§ 1. *The tragedy of Aurangzib's life, how developed.*

The life of Aurangzib was one long tragedy,—a story of man battling in vain against an invisible but inexorable Fate, a tale of how the strongest human endeavour was baffled by the forces of the age. A strenuous reign of fifty years ends in colossal failure. And yet this king was one of the greatest rulers of Asia in intelligence, character, and enterprise. He was, in an extraordinary degree hardworking, active, moral, and inspired by the sense of duty. He denied himself pleasure and repose, steeled his heart against the seductions of the senses and the appeals of pity and human weakness, and governed his people according to the best ideals of his age and creed. And yet the result of fifty years of strong and good administration by this Puritan in the purple was the hopeless breaking up of his empire. This tragedy in history was developed with all the regularity of a perfect drama.

The first forty years of his life were spent in steady and arduous self-training and preparation for the supreme office in the realm. This seed-time was followed by a year of sharp contest for the throne, which put all his powers to the test and rewarded his energy, courage and sagacity with the golden crown of Delhi. Then came twenty-three years of peaceful and prosperous reign and settled residence in the great capitals of Northern India. With every enemy removed from his path, the whole empire of India obeying his command, and wealth and culture increasing from the peace and order that his firm and vigilant rule had ensured to the country,—Aurangzib seemed now to have attained to the
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summit of human happiness and glory. This was the third Act of his life, and after it began his decline. A pitiless Nemesis, like that of the Greek tragedy, raised against him an enemy in the very bosom of his family. The rebel son of Shāh Jahān cannot long enjoy his triumph because he is confronted by the rebellion of his own son Muhammad Akbar (1681).

The flight of the defeated rebel to the Marātha king drew Aurangzib to Southern India, where he was destined to spend the last 26 years of his life in tents and to wear out the empire’s revenue, army, and organised administration as well as his own health in an unending and fruitless struggle. But the irony of Fate at first veiled from his eyes and the eyes of his contemporaries the futility of his efforts and the tragic close of his career. In the fourth Act of his life, which is comprehended in the fourth volume of this History, all seemed to go well with him;—Bijāpur and Golkondā were annexed, the Berad chieftain of Sāgar was forced to submit, and the troublesome Marātha king was brought to the block and his capital and entire family captured (1689). In this result nothing seemed to be wanting to complete the triumph of Aurangzib. But a few thoughtful observers could already discern ominous signs of the coming doom, peeping out here and there, while others were still blinded as to the future by the brilliancy of the empire. The seeds that had been sown in the third stage of his life, unnoticed and in ignorance of their fruits, began to sprout up in the fourth, and he had to gather their baneeful harvest in the fifth and closing period of his life.

Therefore, the tragedy of Aurangzib is concentrated in the last eighteen years of his life (1689-1707), which form the theme of the present volume. Not that any one could at its outset forecast the exact course of the future, nor that events moved steadily in one direction only. Slowly but pitilessly his Fate works itself out, finally defeating all his
efforts, though the invisible cause of his failure lay in his character and past deeds. Slowly but with increasing clearness does the tragic plot unfold itself, till Aurangzib realises the true nature of the forces arrayed against him and the real trend of affairs. But he does not abandon the struggle; even when the hopelessness of the contest forces itself on him and his Court, his endeavour is as strenuous as before. He tries new remedies; he changes his tactics with changes in the political situation and in the distribution of the enemy forces. At first he sends out his generals, while himself occupying a central position for their control and guidance. His generals fail to achieve a decision; very well, then this old man of eighty-two must go out to conduct the war in person for six years (1699-1705); and he retires to Ahmadnagar only when the first summons of death reaches him. Then, and then only does he mournfully recognise Ahmadnagar as destined to be his "journey's end" (khatam-us-safar).*

In this chapter I propose to take a general survey of Aurangzib's movements and policy during these last eighteen years,—how the situation developed at different times and in different theatres,—what steps he took to meet each of these new developments and with what results,—what leading actors arose at different stages of the contest and how they influenced the action,—and how slowly but surely the moral decline of the empire passed into the actual dissolution of government and of social order at his death.

§ 2. Aurangzib's movements during his last 20 years.

When Golkondā fell to him (on 21st September 1687), a year after the conquest of Bijāpur, Aurangzib's work in the Deccan seemed to have been completed. The long dream of the Mughal Emperors ever since the days of Akbar

* Hamid-ud-din's Akham, § 56. K. K. (540) has Ikhtitam-i-safar.
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seemed at last to have been fully realised. No rival Muslim Power was left in the Deccan, and all India now bowed beneath the sceptre of Delhi. True, there was a Hindu king still unsubdued; but he was an upstart of limited means and his soldiers no better than brigands; their suppression, so it seemed, was only a question of time, now that the Mughal army was set free and the Marāthas had no ally left to them anywhere in India.

After the capture of Golkondā, Aurangzib lay encamped near that fort till 25th January 1688, in order to settle the administration of the conquered country, and then he returned to Bijāpur (on 15th March) by way of Bidar and Kulbarga. At Bijāpur he lived for the next nine months, till driven out (on 14th December) by a terrible outbreak of the plague. By way of Akluj and Bahadur-garh (on the Bhimā) he reached Korégaon in the Punā district, where he encamped from 3rd March to 18th December 1689, and then returned to Bijāpur (on 11th Jan. 1690), this being his third visit to the Adil Shāhi capital. But he soon left it, and after spending February, March and April at different places south of that city, near the bank of the Krishnā, he finally encamped at Galgalā, on the southern side of that river and 34 miles south-west of Bijāpur, about 21st May 1690. The rest of this year and the first two months of the next year were passed by him here; and then he went back to the environs of Bijāpur for fourteen months (March 1691—May 1692). Thereafter, Galgalā was again his residence, for nearly three years (May 1692—March 1695). Here the Venetian doctor Gemelli Careri visited him (21st March 1695) and has left a graphic account of his Court and personal habits.

Finally, after a fifth and last visit to Bijāpur for five weeks (April-May 1695), he settled at Brahmāpurī on the southern bank of the Bhimā, (some 20 miles south-east of Pandhārpur), which his pious zeal renamed Islampurī.
Here he lived for four years and a half (21 May 1695—19 Oct. 1699), travelling to Sholapur every year in Ramzan in order to spend the holy month there in prayer, fasting and meditation. At Islampuri his encampment was walled round, and here he left his family in charge of his wazir when he set out on 19th October, 1699, on that endless campaign against the Maratha forts which was to wear out the years of his life, and from which he returned to Ahmadnagar (20 Jan. 1706), only to die a year later (20 Feb. 1707).

Such briefly were Aurangzib’s movements during the last twenty years of his reign. We shall now survey the changes in the military situation during this time.

§ 3. *The Maratha recovery 1690-91.*

The years 1688 and 1689 were a period of unbroken triumph to the Emperor. His armies marched east and south to take possession of the forts and provinces of the annexed kingdoms of Bijapur and Golkondā. Thus Sāgar (the Berad capital), Raichur and Adoni (in the east), Serā and Bangalore (in Mysore), Wandiwāsh and Conjeveram (in the Madras Karnātak), Bankāpur and Belgaon (in the extreme south-west), were occupied; and to crown all, Shambhuji was captured and his capital with his entire family seized. As the Maratha chronicle says of 1689, “This year the Mughals took all the forts.” In Northern India, too, signal success attended his arms: the Jāt rising under Rājārām was put down and that leader was slain (on 4th July, 1688).

But at the end of 1689 the new Maratha king Rājārām was known to have reached the fort of Jinji in safety, and the Emperor’s forces had henceforth to be directed south-eastwards into the Mysore plateau and the Madras Karnātak if he was to preserve his rightful gains from Bijapur and Golkondā in those quarters and to check Maratha activity there. Thus, the brilliant success of Mughal arms since
1687 received a sharp set-back in 1690. Jinji became a centre of Mahātha enterprise in the East Coast, while their ministers left at home organised resistance to the Mughals in the west. The difficulties of Aurangzib were only multiplied by the disappearance of a common head and a central Government among the Marāthas, as every Marātha captain with his own retainers fought and raided in a different quarter and on his own account. It now became a people's war, and Aurangzib could not end it, because there was no Marātha Government or State-army for him to attack and destroy. The imperial forces could not be present everywhere in full strength; hence, they suffered reverses here and there. The enemy forts which the Mughals had captured or bought during the first panic following Shambhuji's downfall, now began to be recovered by the Marāthas. The tide first turned against Aurangzib in May 1690, when his general Rustam Khan was captured and his whole camp looted by the Marāthas.

Throughout 1690 and 1691 the Emperor's chief concern still was to take possession of the almost boundless expanse of fertile territory in the south and the east, which had legally fallen to him as the heir-at-law of Adil Shah and Qutb Shah. At this stage, he evidently underrated the Marātha danger, as he hoped that with their capital and royal family in his hands and their new king invested in Jinji by the same general who had captured Sāhu and Rāigarh, the State of the Marāthas had been practically annihilated. He had yet to take a proper measure of the Maratha people.

§ 4. The fighting during 1692 and 1693.

In the autumn of 1691 the Mughal position before Jinji became so dangerously weak that the Emperor had to divert large forces to that quarter. In 1692 nothing was achieved
by the imperialists in the western theatre, while in the east coast the year ended with crushing disasters to their arms,—the capture of two high Mughal generals, the abandonment of the siege lines before Jinji, and the arrest of Prince Kām Bakhsh by his colleagues (Dec. 1692—Jan. 1693). So, the first thing to be done in 1693 was to save the situation by pouring reinforcements and supplies into the Eastern Karnātak. In the western theatre, Prince Muizz-ud-din, who had laid siege to Panhāla in October 1692, toiled unsuccessfully throughout the next year, and was finally expelled by the Marāthas in March 1694. In addition to this, there were the incessant raids of the Marātha partisan leaders,—Santā Ghorparé, Dhanā Jādav, Nimā Sindhiā, Hanumant Rao and others,—diversified by occasional successes of the Mughal pursuing columns which had not the least decisive effect, but merely lightened the Marātha rovers of a part of their booty and some mares and arms, and sometimes cost them the lives of their rear-guard.

Meantime, nearer the imperial head-quarters, over the broad and strategically important tract from Bidar to Bijapur and from Rāichur to Malkhed, the activities of the hardy aboriginal tribe of Berads led by the genius of their chief Pidiā Nāyak, had become so serious that a large army under a first-rate general had to be posted at Sāgar (72 miles east of Bijāpur) from June 1691 to December 1692. Then the Berad chieftain made his submission, but he renewed his hostility three years later, when another large army had to be sent against him (1696).

During 1694 the war in Western Deccan continued to be of the same indecisive and straggling character. Only in the Madras Karnātak the reinforced Mughal general made many conquests and levied contribution from Tanjore, but without thereby hastening the capture of the new Marātha capital at Jinji.
§ 5. *Aurangzib realises his hopeless position, 1695.*

At last, by April 1695 Aurangzib came to realise that he had really gained nothing by the conquest of the Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi capitals and the extinction of their royal lines. He had formally annexed their dominions and his officers had taken legal possession of their chief forts and administrative centres; but these gains had not been secured, they had not been made into "settled" provinces like the old *subas* of the empire. For Aurangzib, then, there was no going back to Delhi; his work in the Deccan was still unfinished; indeed, it was only just beginning.

He now perceived that the Maratha problem was no longer what it had been in Shivāji’s time, or even in Shambhurji’s. They were no longer a tribe of banditti or local rebels, but the one dominating factor of Deccan politics, the only enemy left to the empire, and yet an enemy all-pervasive from Bombay to Madras across the Indian Peninsula, elusive as the wind, without any headman or stronghold whose capture would naturally result in the extinction of their power. They had now assumed the alarming character of being the ally and rallying point of all the enemies of the empire and all disturbers of public peace and regular administration throughout the Deccan and even in Malwa, the Central Provinces and Bundelkhand. A nation was now up in arms, or more correctly all the various tribes residing in Southern and Central India were up in arms with Maratha aid and concert, against the officers of the Emperor and the cause of law and order in general. Aurangzib realised that he was a frail man buffeting a raging ocean with his bare arms.

His hope of returning to Delhi and ruling peacefully from that centre of the empire had at last to be given up as an empty dream. He must stay on the spot till death, if necessary.

Therefore, in May 1695 he sent his eldest son to govern the north—western portion of the empire (the Punjab, Sindh, and afterwards Afghanistan) and to guard the western gateway of India, while he himself settled at Islāmpuri in as much permanence of residence as the military situation and his age (now verging on eighty) allowed. This place was his last abode, because though he actually lived here for the next 4½ years only, it remained ever after as his home and stronghold, the base (*bungāh*) at the back of his campaigns.

During the Islāmpuri period (1695-1699), the Maratha danger came nearer home and drove the Mughals into the defensive in the Marāthi and Kanārese districts of the present Bombay Presidency. The movements of the roving bands under Santā Ghorparé, Dhanā Jādav and their imitators were bewilderingly rapid and unexpected. The Mughals could not defend every place; their pursuing columns panted helplessly behind the "robbers" and wore themselves out in vain. Local representatives of the Emperor, who had learnt by bitter experience that aid could not be expected from their master in time,—and sometimes ever at all,—made unauthorised terms with the Marathas by promising them an annual blackmail of one-fourth of the revenue (*chauth*). They were still more urged to do it by the fact that if the Marathas looted a district the Emperor ordered his local governor to make the loss good to the victims! If a Mughal officer resisted the Marathas and was defeated and captured by them, he had to provide his own ransom, and the Emperor would often dismiss such unfortunate sufferers on the suspicion of cowardice. Hence, it was safer for a Mughal commander to bribe the Marathas than to fight them; certainly, it was cheaper. Worse than these, many imperialists made a concert with the enemy and enriched themselves by robbing the Emperor's own
subjects and innocent traders, as these officers had been
starving at getting no rent from their devastated fields. The
Mughal administration had really dissolved, and only the
presence of the Emperor with all his troops in the country
held it together, but it was now a delusive phantom. Santa
and Dhana were the heroes of this period; the initiative lay
entirely with them, and they upset every plan and calcula-
tion formed by the imperialists.

The chief incidents of this Islāmpuri period were Sānta's
destruction of two great Mughal generals, Qāsim Khān
(Nov. 1695) and Himmat Khān (Jan. 1696), the murder
of Santā in a domestic feud (June 1697), the Mughal cap-
ture of Jinji (7 Jan. 1698), and the return of Rājārām to
Mahārāṣṭra.

§ 7. Aurangzib's last campaigns, 1699-1705.

This last event forced a change on Aurangzib's policy.
Safe in the undisputed possession of the east coast, he could
now concentrate all his resources in the western theatre of
war. Such a change of objective had become necessary too,
as the head and centre of the Maratha power had once
more shifted to the west and he could destroy it only by
seizing their king's forts and family in Mahārāṣṭra and
thus repeating once again, but in a more decisive and final
form, the success that had followed his capture of Shambhuji
and his capital in 1689.

Now, therefore, began the last stage of Aurangzib's
career,—the sieges of successive Maratha forts by the Em-
peror in person. The rest of his life (1699-1707) is a repeti-
tion of the same sickening tale: a hill-fort captured by him
after a vast expenditure of time, men and money, the fort
recovered by the Marathas from the weak Mughal garrison
after a few months, and its siege begun again by the
Mughals a year or two later! His soldiers and camp-fol-
lowers suffered unspeakable hardships in marching over
flooded rivers, muddy roads, and broken hilly tracks; porters disappeared; transport beasts died of hunger and overwork; scarcity of grain was ever present in his camp. His officers wearied of this labour of Sisyphus; but Aurangzib would burst into wrath at any suggestion of return to Northern India and taunt the unlucky counsellor with cowardice and love of ease [Akhām § 46]. One by one the old able and independent officers and courtiers of his earlier years had passed away, and he was now surrounded only by timid sycophants and upstart nobles of his own creation, who could never venture to contradict him in his errors, nor give him honest counsel. The mutual jealousies of his generals—Nasrat Jang against Firuz Jang, Shujāet Khan against Muhammad Murād, Tarbiyat Khan against Fathullah Khan,—ruined his affairs as completely as the French cause in the Peninsular War was ruined by the private quarrels of Napoleon's marshals. Therefore, the Emperor must conduct every operation in person, or nothing would be done.

A bare list of his sieges is given below:—
Basant-garh (siege, 22nd—25th Nov. 1699).
Satārā (siege, 8 Dec. 1699—21 April 1700).
Parli-garh (siege, 30 April—9 June).

*Halt at Khawaspur for the rainy season of 1700*
(from 30 Aug.)

Panhālā (siege, 9 March—28 May, 1701).
Pavan-garh (do.)

*Halt at Khātāū for the rainy season of 1701* (29 May—7 Nov.)

Capture of Wardhan-garh (6 June)

Nandgir, Chandan and Wandan (6 Oct.) by Fathullah Khan.

Khelnā (siege, 26 Dec. 1701—4 June 1702).

*Halt at Bahādur-garh for the rainy season of 1702.*

Kondānā (siege, 27 Dec. 1702—8 April 1703).
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_Halt at Punā for the rainy season of 1703_ (1 May—10 Nov.)
Tornā (siege, 23 Feb.—10 March).
_Halt at Khed for the rainy season of 1704_ (17 April—22 Oct.)
Wāgingerā (siege, 8 Feb.—27 April 1705).
_Halt at Devāpur for the rainy season of 1705_ (May—23 Oct.)

This was the last campaign of the old campaigner of eighty-eight, for here he received a warning of what was to come. At Devāpur a severe illness seized him, which was aggravated by his insistence on transacting business as usual. The whole camp was thrown into despair and confusion. At length Aurangzib yielded to their entreaty and the warning of approaching death, and retreated to Ahmadnagar (20 January 1706), to die there a year afterwards.

§ 8. _Sorrow and misery of his last years._

The last few years of his life were inexpressibly sad. On its public side there was the consciousness that his long reign of half a century had been a colossal failure. The endless war in the Deccan exhausted his treasury; the Government turned bankrupt; the soldiers starving from arrears of pay (usually three years overdue) mutinied; and during the closing years of his reign the revenue of Bengal, regularly sent by the honest and able diwān Murshid Quli Khan, was the sole support of the Emperor’s household and army, and its arrival was eagerly looked forward to. While in the Deccan the Marathas remained supreme to the end, lawlessness reigned in many places of Northern and Central India also. The old Emperor in the far South lost control over his officers in Hindustan, and the administration grew slack and corrupt; chiefs and zamindars defied the local authorities and asserted themselves, filling the country with
tumult, and the great anarchy began in the empire of Delhi even before Aurangzib had closed his eyes.

In the Deccan, the Maratha captains, each acting on his own account, incessantly raided Mughal territory and did the greatest possible injury to the imperialists by their guerilla warfare. They seemed to be ubiquitous and elusive like the wind. The movable columns frequently sent out from the imperial head-quarters to "chastise the robbers", only marched and counter-marched, without being able to crush the enemy. When the Mughal forces had gone back, the scattered Marathas, like water parted by the oar, closed again and resumed their attack as before. There was an exultant and menacing Maratha army always hanging three or four miles behind the Emperor's camp wherever it marched or halted.

The wastage of the Deccan war, which raged intensely for nearly 20 years, was one hundred thousand soldiers and followers and three times that number of horses, elephants, camels and oxen on the Mughal side every year (Storia, iv. 96). In the imperial camp pestilence was always present and the daily mortality was heavy from the immense numbers of men crowded together, the accumulation of filth and flies, and the unbearable stench. (Ibid, 116.) The economic exhaustion of the Deccan was complete; "the fields were left devoid of trees and bare of crops, their places being taken by the bones of men and beasts. The country was so entirely desolated and depopulated that neither fire nor light could be found in the course of a three or four days' journey." (Ibid, 252.) Trade and revenue collection had long ceased, and incessant brigandage by both sides had at last left nothing to be lootd.

§ 9. The end of Aurangzib.

In addition to the failure of his rule, Aurangzib's domestic life was loveless and dreary, and wanting in the benign
peace and cheerfulness and the kindred warmth which throw a halo round old age. He was ever haunted by the fear that his sons would treat him as he had treated Shah Jahān. Lastly, there was the certainty of a deluge of blood when he would close his eyes and his three surviving sons, each supported by a provincial army and treasury, would fight for the throne to the bitter end. Death was busy at work within his family circle for some years before his own end. In the midst of the darkness closing around him, he used to hum the pathetic verses:—

By the time you reach your 80th or 90th year,
You will have received many a hard blow from the hand of Time;
And when from that point you reach the stage of a hundred years,
Death will put on the garb of your life.

His last illness overtook him at Ahmadnagar, late in January 1707; then he rallied for five or six days, sent away his two sons Azam and Kām Bakhsh from his camp to their provincial governments, and resumed his daily prayers and official work. But that worn-out frame of 90 years had now been taxed beyond human endurance. A severe fever set in, and in the morning of Friday, 20th February, 1707,* he sank into eternal rest.

* *Maasir A*, 521, gives Friday 28 Zil Q. 1118, but that date was a Thursday. As this official history emphasises that the death took place on a Friday, we must correct the text into Friday the 29th Zil Q. — 21 Feb. 1707.
§ 1. *The leading Maratha ministers and generals at the accession of Rajaram.*

When the great Shivaji’s successor Shambhuji was killed by Aurangzib (March 1689) and his family was closely besieged in Rāigarh, it seemed very likely that the newly created Maratha kingdom and independent nationality would be destroyed very soon. The prospect became still more gloomy at the end of the year, when Shambhuji’s sons were captured and his successor Rajaram driven into hopeless flight by the Mughals. In this terrible national crisis the genius of the Maratha people saved them and secured their liberty. It is, therefore, necessary to study the leaders of this almost kingless State during the period.

At the time of the downfall of Shambhuji and the hurried crowning of Rajaram (Feb. 1689), the leading persons in the Maratha State who had survived the havoc of Shambhuji’s reign were three: Nilkantha Moreshwar Pinglé the *Peshwā*, Rāmchandra Nilkantha Bāvdékar the *Amātya*, and Shankarāji Malhār the *Sachiv.* In addition to them there was an officer possessed of the highest cleverness and experience, namely, Prahlād, the son of the late Chief Justice and shrewd diplomatist, Nirāji Rāvji. This Prahlād had been Maratha ambassador at Golkondā, and had, in that capacity, done signal services to Shivāji and Shambhuji, and the influence and knowledge that he had thus

* This distribution of offices is tentative, being based upon Chitnis, ii. 39-40. In the *Modern Review*, May 1924, p. 588, a writer gives reasons for doubting its correctness.
acquired were so great that he became all in all in the council of Rajaram at Jinji.

Three other men, who had hitherto filled only subordinate posts, now forced their way by their genius and enterprise to the front rank of State servants and popular leaders in this crisis of Maratha history. They were Dhana Singh Jādav and Santāji Ghorparé (the two rivals for the office of Senapati), and Parashurām Trimbak, who finally rose to the post of Regent in 1701. *

§ 2. Rajaram's position and policy on his accession, 1689.

In the last year of Shambhuji's reign (1688), the splendid State created by the genius and valour of Shivāji seemed about to break to pieces. Many vassal chiefs, notably the Sāvants of Vādi, had been in rebellion for some time past and could not be conquered. In November 1688, the Shirké family had risen in arms with the sympathy of the discontented ministers jealous of the foreign favourite Kavikalas and the good wishes of all who despaired of the safety of Shivāji's heritage in the hands of the drunken profligate Shambhu; but they had been defeated and driven out of the country, and the king had taken swift vengeance by throwing into prison Prahlād Nirāji, the chief kārkuns and many other prominent officers (December)—which had the effect of paralysing the administration [Jedhe S.].

Less than two months after this coup had come the crushing blow of the capture of Shambhu by the Mughals (about 3rd February, 1689). To many of the Marathas this disaster probably appeared as a blessing in disguise: the hateful North Indian favourite who had bewitched the king and the insolent and capricious Rajah himself, whom

* Chit. ii. 71; Bharatvarsha, year 1, No. 3, pp. 31—40; Kaifyāts, p. 146.
no patriot and no honourable man could serve, were both removed by one stroke of fate.

Immediately after hearing of Shambhuji’s capture, Chāngoji Kātkar, the qiladār of Rāigarh, with the support of Yesāji Kank, the old Māvlé captain and comrade of Shivāji’s youth, took Rajaram out of prison and seated him on the throne (8th February). The State officers confined by the late king,—some in 1684 and others only two months ago—were all released. Shambhuji’s heir Shāhu was a boy of six only, and therefore the dowager queen, Yesu Bāi, very wisely supported Rajaram instead of urging the claims of her own son. It was not a time for woman’s rule or infant’s rule. Even before the capture of Shambhuji, a Mughal army had been detached in December 1688 under the able general Zulfiqār Khan, against his capital, and now (February 1689) the fort was invested in right earnest. [M. A. 331, 327.] As the besiegers strengthened their posts, Rajaram wisely decided not to risk his all by shutting himself up in that fort, but to go out of it in time, raise forces from the country at large, and with them try to drive away the besiegers of Rāigarh.

So, he slipped out of the fort in the garb of a Hindu religious beggar (yogi) on 5th April, and by way of Pratāpgarh, Satārā and Parli took refuge in Panhālā, c. 30 June. Here with the help of Rāmchandra he began to levy fresh troops, but the Mughals were after him, and he found no real safety anywhere in the home country. True, all these forts were still in his possession; but how long would they withstand the captor of Bijāpur and Golkondā? Moreover, it would be a wise strategy to divide the enemy’s forces by transferring a part of the Maratha activities to the far-off East Coast, while the Mughals were kept in play on the western side of the Peninsula by his other officers. So he decided to retire to the Madras Karnātak
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and there make a stand with the help of his first cousin Shāhji II of Tanjore (the successor of Vyankoji).

The plan of operations for the future was thus arranged: Rajaram was to be conducted to Jinji by Prahlād Nirāji (as his chief counsellor) with a number of generals and high civil servants. The supreme control of affairs in the homeland was vested in Rāmchandra N. Bāvdékar, the Amātya, with his head-quarters first in Vishālgarh and latterly in Parli, assisted by Shankarāji Malhār (the Sachīv) and certain other officers. All officials and captains in the homeland were to take their orders from Rāmchandra and obey him like the king himself. The commands of this dictator of the West were not to be upset even by the king on appeal. The supreme authority thus conferred on Rāmchandra was designated by his new title of Hakumat-panāh. Rāmchandra had an inborn genius for command and organisation. He gathered round himself the ablest lieutenants, men like Parashurām Trimbak and Shankarāji Nārāyan, and managed to make the mutually jealous and contentious Maratha guerilla leaders act in concert, though his orders lacked the prestige and authority which the king’s presence in Maharashatra could have given to them and though he was confronted by a tireless clever and powerful enemy like Aurangzib. Rāmchandra’s masterly insight and consummate tact were proved by his exact adaptation of his policy and plan of operations to the genius of his countrymen and the actual situation in the midst of which he had to work.

Finding the Mughal pursuit dangerously close and persistent, Rajaram left Panhālā on 26th September, 1689, passed through many perilous adventures and a period of concealment in Bednur territory, and then by rapid marches reached Vellore on 28th October, and some four days later entered Jinji “in humble guise” like a poor private person. There he took over the government from the unwilling
hands of Harji Mahādik's widow and son, formed a full Court and began to reign like a king, though in extreme poverty.* The Peshwā Nilkantha M. Pinglé accompanied his master to Jinji, but there fell completely into the second place. He merely stamped his seal on the royal letters, while the king's leading counsellor and the supreme authority in the State was Prahlād Nirāji, whom Rajaram called his father and on whom the high title of Regent (Pratinidhi) was conferred thus placing him outside and above the cabinet of eight ministers (Ashta-Pradhān).

§ 3. *Aurangzib's successes and policy during 1689.*

At the time when Rajaram fled from Mahārāṣṭra (1689), Aurangzib had already won many of the Maratha forts and was rapidly winning others by money or force, as the enemy were paralysed by Shambhuji's misgovernment and subsequent downfall. In the extreme north, Sālhir (21 Feb. 1687) and Trimbak (8 Jan. 1689) had been captured, and in the centre Singhgarh (Nov. 1684) and Rājgarh (May 1689), while in North Konkan his able agent Matabar Khan was on the high tide of success, taking fort after fort, as will be described in Chapter LIII. Only the capital Rāigarh and the three very important fortresses of Vishālgarh, Satāra and Panhālā still remained in Maratha possession. Of these Raigarh and Panhālā were to fall before the year was over.

The Mughals had been holding for some years past the plains of the Nāsik and Punā districts, but not the hill forts within their limits. The first Mughal successes after Shambhuji's fall were the capture of the mountain strong-

* For the dates Jedhe Shakāvali, and the details Keshav Pandit's Sanskrit poem and F. Martin's French Mémoire, summarised in Appendix A. Rajaram's life in Jinji, as described by Martin is given in an abridged translation in my *House of Shivaji*, 3rd edition.
holds in the extreme north-west (the Nāsik district) and the descent from them into the Thānā district of North Konkan, across the Western Ghāts. The inland parts of Central and Southern Konkan remained in Maratha possession, but the coast was mostly subject to Mughal sway, as the Siddi of Janjirā with his invincible fleet was now a Mughal admiral, and the Marathas were forced to lose the port of Chaul and even to evacuate the island-depot of Underi. Their navy had to transfer its head-quarters further south to Gheriā or Vijaydurg.

In the year 1689 many Maratha forts fell easily into Aurangzib's hands,* but it was then not worth his while to lay regular sieges to the numberless other forts in Mahārāshtra, as will become evident when we consider his position in that year with reference to the entire Deccan and not in respect of the Marathas alone. They were a minor factor at that time and he expected them to be subdued as the natural consequence of the fall of their king and the impending capture of their capital and royal family. The Mughal Emperor had yet to gain his knowledge of the character of the Maratha people and of the people's war. His one aim now was to occupy the rich and boundless dominions of the fallen Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi kingdoms, and he would take the Maratha forts only if they could be secured easily and cheaply. Therefore, during 1689, 1690 and 1691 Aurangzib was too busy in the plains of the south and the east to divert his resources to the barren hill-forts of the west. Nor had he been yet seized with the obstinate folly of his old age, which made him dash his health,

* "The forts captured by the imperialists in 1689 were too many to be named." (M. A. 311.) "In the year 1689 the Mughals took all the forts. ... Out of these Pratapgarh and Rohira Rajgarh and Torna in the Wai subdivision were recovered by Ramchandra and Shankaraji in 1690." (Jedhē Shakāvalī.)
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army, treasure and empire itself against the Maratha rock-
fortresses,—only to win them after a prodigal waste of time,
money and men, and then to lose them to the Marathas
when his grand army marched away from the conquest.

At the beginning of February 1689 came the capture of
Shambhuji. Aurangzib spent the next ten months (3 March
—18th December 1689) at Korégaon, 12 miles north-east
of Punä. During this period Zulfiqār Khan brought to a
successful end his siege of Rāigarh by capturing it (19th
October) with Shambhuji's entire family.

But the effect of the capture of the Maratha capital was
nullified by the flight of Rajaram to Jinji, and the Emperor
had to depute Zulfiqār Khan, immediately after his return
from Rāigarh, to follow the Maratha king to the East
Coast. The only other important operations of 1689 were
the siege and capture of Rāichur (10 July—29 November)
by Ruhullah Khan, the unsuccessful pursuit of Rajaram by
some local Mughal officers in the Bijapur and Bellary dis-
tricts, and the invasion of Bednur by Jān Nisār Khan to
compel the surrender of the fugitive Maratha Rajah, which,
however, was frustrated by Santā. [M. A. 329, 331, 333.]

§ 4. Maratha recovery: capture of Rustam Khan, May,
1690.

But, in 1690, the Marathas began to show signs of re-
covery from the effects of the disastrous fall of their late
king, which had stunned them for a year and a half. On
25th May 1690 they gained their first signal victory under
their new popular chiefs.

Sharzā Khan (son of Sayyid Iliyās), a former Bijāpuri
general, who had come over to the Emperor's side in 1686
and been created Rustam Khan, was roving in the neigh-
bourhood of Satārā with his family and troops, planning
how to capture that fort for the Emperor. The Maratha
leaders,—Râmchandra, Shankarâji, Santâ, and Dhanâ,—fell upon him in concert. The Khan sent his son Ghâlib to the front to oppose them. The youth was hopelessly outnumbered and outclassed in weapons.* Karnâtaki foot-musketeers (probably Berads) formed the enemy’s vanguard and fired their pieces with deadly accuracy, wounding the elephants in the Mughal front line, which turned and fled away trampling down their own men, Rustam Khan hurried up to the spot to restore the fight, but a charge of the enemy’s elephants caused the Mughal horses to shy and stampede. Rustam, however, made a stand and fought for some time, and on being gradually rejoined by his runaway followers he delivered a counter-attack on the enemy’s advanced reserve, then led by Santâ and Dhanâ. These two, following the usual Maratha tactics, pretended to give way and the Khan pressed impetuously on, driving his own elephant onwards accompanied by a few troopers. Just then the skirt of his dress was set ablaze by the enemy’s fire. The Berad musketeers took advantage of the confusion by falling upon the imperialists’ baggage and rear-guard and plundering them. The Mughal troops were distracted, and they dispersed, abandoning the fight.

Rustam himself, after receiving many wounds, fell down from his elephant and was carried off into captivity by Bâbâji (? probably Mânâji) Moré. His right wing, under Ghâlib, was hopelessly overpowered by the crowd of exultant Marathas, and that commander too was wounded and brought down from his elephant. Fifteen hundred of the Mughals fell on the field. The Maratha general in Satârâ

* Dil (ii. 146b.) “The Deccani soldiers carry no weapon besides the sword and the spear, and the Bijapuris (excepting the Marathas) do not even carry the spear. . . . Though, in imitation of the men of N. India, they have procured artillery, they can really do nothing with it.”
fort now sallied out with his 5,000 men, enveloped the family of Rustam Khan, and carried off his mother, wife and some children into the fort. In addition to the Mughal general and his family, the Marathas made prize of 4000 horses, eight elephants and the entire camp and baggage of Rustam’s army.

After sixteen days, Rustam Khan ransomed himself by promising to pay one lakh of rupees, and leaving his mother and eldest son as security for the money. Two of his wives and two other sons had escaped during the plunder of his camp by putting on tattered old cloaks, veiling their faces, and giving themselves out to be the Khan’s menial servants. A few followers guided them to a nook among the hills where they lay hidden for the day and afterwards made their way to the imperial thāna of Karargāon,* walking in the guise of beggars. [Ishwardas 141a—143a, J.S., M.A. 336.]

The Emperor, on hearing of the disaster, immediately sent Firuz Jang with a large army to invest Satārā and secure the release of Rustam. Siddi Abdul Qādir, when going from his fief of Lakhisar to join this force, was attacked by Rupā Bhonslé and wounded, fifty of his troops being killed and all his property looted by the enemy. [Ishwar, 142b.] These two strokes were followed up by Rāmchandra and Shankarāji recovering the great forts of Pratāpagarh, Rohirā, Rājgarh and Tornā, in the course of the same year (1690). [J.S., Chit. 53.] The Mughals, after their capture of Rājgarh (about July 1689) had placed it in charge of Abul Khair (son of Abdul Aziz, one of the slaves of the family of Bairam Khan), who had long been qiladār of Junnar. When the Marathas made a demonstration round it, Abul Khair lost heart and vacating the fort fled

* Either Korégaon, 10 m.e., or Karar 30 m.s. of Satara.
towards the Emperor's camp. For this desertion of duty he was banished to Mecca. [K. K. ii. 392.]*

§ 5. *Panhālā won and lost by the Mughals.*

The famous stronghold of Panhālā was still in Maratha hands when Shambhuji fell (Feb. 1689).† A Mughal general, Shaikh Nizām, was at that time engaged in investing it, [M. A. 320] but nothing came of his efforts, as the capture of such a fort was quite beyond the resources of any single general. About the middle of the year, after Rāīgarh had been closely invested and Rajaram was fleeing towards Jinji, Ruhullah Khan was sent to secure Panhālā by bribery, but the defenders refused his offer at the time. The fall of Rāīgarh in October, however, took the heart out of them and they now sold Panhālā to the Emperor, about December 1689. [Dil. ii. 97b, 111b; Ishwardas 140a; Chitnis, ii. 32; J.S. is silent.] But the Mughal garrison held it so negligently that the Marathas under Parashurām afterwards easily recovered it by surprise (about the middle of 1692).


Imperial prestige demanded that the fort should not be left in enemy hands. In October 1692, Prince Muizz-ud-din, the eldest son of Shah Alam, was sent from the Emperor’s camp at Galgalā (32 miles south-west of Bijapur) to take

* The date of Abul Khair's appointment is given in M.A. 330 as July 1659. Khāf Khan is, therefore, wrong in saying that the fort was recovered by the Marathas shortly before Shambhuji's downfall.
† M.A. 435 says (but in recording the events of 1700) that Panhala had been captured by Prince Azam and recovered soon afterwards by Shambhuji (which means a date like 1686 or 1688). Here the name of the king is wrong, and consequently the date that follows from the name. Ishwardas and Chitnis, with their confused order of events and lack of dates, imply that Panhala was sold to the Mughals by its qiladar near about 1690.
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it. He arrived before Panhālā near the end of the month, and with his officer Iftikhār Khan invested its two gates. The jagirdars of the district were ordered to supply provisions to his camp, and in the middle of December, he was reinforced by Lutfullāh Khan, who became superintendent of his body-guard and in effect his lieutenant.

Sixty miles north-west of the Emperor’s camp at Galgalā lay the fort of Miraj, and midway between Miraj and Panhālā, a distance of forty miles, an outpost was set up at Altā to guard the communications. Gradually the investment was tightened. Covered lanes were begun towards the walls, Mughal outposts were set up around it, and in January 1693 four large pieces of artillery were sent to the prince by the Emperor. Muizz-ud-din’s position seemed so secure that in August his family was sent to his camp. [M. A. 360.]

But, for a year the fort held out, and in October 1693 the scene entirely changed. A vast Maratha army,* under Dhanā Jādav, Rāmchandra, and Shankarāji, arrived for its relief and encircled the small siege force. The battle began on the 20th and there were daily encounters for some days after. While this contest kept the besiegers engaged, the Marathas outside easily threw fresh troops and provisions

* Ten thousand horse and foot, according to Akhbarat (27 Oct.). But Muizz-ud-din’s despatch gives eighty thousand cavalry and countless infantry (Insha-i-Madhuram, p. 70). The account in my text is based on the Court-news-letters. I cannot accept Muiz’s report of the result of the battle which runs thus:—“In the midst of the fight, a musket-shot hit Parashuram, the chief of cavalry of Ramchandra, in the head, and sent him to hell. The enemy were shaken. Our men charged them with swords and daggers. After a long fight the enemy fled in confusion, many of them were drowned in the river [Krishna]. Numberless of their foot-soldiers were put to the sword. Hillocks of the slain were formed. All the enemy’s artillery, 200 lances, the same number of muskets, and many mares and all other property of the Marathas were captured by us.” (Ibid.)

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into the fort, and in concert with the garrison raided the Mughal trenches with great success. Some guns and wheel-ed field-pieces (rahkala) were carried off from Saf Shikan Khan's position into the fort. Some imperial officers were slain, several others wounded, and one taken prisoner by the enemy.

Meantime, the Emperor had issued urgent orders to hurry up two heavy reinforcements to the prince under the command of Firuz Jang and Khānazād Khan.* The Maratha relieving force heard of their coming (at the end of October) and dispersed from the neighbourhood of Panhālā. Dhanā made his way north towards Satārā; but before reaching that fort he was sighted by Firuz Jang's army on its southward march to the prince's side. The Khan sent his vanguard under his son Chin Qalich Khan and Rustam Khan, who overtook the Marathas near Karad.† A severe battle was fought. The Marathas were defeated and dis-persed with heavy slaughter, leaving 30 prisoners and 600 horses in the hands of the victors. The Mughals, too, lost many men.

But Dhanā Jādav had effectively spoiled the work done by Muizz-ud-din in a year outside Panhālā. The fort had been reprovisioned, the siege-works had been destroyed and heavy losses inflicted on the Mughal army. Thereafter, though the prince continued there for four months longer, he could do nothing.

The siege was practically abandoned; the prince carried on his operations languidly, merely to deceive the Emperor, and opened negotiations with the garrison to secure the fort

* Khem Savaht (the desai of Kudal and Banda) was also written to, by order of the Emperor, to keep his kinsmen and followers back from their design of coming to the help of the Marathas who were attacking Muizz-ud-din. [Insha-i-Madhū, p. 17.]

† The place where Dhanā's force was sighted was Belhen, between Satara and Miraj.
for a price. When four months had been thus wasted, Aurangzib, on 7th March, 1694, ordered a force of 6,000 men to strengthen the prince, as the siege had now come to a stop. At the same time Muizz-ud-din was authorised to use his own discretion; if the fort was surrendered peacefully he could grant terms, if not he must renew entrenching and lay siege to it a second time.


But it was of no use. Already, about 8th March, the prince availing himself of the Emperor’s permission, had begun to march away from Panhālā, while Lutfullah Khan and many other officers, who had positive orders to stay below the fort, joined him in the retreat. The Emperor, on hearing of this (13th March), sent an officer to turn the prince back from Vadgāon (14 m. e. of Panhālā) and take him back to that fort to make a decision about it on the spot by either securing it for a price or renewing siege operations against it. Four days later the Emperor changed his mind and wrote to the prince to come to Court, while his officers were to be forced to go back to Panhālā under Lutfullah’s command, to continue the siege. Muizz-ud-din was received in audience by his grandfather on the 29th of the month. His cousin Bidār Bakht (the eldest son of Prince Md. Azam) had been selected to undertake the task from which he had returned unsuccessful. Bidār Bakht, with a nominal muster-roll of 25,000 men and artillery, was given formal leave on 27th March and began his journey from the Court at Galgalā on 5th April. “The officers who had come with Muiz to Court without orders, were now driven by force back to Panhālā.”

But the Emperor seems to have changed his plan again, as we find Bidār Bakht campaigning in the Bombay Kanārā (Belgāon and Dhārwar) during the second half of 1694,
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and his siege of Panhālā began a year later, in April 1695. His first acts were marked by vigour. Opening his approaches and planting his artillery, he siezed the village at the foot of the hill and demolished one bastion of the fort. [Akhbarat, 11 May, 1695.] But the promise of these opening operations was not fulfilled. A desultory siege was continued by him till the end of January 1696, when the disasters to Qāsim Khan and Hīmmat Khan further south induced the Emperor to send the prince to Bāsavapatan, and to entrust the siege of Panhālā to Firuz Jang, who, too, could effect nothing. In fact the capture of Panhālā was quite beyond the power of any divisional army, as Aurangzib was to realise during his own siege of it in 1701.*


Having brought the story of Panhālā down to the end of the century, we shall now go back to the year 1690 and make a survey of the Mughal and Maratha activities in other parts of Western India.

After the disaster to Rustam Khan (May 1690), the Emperor found it necessary to occupy the North Satārā district in force. Lutfullah Khan was detached from the Court as thānadār of Khatāū (25 m.e. of Satārā), with orders to make that town his head-quarters and set up a chain of outposts in the surrounding country. After arriving at Khatāū on 6th July, the Mughal troopers dismounted and rested as best they could, but on account of the incessant rain they could not immediately form a regular camp and entrench it round. Towards the end of the night, Santā Ghorparé at the head of ten thousand horse and numberless infantry surprised them. The tired soldiers, awakened with

* The entire narrative from Dhanā’s attack on Muiz to this point has been reconstructed from the Akhbarat or daily news-letters of Aurangzib’s camp preserved in MS. in London.
difficulty, began to put on their armour and saddle their horses, while Lutfullah's son, Md. Khalil, gained time for them by hastening on foot to encounter the enemy with some musketeers of the guard and the armed menials of the general. Thus the camp was saved from plunder. By firing from a distance he turned the enemy out of the lanes and bazar, and then, being reinforced by troops who had arrived in the meantime, he took horse and attacked the enemy at close quarters. After a severe fight for three hours, Santā fled to Wardhangarh (8 m. n. w.), and his followers dispersed to their homes through the passes. The victorious Mughals returned to their camp, having lost 67 killed and 170 wounded. The Marathas were reported to have lost nearly 500 in killed alone. A hundred of them were captured alive and put to the sword. The spoils taken by the victors were 300 mares, 400 spears, 200 muskets, besides some kettledrums and flags. Thereafter Mughal outposts were easily set up in that district.

But the Marathas were only baffled and not crushed. They rallied their forces and reappeared in the East Satārā region in force. Lutfullah, urged by the Emperor, hastened to the scene. He halted at night in the village of Piliv (12 m. e. of Mhāsvad, and 15 m. s. of Akluj.) Next morning, a Maratha army reputed to be 20,000 cavalry and unnumbered infantry, led by Santā, Dhanā, Dāfle, Moré and other generals, enveloped the small imperial detachment on its march. Lutfullah, placing his baggage in the centre, faced on all sides and engaged the enemy. Daflé had 10,000 Karnātaki foot-musketeers, whose fire severely galled the Mughals. The battle raged from dawn to sunset, the imperialists beating back repeated attacks of the enemy. Finally, Santā and Dhanā, at the head of 5,000 picked horsemen, charged the division of Lutfullah himself, but were repulsed. At sunset the Marathas withdrew, leaving
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a thousand dead on the field, besides many wounded. The Mughals lost 200 killed and above 300 wounded.*

There was nothing further to note till the end of 1690, when some Maratha auxiliaries of the Mughals,—namely Nimā Sindhia, Mānkoji Pāndrē and Nāgoji Manē,—went over to Rajaram at Jinji with their contingent of 2000 men (November.) But next month Sharzā Rao Jedhé, the desh-mukh of Bhor, joined the imperialists and was given a robe of honour and a conciliatory letter. [J. S.] The wazir Asad Khan was sent (November) to the Karnul and Kadāpā districts across the Krishnā, to wrest them from the officers of the late Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi Governments and thereby secure the rear of the Mughal army fighting in the Madras Karnātak. Here he conquered many forts, including Nandiyāl, the frontier-fortress between the Bijapuri and Haidarabadi Karnātaks.


In April-May 1691 the Emperor had to detach some generals against the Maratha bands whose activity had again begun to be reported. But his chief anxiety now was about Sāgar, where the Berad chief Pidiā Nayak was giving serious trouble. One large army after another, each under a first-rate general, had to be posted in the Berad country for a year and a half (June 1691-Dec. 1692.) While the Satārā district in the north was probably quiet,

* Insha-i-Madhuram. The despatch is undated, but I conjecturally place the battle in 1690, as Santā and Dhanā were absent in Kanara during Lutfullāh’s second thanadari of Akluj (16 Oct.—15 Dec. 1692.)

If my conjecture be correct, and if we can take Lutfullāh’s two despatches as approximating to truth,—then we must conclude that the first Maratha attempt at revival was temporarily checked and Dhanā and Santā were driven into hiding and comparative inactivity for six months (Oct. 1690—April 1691), and the Mughals retained their mastery in Maharashtra during that brief period.
the Raibagh-Hukri region in the south was subjected to Maratha raids (June 1691).

The year 1692 witnessed a renewal of Maratha activity* and their conspicuous success in many quarters, one of these being their recovery of Panhālā from Mughal hands. The important post of Akluj, where the great southern highway from Ahmadnagar to Bijapur crossed the Punā-Haidarabad road, was infested by the enemy, and on 8th May Prince Muizz-ud-din was sent there. Santāji Ghorparé’s base was the Mahādev hill to the north-east of Satārā, and from this refuge he used to make rapid raids far to the east, over the rolling plains of Bijapur. Evidently the prince effected nothing decisive, as we read of Lutfullah Khan being sent to Akluj in the middle of October, to clear the country between Bijapur city and the Bhimā.

At the same time the Marathas were disturbing the Belgāon and Dhārwar districts of the Western Karnataka. On 8th October, Dhanā and Santā with 7,000 men were reported to have siezed some forts near Belgāon and and invested the latter town itself, and to be feeding their horses on the growing crops. By the 27th, these two generals had left Belgāon to attack Dhārwar, and they finally retired to Nargund (30 m. n. e. of Dhārwar). At the same time, other Maratha bands were roving in the Akluj-Indi region in north Bijapur.

The Emperor stiffened the defence of Kanārā, by sending Hamid-ud-din Khan to Belgāon and Matlab Khan to Dhārwar, while Qāsim Khan, the faujdār of Bijapuri Karnātak or north-west Mysore, was reinforced and ordered to guard Bankāpur and other places near it in addition (16 Oct.). A little later, Matlab Khan defeated the enemy

* The whole of the remaining part of this chapter is based on the Akhbarat, except when other sources are cited.
near Dhārwar and captured a son and a daughter of one of the Maratha generals.*

Soon afterwards (in the beginning of November 1692) the siege of Panhālā began, and the Mughal forces had to be concentrated there. Early next month both Santā and Dhanā were sent to Madras with large armies to relieve Jinji, and therefore Mahārāṣṭra was for a time denuded of the best national leaders and troops, and the Mughals in the western theatre enjoyed peace for a time.

§ 10. Struggle with Santaji Ghorparé and Dhana Jadav, 1693-94.

Late in 1693 Maratha activities revived in the west. Their general Amrit Rao† had entered Mughal service after Shambhuji’s downfall and been posted to the Phaltan thāna, but in October 1693 he came back to the national side, and crossed the Bhimā to raid Mughal territory. Himmat Khan set out in pursuit of him, but could not catch the elusive Maratha horsemen. At the same time Dhanā, Shankarāji and other leaders were attacking the Mughal force before Panhālā, as we have already seen. And a more active enemy was making his presence felt by the Mughals.

Santā Ghorparé had come back from Jinji in May 1693 after triumphantly raising its siege. As soon as the campaigning season opened in October, he resumed his raids in the homeland. His bands spread near Bhupāl-garh (65 m. n. w. of Bijapur and 76 m. s. e. of Satārā), while Dhanā was attacking the besiegers of Panhālā. Himmat Khan went out in pursuit of Santā and overtook him about 22nd October. The Maratha general, at the head of a vastly superior force, turned at bay at Māṅgaon and attacked

* His name cannot be read in the transcript of the Persian MS. made for me.

† Called “Palkar, a general of Shivaji’s son” in the Akh. of 24 Oct. 1693. Should be Nimbalkar.
Himmat, whose small column took refuge at the foot of the village, "the enemy occupying three sides and the Khan one." Evidently at this stage reinforcements under Hamid-ud-din and Khwaja Khan joined Himmat, and the Mughals resumed the chase of the raiders. They gained a signal victory over Santā and his Berad allies (about 14th Nov.) at the village of Vikramhalli. Two hundred of the Berads and 300 of Santā's own men were slain, and 300 mares and some flags and kettledrums captured by the Mughals, though they too suffered heavy casualties. [Akī. 19 Nov.]

Then the Mughal generals quarrelled. Hamid-ud-din and Khwaja Khan, taking offence, left Himmat Khan, gave up the pursuit and returned towards Kulbarga. Himmat alone followed the enemy. Santā now safely divided his force, detaching 4000 troopers under Amrit Rao to raid Berar, while he himself marched with 6,000 horsemen towards Mālkhed, sending in advance threatening letters to the deshmukh of that place to this effect, "For a long time past you have not paid the chaouth. Send me immediately 7,000 hun." The couriers who had brought these letters were arrested by the Mughals and put to death.

Foiled in his object, Santā turned aside to the hills of Torgal in the Berad country, while Himmat Khan halted at Mālkhed, not daring to venture into that wild and broken region. In a day or two the elusive Maratha leader was out again and reported to be marching upon Haidarabad. Himmat Khan, now joined by Sayyid Abdullah, was immediately on his track and drove him into the small fort of Alur (14 miles s. w. of Mālkhed). This happened about 21st Nov. 1693. Then for three months the records have been lost.

On 6th March 1694, a report was received from Himmat Khan that he had followed Santā to village Bahram (in taluqa Kāngrati), and repulsed his counter-attack. We soon afterwards hear of Santā making an attempt to cut off
two big guns at Maklur (? or Mahkur), on the way from Aurangabad to Galgalā; but Matlab Khan defeated him and drove him back to the Mahādev hills, where he lay quiet for some months after.

§ 11. Minor operations till the end of 1695.

On 2nd August 1694, the Court learnt that Santā and Dhanā were out near fort Waru-garh (25 m. e. of Satārā) and had detached some troops to invest Mahimāngarh (10 m. s. of Warugarh), and closed the road. A Mughal column was now ordered there to clear the district. In the meantime, Bidār Bakht had been sent to the Kanārese district of Belgaon. The strong rock-fortress of Nargund (30 m. n. e. of Dhārwar) was besieged by the prince's lieutenant Khan-i-Zamān Fath Jang (June 1694), who had constant fights with the enemy's field forces. A month later the Khan delivered an assault on it in person, but "no one followed him, and in disgust he abandoned the siege."* The prince sent Rajah Udwat Singh of Urkhā to replace him. Evidently the fort afterwards came into Mughal hands,† as we find its name changed to Bahādur-nagar in a newsletter of November next.

Throughout 1694 and 1695, though the Maratha bands were active and the Berads troublesome all over the Western Deccan, nothing decisive or note-worthy was done on

* The fort is on a hill, rising 800 feet from the plain. The lower sides of the hill are covered with prickly pear. To about half way up, the hill rises from the plain at an even slope of 35 to 40 feet. In the upper half the rocks rise sheer, in some places in tiers of natural scarps. A committee of British officers reported "This fort is one of the strongest in the Bombay Karnatak, and if well defended its capture would require much time and trouble and a large invading force." (Bom. Gaz. xxii. 776-7.)

† It must have been secured by bribery and not by force of arms. Bidar Bakht gained two other forts in the same region,—Paraghar and Ramdurg,—by the same means.
either side, till the end of 1695, when Santā defeated and killed two first-rate Mughal generals, Qāsim Khan and Himmat Khan.

About November 1694, the Maratha nationalist leaders wreaked vengeance on a traitor to their country’s cause, who had served as the agent of the Mughal power. The fort of Kāri* was held by Trimbak as deputy governor, assisted by Yādav Shāmraja and Mahādji Bāji. A Muslim inhabitant of Junnar named Beg came there on behalf of the Mughals, bribed Rāyāji Bahulkar, and through his connivance gained the fort by scaling the walls with ropeladders unopposed. During this attack, Beg captured Trimbak and Moro Narayan, while Yādav and Mahādji escaped with their families by the back-door. But towards the end of 1694 Shankarāji organised an expedition for the recovery of Kāri. From the fort of Rājgarh he sent Shivdev, with Chāndji Kadam of Bhorap and the contingents of several forts in that region, to invest Kāri. Beg and his men evacuated the fort under a promise of safety, but the victors seized them in violation of their word. Beg was kept a prisoner, but the lesser men, who had their families with them, were released by Trimbak and Moro. Hearing of the success, Shankarāji himself went to Kāri, gave the traitor Rāyāji Bahulkar a good beating, and confined him in the citadel of Rajgarh. [J. S. I have rearranged the events here.]

§ 12. Santaji Ghorpade’s movements, 1694-95.

On 26th November 1694 Santā was reported as out in Haidarabad territory, with Himmat Khan pursuing him, though the latter’s troops were constantly* leaving his banners and sneaking back to the imperial base camp to avoid the hardships of campaigning. Then Santā turned

* Kari, 8 m. s. of Bhor, and very close to Rohira fort.
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towards Bijapur, but on 30th November Himmat brought him to an action near Pānur, and drove him into flight with the loss of twó of his captains. Continuing the pursuit, Himmat again came upon Santā (about 7th Dec.) near Naldurg, and again defeated him with many losses on both sides. Santā retired to his base in the Mahādev hills. But at the end of the month he was out again in the Rāichur district, with Himmat Khan’s flying force on his heels, and was again driven away with heavy casualties on both sides, as usual.*

About the middle of May 1695, Santā visited Parli to celebrate the marriage of two sons of his brother Bahirji (then absent in Jinji). At the end of this month he came back to the Mahādev hills by way of Bhupālgarh. One of his followers named Mādhav Narayan, with his family and 300 retainers, left him and entered the Mughal service through the qilādār of Parendā. In July the Marathas blockaded the Mughal outpost of Khatāv. Hamid-ud-din Khan was sent against them, but at the end of the next month (August) he found himself dangerously outnumbered by the enemy who had placed three armies in the field. The Emperor pushed up reinforcements. Hamid-ud-din then (September) detached Fathullah to burn the village below forts Chandan-Wandan. Santā, hearing of it, went to attack Fathullah; but Hamid-ud-din hastened in

* J.S. says that in Kartik, Shaka 1096, (9 Oct.—7 Nov. 1694) Shankaraji the Sachiv sent Santa Ghorpare to the Eastern Kar-nātak, telling him “Go with your troops and do our king’s work. Go, hastening in light kit [or alone] to the Rajah. Remain there with honour. Raise the siege of Jinji. Do not act faithlessly.” He took oaths from him to this effect and sent with him Yesāji Malār as mutaliq (plenipotentiary deputy). With him were joined Hanumant Rao Nimbalkar sar-i-lashkār and other sardars, making a total of 25,000 troopers. These two formed the above concert at the darbar (office) of Shankaraji, and agreed to manage the revenue matters [together] and remain [mutually] faithful.
support of his lieutenant. The Marathas were repulsed and driven into the fort, after losing a son of Dhanā and another officer. The Mughals burnt the village and brought away 200 mares and some Deccani swords &c. as prize of war. Amrit Rao now left Santā and came over to the Mughals with 500 men.

Such was the chequered history of the contest with the Marathas* in Western India till near the end of the year 1695. It was no longer a simple military problem, but had become a trial of endurance and resources between the Mughal empire and the indigenous people of the Deccan.

APPENDIX A.

Rajaram's flight to Jinji.

It is now possible to give a correct and intimate account of Rajaram's journey from Raigarh to Jinji, by using two newly printed sources, namely, the Sanskrit narrative poem Rājārām-Charitam of Keshav Pandit (edited by V. S. Bendrey) and the diary of Monsieur Francois Martin, the French chief of Pondicherry. Keshav Pandit was a Brahman judge who accompanied Rajaram during his flight to Jinji. And Jinji, where Rajaram set up his Court after reaching the Karnātak, was only one day's march from Pondicherry, where (as Martin tells us) he could every day count the guns fired on the two sides during the Mughal siege of Jinji. For the safety of this French settlement, its governor kept constant intercourse with the Maratha Government in that fort by means of his French agents and

* These desultory and indecisive fights have been described in some detail in this chapter to serve as an illustration of the task before the Mughal army. In future such minor operations will be either passed over silently or merely mentioned in a few words.
Brahman envoys. He also engaged on his own side Krishnāji Anant, who was “the second minister” under Rajaram, or in other words next in power to Prahād Nirāji, the Regent of the boy-King. By means of money and presents Martin made Krishnāji his mediator at the Raja’s Court and thus received full information about the Raja and his affairs. As Krishnāji Anant was the historian who wrote the famous Sabhāsād Bakhar of Shivaji, his knowledge of events was invaluable. Martin made daily entries in his diary of what he learnt, and composed from these a Mémoire or connected narrative which has been printed in Paris, under the editorship of Alfred Martineau, in three volumes (1931-1934). These two absolutely contemporary and authentic sources enable us to sweep away the legends and worthless traditions in the Marathi language which have so long passed for history.

After the capture of Shambhuji, a Mughal army laid siege to Raigarh fort where the King’s younger brother Rajaram had been crowned by a party of Brāhman ministers and Prabhu Kāyastha secretaries, who had been kept out of power and many of whom had been persecuted during the reign of Shambhuji. To avoid being blockaded there, Rajaram slipped out of Raigarh in disguise with a small band of followers on 5th April 1689, but he could not find safety anywhere before reaching Panhālā about 30th June, in the far south of his dominions. Here he passed the rainy season and celebrated the Dasaharā (14th September). But other Mughal forces began to converge upon this fort and Rajaram had to leave for the Eastern Karnatak on 26th September, in order to be beyond the reach of the Mughals.

He was at first accompanied by some three hundred soldiers, besides a picked band of civil officers. Prahād Nirāji took the leadership of the party and protected the Raja like a son, often carrying the sickly lad on his own
shoulders. Three other Brāhman ministers were in the party, viz., Krishnāji Anant (the assistant or hastak of Prahlād), Nilkanth Moreshwar Pinglé the Peshwā, and his assistant Uddhav, besides Nilkanth’s brother Bahiro Pant and Prabhu secretaries like Khando Ballāl Chitnis, Niloji Pārasnis, Bāji Kadam and Indra Kadam. The escort, some 250 men, were under Mān Singh Moré and his lieutenants Bahirji and Māloji Ghorparé (the brothers of Santāji) and Rupāji Bhonslé. But on the way, between the Krishnā and the Tungābhadrā they found that the various Mughal detachments scattered over the Karnātak plateau (modern Mysore) had been alerted, and these men attacked the Maratha fugitives from many sides. Mān Singh led the van, while Rupā Bhonslé fought desperate rear-guard actions to hold the enemy back. In a severe battle on an island in the Tungābhadrā, the Maratha resistance was crushed and Rupāji with 70 officers was captured; but in the confusion of the fighting Rajaram escaped. The rest of his journey was carried out on foot* with break-neck speed in a small broken band disguised as Hindu religious beggars.

The fugitives reached Ambur about 25th October, reduced to the last stage of penury and exhaustion. Thence they sent an envoy to report the Raja’s arrival to Bāji Kākdé, the Maratha faujdar of Vellore. After being relieved and welcomed by this officer, Rajaṛam reached Vellore on 28th October and Jinji, the capital of his father’s eastern dominions, on 1st November 1689.

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* Le voyage toujours à pied pendant une marche de plus de deux cents lieues. (Martin, iii. 64.)
§ 1. *The Eastern Karnatak and its divisions.*

The Eastern or Madras Karnāṭak, which we must distinguish from the Western Karnāṭak or the Kanārese-speaking division of the Bombay Presidency, extends from near the 15th degree of north latitude to the Kāveri river in the south. In the late 17th century it was divided into two halves by the Palar river, or an imaginary line in the southern part of the North Arcot district, slanting from Vellore to Sadras. These two parts were called Haidarabadi Karnāṭak and Bijapuri Karnāṭak respectively, and each of them was further sub-divided into uplands (*bālāghāt*, in Persian) and plains (*pāyinghāt*). The upland of Haidarabadi Karnāṭak began south of Nandiyāl (a frontier fort of Bijapur territory) and included Sidhout, Gandikotā, Guti, Garamkondā and Kadāpā,—the last-mentioned town being its seat of government. Bijapuri Bālāghāt lay west of Haidarabadi Karnāṭak and included the Serā and Bangālore districts of Mysore and their dependent zamindaris, Serā being the governor's head-quarters.

Coming down to the lowlands, Haidarabadi Karnāṭak embraced the sea-coast from Guntur to Sadras.* Bijapuri

* Wilkes, i. 134—136 (Madras reprint.) Kaeppelin, 101. Manucci (*Storia*, iii. 242) says that the two Karnāṭaks were separated by the Marakkanam river,—the Bijapuri extending to Porto Novo and the Haidarabadi to Sadras. As for Telingana (or the Gingerlee Country, as it is called in the Madras Factory Records), it stretched along the coast from the Krishna northwards to the frontier of Orissa and included Masulipatam (the capital), Vizagapatam, and Chicacole. It formed a separate province, under its own viceroy.
Päyinghāt cannot be precisely demarcated, as it was in a disturbed state in 1689. It extended south and west of the Palar river, from Sadrās (12.30 degree of north latitude) to Tanjore. The whole of this tract belonged to Bijapur in theory, having been conquered by Adil Shahi forces in the middle of the 17th century. But the conquests had not been consolidated, the authority of the central Government was feebly exerted in this most distant frontier province, much of the country was still in the hands of unsubdued poligars or petty local chieftains, and Adil Shah only held certain forts and their environs; but even in these his authority was exercised by his nobles, who were independent in all but the name. This situation was further complicated by Shivāji's invasion and conquest of the country (1677-78).* But even as the result of that conquest, the entire region did not pass into Maratha possession. Muslim and Hindu servants of the defeated Government maintained themselves here and there, though with diminished territory, and diversified the political geography of what was once Bijapuri Karnāṭak Päyinghāt. The new Maratha Government of the South Arcot district (capital, Jinji) wisely ensured a portion of its territorial acquisitions by a sort of armed truce with the Maharajah of Tanjore and the local poligars.

§ 2. **Harji Mahadik, the Maratha viceroy of the Eastern Karnāṭak.**

The great Shivāji in his expedition of 1677-78 had conquered the Bijapuri Karnāṭak from the Palar to the Kole-run river. Over this vast territory he placed Raghunath Narayan Hanumanté as viceroy, with Jinji for his seat of government and subordinate governors under him at

* Described in my *Shivaji*, ch. 12 (4th ed.)
Kunimedu (13 miles north of Pondicherry) and Mahmudi Bandar (or Porto Novo).

Shambhuji, soon after his accession, dismissed and imprisoned Raghunath* (early in January 1681), and sent his own sister's husband Harji Mahâdik to govern Jinji with Shâmji Nâyak Pundé as his lieutenant or partner in power. The two arrived there with their troops in March 1681 and took charge of the government. Five months afterwards, Shâmji was thrown into prison, evidently on suspicion of complicity in the plots formed by Annâji Datto and his faction against Shambhuji in Maharashtra. Henceforth Harji Mahâdik ruled the Eastern Karnâtak with undivided power, and circumstances soon afterwards made him practically independent of his master. The Maratha king's absorption in vice, the baneful predominance of the favourite Kavi-kalash in his council, the consequent disorder in the kingdom, and the increasing Mughal pressure on Maharashtra under the personal direction of Aurangzib, all tended to extinguish Shambhuji's authority in the far-off province of Jinji and to make the local viceroy his own master. Harji extended his power over the neighbourhood,†

* The Madras Diary, 8 January 1681, records the popular report that he was seized and put in irons by Santaji Bhonsle on hearing a (false) rumour that Shambhuji had been cut in pieces by one of his great commanders and that Rajaram was seated on the throne. In Dec. 1682 Raghunath returned to Maharashtra and was locally employed by Shambhuji as a majmuadar. He died at Valni on the 4th May following [Jedhe S.].

† In March 1683 he went with his army to help the Nayak of Trichinopoly in defeating an invasion by the chief of Seringapatam, in which the Mysore general and 2000 horses were captured. (J. S.) The ruler of Trichinopoly was driven into the arms of the Jinji Government by his eternal hostility to the king of Tanjore, while Shivaji's conquests in central and eastern Mysore made the chief of Seringapatam the ally of Shivaji's enemy, the Rajah of Tanjore. Vyankoji died in January 1685 and was succeeded on the throne of Tanjore by his son Shahji II. (J. S.)
gave himself the airs of a king, assumed (at least in popular speech) the title of Maharajah, and neglected to send the surplus revenue to his sovereign at Raigarh.

The fall of Bijapur (12th Sep. 1686) and the impending siege of Golkondā (which actually began on 28th January 1687) roused Shambhuji to a full sense of the danger which now began to threaten his richest possession, the golden land of Karnātak, from the extension of Mughal dominion in that direction. In October 1686 he sent Kesho Trimbak Pingle with 12,000 horse, outwardly to strengthen his garrisons in the Karnatak, but with secret instructions to seize and depose the refractory Harji Rajah and assume the government of Jinji in the king’s name. There was even a popular belief that Harji was thinking of securing his position by disowning Shambhuji’s authority and declaring himself a tributary vassal of the all-conquering Mughals on their arrival in the Karnātak. (Orme’s Frag., 155.)

Kesho Trimbak arrived near Jinji on 11th February 1687. (J. S.) Aurangzib, on hearing of the march of this large enemy force eastwards across the peninsula, could not at first divine its exact destination, but regarded Mysore as its objective. In order to forestall them in the occupation of the Bijapuri territories in that quarter, of which he now considered himself the lawful heir, he quickly detached Qāsim Khan from his siege-camp before Golkondā. The Khan by rapid marches and vigorous attacks forced Bangalore* to surrender on 10th July 1687, and on 27th September next gained by bribery the important fort of Penukundā (75 miles north of Bangalore and once the capital of the fallen Vijayanagar kingdom).

* The J. S. is confused here, and I suggest that the text should be rearranged to mean that the Mughal general was aided by the chief of Seringapatam, the enemy of Shivaji’s house.
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The Marathas in the Karnātak were too much divided by internal quarrels to hinder his progress. Kesho Trimbak naturally wished to assume immediately the high post to which he had been nominated by the king, and it was probably his impatience that caused his secret orders to leak out. We find that in March it was publicly known at Cuddalore that Harji Rajah had been dismissed and that Kesho was to be the new viceroy (Madras Diary, 26 March). But his hopes were doomed to disappointment. Harji having learnt the real object of Kesho's mission from his friends at Court, had effectually secured Jinji fort in his own hands and made the local army absolutely devoted to himself. Kesho, finding the game lost, pretended that he had never had any such hostile aim, and began to obey Harji's authority openly. Then, with a view to exacting tribute from the petty local chiefs and checking the progress of the Mughals, he marched into Mysore at the head of 18,000 horse, after getting Harji's contingent to reinforce his own. But here he could effect nothing, and soon returned to the neighbourhood of Jinji, reaching Trinomāli (23 miles west of that fort) about 10th November.

§ 3. Mughal penetration into the Eastern Karnātak, 1687.

In the meantime Golkandā had fallen (7th Sep. 1687) and a Mughal penetration of the Karnātak plains was imminent. Even before the surrender of the Qutb Shahi king and citadel, Aurangzib had been sending out his officers to take possession of its provinces. In July Kondāpillā, the second strongest fort in Telingānā and the king's chief treasury and arsenal, had been gained by bribery, and several scattered parties of the Mughal army were robbing the country within three days' march of Masulipatam (Madras Diary, 29 July).

After the conquest, Aurangzib wisely retained the former Qutb Shahi officers at their respective posts for some
time. Muhammad Ibrāhim (created by him Mahābat Khan), the highest Golkondā noble to desert to him, was appointed subahdār of Haidarabad and the Khan’s confidant, Muhammad Ali Beg (now entitled Ali Askar Khan), was nominated faujdar (or sar-i-lashkar, in Golkondā official designation) of the Karnātak,* with Kadāpā for his headquarters and subordinate qiladars and magistrates under him, such as Fath Khan at Chinglepat, Madanā Ananta Pantulu at Conjeeveram and another Hindu at Punāmāli. These officers submissively proclaimed Aurangzib as their sovereign and planted the Mughal flag upon their forts (October 1687).†

But the Emperor changed his mind soon afterwards. It was deemed unwise to leave the newly-conquered country in the hands of the servants of the fallen dynasty. They were now replaced by Mughal officers;—Mahābat Khan was sent away to far-off Lahore, Ruhullah Khan getting the subahdari of Haidarabad; Qāsim Khan supplanted Ali Askar and was directed to march to the Karnātak and

* "A farman was sent to Muhammad Ali, a Haidarabadi officer, who had been in supreme control of the Karnatak, creating him a Mughal mansabdar with the title of Askar Khan and directing him not to let the sehbandi (militia) troops of that province disperse [on the downfall of their old master, Qutb Shah]. Ismail [Khan Maka], Yachapa Nair and other jamadars of the sehbandi and zamindars of the place, without any cause fell upon Askar Khan and plundered [him]. Then an imperial force under Makaram Khan arrived and the lawless men dispersed on all sides." [Dilkasha, ii. 95a.] But the revolt of Ismail and Yachapa against the Mughal Government took place later, in Jan. 1690, as we learn from J. S., and the Madras Diary.

† The governor of Punamali said, "that as the world turned like a wheel, he had beaten his drums, and fired his guns, for the victory which the mighty Alamgir had gained over his old master." [Orme’s Frag. 157.]
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conduct a vigorous war against the Maratha forces there (January, 1688).

§ 4. Indecisive struggle 1688; both sides plunder the country.

On Kesho Trimbak’s return from Mysore, he openly quarrelled with Harji and demanded the delivery of Jinji in obedience to their master’s order. A civil war between the partisans of the two rivals for the viceroyalty was expected. Harji, in preparation for the worst, secured a retreat for himself in the fort of Tevenāpatam (near Cuddālore). Then he sent out a detachment of his army under Gopāl Pandit and Vital Pillai (Vital Pildev Garud?), to plunder and conquer on his own account the late territory of Golkondā north of the Palar river, which had recently submitted to Mughal ownership without having as yet received adequate Mughal garrisons. Marching with 2,000 horse, 5,000 foot, and great numbers of pioneers and scaling ladders, these two officers took easy possession of several forts and a hundred towns in this region. On 24th December Arcot was captured by assault and its governor with most of his infantry killed. The Marathas spread over the country plundering and torturing without regard for sex or creed. Several great Brahmans of Conjeveram with their wives and children took refuge in Madras (27th Dec. 1687—10th Jan. 1688), to save their persons and property from Maratha outrage. On 10th January, Madanā Ananta, the governor of that holy city, himself fled to Madras. On the 11th the Marathas burst into Conjeveram plundering the city, killing about 500 men, destroying the houses, and putting the terror-stricken inhabitants to flight. Kesho Trimbak took to the same profitable business with his own

* A Mughal force, evidently a small advanced corps, reached the Jinji country about the middle of November 1687. (Madras Diary, 22 Nov.)
contingent: after capturing Chittapet and Kāveripak, he established his camp at Conjeeveram and plundered the country around (January 1688). (Madras Diary. Martin, ii. 525).

But the Maratha occupation was short-lived. Aurangzib had been roused to the danger, and already in the middle of December he had issued urgent orders to four high generals of the late Golkondā Government—Ismail Khan Makā, Yāchāpā Nāyak, Rustam Khan, and Muhammad Sādiq,—to hasten to the Karnātak plains and succour the Emperor’s partisans there. These officers arrived at Conjeeveram on 25th February 1688, with 4,000 horse and 7,000 foot. [Madras Diary; J. S.; Orme is inaccurate; Kaep 260. Martin, ii. 530]

The Marathas evacuated that town at their approach and retired beyond Uttrāmālore, plundering the towns of the cows, cattle, etc. as they went. The Mughal vanguard pursued them, and fought them at Wandiwāsh and made it their camp, while the Marathas encamped at Chittapet, a day’s march southwards. The main armies on the two sides remained in this position for a year, merely watching each other,* but they daily sent out detachments and foraging parties who plundered the country indiscriminately. The hapless people, who had not yet recovered from the effects of the desolating famine of 1686,† had now to endure two

* The French agent, Mons. Germain, who left Pondicherry on 17th October 1688, reports that on his arrival at Jinji he found there a great confusion at the news of the approach of the Muhammadans. Harji, for a consideration of Rs. 11,760, allowed the French to raise walls and four high towers at Pondicherry; the actual farman was granted on 9th Jan. 1689, the month of December having been wasted by the Maratha Court. [Martin, Mémoires, ii. 568.]

† When 2,000 famished beggars crowded into Madras town, many of them dying daily in the streets, till at last the English raised subscriptions and opened a relief kitchen under their chief dubash. [Madras Diary, 19 Aug. 1686.]
sets of robbers instead of one. No regular battle was fought for many months afterwards, but skirmishes and alarms were frequent, the trade of the district was ruined, due to constant plunder and ravage, and multitudes flocked to the fortified European settlements on the coast as their only refuge.

Ibrāhīm Khan Lodi, son of Sher Khan the late Bijapuri governor of Valikandapuram, now formed a plan for taking advantage of the disorder by wresting Cuddālore from the Marathas, and making himself its governor (March 1688.) But nothing came of it. Rāmji Krishna was appointed by Harji Rajah with a large force to raid the borders of the Golkondā country, but instead of going there he robbed the country adjacent to Pondicherry, though it was loyal Maratha territory, and in this way he amassed 20,000 hun in a short time. (Dec. 1688.)

During 1688 Aurangzib made frequent changes in the governorship of Haidarabadi Karnātak, first Yettamato Rāo Timāpā was retained in office; then soon afterwards (April) he was turned out and Jān Nisār Khan appointed as his successor. In October Askar Ali replaced Jān Nisār, but, pending the arrival of this new governor, Muhammad Sadiq, the deputy, continued to act for him. Askar Ali took charge in January 1689 and Muhammad Sādiq lost his employment. [Madras Diary, 25 Oct. 1688, 1 May 1690.]

§ 5. Confusion and disorder continue in 1689.

The year 1689 continued to be as bad for the Karnātak as the year before. The roads were unsafe; Mughal and Maratha armies daily plundered the country. Country-made cotton and other goods could not be brought to the English factory at Kuṇimedu for export, by reason of the constant warfare and robbery in the region from there to Porto Novo and the deepening scarcity. In July the English factory at Porto Novo was withdrawn for these troubles.
The situation in the Karnātak was adversely reacted upon by the situation in the Telingana coast immediately north of it, where “a great famine” was raging in the Vizagapatam district and frequent wars were going on between the new Mughal faujdar and the local rajahs. (Madras Diary, 25 March 1689).

In the February of this year, Shambhuji was captured by the Mughals. When the news of the disaster reached Harji, he imprisoned Kesho Trimbak and his adherents at Trinomāli, and made himself free from the chance of his rivalry. But later the reports of Mughal progress and Maratha reverses in the homeland and Rajaram’s disappearance into obscurity alarmed him and for a time he seems to have thought of submitting to the Mughals and paying them tribute. (Madras Diary, 2 Aug. 1689). But he wisely decided, instead, to strengthen his army, improve the defences of Jinji, and defy the Mughals from its impregnable shelter. He released Kesho Trimbak on 19th August, but himself died a month afterwards (c. 19th Sep.).* His wife Ambikā Bāi, (Shivaji’s daughter), continued to govern the fort and province on behalf of her minor sons. But the situation at Jinji was unexpectedly reversed by the arrival of Rajaram there on the 1st or 2nd of November, 1689.

§ 6. Rajaram at Jinji.

The arrival of Rajaram was followed by a peaceful revolution at Jinji. Harji’s widow and her Brahman advisers were reluctant to part with the usurped authority and local.

* J. S. gives the date of his death as Ashwin Baḍi 11 (= 29th Sep. 1689). But the Madras Diary records on 26th Sep. the receipt of the report of his death via Kunimedu, so that he must have died some days earlier. F. Martin (iii. 55) writes, ‘We had news at the beginning of October (N. S.), of the death of Hari Raja, Governor General of the province of Jinji after an illness of 8 to 10 days.”
independence they had enjoyed for over eight years. [Mémoires of F. Martin, iii. 64.] But Rajaram’s right could not be disputed; the government of Jinji passed into his hands. Kesho Trimbak became his chief favourite, took his revenge by placing Harji’s son under confinement (15th Nov.), and squeezed money out of the late viceroy’s widow by calling upon her to render accounts for her husband’s long years of administration of the province. She had to make her peace by paying three lakhs of hun, and Santaji Bhonsle one lakh. (Madras Diary, 6 Dec. 1689.)

“Rajaram, on his arrival, sent a summons to all in any considerable employment in the Government to make their appearance before him.” His aim was reported to be “to divert the Mughal army from his kingdom of Punā and join with several Hindu Nāyaks and raise a considerable army to retake the Golkondā and Bijapur kingdoms.” (Madras Diary, 5 Dec. and 14 Nov. 1689). For Prahlād Nirāji, his supreme agent, a new post, that of Pratinidhi or Regent, was created, while Nilo Moreshwar Pinglé continued to hold the title of Peshwā or nominal prime minister. In the French records Krishnāji Anant, the historian of Shivāji, is called his second minister. Timāji, the son of Kesho Trimbak Pinglé, was appointed subahdhar of the Jinji district and Sundar Bālāji that of Kunimedu.

The Regent, Prahlād Nirāji, “threw Rajaram into a life of debauchery” and kept “the young king constantly intoxicated by the habitual use of ganja and opium” [Wilkes, i. 133.] Then “seizing the reality of power, he caused the Brahmans who had enriched themselves under Harji to disgorge their money and goods by the stroke of confiscation.” [Kaep. 267. Martin iii. 67.]*

* F. Martin writes, “The minister Prahlad Pandit, who had his own (selfish) designs, threw the young prince into the pleasures and amusements of that race; he made him marry three or four women
§ 7. **Rapacity of Maratha Government of Jinji; its dealings with the European traders.**

But this squeezing of its former officials could not fill the gaping void of the Maratha Government's financial distress. The ministers at Jinji looked round to raise money from the European settlements on the East Coast,—all persons living outside these strong places having been already plundered and ruined. Early in December the subahdar of Jinji demanded 3,000 hun as an advance or loan from the English factory at Kunimedu, and a like amount from the French and Dutch factories lying within his jurisdiction; the richer merchants were urged to lend 5000 or even 1000 hun each. Before the end of the month, the pressure was increased; in addition to the loan of 3,000 hun to the king, 5000 more were demanded as a fine for the buildings and fortifications of each European Company. "They will have no reason or equity, saying that they are in great want of money, having given the king (Rajaram) their estates to continue themselves in their employments, which they must seek to retrieve." [Madras Diary, 4 Jan. 1690]. At the same time the Marathas asked the governor of Madras for 100 barrels of gun-powder and 2500 weight of small shot, to carry on their war against the Mughals; but the English, not wishing to give offence to Aurangzib, managed to evade the request. In March, Rajaram visited the coast to bathe in the sea on the occasion of the lunar eclipse (on the 14th of the month). The opportunity was taken to extort money gifts from the Indian merchants and European Companies of the region, the French at Pondicherry having to pay 200 hun. [Kaep. 274. Martin, iii. 85.]

But this source brought in very little. In their extreme penury, the Maratha Government offered to sell the fort of

during the first two or three months of his arrival. The dancing girls were brought by the minister to the Court in many bands, and they served for more than one purpose, (à divers usages.)" iii. 67-68.
Tevenāpatam (afterwards St. David) with a gunshot of land round it, to the European Companies, who began to bid for it. The French were given the refusal of it at 50,000 hun, but they were too poor and their able agent Francois Martin wisely declined the offer. The English were more eager; after some skilful haggling they beat down the Marathas to 51,500 chakram,* or Rs. 1,08,150. Early in August 1690, Rajaram signed a farmān selling the fort and a “random shot” of land round it to the English, for that amount. The English governor cunningly wrote to his agent at Kunimedu to contrive to delay taking possession of Tevenāpatam till their best brass gun had arrived from Madras, so that the “random shot” might range over the greatest possible width of territory! But alas for the vanity of human wishes, in their greed of territory they had reckoned without Maratha perfidy. F. Martin had found out to his cost that “the Marathas need money so badly that they do not respect old promises and written farmāns.” [Kaep. 273.] The English president Elihu Yale now discovered the same truth. As he wrote in his bitterness, “the mercenary Marathas may be induced by bribes to resell the fort ten times over to the same or several persons. Nay, they will sell their honour and conscience, too, to any that will buy it.” [Madras Diary, 21 July.] Manikupam, one of the villages included within the “random shot,” remained a subject of dispute, the Dutch claiming it by virtue of an old farmān and the Marathas supporting their claim in order to get more money out of the English.

The Dutch, as the mortal enemies of the French, intrigued hard at Rajaram’s Court to destroy the infant French settlement rising at Pondicerry, close to their factory at Cuddalore. In view of the approaching war between

* A chakram is a small gold coin worth two Rupees and one-tenth, while the value of the hun varied from 3½ to 4½ Rupees.
the Mughals and the Marathas on the East Coast, which he had clearly foreseen as early as February 1688, Martin had fortified the landward side of Pondicherry and secured through his agent, M. Germain, permission for these defensive works by paying 5,000 chakram to Harji Rajah (9 Jan. 1689).

On Rajaram's arrival in the Karnātak, Martin hastened to send the same Germain to Jinji to be one of the first to welcome him. "The young prince showed himself amiable and gave the French a farmān confirming its predecessors." [Martin, iii. 65.] Even before the death of Harji Rajah, Martin had been negotiating with the Jinji Court to counteract the effect of the pecuniary offers made by the Dutch to the Marathas in order to secure an order expelling the French factory. After Rajaram's coming, the French and Dutch agents continued to intrigue against each other among the Maratha ministers,—the Dutch offering a large bribe for a proclamation condemning the French. The Jinji ministers encouraged the game, "thinking only how to get the maximum amount of money out of the one or the other." In June 1690, the Dutch retired with failure, the French having lent Rajaram 6,000 chakram at 18 per cent interest. The turn of the Dutch, however, came in 1693, when they at last secured Rajaram's permission and seized Pondicherry. [iii. 97.]

§ 8. Campaign of 1690.

The year 1690 opened very badly for the imperialists in the Karnātak. While the coming of Rajaram gave an impetus to Maratha activity in December 1689, next month the Mughal cause suffered a temporary eclipse from the rebellion of the old Ḥaidarabadi local officers lately taken over into the Emperor's service. Muhammad Sādiq, the foremost among them, brooded over his removal from the local command; Yachāpā Nayak and Ismail Makā, too,
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found out that the profuse promises made to them when the Emperor annexed Golkondā territory and sought their adhesion, were not intended to be kept and that they were sure to be replaced by former servants of the Emperor and doomed to unemployment or humbler offices. So they deserted their new master, made an alliance with Rajaram (through the mediation of Nilo Moreshwar Pinglé, the Peshwā) and began to usurp the country and collect the revenue. The imperial representatives, from Madras to Kunimedu, were hopelessly out-numbered and defeated and forced to flee to the European settlements on the coast. The governor Askar Ali Khan himself had to send his family and many of his followers to Madras for refuge (April). The rebellion was extinguished only at the approach of Zulfiqar Khan as the supreme Mughal commander a few months later. He had been detached from the imperial Court at Korégaon at the end of November 1689, marched by way of Raichur; Kurnool, Nandiyāl, Kadāpā, and Garamkondā and then descended into the Karnātak plain (about June 1690), fighting and capturing many forts on the way and reaching Conjeeveram in August and the environs of Jinji at the beginning of September. [Del. ii. 98b; Madras Diary, 1 and 22 Sep. 1690.] Rajaram had sent his own troops with the contingents of his allies, Tanjore Trimbak Rao and Yachāpā Nāyak, north-westwards into the Karnātak plateau to prevent the Mughal general’s descent into the eastern plains, but the terror of his name was too great and they returned “without doing anything.” [J. S.]

The military situation was now reversed; the Maratha raiding bands were driven back by the Mughals and “in-

* Kaeppelin says in March, a mistake for August (Martin, iii. 113). Zulfiqar arrived at Conjeeveram in August and could not have reached Saddam, the southern frontier station of the Kadapa district and place of descent into the Karnataka plain, earlier than the preceding July.
vasion threatened the dominions of Rajaram.” [Kaep. 272].

The Maratha retreat to Jinji was precipitate, and the coming of Zulfiqar Khan, crowned with his great victory at Räigarh and the capture of Shambhuji’s entire family, as well as his unbroken series of successes in the Kadapå and Arcot districts, at first created a consternation at Jinji. Rajaram left that fort and went to some safer refuge further south in the Karnaták, nearer his ally the Rajah of Tanjore, [J. S.], and in October Zulfiqar wrote to the French to prevent his escape by the sea in an English ship. [Kaep. 279. Martin, iii. 125-131.]

The miserable country from Jinji to the sea-coast continued to be pillaged by the camp-followers and “couriers” of both sides. The local people fled with their families for safety far to the south in Tanjore territory, or to the European factories on the coast, and hence the population of Pondicherry doubled in the course of one year (rising to 60,000 souls.) [Kaep. 278. Martin, iii. 133.]

§ 9. *Fort of Jinji described.*

The rock-fortress of Jinji from its almost central position dominates the vast Karnaták plain from Arcot southwards to Trichinopoly, and from the Eastern Ghãts to the Bay of Bengal. It consists not of one fort, but of three fortified hillocks connected together by strong lines of circumvallation, and forming a rough triangle nearly three miles in circumference.

“These hills are steep, rocky and covered with such enormous boulders that they are almost unclimbable. Each of the three is fortified on all sides with line above line of stone walls, flanked with bastions, filled with embrasures for guns, loopholed for musketry and pierced only by narrow and strong gateways; and from each to the next, connected with these defences, runs a great stone-faced rampart nearly 60 feet thick with a ditch over 80 feet wide
outside it. The triangular space thus enclosed (which is about three miles round) forms the lower fort, and the three hills are the citadels. Up each of the three citadels leads, from the lower fort, a steep flight of steps of hewn granite built on and among the great boulders with which the sides of the hills are strewn."

The strongest and highest of the peaks is the western one, called Rājgiri (or Great Mountain in Orme’s plan), its top standing 800 feet above the plain below and 400 feet in an almost sheer ascent above the rest of the ridge . . . The only path to Rājgiri, “a steep and narrow way, leads from the lower fort below, from the south-west, through gates in three lines of loopholed walls built one above another on the ridge across the road, and at length scales a mass of rock the top of which is nearly level with the summit of the citadel. But at this point, on the north side of the bluff, a great natural chasm, some 24 feet wide and 50 feet deep, separates this mass of rock from the topmost terrace of Rājgiri. This chasm, the former owners (agents of the Vijayanagar empire) had artificially lengthened and widened, and they had made the only entrance to the citadel pass across a narrow wooded bridge thrown over it, the further end of the bridge leading to a stone gate commanded by more embrasures and loopholes. Orme says that this point could be held by ten men against ten thousand.” [S. Arcot Dist. Gazetteer, i. 347-348; also Manual, 413].

The northernmost of the three hills is Krishnagiri (“English Mountain” in Orme’s plan), and the southern one is Chandrāyandurg (“St. George’s Mountain” in Orme). The last is of much lower elevation.

The gates are three: one in the northern wall, now called the Vellore or Arcot gate, but known in the 17th century as the ‘gate towards Trinomāli’; a second in the eastern face, now called the Pondicherry gate, which was the principal entrance into the fort in the 17th century; and
due west of this second gate, right across the lower enclosure, stands a small postern gate (in the wall connecting Chandrayan with Rājgiri), called by the Indians Shaitān-dārī (or Port du Diable in French, as in Orme’s plan).

About half a mile south of Rājgiri is a fourth hill now called Chakkilī-durg (and Chamār-tikri by Bhimsen), the summit of which is strongly fortified. But it is not connected with Jinji. [S. Arcot Manual, 418.]

§ 10. Mughal army begins siege of Jinji.

From Aurangzib’s Court Zulfiqār Khan had reached Jinji early in September 1690, but he merely sat down before it. The investment of such a vast group of forts with the forces under him was out of the question, and he had no heavy guns nor enough munitions for a bombardment. About 19th September we find him asking for 200 maunds of powder and 500 soldiers from Madras, and the demand was soon increased to 500 maunds of powder, 500 great shot, 500 soldiers and 30 gunners. The English who owed him ground-rent for their settlement, sent him 200 maunds of powder and 300 iron shot. In November he demanded from the French agent in his camp, European munitions and gunners. Many European soldiers—of the English and other races—were tempted by offers of high pay to join his army, and he thus formed a corps of 100 white men.

In April 1691, the Mughal army before Jinji had become so large and well-provisioned that the country around expected a speedy fall of the fort. [Madras Diary, 26 April.] But, in reality, the siege had made little progress in all these months. The Muhammadans could not prevent the victualling of the place, as a complete blockade was beyond their power; and “the Marathas recovering from their first consternation began to harass them incessantly.” [Kaeppelin, 280, Martin, iii. 135.] In November 1690 three Maratha chiefs—Nimāji Sindhiā. Mānkoji Pāndhrė and
Nāgoji Mānē—left the Mughal side in Western India, came to Rajaram with 2,000 horsemen, and took charge of the defence works at Chakra-kulam* in the lower fort. In the February following, Rajaram returned to Jinji. His first plan on coming to the Karnātak was to gain the help of the petty Hindu princes of the East Coast and lead a confederacy against the Mughal forces in Golkondā and Bijapur. But the mutual enmities of the local chieftains were so bitter that this proposal met with no support. Only his first cousin, the Rajah of Tanjore, aided him throughout the siege with men, money and provisions, partly from family affection and partly for cession of territory, and thus enabled him to defy the imperialists from within his stronghold for several years.

§ 11. Mughal besiegers hard pressed, 1691.

The military superiority of the Mughals was rapidly lost after April, while the activity of the Maratha bands roving around stopped the supply of grain to Zulfiqār’s camp. “Many Deccani mansabdārs who had accompanied him now deserted to the enemy.” Sayyid Lashkar Khān brought in a welcome supply of money from the Emperor and grain from the Kadāpā district, which gave the besiegers some relief. “Zulfiqār reported to the Emperor that the enemy were hemming him round, stopping his supply of provisions, and that he needed reinforcements urgently.” [Dil. ii. 99b, M. A. 352.]

This general’s father Asad Khān, the wazir, who had been sent from the Court in November 1690 into the country south of the Krishnā, had after many successes encamped at Kadāpā. He now received orders to hasten to his son’s

* J. S., which reads Chakra-puri. It is a tank (kulam) lying in the valley between Chandrayan and Rajgiri. [Gaz. i. 359.]
aid. Prince Kām Bakhsh, then at Wāgingerā,* was ordered by the Emperor (20th July, 1691) to proceed to the Karnāta and support the wazir from behind. But Asad Khan wasted months without moving. He had often expressed an eager desire to see his son, but now that the son was in sore straits he was in no hurry to go to his side. He had also frequently taunted the other imperial generals with failure against the Marathas and bragged of what he could have done, saying, “His Majesty has not charged me with any enterprise. When he does so, he will see what ‘Turk’ means.” This speech had been reported to the Emperor, and now on hearing of Asad Khan’s supine inactivity, Aurangzib turned to his librarian and said, “His Turkship is over. How runs the proverb?” And then they both recited it,—‘Don’t brag again, as your boast (Turki) has come to an end!’ This verse was embodied in a despatch now sent to Asad Khan. [M. A. 353, letter in Ruqaat No. 153.]

On receiving this stinging letter, Asad Khan made active preparations for an advance. The prince reached Kadāpā on 4th October, and the two marched to Jinji, which was reached on 16th December, 1691.†

In the meantime, Zulfiqār had abandoned his futile attacks on Jinji and turned to the more profitable work of levying contributions from the zamindars of South Karnāta. “The Khan Bahādur summoned to himself Ali Mardān Khan, the faujdār of Conjeveram, strengthened his camp, then started [with a mobile field force] against the kingdoms of Tanjore and Trichinopoly, and returned after collecting tributes from the zamindārs of this tract. He fought many battles, but was victorious in them all.” [Dil.

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* M. A. 339 corrected by reference to 355 and 344; Dil. 103a.
† M. A. 355. 344; his march from Wāgingerā described in Dil. 103a.—105b.
99b.] At the end of August we find him passing by way of Cuddalore towards Tanjore. [Madras Diary.] At the end of this year he captured Trinomali* (23 m. W. of Jinji), for which he was promoted on 16th Jan. 1692. He had asked the French in October to take Valdaur for him, but they had wisely declined. Thus the year 1691 passed without any decisive success for the imperialists.

§ 12. Siege operations during 1692.

The next year was equally barren of results for them, in spite of the great accession to their armed strength brought by the prince and the wazir. Ismail Khan Makā (a grandee of the late Qutb Shahi State) was induced to enter the Emperor’s service and joined Zulfiqār’s camp with his contingent; but Yachāpā Nāyak continued with the Marathas. [Dil. 100a.]

With these additions to his forces, Zulfiqār renewed the siege of Jinji in 1692. He himself took post opposite the eastern (or Pondicherry) gate near a hillock called ‘Alī Madād (evidently the ‘Rock Battery’ of Orme’s plan), across one of the branches of the Jinji river. Asad Khan and the prince were encamped three miles away from him, beyond the northern gate, on the road leading from Krishnakiri to Singhāvaram† hill. Ismail Khan and other local auxiliaries were stationed in an outpost north-west of the fort, “in the direction of Karnātak-garh”,—evidently south of the channel which drains the pool at the northern foot of Rājgiri. Each Mughal camp was walled round for safety. The gate of Shaitāndāri could not be blockaded,

* M. A. 345, (where the name is mis-spelt as Tirmal or Nirmal). Its importance in the siege of Jinji is clear from Br. Mus. Sloane-MS. 3582, p. 24.
† Two miles north of Jinji. The name is mis-spelt by Bhimsen as Sholing-varam, but Sholinghur (also Sholing-puram) is another place 60 miles northwards.
and the garrison freely came and went out by it and brought in provisions whenever they liked. An outpost under Kākar Khan watched the path through the Vetavalam* wood by which supplies reached the fort, but the task was ineffectively done.

The Marathas made sorties from Krishnagiri, firing rockets and threatening the prince’s camp. Zulfiqār strengthened the guards there. One night a Maratha force 5,000 strong sallied out of the north gate, but were defeated by the combined exertions of the entire Mughal army. The danger, however, was great and Zulfiqār removed the prince’s camp to the side of his own and joined the two encampments together by the same enclosing walls. The position opposite the north gate, vacated by the prince, was assigned to Sayyid Lashkar Khan. Zulfiqār next selected Chandrayān-durg as his objective and ran trenches towards it. Then he began a bombardment of this hill as well as of the Pondicherry gate. [Dil. 105b—106a.] But all his exertions were a mere show, as the country around knew well.

The condition of the Mughal camp in 1692 is thus described by an eye-witness: “The rain fell with excessive severity. Grain was dear. The soldiers, having to spend days and nights together in the trenches, suffered great hardship. From a position in the hillside, where Muhammad Mumin (the chief of the imperial artillery) had constructed a yard and a strong portico with stages, 24 tanks could be seen in the Mughal camp. In the rainy season the entire tract looked like one lake.”†

* Vetavalam, 16 miles south-west of Jinji, and now in the Tiruvannamalai taluk. Here elephants used to roam. [S. Arcot Gaz. i. 82.]

† Dil. 106b. One night this battery on the hillside was attacked by the garrison and the defenders driven out of their trenches with slaughter. But Dalpat Rao recovered the lost position and restored the damaged trenches. (Ibid.)
§ 13. *Santä Ghorparé captures Governor of Conjeveram.*

Bad as the Mughal position had been during the rainy season, it became absolutely untenable in winter. Early in December, a vast Maratha force of more than 30,000 horse, raised in Western India by Rāmchandra (the chief agent of Rajaram) arrived in the Eastern Karnātak under the celebrated generals Dhana Singh Jādav and Santā Ghorparé.

The deluge of the newly arrived Maratha cavalry first burst on the Conjeveram district. The terror inspired by these brigands caused a panic flight of the inhabitants far and near into the city of Madras for refuge (11th to 13th Dec.). When the division under Santā arrived near Kāve-ripak, Ali Mardān Khan, the Mughal faujdār of Conjeveram, went out to encounter it, without knowing its vast numbers. He fell into a trap laid by Santā and during the battle his corps of *bahelia* musketeers went over to the enemy. The Khan, finding resistance vain, tried to retreat to Conjeveram, but his small force was hemmed round and he was captured with 1,500 horses and six elephants.† All the property and materials of his army were looted (13th Dec.). The Khan was taken to Jinji and held to ransom. Several of his officers and many other nobles on the Mughal side fled precipitately to Madras, where they were well treated and fed at the E. I. Company’s expense. After some months Ali Mardān secured his release by paying the huge ransom of one ḥākh of *hun*, which his brother-in-law Ali Qādir had raised. [*Madras Diary*, 13, 17 and 23 Dec. 1692 and 4 Aug. 1693, *Dil.* 108b, *J. S. Martin*, iii. 268—269.]

† Five elephants and 300 *good* horses, according to Martin; but there were many ponies and mares also. Santa’s tactics are finely described by Martin in his *Mémoires.*

The other division of the Maratha reinforcements, led by Dhanā Jādav, attacked the siege trenches on the west side of Jinji. On the reported approach of Santā and Dhanā, Zulfiqār saw himself hopelessly outnumbered, and wisely ordered his outposts to fall in on his main army, as these scattered positions were no longer tenable, Sayyid Lashkar Khan and Kākar Khan quickly carried out the order and joined their general. But Ismail Khan, posted west of the fort, had a longer distance to cross, and his soldiers, also, were dispersed in trying to remove their property, so that when he at last began to withdraw it was too late. The Marathas helped by their brethren in the fort intercepted him. The Khan offered a brave opposition to tenfold odds, but was wounded and captured with 500 horses and two elephants, and carried off a prisoner to Jinji. [M. A. 357, Dīl. 107a, Madras Diary, 9 Jan. 1693. Martin, iii. 267.]

The victorious Marathas immediately proclaimed their authority over the Haidarabadi Karnātak,—'the Conjeveram and Kadāpā countries',—appointing Keshava Ramanā as their subahdar at the head of 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot. (Jan. 1693.)

§ 15. Prince Kām Bakhsh intrigues with Marathas.

The revival of Maratha activity and predominance in the surrounding country put a stop to the free and plentiful supply of grain in the Mughal camp by way of Punamālī and Madras, which had prevailed ever since the siege began. It also stopped the coming of letters from the Emperor's Court to the siege-camp, with calamitous results. The Mughal army outside Jinji was now besieged in its turn, and its condition became extremely dangerous by reason of internal disputes. Prince Kām Bakhsh was a foolish young man, the spoilt child of his father's old age, untaught to bridle his passions, and ever swayed by his
caprices and the counsels of young and worthless favourites. He contrived to offend his guardian, the aged and influential wazir, Asad Khan, by putting him to inconvenience in a childish spirit of mischief. As the Court historian writes, “The Prince, in the intoxication of youth and under the influence of evil counsellors, made the entire long journey [from Kadāpā] to Jinji on horseback, prolonging it still further by hunting and sight-seeing on the way. Asad Khan, as bound by etiquette, had to ride on horseback alongside the prince, in spite of his great weakness and the infirmities of old age. It embittered his feelings towards the prince, and wicked men on both sides aggravated the quarrel by their intervention.” [M. A. 355.]

After reaching Jinji, the prince acted still more foolishly. Through the medium of “some reckless and mad men” he opened a secret correspondence with Rajaram. The Marathas were greatly elated by their securing such an ally in the enemy’s camp; they flattered the prince’s humour and mischievously instigated him in new evil projects. Zulfiqār Khan, who “kept watch in every direction and daily paid a thousand rupees to his spies within the fort” for intelligence, soon learnt the prince’s secret, and secured the Emperor’s permission to keep him under careful surveillance. Dalpat Rao, the general’s bravest and most devoted lieutenant, was posted at the prince’s camp in constant attendance on him.* Kām Bakhsh could not ride out, hold Court, admit or send out any one from his encampment without Asad Khan’s permission. In fact, he found himself a powerless prisoner of State, and the

* The reason publicly given out for this step was the necessity of guarding the prince from the nightly fire and hostile threats of the garrison of the fort. “The enemy’s audacity being reported to the Emperor, he ordered Rao Dalpat to keep watch day and night, armed and ready, in front of the prince’s tent.” [Dil. 105b.]
quarrel in the Mughal camp became a matter of public notoriety. [M. A. 356.]

While the unhappy prince was thus fretting in his camp and forming with his wretched servants vain projects for escape, the horizon grew totally dark for the Mughals, as the result of the arrival of Santā and Dhanā in December, 1692. The grain supply of the siege-camp was entirely cut off, famine began to rage among the vast multitude, and for some weeks communication with the Emperor's Court and the Mughal base ceased altogether, as no courier could make his way through the cordon of Maratha cavalry drawn round Zulfiqār's force. Alarming rumours arose immediately, which the Marathas spread and exaggerated,—even if they did not originate them as Khāfi Khan asserts. It was said that Aurangzib was dead and that Shah Alam had succeeded to the throne. Kām Bakhsh considered himself to be in a most perilous position. Asad and Zulfiqār were his enemies; they would naturally try to win the favour of the new Emperor by sending Kām Bakhsh in chains to him, to be imprisoned, blinded or even put to death. It was impossible for him, even if all the imperial forces before Jinji had been under his absolute control, to defeat the Marathas, assert his supremacy, and proclaim himself Emperor. His only hope of safety, so his servants assured him, lay in his making terms with Rajaram, escaping to the fort with his family on a dark night, and then trying with Maratha aid to win the throne of Delhi, as his brother Akbar had once tried to do. So, one night he got his elephants and palkis ready for himself and his women; but on receiving a warning from Asad Khan and hearing that the latter too had assembled his men and was standing ready to offer armed opposition, the prince dismissed his retinue and postponed the execution of his plan to another day. [Dil. 107a, M. A. 357.]
§ 16 *Zulfiqār abandons the siege trenches.*

But every project and every step of Kām Bakhsh was reported to Asad Khan by his spies. In extreme alarm and distraction at this division in their own ranks and the immense preponderance of the enemy outside, Asad Khan and Zulfiqār consulted the leading officers of the imperial army; they urged with one voice that the prince should be strictly guarded, the trenches abandoned, and the entire army concentrated in the rear lines round Asad Khan and the prince.

But the withdrawal from the siege lines was not to be effected without a severe fight. Zulfiqār burst his big guns* by firing excessive charges of powder and abandoned them where they stood. Then, as he started from the trenches with his men drawn up in compact order and carrying away whatever materials he could, the exultant Marathas fell upon him. The base-camp was four miles in his rear and the fort-walls only half a mile in front; the garrison made a sortie, joined their brethren outside under Dhanā Jadav, and hemmed the Mughal army on all sides. “The audacity of the infields passed all bounds, and death stared the Muslims in the face.” (*M. A. 357.*) The Khan had only 2,000 troopers with him, but they cut their way through “a hundred thousand (!) enemy horsemen and infantry.” Zulfiqār and his lieutenants fought, as men fight for dear life. He made a counter-attack, urging his elephant up to the fort-gate and driving away the Marathas on that side. They fled within and shut the gate, losing about a thousand infantry in killed and abandoning in their flight about a thousand mares as spoils to the Mughals. In the whole

* Including some brass artillery purchased at Madras. They were burst, according to Bhimsen and the English soldier Lewis Terrill who had gone six months earlier to serve Zulfiqar. [*Madras Diary, 30 Jan. 1693.*] But *M. A. 357* says that nails were driven into their touch-holes.
battle 3000 foot and 300 cavalry are said to have fallen on the Maratha side. The imperialists lost 400 troopers, 400 horses and 8 elephants, mostly killed by artillery fire; and "few of them remained unwounded." At the close of the day they reached Asad Khan's camp. [M. A. 358, Dil. 107b.]

§ 17. Prince Kām Bakhsh arrested.

Here the prince had been exulting as danger thickened round Zulfiqār and Asad. He had even plotted with his silly courtiers to arrest these two generals at their next visit to him and then grasp the supreme power. But this plot, like all others, had leaked out. Zulfiqār Khan, worn out with his daylong fighting and anxieties, reached his father's side at night, learnt of the new plot, and then the two leaders quickly decided that the safety of the entire army and the preservation of the Emperor's prestige alike demanded that the prince should be deprived of the power of creating mischief. They immediately entered within the outer canvas-wall (jali) seated on their elephants and knocked down the screens of his audience hall. The other nobles stood by as idle spectators, leaving the odium of arresting their master's son to rest solely on these two leaders. The servants of the prince foolishly discharged some bullets and arrows and raised a vain uproar and tumult. But Asad Khan's force was overwhelming and his movements quick. Kām Bakhsh lost heart, and in utter distraction came out of his harem by the main gate. He had advanced only a few steps when the Khan's musketeers (bahlias) siezed both his arms and dragged him bare-footed to Asad. Rao Dalpat, seeing it, promptly drove his elephant forward, and with great agility lifted the prince up on his hawdā, sat behind him as his keeper, and brought him to Asad Khan.*

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The wazir was in a towering rage. He severely rebuked the prince, calling him a dancing-girl’s son, unworthy to rule over men or to command in war. Then he continued, “The rumours you have heard, are false. The Emperor is alive. What is this that you have done? You have disgraced yourself, and covered my grey hairs with disgrace.” The prisoner was taken to Asad Khan’s own tent and treated with every courtesy consistent with his safe custody. The grand wazir saluted him and served his dishes with his own hands. [Dil. 108a.]

When day broke, Zulfiqar called together all the officers of the army, great and small, explained his late action, reassured them, and bound them to his side by a lavish distribution of money and presents. Thus the Mughal army was saved by establishing unity of control. The Marathas, hoping to profit by the internal difficulties of the besiegers, created “an astonishing amount of tumult and disturbance near the camp from dawn to sunset.” But Zulfiqar defended himself successfully, as he had no longer to fear any enemy within his own camp nor divided counsels. [M. A. 359.]

But Santaji Ghorparé, flushed with his signal victory over Ali Mardan Khan and the unresisted plunder of the Conjeeveram district, now arrived at Jinji and turned his great talents and energy against Zulfiqar. Fighting took place daily, in warding off the Maratha attacks on the imperial camp and foraging parties. As the eye-witness Bhim-sen writes,—“The enemy exceeded 20,000 men, while the imperialists were a small force and many of them were engaged in guarding the prince and the camp. Kam Bakhsh’s contingent was unfriendly and never left their tents to cooperate in the defence. Man Singh Rathor (a two-hazar) and several other imperial officers hid themselves in their tents on the plea of illness. The whole brunt of the fighting fell on Zulfiqar Khan and Rao Dalpat, Sarafraz Khan Deccani, Fathullah Khan Turani, Kanhoji Maratha and a
few other mansabdārs with only 2,000 horsemen." [Dil. 108b, also M. A. 358.] They, however, fought like heroes and were victorious in every encounter in the open.

§ 18. Zulfiqār brings food from Wandiwash.

But such victories were of no avail. The Mughal army was now in a state of siege and famine was its worst enemy. In a few days scarcity deepened into an absolute want of food. "Zulfiqār then marched out with his own division to bring in grain from Wandiwāsh, 24 miles north-east of Jinjī. He arrived there at night. His Turāni soldiers, under cover of the darkness, fell on the helpless grain-dealers (banjārās) and carried off whatever they could seize. All discipline was lost. In the morning the Khan collected the grain left unplundered by his men, and set out on his return" (5 Jan. 1693). Santā with 20,000 men, barred his path at Desur, 10 miles southwards, and then enveloped his army. The Mughals, after a hard fight, reached the shelter of the fort of Desur at night and encamped at its foot. Here a halt was made for a day or two.

When the Mughals resumed their march in the morning, the Marathas brought a large force into the field and made a most determined attack. "They fired so many muskets that the soldiers and banjārās of our force were overpowered. Bullets were specially aimed at the elephants ridden by the imperial commanders. Many of these animals were hit. Regardless of the enemy fire, Rao Dalpat and his Bundelas boldly charged to clear a way ahead..... The transport animals and guns stuck in the mud of the rice-fields, artillery munition ran short, no powder or shot was left with any musketeer." But Dalpat, fighting with desperate bravery and assisted by the opportune arrival of the vanguard under Sarāfrāz Khan (who took on himself one enemy division), succeeded in driving the enemy back half a mile, then halting extricated the baggage and guns out
of the mud, sent the column on, and brought up the rear. The Marathas abated their shower of bullets and finally withdrew. The Bundelas had saved Zulfiqar's division and thereby saved also the camp before Jinji. [Dil. 109b.]

§ 19. The imperialists retreat to Wandiwash.

But the food brought by Zulfiqar at such a heavy cost was all too little for that huge multitude of soldiers and camp-followers. The condition of the starving imperialists became so bad that many common men daily walked over to the Maratha camp at the fort of Jinji, where provisions were plentiful, bought, cooked and ate the grain there and returned to their own quarters, without being allowed to carry away either raw or cooked food to their army.*

"Every day from dawn to sunset the Marathas assembled round our camp and made demonstrations. No aid came from any source except the Gracious to the Lowly; neither money nor food-stuff arrived. All the army, high and low alike, were distracted and depressed."

Asad Khan now made secret overtures of peace to Raja-ram, offering a heavy bribe if he was allowed to retreat to Wandiwash unmolested. The Maratha generals and ministers pressed their king to continue the war, crush the Mughal army which was half dead from starvation and thus establish his rule over that country before a new army could be sent by the Emperor. But Asad Khan "had cast a

* Dil. 110a. Also, Keshava Ramana, the newly appointed Maratha subahdar of Haidarahadi Karnatak, wrote to the English Chief of Madras, on 8 Jan. 1693: "The Mughal army being before Jinji, Dhana Jadav and several other great persons surrounded that army, whereby they cut them off from all manner of provisions coming to the prince and Asad Khan ... whereupon many of the Mughal's merchants and shopkeepers came to us upon our granting them our qaul (safe conduct), and we doubt not in 4 or 5 days to have all our enemies in Jinji fort." [Madras Diary.]
spell over Rajaram,” so that the latter rejected the advice of his followers and agreed to an armistice to let the Mughals withdraw if the wazir would recommend it to the Emperor to make peace with the Maratha king.† On the other side, too, Dalpat Rao urged Zulfiqār not to withdraw, as it would only bring disgrace in the end, and he offered his own gold and silver worth Rs. 40,000 for the Khan’s army expenses. But while Zulfiqār was hesitating, his hands were forced by his soldiers.

One day his artillerists loaded their effects, left the camp and sent word to their general that, as they were dying of hunger there they were going away to Wandiwāsh. It was impossible to fight without the artillery, and hence, at the departure of the gunners every man in the camp turned to packing his baggage for removal.

Asad and Zulfiqār had no help but to start with the prince at noon. “Owing to long continued starvation, most of the horses, camels and other transport animals of the army had perished. Those who had a few left, loaded just enough goods for these. Most men set fire to their belongings. Many in perplexity and helplessness at the terrible confusion and danger then raging, . . . . . . . took their own way forgetful of their friends and relatives. Many stores of the Emperor and nobles were left behind there. . . . . . . When the army marched out of the camp, about a thousand Maratha horse came after them like a rear-guard, and plundered the men of the army of their property. The imperialists reached Wandiwāsh in three days.” [Dil. 110b.]

This retreat was effected on 22nd or 23rd January 1693. Ten days latter, Qāsim Khan, the newly appointed faujdar of Conjeeveram (vice Ali Mardān Khan), was reported to be coming from Kadāpā with abundant supplies and a

† How Zulfiqār bribed Rajaram’s Brahman ministers, the Maratha generals protesting. Martin, iii. 285-287.
strong force. Santā Ghorparé tried to intercept him; he attacked Qāsim between Kaveripak and Conjeeveram and pressed him so hard that he had to shut himself up in the great temple enclosure of Conjeeveram. Next day Zulfiqār arrived to his aid, drove away the Marathas and escorted Qāsim Khan to Wandiwāsh (7th February). Food again became abundant in the Mughal camp and the troops were further reassured by getting the latest news and letters from the imperial Court telling them that the Emperor was alive and well. A dark cloud was lifted from the hearts of all the imperialists; “life came back to our bodies,” as Bhimsen says. There was much rejoicing, playing the band of victory (kettle-drums), dance parties and distribution of alms by the officers in celebration of the Emperor’s safety. [Dil. 111a.]

Zulfiqār made his camp at Wandiwāsh for four months (February—May, 1693), abandoning the attack on Jinji for the present. He had to wait for the Emperor’s orders about Kām Bakhsh and also to replenish his army and military chest, which had been sadly depleted.

§ 20. Emperor’s treatment of Kām Bakhsh and Asad Khan.

We may here complete the history of this episode in Kām Bakhsh’s life. The officers of the Karnātak army, especially Asad and Zulfiqār, lay quaking in mortal anxiety as to how the Emperor would take the arrest of his favourite son. The wildest rumours circulated as to his wrath towards his generals. A story ran in the Wandiwāsh camp that Asad Khan, on being sentenced to disgrace by the Emperor, had poisoned himself (July).

Aurangzib at first ordered the prince to be brought to his presence in charge of Asad Khan, and fresh equipment and furniture to be given to him on the way, to replace what had been abandoned or looted at Jinji, but no order
was passed regarding Zulfiqār and his officers. [Dil. 111b.] Meantime, Prince Azam had been posted to Kadāpā district to support the Jinji army from the rear. He encamped at Saddam at the southern frontier of his charge; and thus, after the arrival of Qāsim Khan at Wandiwash, the Mughal line of communication from the Eastern Karnātak to the Emperor's Court was again secured from interruption.

When the wazir reached Sāgar on his way to the Court, he received an order to stop there* and send the prince alone to the Emperor at Galgalā. Kām Bakhsh arrived there on 11th June and was presented to his father in the harem through the intercession of his sister Zinat-un-ṇisā. [M. A. 359.] Here the spoilt child tried to justify his late conduct by charging Zulfiqār with treachery and the collusive prolongation of the siege for enriching himself. Aurangzib was too experienced a soldier and too good a judge of men, to credit Kām Bakhsh's words. [Dil. 112a.]

Zulfiqār used the reinforcements brought by Qāsim Khan to reassert Mughal authority over the neighbourhood and

* This was a mark of censure. In addition, the Emperor taxed Asad Khan a huge sum as the price of the prince's stores which had been looted and the guns and material abandoned at Jinji; two mahals of the wazir's jagir were attached for recovering this amount. [Dil. 112a.] Asad Khan was permitted to come to the Emperor as late as 8th Jan. 1694. "On account of the affair of Kam Bakhsh, he anticipated the severe anger of the Emperor. On the day of interview, when Asad reached the place for making his salam, Multafat Khan, who was standing close to the throne, recited in a low tone the verse, ‘Forgiveness has a sweet taste which retaliation lacks.' The gracious Emperor replied, ‘You have recited it at the right time,' and looking benignantly at his prime minister ordered him to kiss his feet, and raised his head out of the dust of distress." [M. A. 365.] Dalpat Rao, in his anxiety, sent Bhimsen to the imperial camp to learn about the Emperor's feelings towards the Jinji army and the chance of Government supplying its officers with what they had lost during the retreat. The historian brought back reassuring news. [Dil. 112a. ]
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fill his chest. His disastrous retreat from the walls of Jinji had been a signal for the numerous petty zamindars of the Karnātak to rise in rebellion and lawlessness. They plundered banjāras bringing grain to the Mughal camp and seized certain forts. Zulfiqār now chastised them, exacted fines, and returned to Wandiwāsh. [Dil. 111a and 112b.]


The Eastern Karnātak from the latitude of Madras to that of Porto Novo, was at this time occupied by three sets of authorities, often in conflict with one another,—namely, the representatives of the old Hindu local chieftains and Vijaynagar viceroys, whom the conquering armies of the Bijapur and Golkondā Sultans had imperfectly subdued; the officers of the lately subverted Bijapur and Golkondā Governments, who were loth to recognise their new Mughal master; and the Maratha intruders representing the houses of Shivaji and Vyankoji. To the first of these classes belonged Yachāpā Nāyak, whose ancestors claimed to be Rajputs of Qanauj and had obtained the fort of Satgarh (26 miles west of Vellore) from the ministers of Rajah Pratap Rudra of Warangal. [Dil. 116a.] The Qutb Shahi Government had recognised his position by creating him commander of its local levies (sehbandi). After the fall of Golkondā he had resisted the Mughal conquest of the Kadāpā district [Dil. 98b] in the company of Md. Sādiq, but had been won over to the imperial side and sent with a considerable force (early in 1690) to expel the Maratha plundering bands infesting the Conjeveram district. [Mad.

* His name is spelt as Yachapa Nair and also Nayak in J. S., as Achap Nair in Bhimsen’s Persian memoirs, as Arsunna, Eashuma, Yasunna and Arzero Nayak in the Madras Diary, Achna Nayak in Akbarat (28 Oct. 1693, offers to surrender Satgarh fort to Zulfiqar, who arrives there), and Achapnar by Manucci [iii. 271.]
Diary, 1st May 1690.] Soon afterwards these two officers had revolted from the imperial side, and Yachāpā had usurped the country up to the Madras coast. [Mad. Diary, 21st July.] When Rajaram reached Jinji, Yachāpā joined him and lived in that fort for some time as his chief military supporter. [Dil., 112b; Mad. Diary, 9th Jan. 1693.] But in January 1693 he was thrown into the background by the arrival of Dhanā and Santā, and so, in March, he left Rajaram, recovered Sātgarh, and began to fight for his own hand. In extending his territory eastwards to Vellore, he came into conflict with Rajaram in June. [J. S.] At the close of the year Zulfiqār Khan won him over, by securing for him a mansab of 6-hazari and a jāgir of 3 laks of hun in the Karnātak. [Dil. 112b; Mad. Diary, 20th Feb. 1694.]

To the second category belonged Ismail Khan Makā, an ex-general of Golkondā and a local zamindār, as well as the sons of Sher Khan Lodi, the former Adil Shahi governor of Valikanda-puram. These joined the Mughals wholeheartedly. The temporary eclipse of the Muhammadan power at the beginning of 1693 was turned to good account by the Marathas. Santāji Ghorparē besieged Trichinopoly in March, Rajaram himself arrived there soon afterwards, and on 10th April the Nayak of Trichinopoly made peace with the Maratha king, who then went to visit his first cousin and friend Shāhji II at Tanjore (May 1693). But a quarrel now broke out in the Maratha ranks; Santāji’s temper was found intolerable and he left for Maharashtra in anger, Dhanāji being appointed Senāpati in his place. [J. S. Martin gives a different cause for Santāji’s anger, Mémories, iii. 303.]

§ 22. Mughal successes against the Tanjore Rajah, 1694. Zulfiqār had rashly begun the siege of Jinji, without first bringing the country around under his control. His stay before the fort had necessarily involved his army in the
risk of destruction in a hostile neighbourhood. But now, strengthened by the adhesion of these men of local influence, he set out in February 1694 to conquer the South Arcot district. The fort of Peru-mukkal, on the top of a steep hill 300 feet above the plain, 18 miles north of Pondicherry and 6 miles east of Tindivanam, was stormed for him by Dalpat Rao’s Bundelas under his eyes.* Thence he went to the beach to gaze on the ocean for the first time. Then he marched down the East Coast, towards Tanjore, by way of Pondicherry and other European factories,† capturing many forts in the South Arcot district, and skirting Cuddalore at the end of February. Yachapā cooperated with him.

When (in March 1694) Zulfiqār with his army arrived near Tanjore, Maharajah Shāhji II found resistance vain, especially as his ever-hostile neighbour, the Nāyak of Trichinopoly, joined the Mughals, helped them with men and money, and besought them to recover for him some forts and districts which the Maharajah of Tanjore had seized from him. The imperialists did this service to their ally. Then they invaded Tanjore itself. [Dil., 114.] Rajaram had sent (March) Baharji Ghorparé (the younger brother of Santā) to the assistance of his constant friend Shahji, but Zulfiqār was now irresistible. Shahji had to yield; on 22nd May he signed a letter of submission, promising to obey the Emperor’s orders like a faithful vassal in future, to cease from assisting Rajaram in any way (such as sending provisions into Jinji through the Vetavalam

* This is on the authority of Bhimsen, an eye-witness, who however, does not give the date. (Dil. ii. 112b.) But Akhbarat, 14 Nov. 1694, records that the Emperor received a report from Zulfiqar that in the storming of Perumukkal, Aziz Khan, the son of Bahadur Khan Ruhaela, had distinguished himself and entered the fort.

† He only looked at their outside from a distance. “These forts of the Europeans were mere shops,” as Bhimsen says. [Dil. 114a.]
wood), to pay the Mughal Government a tribute of 30 lakhs of rupees annually, (of which 20 lakhs were to be paid down in cash, jewels and elephants, and 10 lakhs next year), and to cede the forts of Palamkotā, Sittānur (?) and Tungānur with their dependent districts as well as Kul-Manārgudi, Shri-mushnam, Tittāgudi, Trinnānur (?), Elavanasore, Kālākurchi, Pandalum,* etc., which had been mortgaged to him by Rajaram. This cession of territory was to take the place of a contingent of 1000 horse and 4000 foot which he had originally agreed to supply for the Emperor’s service. The Mughal general, on his part, granted the Maharajah a qaūlnāma or letter of assurance, accepting the above terms and promising to procure for him an imperial farmān pardoning his offences and recognising his title and kingdom.† [Mackenzie Collection.] Shahji II made, in addition to the above, large gifts to Zulfiqār Khan and his officers. Out of the stipulated tribute 17 lakhs were paid down and the remaining three lakhs were promised when the invaders would retire beyond the Kolerun. [Mackenzie Collection, Mad. Diary.]

But Rajaram, who had mortgaged Palamkotā to Vyānkoji, sent two or three thousand horse, and seized the fort for himself, so that when (middle of June) Zulfiqār’s army appeared before it he was refused admission and had to

* Palamkota, 15 m. s.w. of Chidambaram. Sittanur, 10 m. w. of Tindivanam, (the English records spell it Cittoners, which may also stand for Chidambaram). Tunganur, 4 m. s. w. of Chidambaram, (spelt in the English records as Tank). Kul-Manargudi, 13 m. s. w. s. and Shri-mushnan, 19 m. w. of Chidambaram. Tittagudi, on the n. bank of the Vellar, 17 m. s. w. of Vridhachalam. Trinnanur (in English Imrapur), 27 m. n. e. e. of Trichi. Pandalum, 11 m. n. of Kalakurchi, which is 15 m. w. of Elavanansore. Elavanasore, 17 m. n. w. of Vridhachalam.

† A robe of honour, a jewelled pendant and an elephant were ordered by the Emperor to be presented to Shahji. [Akhbarat, 27 Aug. and 3 Sep. 1694.]
lay siege to it. After six days of trench warfare, Dalpat Rao by one charge seized the fortified village (pettā) before the fort-gate, losing 150 of his Rajputs in killed and wounded. The garrison then capitulated, but escaped by the postern gate under cover of the night, 23rd June 1694. [Dil., 114b; Akbbarat, 18 July.]

Then the Mughal army returned to its base at Wandiwāsh by way of Tiru-vādi, and made another attack on Jinji in September,—this time taking care to plant outposts in the Vetavalam forest through which provisions used to enter the fort. [Dil., 115b, Akbbarat, 22 Sep.] In this month Zulfiqār suddenly arrested Yachāpā at a darbar and had him beheaded on the charge of treason, with the previous sanction of the Emperor; "of the Nāyak's family then with him all slew one another, and his property was looted by the camp."*


Zulfiqār Khan renewed the siege of Jinji towards the close of the year 1694, but it was a mere show intended to deceive the Emperor. The fact of his treasonable collusion with the Marathas was notorious in the country. François Martin, the founder of Pondicherry, who was in close and constant touch with the Court of Jinji "frequently in his letters and Memoirs, expressed the opinion that Zulfiqār Khan had, during the course and particularly at the end of the siege of Jinji, an understanding with Rajaram; in ex-

* Dil. ii. 116a; Madras Diary, 18 and 22 Sep. 1694. Manucci (iii. 271—2) gives horrible details of this suicide and also asserts that Zulfqar falsely accused Yachapa of treason and killed him, because the Nayak had written a letter to the Emperor exposing, Zulfiqar's treasonable collusion with the Marathas and deliberate prolongation of the siege of Jinji, and offering to capture the fort in eight days by his own troops alone, but the letter had been intercepted by Asad Khan.
pectation of the death of the very old Aurangzib and the
civil wars that would fatally follow among his sons, he had
conceived the ambition of carving out for himself an in-
dependent principality, and with that object he wished to
placate (manage) the Marathas.” (Martin, Mémoires, iii.
287). So, too, the English merchants of Madras record on
5th November 1696: “Zulfiqār Khan has, been frequently
ordered to take Jinji, and it has been in his power to do
so and destroy all the Marathas in the country. But instead
of that it appears plain that he hath joined council with
them.” Even Bhimsen, the right-hand man of Zulfiqār’s
right hand man Dalpat Rao, frankly charges the Khan
with treasonable neglect of duty: “If he had wished it, he
could have captured the fort on the very day that he reach-
ed Jinji. But it is the practice of generals to prolong opera-
tions (for their own profit and ease).” And, again, “God
alone knows what policy he adopted.” Manucci says the
same thing. [Dil., 123a and 106a. Storia, iii. 271.]

In October 1694, Zulfiqār suddenly marched out of
Wandiwāsh and encamped north of the Changāmon fort and
pass (42 miles west of Jinji), the Marathas hovering round
him and making daily incursions into his camp, in which
they carried off horses. The Mughal cavalry, in its turn,
harassed and plundered the country round, carrying away
both men and goods. “At Wandiwāsh the people fled in
fear of the Muhammadan army and took refuge in the
Changāmon hill.” There was much disagreement at this
time between Zulfiqār and his chief officers,—especially
Dāud Khan Pani, Kishore Singh Hādā, and Dalpat Rao
Bundela,—who were absurdly credited in public rumour
with a design to seize him and send him in chains to the
Emperor. The Khan, so it was reported, had sent ten
camels laden with rupees for Rajaram, but they had been
intercepted by Dāud Khan. Another report was that the
Marathas, by poisoning the waters and mixing milk-hedges
in some of the tanks, had killed a great number of people. [Mad. Diary, 10 Nov. 1694.] Then after taking two or three small forts from the Marathas and receiving three lakhs of Rupees sent from the Court, the Mughal general marched to Saddam (at the end of December, 1694).

Early in April 1695 one of his chief officers, Sarāfrāz Khan, quarrelled with him and marched away to the Court without his permission. We read in the Court news-letters reports about other desertions from his army. Nothing was achieved by the Mughals during 1695, while the scarcity of grain which raged there for the entire year intensified their sufferings. Siege was laid to Vellore in October, but it held out for many years. Early in December came the alarming news that a large Maratha army of 15,000 men under the dreaded Santā and Dhanā was marching to the Eastern Karnātak and that they had already crushed Qāsim Khan, the governor of the uplands of Mysore, (capital Serā). On hearing of this disaster, the imperialists took fright and prepared to decamp and send their families to places like Madras for protection. [Mad. Diary, 5 Dec. 1695.]


Dhanā Jādav arrived near Vellore at the end of December. Zulfiqār immediately raised the siege, sent off his camp baggage and family to Arcot, and prepared for action. The Maratha general had turned aside towards Jinji, and then roving further south had besieged the Mughal faujdar in Tiru-vādi. Zulfiqār, coming up promptly in pursuit, relieved the outpost, drove Dhanā away,* and fell back on Arcot. But the situation changed entirely against the Mughals in March, when Santā Ghorparé arrived on the scene. The

* Akhbarat, 18 Jan. 1696. See Sanads and Letters, p. 175, mentioning Dhanāji’s fight in which Gangāji Bābar fell (8 Feb.)