuddin, son of Qutlugh Khan Shamsi. Tughril challenged Amin Khan as soon as he crossed the Sarju river (modern Ghagra) and defeated him. Besides, Tughril also won over a number of amirs and soldiers of Balban's army through lavish grants of gifts. On its retreat the imperial army was harassed and plundered by Hindu tribes. Balban was enraged at the performance of Amin Khan; he ordered Amin Khan to be killed and his body he gibbeted at the gate of Awadh. This execution, Barani says, was deeply resented by the people, who read in it the beginning of the doom of Balban's power.

Balban's anger and distress at the defeat of his army by a former slave of his knew no bounds. The governor of Awadh and his army having failed, Balban assigned the task of suppressing Tughril to the

41 Barani, 'Rebellion of Tughril', 81-92. Barani says that Tughril rebelled in the fifteenth or sixteenth year of Balban's reign. But this is not possible, for Balban reigned for twenty years only.

42 Mui-daraz is referred to by Minhaj among the officers appointed when Ulugh Khan returned to power. Isami, while giving the same facts, calls him 'Taramati' and implies that Taramati means 'brave'.


army of Delhi led by one of his chosen officers, Bahadur. In the battle that ensued, Tughril struck straight at Bahadur’s centre; Bahadur fought courageously, but some contingents of the imperial army took to flight and their example proved infectious. In spite of Bahadur’s efforts, the army of Delhi melted away. When Bahadur with his fugitive soldiers reached Delhi, Balban wanted to put him to death, but Bahadur’s friends succeeded in saving his life by giving proofs of his courage on the battle-field, and Balban was content with exiling him from the court.43

Two generals—Amin Khan and Bahadur—had been defeated by Tughril. It caused Balban great concern. He waved his aged arms in fury at the defeat of these armies. His life became miserable and he considered these defeats a serious loss to his prestige. So in A.H. 680 (1280-81) he decided to march personally to deal with Tughril, but he wanted to entrust matters at Delhi and the areas around it in safe hands before embarking on such a distant campaign. He first went towards Sunam and Samana. These two provinces were in charge of his second son, Mahmud Bughra Khan. Balban broke the two provinces into small territories under military amirs, and the over-all charge of Sunam was given to Malik Sonj, the sar-jandar. Samana was assigned to Balban’s eldest son, Sultan Muhammad, whom he had designated as his heir, with the title of ‘Qa-an Malik’. Sultan Muhammad had first been in charge of Koi and other territories. But later on he was assigned the whole of Sind, with plenty of officers whom Balban thought capable.

Balban then proceeded to the Doab without returning to Delhi. He wrote to Sultan Muhammad assigning him the army of Samana in addition to Sind and asked him to meet the Mongol danger in the best way he could. He also wrote to Malikul Umara Fakhruddin, the kotwal of Delhi, appointing him naib-i ghabat (regent in absence); he was to keep the Sultan informed, as far as possible, but he had the authority to issue all orders concerning state-affairs according to his discretion and without waiting for the imperial sanction. Then taking Bughra Khan with him, Balban marched eastwards regardless of the rainy season. ‘On reaching Awadh, he ordered a general enlistment and some two lakhs of men—horsemen, foot-soldiers, paiks, archers, Kahars, Kaitwati (bow-men), riders on ponies, arrow-shooters, slaves, servants, merchants and shopkeepers were entered in the registers.’ Owing to the rainy season the imperial army had to stop for ten or twelve days at various places. Tughril decided to fly to Hajinagar, a

43 Barani’s memory of this campaign is very dim but Isami devotes more than two pages to it (161-63).
place several marches east of Sonargaon (near the modern Dacca), but he gave out that he would return and reconquer Lakhnauti after Balban had gone back to Delhi.

Balban reached Lakhnauti and stayed there for a few days to re-equip his army. He appointed Sipah Salar Husamuddin (maternal grandfather of the historian, Barani), who had been vakildar to Malik Barbek Bektars, to the post of shuhna of Lakhnauti with instructions to send to the Sultan all papers received from Delhi three or four times a week. After some days of continuous marching, the Sultan reached the precincts of Sonargaon. Dhanuj Rai, the rai of Sonargaon, came to meet him, and the Sultan took a promise from him that he would capture Tughril whether he fled by land or sea. Balban, not knowing Tughril's real plan, seemed at that time to think that Tughril would seek his personal safety by fleeing across the sea. Nevertheless, Balban moved eastwards by continuous marches till he reached within 60 karoūs (120 miles) of Hajinagar, but no trace of Tughril could be found. As the main army moved slowly, Balban directed Malik Bektars to march as an advance-guard ten or twelve karoūs ahead. The advance-guard, in turn, sent a few men to find the whereabouts of Tughril through interpreters. Ultimately a party sent under Malik Muhammad Sherandaz and others came across some corn-dealers and enquired from them about the whereabouts of Tughril. They pleaded ignorance. Malik Sherandaz, thereupon, struck terror into their hearts by cutting off the heads of two of them. They then disclosed that the camp of Tughril was only half a farsang (about a mile) from that place; today he is encamped by the stone-tank dam and tomorrow he will reach the territory of Hajinagar. Sherandaz immediately communicated the news to Malik Barbek Bektars.

Tughril's army was enjoying rest at the time; the horses and elephants were grazing on the green ground, and owing to a false sense of security no sentinels seem to have been posted. Without losing any time, Sherandaz dashed into the camp and shouted loudly for Tughril. Tughril was terrified by the suddenness and confidence of the shouting; so in great nervousness he slipped out of his bathroom, jumped on an unsaddled horse and rode hard to a river nearby. Malik Muqaddar and an officer, named Ali, followed in close pursuit. Tughril had nearly reached the river when Ali struck him with a short battle-axe and knocked him down from his horse. Malik Muqaddar immediately got down from his horse, chopped off Tughril's head and threw his body into the river. As Tughril's soldiers were searching for him, the Malik buried his head under the soft earth by the side of the river and started washing his clothes. Shortly
afterwards Malik Barbek Bektars arrived and Tughril's head was sent to the Sultan. When Muqaddar arrived to report the details to the Sultan, he was at first angry at the risk Malik Muhammad Sherandaz and his group had taken. But all had gone well, and the Sultan raised the rank of all those concerned in the enterprise. Ali was given the title of 'Tughril-Kush' (Tughril-slayer) and equal in'ams were given to him and Malik Muqaddar.44

When Balban returned to Lakhnauti, he ordered a row of gibbets to be erected on both sides of the market for more than two miles and all friends, supporters and relatives of Tughril were impaled on them. 'I have heard from many aged officers', Barani writes, 'that no king of Delhi had meted out such extensive capital punishments as Balban did at Lakhnauti.' Soldiers of Tughril's army, who belonged to the capital, were kept under guard for punishment at Delhi.

The Sultan assigned Lakhnauti to Bughra Khan, and then turned to him and asked: 'Mahmud! Didst thou see?' He repeated the question thrice and on receiving no reply, he explained. 'Did you see my punishments in the bazar? If mischievous and intriguing persons induce you to break from Delhi, recall the punishment inflicted by me on Tughril and his supporters.' He advised Bughra to remain loyal to Delhi, even if the occupant of the Delhi throne belonged to another dynasty.

The Lakhnauti campaign was a great strain on Balban in his old age and it was only after three years that he could return to Delhi. His success was celebrated in the capital. The Sultan addressed Malik Fakhruddin as 'brother' and gave him the cloak that he was wearing. Charities were distributed and prisoners were set free in order to celebrate the occasion. Subsequently, Balban ordered the execution of all those Delhi soldiers who had supported Tughril and directed gibbets to be put up in the streets of the capital. But many of these prisoners had their kinsmen in Delhi and their laments filled the capital. The qazi of the army, whose recommendations were always sympathetically considered by Balban, interceded on their behalf and secured the Sultan's pardon.45 An idea of the mental agony of the supporters, servants and slaves of Tughril may be formed from the fact that we find one of them seeking spiritual solace in the jama'at khana of Shaikh Farid Ganj-i Shakar at Ajudhan.

44 Isami and Barani differ about the way in which Tughril was killed. Barani is more reliable. But writing in his old age, he could not recall the personal name of Tughril Kush. Isami says his name was Ali.
45 Barani, 108.
SULTAN MUHAMMAD, THE MARTYR PRINCE

Balban adopted a number of measures to guard his western frontier. In 1270 he visited Lahore and ordered the reconstruction of its fort. The Mongols had also destroyed and depopulated most of the villages round Lahore and Balban took measures to rehabilitate those areas. The city of Lahore had been seized and plundered by the Mongols in 1241, but immediately afterwards news arrived of the death of Ogatai and, in consonance with their Yasas, which required that all campaigns should stop at the death of the Qa-an, the Mongol armies went back. Lahore city thereafter remained in charge of governors appointed by Delhi. The frontier was fluctuating, but Lahore, Dipalpur, Sunam, Samana, Uchch and Multan were almost always in the hands of Delhi officers. There was no danger of a Mongol conquest of India during Balban’s reign but a Mongol raid was always to be feared. After making several experiments, of which some account has been given, Balban placed the over-all charge of the western frontier in the hands of his son and heir-apparent, Sultan Muhammad, known to later generations as the ‘Khan-i Shahid’.

Balban had only two sons. He had no expectations from Bughra Khan to whom he had assigned Lakhnauti with the wise advice of being at least outwardly loyal to Delhi so that a conflict may be avoided. All the hopes of the old Sultan were concentrated on his eldest son and heir, Sultan Muhammad. The fact that Muhammad was unlike his father in many respects did not interfere with Balban’s affection. Balban used to hold three or four drinking parties every week before he ascended the throne; he never touched a drop of wine after his accession. Sultan Muhammad drank but never to excess. Unlike his father, Muhammad was affable, courteous and distinguished for his excellent manners; by birth a prince, it was not necessary for him to resort to the mannerisms of a superman, which made his father so dignified in the eyes of the masses and so ridiculous in the eyes of the discerning. Unlike his father, Muhammad was a highly educated man. Showering all possible praises on Balban, Minhaj is unable to list him as a patron of culture and learning. Sultan Muhammad’s court at Multan, on the other hand, was full of able and highly educated men. ‘His courtiers read the Shah Nama (of Firdausi), the Diwans of Sanai and Khaqani and the Khumsa of Nizami. Wise men discussed the verses of these great poets before him.’ The prince’s discerning judgement picked up Amir Khusrav and Amir II Hasan and they remained in his service for five years. His ambitions as a patron of literature went higher still.
‘Owing to his extraordinary discernment, the Khan-i Shahid twice sent messengers with expenses of the journey and invited Shaikh Sa‘di to Multan. His idea was to construct a Khanqah for Shaikh Sa‘di at Multan and to endow sufficient villages for its maintenance. But Shaikh Sa‘di was unable to come owing to his old age. On both occasions he sent a ghazal in his own handwriting to the Khan and apologized for his inability to come.’

Balban had at first assigned Sunam and Samana to Tamar Khan, a distinguished member of the famous Forty (Chihalgani) Turks. But he may have remembered that both Kishlu Khan and Sher Khan had gone to seek help from the Mongols; so he transferred these two provinces to his younger son, Bughra Khan, on whose loyalty he could rely but whose efficiency was questionable. Balban was driven to appoint barids to keep him informed of Bughra Khan’s actions and succeeded in keeping his administration at the proper level. ‘In those days’, says Barani, ‘the Mongol soldiers often crossed the Bias and entered (Indian) territory. Balban would send Sultan Muhammad against them from Multan, Bughra Khan from Samana and Malik Barbek Bektars from Delhi. They would go to the Bias and drive back the Mongols. Very often they were victorious and the Mongols had not the courage to cross the Bias. There were seventeen or eighteen thousand horsemen in each of these armies.’

When Bughra Khan was appointed to Lakhnauti, Sultan Muhammad was given complete charge of the western frontier.

Isami, without giving the date, says that two Mongol armies crossed the Sind frontier. Sultan Muhammad sent his officers against them; a battle was fought at Dhandi Kandali and the Mongols won owing to their superior numbers. Muhammad wanted to fine his officers, but as this would have lessened their prestige, he ended by giving them robes of honour and in’ams.

During the summer after his return from Lakhnauti, Balban found his physical powers failing him; so he decided to hand over the kingdom to Sultan Muhammad and asked him to come to Delhi immediately. Balban’s messenger reached Multan on the tenth day. Sultan Muhammad had some urgent affairs of state to attend to and replied that he was starting immediately. Balban, on cross-examining the messenger, discovered the contradictions between Muhammad’s words and deeds. Balban sent a letter of complaint, but by that time affairs had taken a gruesome turn.

46 Ibid., 67-68.
47 According to Barani (61) he was the most trusted confidant of the Sultan.
Sultan Muhammad marched against the Sumrah tribes in A.H. 684 (A.D. 1285), possibly because they had rebelled against him, and pitched his camp in the precincts of Jatral, in order to proceed with the suppression of the Sumrahs. Whether by chance or design, Tamar, a frontier Mongol officer, marched with thirty thousand Mongol horsemen against him at the same time. The Mongols either marched very swiftly or succeeded in keeping their movements a secret, for Sultan Muhammad only got a letter informing him of the Mongol advance when they were at a distance of five farsangs only.

Sultan Muhammad consulted his officers. Their loyal advice was that he should quietly slip back to Multan and let them do the fighting; the battle would be serious; they could be replaced but he was irreplaceable. But Sultan Muhammad decided to fight. ‘It does not become shahzadas to turn their bridles on seeing the enemy.’ Next morning the Mongol advance-guard could be discerned. ‘Group after group’, the poet Khusrav says, ‘they crossed the river (Ravi) and came on suddenly.’ But the Indian army had mounted by the time the Mongols appeared in full force. The battle raged till the afternoon, without victory to either side. But in the army of Sultan Muhammad, there was a Ghizz Turk officer, named Mangli, whom the Mongols knew to be a coward. They discovered his whereabouts and suddenly attacked his lines, which broke and fled. The Mongols rushed forward and the discipline of the Indian army was completely broken. ‘As the Mongol army was more numerous,’ Isami says, ‘it exerted its full strength everywhere. The Indian lines were completely shattered and the Mongols began to slaughter the Indians.’

Sultan Muhammad, after fighting bravely for several hours, found no one by his side and turned his horse towards the river (Ravi). But he was shot dead by a Qaruna of the Mongol army, who proceeded to appropriate his horse, sword, bow and arrows. One of the two singing girls of Sultan Muhammad, whom the Mongols had captured, recognized his famous horse on which the Qaruna was riding, and incited by her loud cries, the Mongol officers compelled the Qaruna to take them to the dead body of the Khan-i Shahid. They put his body in a coffin with the intention of taking it to their own country. But Rai Kalu, the father-in-law of the Khan-i Shahid, sent the Mongols enough money from his territory and bought the body of the Khan from them. The Mongols as usual retired after collecting their spoils.

48 The Qarunas are often referred to, but the meaning of the term is not settled. Provisionally we may take a Qaruna to mean the son of a Muslim mother and a Mongol father.

49 We have two mursias (elegies) on the death of the Khan-i Shahid, one in prose written by Amir Hasan and the other in verse written by Amir Khusrav. Perhaps
THE LAST DAYS OF SULTAN BALBAN

Sultan Muhammad's death was a smashing blow for Balban, who had reached his eightieth year, for the prince had been the sheet-anchor of his earthly hopes. In his death Balban heard the death-knell of his dynasty, and a tragic end of his life-long efforts to perpetuate kingship in his family. May be, the ghosts of Nasiruddin Mahmud, Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri, Sher Khan and others, whom he had murdered in order to make the crown safe for his dynasty, began to dance before his eyes.

As a last resort he summoned Bughra Khan from Lakhnauti and appealed to him to remain at Delhi. His grandsons, Kaikhusrau and Kaiqubad, were young and inexperienced; unless Bughra was prepared to bear the burden, the kingship of Delhi would become a 'children's game' (bacha-bazi), as it had been for a whole generation after the death of Ilutmish. Balban's argument was convincing, but Bughra was a prince of hasty temper, ignorant of the cataclysmic changes in states. He remained by the side of his father for two or three months; then there was a slight improvement in the Sultan's health and the desire of returning to Lakhnauti took possession of Bughra's mind; so making the recovery of the Sultan an excuse, he left for Lakhnauti without the Sultan's permission. Isami has given a deeper touch of poignancy to this tragedy by narrating the following story. Some persons alleged to have minted coins (qalbkart) were brought before the Sultan. Amongst them was the only son of an old widow. He was innocent but had been wrongly arrested. She made pathetic representations to the Sultan but they were not heard; it was not his rule to show leniency in crimes against the state. All persons implicated in the case were put to death. This put the old woman's heart on the rack. Every night she appeared before the imperial palace to bemoan the death of her son and to demand Divine punishment for the Sultan. Her pathetic cries used to disturb the Sultan in his sleep and the officers of the Sultan used all possible methods to dissuade her from raising her heart-rending cries. But she ignored all admonitions. She was not afraid of 'iron' and could not be tempted by 'gold'. After the death of the Khan-i Shahid, she did not come near the palace again and all attempts to trace her whereabouts failed.\(^{50}\)

The old Sultan's spirit was at last broken. All day long he

\(^{50}\) Fusukhus Salatin, 177-78.

no poem of Amir Khusrau evoked so many tears as this mawṣa, which has been quoted in part by Badani in his Muntakhabat Tanzirikh. Historically Isami’s account of the death of the Khan-i-Shahid is best we have (166-76).
transacted the business of the government as usual, but when he retired to his chamber he wept and cried and put dust on his head. He did not long survive his son’s death. Realizing that his end was near, the Sultan summoned Malik Ul Umar, the kotwal of Delhi, Khwaja Hasan Basri, the wazir, and other high officers and gave his instructions about the succession.

‘I have appointed Kaikhusrau, son of my eldest son, Khan-i Shahid, as my heir; put him on my throne; he is a young man of promise but lacks age and experience and cannot perform the obligations of kingship. But what else can I do? Mahmud (Bughra Khan), for whom people have a regard and from whom something could be expected, has gone to Lakhnauti and there is not enough time to call him back. I have no alternative but to nominate Kaikhusrau.

He then asked the maliks to depart. Three days later he died. ‘The kotwal and the kotwals officers were bold, capable and in touch with the public mind. On account of facts, the revelation of which appertains to women, they had no good inclination towards the Khan-i Shahid and thought that it would be a disaster if Kaikhusrau was to ascend the throne. So during the day they sent Kaikhusrau to Multan, placed Kaiqubad, son of Bughra Khan, on the throne with the title of Mu’izzuddin, and towards the end of the night they brought Balban’s funeral from the Koshak-i Lal (Red Palace) for burial in the Darul Aman.’

All the usual formalities were performed, or perhaps overdone, at Balban’s funeral. The maliks and officers threw dust on their heads and tore their garments. They all followed the bier to the graveyard bare-headed; and when his body was being lowered into the grave, Malik Fakhiruddin Kotwal paid his last compliments to his master and saw in his death the extinction of old and respected families. He slept on the ground for six months and other eminent maliks and amirs followed his example. Many people of the city distributed food in alms to bless the soul of the departed Sultan.51

ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF BALBAN

Balban’s dynasty did not last for more than three years after his death. His officers, if any, who believed in his statements that ‘the king is the deputy of God’ and that ‘the king’s heart is the recipient of Divine revelations’, must have been surprised at the contradictions between Balban’s claims and the character of his successor. Balban’s

51 Barani, 120-23.
policy of killing the leading Turkish slave-officers was continued by the government of Kaiqubad. Jalaluddin Firuz Khalji deprived them of their monopoly of high office, but did not put to death those whom he retained in his service. They showed their appreciation of his generosity by constantly conspiring against him. Finally, some twelve years after Balban’s death all the descendants of Turkish slave-officers were imprisoned or put to death by Alauddin Khalji. That was the end of the regime. At the time of my composing the Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi (in 1357), Barani states, ‘seventy years or two and a half generations (qarns) have passed since Balban’s death. No one survives today from his family or the families of his sons, slaves or officers in spite of their large numbers.’

But though Balban’s family vanished, the government of Delhi survived and it is in the context of this institution that Balban’s life’s work has to be judged.

In one matter we can unhesitatingly agree with the praises Barani showers upon him. By his forts and military posts he established law and order in the main provinces of the empire from Haryana to Bihar. Without this preliminary work, the achievements of the Khalji era would have been impossible. This peace, as we shall see, was maintained in the cities and the Khalisa villages by the officers of the sultanat and in the remaining areas by the hereditary Hindu chiefs.

It must be admitted that in almost all other matters, Balban’s reactionary attitude—his insistence on high birth which meant servile Turkish origin or foreign origin—did more harm than good. During the forty years that Balban controlled the state two great movements were taking place to which he did not—and could not—adjust his policy. First, by a series of group-decisions many Hindu working class guilds or biradaries—e.g. weavers, butchers, elephant drivers, etc.—were adopting the Muslim creed. They were not prepared to tolerate an Indian government based on the assumption that all high offices belonged to the Turkish slaves of the sultan by right of conquest. Secondly, a large number of Hindus had been learning Persian and this made it possible, in fact necessary, for the government to undertake enterprises in new fields, particularly the land revenue, in which lack of bilingual clerks and accountants had been the main difficulty. Balban kept the old state-machine working long after it

52 By regime here is meant the regime of Turkish slave-officers—i.e. of Turkish slaves who had been educated by slave-merchants and purchased by the kings—Mu’izzuddin, Aibek, Ilutmish and even Balban. Free-born Turks were destined to play a prominent part in Indian history till they were finally absorbed by the Muslim population of India.
had lost all its utility. Consequently, the long delayed change, when it came, took a revolutionary form.

Balban’s failure is best seen with reference to his army. Balban advised his son, Bughra Khan, not to rebel against Delhi because ‘a king of Delhi could conquer Lakhnauti by the shaking of a bridle.’ Nevertheless, it took Balban six years or more to crush the rebellion of Tughril and a riff-raff of two hundred thousand had to be enlisted at Awadh to strengthen the regular army. Balban did not challenge any of the great Hindu rais, because his primary duty was to fight the Mongols. Nevertheless, his officers failed against the raids of frontier Mongol officers. With reference to the two frontier battles he describes, Isami, on the whole our best authority on military matters, says that the Mongol victories were primarily due to their superiority in numbers. But why should the Indian army be inferior in numbers? Isami, no doubt slightly exaggerating, says that Alauddin Khalji could raise a hundred thousand soldiers within a day from Delhi and its suburbs. Why then was the army of Delhi so insufficient in numbers that Sultan Muhammad and his officers were massacred by a frontier force of thirty thousand horse? There can be only one explanation. In the appointment of civil officers Balban was very particular about the principle of good birth—that is, of foreign origin. The same principle was inevitably applied to officers of the army, for the officers who did the fighting had to be administrative officers or iqtadars also. This meant a limitation of the officers available, and the limitation of officers would seriously limit the number of soldiers they could enrol. We must not forget that only a decade divides the death of Balban from the accession of Alauddin Khalji. Alauddin only cared for loyalty and efficiency and never bothered about anybody’s genealogy; it was the only principle on which an efficient state could be built. Balban with his fad for high birth was quite out of date by the time he died. Both in the civil and the military field Balban and his governing class had been tried and found wanting.

REIGN OF MU‘IZZUDDIN KAIQUBAD

Kaiqubad was a young man of seventeen or eighteen years—handsome, cultured and benevolent—when he ascended the throne in A.H. 686 (1387). He had been brought up strictly under the care of his grandfather and was never allowed by his tutors to look at the face of a beautiful girl or to taste a drop of wine. He had received instruction in all physical and intellectual arts, including calligraphy, literature, archery, spearmanship, etc. As soon as he ascended the

54 Ibid., 96.
throne his life took a somersault; he gave himself up to debauchery and spent all his time in wine and venery. The court of Balban, which was known for its strict discipline and stoic atmosphere, was now turned into a centre for buffoons, pleasure-seekers, dancing girls and musicians. He built a magnificent palace on the bank of the river Jumna at Kailugarhi and began to live there in a world of pleasure and revelry. Barani describes in detail how young girls, whose breasts had not yet developed, were taught archery, horsemanship, dancing and singing Persian and Hindi songs for presentation to the court, where both the girls and their trainers got princely rewards. The misfortune of the young king was that he could not restrain himself from overindulgence in coition, 'which made his face pale and his body weak'. Isami, a mystic-minded middle-aged bachelor, is more emphatic in his statements:

'Day and night the king was engaged in his pleasure-parties; he had no time for anything else... There were no companions for him all the time except moon-faced maidens with rosy lips. I have heard concerning this king, who was a slave of his sex-desires owing to his youth: "that even when he drove his horse gently, it would take him ten miles in the course of one night". Yes! Youth, kingship and madness combined with the constant association and intimacy with young women was as dangerous as the proximity of fire and cotton-wool. Ultimately, the royal horseman, impelled by the heat of sex-desire, drove his horse with such unheeding recklessness that it left half his body paralysed.'

Obviously, the burden of the state had to be shouldered by other persons. 'I have heard from Qazi Sharafuddin Sarpain', Barani writes, 'that the kingdom of Kaiqubad could not have lasted for a week had Malik Nizamuddin and Malik Qawamuddin Ilaqa Dabir not been the pillars of his state; they were among the remnants of the Shamsi and Balbani maliks and were unrivalled in wisdom, discernment and the capacity of controlling affairs.' Qawamuddin, however, did not meddle in politics and left the direction of state-policy to his colleague.

Malik Nizamuddin, nephew and son-in-law of Malik Fakhruddin Kotwal, who was officially a mere dadbek, in practice became the

55 Amir Khusrau gives a beautiful description of it in the Qir'anus Sa'dain, 54 et seq.
56 The general impression that Kaiqubad founded the Shahr-i Nau or Kailugarhi is not correct because Minhaj refers to it even during the time of Nasiruddin Mahmud (Raverty, 634 f.n. 2).
57 Isami, verses 3521 and 3800-05.
naib-i mamlakat, and assumed charge of all affairs of the administration. Probably he fully exploited Fakhruddin’s support to Kaiqubad, and under this mask consolidated his own position. He made appointments of his supporters to the offices of naib-i vakildar, amir-i hajib, and sarjandar. His ambition soared higher and higher as the Sultan sank deeper and deeper in his pleasure-pursuits, and ultimately he began to plan for the throne. While he looked after the administration, his wife controlled the palace; she was called the Sultan’s ‘mother’.

One of the charges brought against Nizamuddin is the murder of Kaikhusrau, who was the nearest successor to the throne. Barani simply says that he got an order for the assassination of Kaikhusrau from the king when drunk, and had him killed at Rohitak. But what other authorities tell us certainly lessens Nizamuddin’s responsibility. According to Ibn-i Battuta, at the time of Balban’s death, Fakhruddin Kotwal prepared a forged document to the effect that all maliks and amirs had accepted Kaiqubad’s accession, showed it to Kaikhusrau and advised him to fly to Multan; he had the city-gate opened and the prince fled. Yahya Sirhindi says that Malik Bekasariq, the wazir, Hasan Basri and others, who supported Kaikhusrau, were taken into custody and subsequently exiled.58 Isami says that Kaikhusrau brooded over his misfortunes at Multan for some months and then, being ‘self-willed and inexperienced’, he did the wrong thing. He left Multan under the pretext of hunting and went to Ghazni and from there to the country of the Mongols. But the Mongols were engaged in a civil war, and after spending all his money Kaikhusrau returned to Mandoli in Hindustan. Nizamuddin, rightly or wrongly, warned Kaiqubad against a cousin, ‘who for the sake of the throne had promised submission and tribute to the Mongols’. So Kaikhusrau was beheaded at Mandoli at the Sultan’s order.59

Other punishments also followed on the recommendations of Nizamuddin. The wazir, Khwaja Khatir, was placed on an ass and paraded through the streets of the capital. These acts horrified the nobility and Nizamuddin came to be despised and feared by all important Turkish maliks and amirs, but he was so firmly entrenched that opposition to his authority was not possible. Nizamuddin, on his part, chalked out a plan to get rid of all important Turkish amirs. At a darbar held at Kailugarhi, he read out a forged report from the governor of Multan intimating the triumph of the imperial forces against a Mongol invasion. On this pretext all maliks and amirs were

58 Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi, 52.
59 Isami, 190-2.
summoned to offer felicitations to the Sultan. When they presented themselves at the court, some of them were killed and others were exiled. Posts were reassigned, and only those who enjoyed the confidence of Nizamuddin were appointed again.

While Nizamuddin was busy purging the administration of all elements whom he considered undesirable, Tamar Khan invaded India and ravaged the country from Lahore to Multan. Khan-i Jahan, the barbek, was sent to deal with him. The Mongol army retreated as soon as it heard about the arrival of the imperial forces. Some Mongols were captured and killed. Later Nizamuddin deceitfully obtained the Sultan’s order for the execution of those Mongols (called New Muslims) who had earlier embraced Islam and settled in India.60

Nizamuddin relentlessly followed his policy of executing the maliks and amirs, and pushed on the dangerous process of eliminating talented Turkish officers, which had been initiated by Balban. Nizamuddin further put to death Malik Alauddin Shaikh, governor of Multan, and Malik Nasiruddin Tuzki, governor of Baran, both of whom were important maliks of Balban.

Nizamuddin’s policy made Malik Fakhruddin Kotwal, now an old man of ninety, apprehensive of Nizamuddin’s fate. He exhorted him to give up the idea of royalty and stick to his proper business. Barani, following his favourite method of putting dialogues in the mouths of his characters, makes Fakhruddin deliver a long harangue dissuading Nizamuddin from his ambitious schemes:

‘Nizamuddin! I have brought you up and educated you; you are like a son to me. My father started his career as the king’s personal attendant, and rose to the position of kotwal, which we have held for about eighty years. It is the maximum to which we can aspire. Our success has been due to the fact that we have never meddled with the politics of the state.’61

Nizamuddin replied that he had gone too far in the matter and if he retraced his steps, he would be killed. In utter disgust Fakhruddin cried out: ‘Then consider ourselves, our families and children as dead and destroyed.’ Nizamuddin, nevertheless, moved ahead with his policy of removing Turkish maliks.

When Kaiqbad ascended the throne at Delhi, his father, Bughra Khan, proclaimed himself king at Lakhnauti with the title of ‘Sultan Nasiruddin’ and had the currency and the Khutba put in his own name. There was a constant correspondence between father and son.

60 Ibid., 181-82.
61 Barani, 134-38. In view of what Fakhruddin Kotwal had done to eliminate Kaikhusrau, this last statement cannot be accepted.
Bughra Khan knew that his son was leading a dissipated life and that Nizamuddin was inducing him to kill the leading maliks and amirs with the ultimate intention of putting an end to Kaiqubad himself. He tried by hints and indirect suggestions in his letters to draw Kaiqubad's attention to the matter, but Kaiqubad paid no heed to the written advice of his father. So after two years of his reign had passed, Bughra decided to see his son personally.

Amir Khusrau\(^{62}\) and Ziauddin Barani\(^{63}\) have given us two different accounts of the circumstances in which the father and the son met. Khusrau says that Bughra Khan marched from Lakhnauti with the intention of conquering Delhi. When he reached Bihar, Kaiqubad decided to march out and challenge him. Barani says that the initiative was taken by Kaiqubad who started with a large army to see his father. When Bughra Khan reached near his son, he gave up his military objective (if he had any), and his march assumed the complexion of a social visit. He, however, sent his dalib, Shamsuddin, to Kaiqubad with the message: 'The kingdom of Delhi is mine, but if it has passed to my son, he should not contend with his father. For me the kingdom of Lakhnauti, the heritage of my father, is most desirable.' Kaiqubad replied that he had kept the throne for his father and protected it from the Mongols. The following day Bughra Khan sent his chamberlain to deliver a message to his son. The boat was in the middle of the river when Kaiqubad shot an arrow at it and the chamberlain returned disappointed. Bughra Khan sent him another message: 'My son! Banish the idea of revolt from your mind. I am the heir to the throne and you can obtain it through me.' Kaiqubad sent a fiery reply: 'Do not be proud of your ancestry, for nobody inherits a kingdom without having to fight for its preservation. I have a claim over the throne by virtue of three descents: Iltutmish, Nasiruddin Mahmud and Ballan.'\(^{64}\)

Bughra Khan was sorry for his son's behaviour but he realized that it was due to Nizamuddin's mischievous planning. Ultimately, he wrote an affectionate letter in which he sought an interview with his son whom 'he was as anxious to see as Jacob had been to see Joseph'. Bughra sent his youngest son, Kaikaus, to Kaiqubad with presents, and Kaiqubad sent his son, Kaimurs, to his father. Nizamuddin was all the time anxious to bring about an armed conflict between Bughra

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62 His masnavi, \textit{Qir'\'an us Sa'dain} (ed. Maulvi Mohd. Ismail, Aligarh, 1918), gives a graphic account of the historic meeting.

63 \textit{Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi}, 139-56.

64 \textit{Qir'\'an us Sa'dain}, 118. 'Iltutmish's daughter was Bughra's mother; Nasiruddin's daughter was Kaiqubad's mother; Balban was his paternal grandfather.' See also \textit{Qir'\'an us Sa'dain}, 22.
and Kaiqubad. He suggested that Kaiqubad should insist on the performance of all humiliating court ceremonies by his father. Bughra Khan behaved with remarkable equanimity and by accepting every servile form of court-etiquette foiled the schemes of Nizamuddin.

‘Kaiqubad (sitting on the throne) affected a stony dignity and with kingly unconcern looked on as his father, bowing and kissing the ground, approached the throne and prostrated himself at his feet; but at the end he broke down and threw himself at his father’s feet and in tears, which melted the hearts of all the spectators, conducted him to the throne.’ The details of this meeting have been vividly described by Khusrav with all the felicity of his powerful poetic imagination. When all the festivities were over and Bughra Khan decided to return to Lakhnauti, he advised Kaiqubad in the presence of the maliks to refrain from indulging in his pleasure-pursuits. While parting he whispered into Kaiqubad’s ears and advised him to get rid of Nizamuddin.

For a short while Kaiqubad abstained from wine and venery, but the large number of charming young courtesans, who were always with him, brought him back to his old ways within a week. Excessive indulgence and dissipation told upon his health and he fell ill. He ordered Nizamuddin to proceed to Multan but Nizamuddin delayed going on various pretexts. The Turkish officers found the time opportune and poisoned Nizamuddin. Barani has expressed his strong disapproval of the ambitious character and unscrupulous methods of Nizamuddin, but he seems to have been deeply impressed by his administrative abilities. After his death, the administration became chaotic, though many of the old nobles of Balban’s court returned to serve under Kaiqubad.

When Nizamuddin was removed, Kaiqubad summoned Malik Firuz Khalji from Samana and appointed him ariz-i mamalik and governor of Baran with the title of Shaiista Khan. Malik Firuz (later Sultan Jalaluddin Khalji) had served Balban for many years along with his brother, Shihabuddin, the father of Ali Gurshasp (later Sultan Alauddin Khalji), and had earned distinction as a military officer in the wars against the Mongols.

Ultimately, the conflicts and ambitions of the nobles got crystallized into two hostile groups—one led by Malik Firuz Shaiista Khan Khalji and the other by Malik Aitmar Surkha. The former comprised of persons who sought the ascendancy of new elements; the latter wanted to retain the house of Balban in power and stood for safeguarding the interests of the old Turkish nobility, which had so long enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the state. While Kaiqubad, incurably paralysed
in body and mind, lay helpless in the Kailugarhi palace, Malik Kachchin and Malik Surkha raised his son, Kaimurs, to the throne with the title of 'Shamsuddin II' and the coronation ceremony took place at the Chabutra-i Nasiri. Their aim was to maintain the dynasty of Balban and the power of the Turkish aristocracy.

The Turkish maliks next hatched a conspiracy to get rid of the group led by Malik Firuz Khalji. They prepared a list of maliks, with Firuz Khalji's name at the top, who were to be put to death. The Khalji malik was at that time inspecting the royal forces at Bhugal Pahari. When he came to know of this conspiracy from Malik Ahmad Chap, the naib-i amir-i hajib, he at once moved his quarters to Ghiyaspur. He also called his relatives from Baran on the pretext of needing them for an impending Mongol invasion. Many non-Turkish officers, who were included in the purge programme of the Turks, joined the Khaljis. Next day the Turkish group started its operations. A message was sent to Firuz Khalji asking him to present himself at the court of Kaimurs. The Khalji malik was reviewing the Kanauj forces at that time; he apprehended the purpose of the order and decided to delay compliance with it. Soon afterwards Kachchin arrived with a more urgent message. Malik Firuz conducted himself with great tact and coolness and gave Kachchin the impression that he knew nothing of the conspiracy. He pointed to the review and requested Kachchin to allow him to finish it. But as soon as Kachchin went to relax under a tent-shade, his head was chopped off and his body was thrown into the Jumna. Open conflict between the two hostile groups then began. Firuz Khalji's sons dashed into the palace, caught hold of Kaimurs and brought him to their camp. Some Turkish officers, including Aitmar Surkha, came out to get back the boy-king but they were captured and killed. Some sons of Fakhruddin, the kotwal, were also captured; and afraid for their lives, the kotwal dissuaded the people of Delhi from making an effort to recapture the boy-king.

The Khaljis, it appears, were not prepared at the time to assume royal power. Probably all that they had done was essentially defensive in character. When the initial storm had subsided, Firuz Khalji installed Kaimurs at the Kailugarhi palace. He offered the regency to Malik Chajju and himself opted for the wardenship of the marches—the provinces of Multan, Bhatinda and Dipalpur. Chajju rejected the offer and preferred the governorship of Kara and Manikpur. Fakhruddin Kotwal also declined to accept the regency. Rejected by Chajju

65 Barani (173) has Baharpur, but Isami (203) and Yahya Sirhind (57) give it as Bhugal Pahari, which can be identified even today.
and Fakhruddin, the regency of the boy-king fell to the lot of Malik Firuz Khalji. Kaimurs was retained on the throne for a little over three months. Some of his coins dated 689/1290 have also come to light. But this farcical arrangement of political power could not be continued for long. Firuz Khalji decided to act. Kaiqubad was dragging on his melancholy existence in an apartment of the Kailugarhi palace. A malik, whose father Kaiqubad had killed, was sent to do the needful; he wrapped his paralytic body in his bed-sheet and kicked him into the Jumna. With him also disappeared the monopoly of power which the Turkish slave-aristocracy had exercised from the time of Sultan Muʿizzuddin.

66 Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi, 61. Yahya Sirhindī's account of these movements is more detailed than Barani's. He, however, disagrees from Barani in many details. See 57-58.
67 Wright, 66; Rodgers, Lahore Museum Catalogue, 84; Brown, Coins of India, 71.