Maratha bands spread to several parts of the country, the imperialists with their depleted numbers could not defend so many places. [Mad. Diary, 20 Jan. 1696.] Zulfiqār wisely concentrated his forces; but throughout this year 1696 he was hampered by his extreme want of money, "having received no supply from the Emperor." He vainly begged the English merchants of Madras for a loan of one lakh of hun, for which he offered to mortgage to them any part of the country. [Mad. Diary, 3 March.] In October he became exasperated by their persistent refusal, and threatened an attack on their city.

In April 1696 Zulfiqār had beaten back Santāji near Arni, but thereafter he confined himself solely to the defensive in the fort of Arcot, as his strength was still further weakened by the death of his captain Rajah Kishore Singh Hādā. [Dil. 118b.] The Marathas, as usual, hovered round him, there being a secret understanding between the two sides to spare each other.

In November it was reported that treasure sent by the Emperor for Zulfiqār had reached Kadāpā. Santā immediately marched in that direction to intercept it. Zulfiqār set out after him, but Santā changed his plan and the Khan after three marches fell back on Arcot. Santā entered the Bijapur uplands or Central Mysore instead, and Zulfiqār, under orders of the Emperor, pursued him there and cooperated with Prince Bidār Bakht, who had reached that province from the north-west for expelling the Marathas from beyond the Tungabhadra. These two Mughal forces united near Penu-kondā (75 miles north of Bangālore). The elusive Marathas disappeared without offering battle, and Zulfiqār returned to Arcot in February 1697. [Dil., 121b; Mad. Diary, 31 Dec. 1696.]


But his money difficulties were as great as ever, and he
again left Arcot to collect tribute from Tanjore and other places in the south. This source was soon exhausted, "he spent all this money in a short time, but could not clear the arrears of his soldiers' pay." [Dil., 121b.] Then by way of Trikolor and Trinomāli he returned to Wandiwāsh to canton for the rainy season. Happily for him, the Marathas were now very much weakened by a bitter and final rupture between Dhanā and Santāji, the rivals for the post of commander-in-chief. Rajaram sided with Dhanā, an internecine war raged among the Marathas, and finally Dhanā was defeated by his rival and driven back to Mahārāshtra (May 1696). "Among the Marathas not much union was seen. Every one called himself a sardar and went out to plunder (on his own account)." [Dil., 122a; J. S.]

Rajaram was as much in want of money as the Mughals. In August he sent his natural son Karnā to Zulfiqār (through the mediation of Ram Singh Hādā), offering to make peace on certain conditions. But Aurangzib was inexorable: he rejected the terms, and issued peremptory orders to Zulfiqār to capture Jinji without further delay. So, the Mughal general sent Karna back to his father in the middle of October, and early in November 1697 renewed the siege of Jinji in right earnest. [Dil., 112b, J. S., Mad. Diary, 26 Oct.]

He himself took post opposite the northern gate towards the Singhāvaram hill; Ram Singh Hādā west of the fort, facing the postern gate Shaitāndāri (Port du Diable); and Daud Khan Pani before Chikkali-durg, a mile south of Jinji. Though Dāud Khan's division lacked artillery and siege-materials, he captured Chikkali-durg in one day by a reckless assault at close quarters, and then, coming to Jinji itself, entrenched opposite Chandrāyan-garh, the southern fort. If Zulfiqār had wished it, he could have taken the entire fort the next day. But his secret policy was to prolong the siege in order to keep his army together, enjoy his
emoluments, and escape the hardships of active duty on some new expedition. He let the Marathas know that his attacks were for show only, and that he would give Raja-ram sufficient notice to escape before he captured the fort. Thus, the siege dragged on for two months more.*

§ 26. The fall of Jinji fort and escape of Rajaram.

At last this sham warfare could not be kept up any longer, and it became necessary for Zulfiqar to capture the fort if he wished to avoid disgrace and punishment by his master. Rajaram received timely warning, and escaped to Vellore, with his chief officers, but leaving his family behind. Then Zulfiqar gave the order for the assault. While Daud Khan with a large force was noisily exploring a track for scaling Chandrāyan-garh from the south and had drawn the defenders to that side, Dalpat Rao scaled the northern walls of Krishnā-giri and captured the outer fort after a severe struggle. The garrison retreated to an inner fort called Kālākot, which Dalpat’s Bundelas entered pell-mell with them and occupied. The surviving Marathas took refuge in Rājgarh or the highest fort.

Meantime Daud Khan had made his way into Chandrāyan-garh and advanced through the city or the low inner plain of Jinji towards Krishnā-giri. The inhabitants fled to the top of Krishnā-giri, but finding no safety there, capitul-

* Wilkes (i. 133),—“To preserve appearances it was necessary to report [to the Emperor] frequent attacks and repulses. On the other side, Daud Khan, second in command of the Mughal army, drank largely of the best European liquors, and when full of the god would perpetually volunteer the extirpation of the infidels. Zulfiqar necessarily assented to these enterprises, but always gave secret intelligence to the enemy of the time and place of attack; and the troops of Daud Khan were as often repulsed with slaughter.” But Bhimsen, who was present in the camp and accuses Zulfiqar of collusion with the Marathas, does not report more than one assault by Daud Khan.
ated. A vast amount of booty in horses, camels and things fell into the hands of the imperialists.

Rajaram’s family was now invested in Rājgiri, the highest and strongest of the three forts in Jinji. But their situation was hopeless. Dalpat held the gate of Kālākot; Zulfiqār who had entered by the northern* gate, held the entrance to Rājgiri fort; and finally Ram Singh Hādā made his way to the summit of Rājgiri by crossing the chasm at its foot by means of a wooden gangway. The Maratha royal family begged for safety, which was promised to them, and palkis were sent for their conveyance. Four wives, three sons and two daughters of Rajaram now came out of the citadel and were kept in honourable captivity. Another wife of the Rajah avoided surrender; she flung herself down from the summit of the fort into the sheer depths below. Her head struck a projecting rock and she was killed instantly, but her mangled corpse was caught in the branches of a tree on the hillside at an inaccessible place and there it lay without funeral. Nearly 4000 men, women and children were found in the fort, but very few combatants.† [Dīl. 124.]

* Bhimsen (124a) says that the commander-in-chief entered by opening the Shaitan-dari, which had been bricked up; then he met and congratulated Dalpat Rao, and the two entered Kalakot together. I think that this is a mistake for the Vellore gate, because Ram Singh was posted opposite the Shaitandari, while Zulfiqar’s post was a mile north-east of it, near the northern or Vellore gate.

† M. A. 391 explicitly says that Jinji was captured on 6th Shaban 41st year of Aurangzib (— 7th Feb. 1608). The Madras Diary of 2nd January 1698 records: “A letter from Amir Jahan from the Mughal camp received today advises that the Nawab has taken the Jinji forts all but one which also offers to capitulate.” If we read Rajab instead of Shaban in M. A., we get 8th Jan. Bhimsen (135a) says that the fort fell on a Sankranti, which would give 2nd or 31st January. Chitnis (ii. 58), as usual is grossly incorrect, giving Chaitra pratipad Sudi 1618 — 23rd March 1696 as the date of the capture!
Zulfiqār then supervised the collection and safe storing of the property and war-materials found in the captured fort. He put to death many of the Maratha officers who had fought against him. The ravages made by the siege in the fort-walls were repaired and the foot-tracks for scaling the hill were all closed. Rockets and gunpowder manufactured at St. Thome were accumulated in the fort for its defence. [*Dil. 124b; Mad. Diary.*]

From Jinji Zulfiqār returned to his base at Wandiwāsh, and then pursued Rajaram from Vellore to Garamkondā.* But the Maratha king had a good start of him and escaped to Vishālgarh in safety (Feb.). Thus the entire work of the Emperor’s long siege of Jinji was undone. The bird had flown away.

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* On the way back from Garamkonda, Zulfiqar made an attack on Vellore [which, however, fell to Daud Khan as late as 14th Aug. 1702, see *Storia*, iii. 420], and reached Wandiwash about 7th April. He was recalled to the Emperor’s side a year later, and leaving Jinji in charge of Jamshid Khan, started for the Court on 25th April, 1699. [*Akhbarat.*]
§ 1. *Qāsim Khan marches against Santā Ghorparé.*

The Maratha captains infested various parts of Mughal Deccan in the usual manner throughout October and November, 1695. Early in November Santā was reported to be ‘out’ near Bhāgdurg* (in the Bijapur district) and Dhanā near Akluj, while other bands were roving in Junnar or threatening to penetrate to Berar and Khandesh. Soon afterwards Dhanā marched with a large force from Satārā, across the Krishnā to Bhāgdurg, and thence to the Madras Karnātak, where he propped up the Maratha cause by driving away Zulfiqār Khan from the siege of Vellore. [J. S.] Santā, who had been looting the Bijapur district, vainly pursued by an imperial detachment under Himmat Khan south of the Krishnā, now turned southwards to convey his rich store of plunder to his own estate in N. W. Mysore.

Aurangzib, then encamped at Islāmpuri, ordered Qāsim Khan, the able and active governor of the Serā country (western Mysore), to intercept the raiders. To reinforce Qāsim Khan, he sent a detachment from his own camp under some of his highest younger officers,—Khānāzād Khan (afterwards Ruhullah Khan II and Lord High Steward), Saf Shikan Khan, Sayyid Asālat Khan and Muhammad Murād (the Paymaster of Prince Kām Bakhsh’s army),—with a command of 25,000 men on paper but only 4,800

* The name as spelt in Akhabarat (5 and 15 Nov.) Probably Ramdurg, (75.20 E. 16 N.), near Torgal, between Bijapur and Dharwar. [Ind. Atlas, 41 N. E. Bombay Gaz. xxiv, 396.]
troopers in actual muster. It was, however, a very choice corps, being composed of men from the Emperor’s guards and personal retinue and the contingents of the nobles who had to patrol round his tent on different days in the week (haft chauki), with artillery. They joined Qāsim Khan about 12 miles from the Marathas’ expected track, early in November. Santā, who had been roving at a distance, heard of his enemy’s position and movements, came up with them by swift marches, and skilfully matured a plan for their destruction, which the luxury and thoughtlessness of the Mughal generals crowned with the most complete success imaginable.

Khānazar Khan was a Persian of the highest descent, being the son of the late Paymaster-General, Ruhullah Khan I, and great-grandson of the Empress Mumtāz Mahal’s sister. With him had come some officers of the greatest influence and favour in the Emperor’s personal circle. Qāsim Khan rose to the height of hospitality required by guests of such a rank. Discarding the simple and light kit of a general who would wage war with the Marathas wisely, he brought out of his stores in Adoni fort, his ‘showy articles, such as brand new Karnātaki tents, gold, silver and China vessels of all kinds, etc., and sent them six miles ahead of his halting place to be kept ready for himself and his guests when they would arrive there at the end of the next day’s march.’ [M. A. 375.]

§ 2. Santā defeats Qāsim Khan.

But on that day doom overtook him in the person of Santā Ghorparé, who showed the highest tactical power in making his dispositions and moving his three distinct and scattered divisons so as to ensure the perfect timing of their movements and exact co-operation among them. He divided his army into three bodies, of which one was sent to plunder the Mughal camp, another to fight the soldiers,
and the third was held in reserve ready for action wherever required. Barmāppā Nayak, the zamindar of the Chittaldurg district, who bore a grudge against Qāsim Khan for having been humbled by that general, now sided with the Marathas in the hope of a share of the spoils, and thus the Mughals were ringed round by enemies and cut off from all information. [M. A. 375. Dil. 117b.]

An hour and a half after sunrise, the first Maratha division fell upon Qāsim Khan’s advanced tents (six miles to the front), slew and wounded the guards and servants, carried off everything they could, and set fire to the heavy tents. On the news of it reaching Qāsim Khan, he hurried towards the point of attack, without rousing Khānazād Khan from his sleep or maturing any plan of concerted action. Before he had gone two miles, the second body of the enemy appeared in sight and the battle began. The noise awoke Khānazād Khan, who left his camp, baggage and everything else on the spot and quickly advanced to the aid of his friend. But the enemy’s numbers were overwhelming, and they had a very large body of Kālā-piādā musketeers,—the best marksmen and bravest infantry of the Deccan,—in addition to their numberless mobile light cavalry. “A great battle was fought and many were slain on both sides. In spite of the steadiness of the imperialists and the destruction done by them, the enemy did not yield one foot of ground or show the least wavering. Then the reserve division of Santā fell upon the camp and baggage left behind and looted everything. This news reached Qāsim and Khānazād in the heat of the battle and shook their firmness. They took counsel together and decided to go to the small fort of Dodderi* close to which their advanced-tents had been sent.

* Dodderi, 14° 20’ N., 75° 46’ E., in the Chittaldurg division of Mysore, 22 miles east of Chittaldurg, and 96 miles in a straight line south of Adoni. South of it stands a large reservoir. “The imperia-
and where there was a tank. Fighting for two miles they reached the tank in the evening and halted; the enemy retired from the attack but encamped close by.” The fort of Dodderi was small and the food-store in it limited. So “its imperial garrison shut its gates upon their newly arrived comrades. The two Khans shared with the other officers the food they had brought with themselves, and the common soldiers found nothing to eat except the water of the tank; grass and gram for the elephants and horses could be had nowhere. As the night closed, the enemy completely encircled them. The imperialists stood to arms ready to meet any attack. But for three days the Marathas only appeared in sight without fighting, till some thousands of infantry sent by Barmāppā Nāyak,† joined them. Then they seized the opportunity and made an attack. On the fourth day, before sunrise, ten times the former number of Kālā-piādās (Kanārese musketeers) darkened the plain and began to fight. The imperial artillery munitions had been plundered in their camp and what little was carried with the soldiers was now exhausted; so after vain exertions for some hours, they sat down in despair. The enemy’s hail of bullets destroyed many men in this situation.”§ Fully one-

lists, giving up all plan of fighting, took the road to Dodderi in confusion, reached the place with extreme difficulty, and were invested.” [Dil. 118a.]

† His relations with the Mughals can be traced from four Persian farmans addressed to him and preserved in the Madras Record Office under “Carnatic Records.” For his family (of Berad origin) and history, see Rice’s Mysore Gazetteer, ii. 461. Chittaldurg is a famous Lingayat centre.

§ This is the contemporary record compiled from State papers like despatches and news-letters, (M. A. 375—377). But more than 30 years later, Khafi Khan (ii. 429), gave the following different and seemingly inaccurate account:—“A party of the enemy fell upon Qasim Khan’s tents. . . . . . and 10 to 12 thousand horsemen attacked the baggage of Khanazad. . . . . 7 or 8 thousand more appeared bet-
third of the Mughal army had been slain at the two camps, during the retreat, and on the banks of the tank of Dodderi.

§ 3. Qāsim Khan flees to Dodderi fort.

Then the chiefs decided to save their own lives by sneaking into the fort, and a disgraceful scene ensued which is thus described by Khāfi Khan (ii. 331):

“In this extremity of distress, Qāsim, Khānzaad and Saf Shikan, who had dismounted close to one another, planned to enter into the garhi secretly without informing Muhammad Murād and other comrades who were at a distance. They began to send within such stores as were left after the enemy’s plunder, pretending to lighten themselves for fighting. The first night Qāsim Khan, on the pretext of patrolling, left his post and entered the fort by scaling the wall with ropes, as it was found inadvisable to enter by the gate owing to the crowd assembled before it. Then Khānzaad and Saf Shikan entered through the gate by charging the crowd of common soldiers round it. Lastly Muhammad Murād and other officers, learning of it, came in with the greatest difficulty. Saf Shikan, turning to Muhammad Murād, cried out—‘How gallantly have we

ween the two Khans, so that neither could reinforce the other.....
The battle raged till sunset.....All night the chiefs remained on their elephants and the soldiers holding the bridles of their horses, to repel night-attacks. At dawn the Marathas renewed their attack .....in this way the imperialists were attacked for 3 days, at last [on the fourth day] they marched fighting all the way and took refuge under the garhi of Dodderi. For these three days they had no food. In the same way 3 or 4 more days were passed, the imperialists entrenching and repelling charges under shelter of the walls of the garhi day and night, while their camels, horses and oxen were carried off by the Marathas. As the gates of the garhi.....had been closed upon them, the grocers of the garhi threw down to them grain from the top of the wall, charging one or two rupees per seer. On the 4th or 5th day [i.e., the 7th or 8th day after the first battle] the two Khans decided to enter the garhi.”
brought ourselves here!' Murâd's nephew retorted—'Shame on the type of gallantry that you have shown in coming here, of which you are bragging!'

The Marathas besieged the fort on all sides, being confident that hunger would destroy its defenders. On the day of entering the fort, the soldiers, high and low, were all given bread of millet (jawâri and bajrâ) from the local stores, while the transport cattle fed on the old and new straw-thatching pulled down from the roofs of houses. On the second day no food was left for either man or beast. Many of the cattle of the army had been carried away by the Marathas, many others had perished from hunger,—

"They chewed each other's tails, mistaking them for straw," as the graphic exaggeration of a Persian writer well describes it;—and the remaining oxen 'lean like the ass's tail,' were now eaten up by the Muslim soldiery. Then they faced utter starvation. Qâsim Khan was a great eater of opium; his life depended on the drug, and the lack of it caused his death on the third day. [M. A., 378; but many suspected that he committed suicide to escape disgrace at the hands of the enemy and censure by the Emperor.] Of the common soldiers, many in the agony of hunger leaped down from the fort walls and sought refuge in the enemy's camp, who took away the money they had concealed in their belts, and turned them adrift. The traders of Santâ's camp-bazar used to come below the wall of the fort and sell fruits and sweets at fancy prices to the starving Mughals on the top, who threw down money tied in rags and drew the food up by means of ropes. [K. K.].

§ 4. Capitulation of Mughal force in Dodderi.

When the food supply was absolutely exhausted and the water in the fort became scanty and unwholesome, Khânazâd Khan, in despair of relief, sent his diwan and a Deccani
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captain of the imperial army to Santā to beg for terms of capitulation.

Santā at first demanded a lakh of hun besides the elephants, horses and property of the Mughal army. But the treacherous Deccani captain whispered to him, “What is this that you are asking for? Raise your terms. This amount will be paid by Khānazād Khan alone as his ransom.” At last the ransom was fixed at 20 lakhs of rupees; and all the cash articles, jewels, horses and elephants of the doomed army were to be given up, each general being allowed to go away on a single horse with the clothes he wore on his person. The generals individually signed bonds for their respective ransoms and each left a kinsman or his chief servant as security for its payment. The terms were faithfully kept on the Maratha side,* thanks to Santā’s iron discipline, [K. K. corrected by M. A.]

Santāji sent word that the men might come out of the fort without any fear and stay for two nights in front of its gate; those who had any money need fear no extortion but might buy their necessaries from the Maratha camp. The lean woebegone and bedraggled remnant of the imperial army filed out of the fort 13 days after entering it. The enemy gave them bread from one side and water from the other. Thus they were nursed back to life and strength in two days. On the third day Khānazād started for the Court with a Maratha escort. He had lost everything, but the imperial officers on the way supplied him and his men with horses, tents, dress, food and money to relieve their urgent distress. [M. A. 378, K. K. 433.]

Meantime, the Emperor, then at Islāmpuri, 280 miles north of the scene of this disaster, on hearing of the danger

* But not on the Mughal side, according to Khafi Khan, who says, ‘Not even half the ransom was paid as many of the hostages escaped from the wretch’s army and he was [soon afterwards] killed. But the property seized by him was worth 50 or 60 lakhs.” [ii. 433.]
to Qāsim Khan, had sent Hamid-ud-din Khan from his side and Rustam-dil Khan from Haidarabad to support him. They had united near Adoni, but too late to do anything except to receive and help Khānazād on his return. Here Khānazād’s army was reclothed and newly furnished by the gifts and forced contributions from the officers and residents of Adoni. [M. A. 379, but Akhbarat, year 39, sh. 72, differs.]*

§ 5. Santa slays Himmat Khan at Basavapatan.

In less than a month from this stroke, Santā achieved another and equally famous victory. Himmat Khan Bahādur, who had been deputed to co-operate with Qāsim Khan, had taken refuge in Bāsavapatan (40 miles west of Dodderi) on account of the smallness of his force, which did not exceed one thousand cavalry, though he had received the impossible order to go out and punish Santā. [M. A. 379.]

After the fall of Dodderi, Santā had planted his own garrison there and told off two divisions of his army to watch and oppose Hamid-ud-din (in the north) and Himmat Khan (in the west). On 20th January 1696, he appeared before Himmat Khan’s position at the head of ten thousand cavalry and nearly the same number of infantry. His Karnātaki foot-musketeers—the best marksmen in the Deccan, took post on a hill. Himmat Khan, with a very

* M. A. 375 has made an astounding mistake of date by saying that Khanazad and Qasim Khan united their forces before sighting the enemy, on 23 Jamādi-us-sani (= 19 Jan., 1696). But the absolutely trustworthy contemporary news-letter, Akhbarat, shows that on that date the mace-bearers sent by the Emperor returned to him at Brahmapuri after delivering his gifts to the vanquished officers, who had then reached Adoni. Qasim Khan had died more than a month before 19th Jan. The Madras Diary records on 15th Dec. 1695, the report of Qasim Khan having been already defeated, [say, about 20th Nov.]
small force, advanced to the attack and dislodged them from it, slaying 500 of them. Then he drove his elephant towards the place where Santā was standing, when suddenly he was shot by a bullet in the forehead and fell down unconscious into the hawda. His driver wanted to turn the elephant back, but the captain of his contingent (Jamadār), Ali Bāqi, told the driver—“The Khan is alive. Urge the elephant onward. I shall drive the enemy back.” But he, too, was wounded, thrown down to the ground and carried off by the enemy. Then his son fell fighting. Santā received two arrow-wounds. The leaderless imperialists fell back to their trenches. At midnight Himmat Khan breathed his last. Three hundred of his men were dispersed and fled to various places. The rest held their fortified enclosure successfully for some days, after which the Marathas withdrew from its siege and went away with the captured baggage of the Khan.*


At the first news of Himmat Khan’s perilous situation Aurangzib had ordered (22 January 1696) Hamid-ud-din Khan to hasten to the relief of Himmat at Basavapatan. On the 28th of the month the Emperor learnt of Himmat Khan’s death and the blockade of his troops in the fort of Basavapatan by Santā; and a great effort was made to gather troops and retrieve the position in N. W. Mysore.

Meantime, Hamid-ud-din Khan, after leaving his heavy baggage in the fort of Adoni, had started on 1st February for the relief of Basavapatan, which was being ably defended by Sayyid Azmatullah and Muhammad Euz (the

* This narrative is based upon the despatch received by the Emperor on 2nd February and included in the Akhbarat of the next day, with some additions from M. A. The rest of M. A. and the whole of Khafi Khan (gossipy fabrication) have been rejected by me.
qiladār). His force was 12,000 strong. Some twenty miles* before his destination he was attacked by Santā (26th February). But the Marathas were defeated and pushed back eight miles, their camp being looted by the Mughals. Santā fled to Khargdurg (?) The victorious Hamid, after a halt of two or three days for burying his dead and tending his wounded soldiers, marched to Basavapatan. Here a few days later Santā re-appeared, but Hamid-ud-din made a sally from the fort and drove away the Marathas, taking 200 mares and many weapons from them. On receiving the despatches of these victories, the Emperor in open Court praised Hamid-ud-din very highly and wrote to Zulfiqār Khan, “That is how a soldier fights!” [Akhbarat.]

§ 7. Military arrangements of the imperialists during 1696.

Meantime, Prince Bidār Bakht had been ordered (end of January) to march from Panhālā to Basavapatan, while Firuz Jang was to take his place at the siege of Panhālā. The troops of Qāsim and Himmat were joined to the prince’s command. He proceeded first to Bankāpur (some 60 miles north of Basavapatan), from which he resumed his advance on 3rd March, but by that time the siege of Basavapatan had been raised. Arriving at this place in a few weeks, he stayed there for some time, sending out detachments to punish the rebel zamindars of the district. Barmāppā Nāyak of Chittaldurg seems to have felt his heavy hand, as he made a humble submission and promise of loyalty. On 16th May 1696 Bidār Bakht, on behalf of the Emperor, granted him a written pardon on certain conditions.†

* Probably at Cakargola, 4 m.e. of Harihar on the Tungabhadra, which latter is 22 m. n. of Basavapatan (Shimoga district).
† “Carnatic records” (Persian) in the Madras Record Office. The conditions are: (1) If Barmappa behaves badly again, he would be
Before the prince's arrival, Santā had left the Chittaldurg district for Jinji in the Madras Karnātak (March 1696.) In the other theatres of the war the disposition of the imperial troops in 1696 was as follows.

In the Junnar district, the qiladar of Junnar had seized Kumāri fort in October 1695, but the Marathas had raided Talégāon. Prince Muhammad Azam had been sent from the Emperor's camp at Islāmpuri to Pedgāon (Bahādurgarh) 90 miles north of it in February 1696. After a visit to the Junnar region to restore order there (April), he returned to Pedgāon, which remained his head-quarters till he was recalled to the Emperor's side at Miraj three years later. In April Firuz Jang was sent against the Berads of Wagingerā; he sat down on the frontier of Sāgar to guard that side. [M. A. 380, J. S.; Akhbarat, 10 May 1696.]

Nothing extraordinary happened in the autumn and winter of 1696 to vary the tale of Maratha raids here and there throughout the Western Deccan. But in March 1697, Santā Ghorparē returned from the East Coast to the Satārā district, and Firuz Jang was despatched against him; at the same time Bidār Bakht was sent to strengthen his father at Pedgāon. But a civil war among the Maratha generals weakened their power during the first half of this year (1697), and in order to understand its cause and course it is necessary to resume the history of Santā Ghorparē.

killed with his family and his country desolated; (2) he should cede to the Emperor the small fort of Dodderi with 2 elephants and the guns [? in it] and demolish the fort of Ramgiri, nor ever rebuild the latter; (3) he should agree to a tribute and fine of 8 lakhs of Rupees,—(three lakhs in cash down and five lakhs by instalments under a written bond)—and another lakh to the prince; and (4) his army under his brother should serve under the prince in the Emperor's wars. In Sep. 1700 Barmappa received a farman and a robe in reward of his military aid.
§ 8. *Civil war between Santā Ghorparé and Dhana Jadav.*

Flushed with his far-resounding victories over two first-grade Mughal generals, Santāji went to Jinji to wait on Rajaram (March 1696). He seems to have claimed the office of Senāpati, contrasting his own brilliant performances with Dhanā’s poor record of victories. Hitherto Prahlād Niraji (the Pratinidhi or regent) had, with great tact and diplomacy, kept peace between the two rival generals and taken great pains to show in all the acts of government that the king treated the two as absolutely equal. But he was now dead, and his successor in the king’s council was less clever and could not keep the balance even. [Sardesai, Rajaram, p. 72.] Santā’s vanity, imperious temper and spirit of insubordination, roused to an inordinate height by his recent triumphs, gave great offence to the Court at Jinji and the result was an open rupture near Conjeveram (May 1696). [J. S.] Rajaram sided with Dhanā and placing Amrit Rao Nimbālkar in the Van of his army, attacked his refractory general. But Santā’s genius again triumphed; Dhanā was defeated and driven precipitately to his home in Western India; Amrit Rao fell on the field.*

* J. S. But K. K. wrongly gives the victory to Dhana.

This encounter is thus graphically described in Masir-i-Alamgiri, which wrongly places it in October 1689:—“On the way to Jinji, this wretch had a fight with Dhana Jadav, who was escorting Rajaram there, on account of an old quarrel. Santa triumphed, and caused Amrit Rao, the brother [in-law] of Nagoji, the comrade and assistant of Dhana, to be crushed to death by an elephant. He also captured Rajaram, but Dhana escaped. The next day Santa appeared before Rajaram with his wrists bound together, saying—‘I am still the same loyal servant [as before]. My rudeness was due to this that you wanted to make Dhana my equal and to reach Jinji with his help. I shall now do whatever you bid me.’ Then he released and conducted Rajaram to Jinji.” (401.)

Bhimsen is more accurate:—“A quarrel had broken out between Santa Ghorpare and Dhana Jadav. Dhana convinced Rajaram that Santa had seized too much power and being a good soldier was trying...
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Santā’s doings in the Eastern Karnātak this year have been fully described in Chap. LI.


He finally returned to the homeland in March 1697. Here an internecine war now raged between him and Dhanā, all the other captains being ranged on the two sides. They fought together in the Satārā district in March 1697. But fortune now deserted Santāji; his severity and insolence had disgusted his officers and most of them were secretly corrupted by the agents of Dhanā. Hanumant Rao Nimbālkar, in concert with Dhanā’s troops, fell on Santā’s baggage train, and most of the latter’s officers deserted to Dhanā while the rest were killed or wounded. Santā, despoiled of all and deserted by his army, fled from the field with only a few followers to Mhaswād, the home of Nāgoji Mānē whose wife’s brother Amrit Rao he had killed. With Nāgoji, however, the sacred rights of hospitality to a refugee rose higher than the claims of blood-feud; he gave Santā shelter and food for some days, and then dismissed him in safety. But his wife Rādhā Bāi followed her brother’s slayer with a woman’s unquenchable vindictiveness. She had urged her husband to slay their guest, but in vain. And now when she saw him escaping unscathed, she sent her surviving brother after him. Of the many diverse accounts† of his death the one accepted by Khāfī Khan is to found an independent State, and therefore he ought to be killed. Rajaram and Dhana with a large army, placing Amrit Rao Navalkar in command of the Van, attacked Santa. Amrit Rao was slain by Santa’s men, and a civil war ensued.” [Dīl. ii. 122a.]

The battle was fought at Aiwar-gudi, 11 m. n. w. of Vridhachalam. Sanads and Letters, p. 177, Sardessi, Rajaram, p. 80-82.

† Admittedly diverse and conflicting, according to M. A. 402, which omits all of them. The Māṇē family “old paper” printed in Parasnīś’s Itihas Sangraha, Junya Aitihāsik Goshṭi, ii. 45, is so
that the pursuer (wrongly called Nāgoji Mānē by both Khāfī Khan and J. S.) came upon Santāji when, exhausted by fast travel, he was bathing in a nāla near the Shambhu Mahādev hill, in the Satārā district. The party from Mhaswad surprised him in this helpless situation and cut off his head. (June, 1697.) “Mānē [i.e., Nimbālkar] threw it into the saddlebag fastened behind his seat. . . . . On the way the bag got loose and fell down. Firuz Jang’s spies, who had spread in that hilly region, in pursuit of Santā, picked it up, recognised it as that general’s head, and sent it to Firuz Jang, who. . . . . . . . .sent it on to the Emperor. The severed head was paraded through the imperial encampment and some cities of the Deccan.” [M. A. 401-402, J. S., K. K. ii. 447-448, Dilkasha 112a.]

§ 10. Character of Santā Ghorparé.

Thus died Santāji Ghorparé, like Charles XII of Sweden, most ignominiously at the end of a most dazzling military career. But his greatest monument is the abject fear he inspired in all ranks of the Mughal army,† which is faithfully reflected in the curses and abuses invariably used as the epithet to his name in the Persian histories.

Santāji had an inborn genius for handling large bodies of troops spread over a wide area, changing his tactics so as to take prompt advantage of every change in the enemy’s plans and condition, and organising combined movements. The success of his tactics depended on the rapid movement palpably incorrect as to suggest an opium-eater’s tale. Khafi Khan, after giving the account adopted by me above, adds, “There is another story current [about his end]. God alone knows the truth!” [ii. 448].

† “When the news arrived that Santa had come within 16 or 18 miles of his, Firuz Jang [Aurangzeb’s highest general] lost colour in terror, and making a false announcement that he would ride out to oppose him, appointed officers to clear the path, sent his advanced tents onward, but then fled towards Bijapur by a roundabout route!” [K. K. ii. 446].

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of his troops and on his subordinates carrying out his orders punctually to the minute. He, therefore, insisted on implicit obedience from his officers and enforced the strictest discipline in his army by draconic punishments. As Khāfi Khan writes [ii. 446], “Santā used to inflict severe punishments on his followers. For the slightest fault he would cause the offender to be trampled to death by an elephant.”

The man who insists on efficiency and discipline in a tropical country makes himself universally unpopular, and, therefore, we are not surprised to learn that “most of the Maratha nobles became Santā’s enemies and made a secret agreement with his rival Dhanā to destroy him.” [Ibid.]

The two lifelong rivals, Santā and Dhanā, were both army leaders and organisers of the highest ability, courage and activity, but with contrasted characters. Dhanā made war like a gentleman. He knew that the fickle goddess of Fortune might desert him in the field any day; therefore he never went to an extreme. He was moderate in victory, generous to the vanquished, polite in his address, practised in self-control, and capable of taking long views and making statesmanly arrangements. His inborn courtesy to the Mughal generals who had the misfortune to encounter him, is noticed with praise by the Muslim historians. Moreover, he served his country’s Government unselfishly for many years.

Santāji Ghorparé, on the other hand, was in comparison with Dhanā, a barbarian devoid of culture or generosity, unable to restrain his passions or to take thought of the distant future. He loved to hustle all whom he met with, not excepting his king. The hour of his victory was the hour of gratification of his vindictiveness. He showed no mercy and expected none. Therefore, he excited among the Mughal generals, as well as his Maratha adversaries, a feeling of mixed terror and repulsion.
By his temperament, Santā was incapable of co-operating with others, and he had not the patriotism to subordinate his own will to the needs of his nation. He lived and died merely as a most successful brigand and selfish adventurer, and exercised no influence on the political history of the Marathas or even on the general effect of Aurangzib’s campaigns. He flashed through the Deccan sky like a lonely meteor, without ever having a companion or ally or even sharing the counsels of his nation’s leaders, among whom he might have naturally claimed a place.

§ 11. Events in Maharashtra during 1698.

Nothing remarkable seems to have happened in the second half of 1697, except a heavy flood of the Bhimā river which washed away the Mughal camps at Pedgāon and Islāmpuri (19 July) and spread universal misery and ruin, and whose effects could not be repaired for months.

But in January next, Jinji fell to the Mughals. Rajaram fled from it and reached Vishālgarh in Mahārāṣṭra in the following month. The Emperor immediately afterwards posted Bidār Bakht to the Panhālā region in the south-west, while Azam continued to guard the northern route from his camp at Pedgaon and Firuz Jang held the Berad country in the south-east.

The extant records for the year 1698 are meagre. It is not probable that any unusual activity was shown by the Marathas immediately after Rajaram’s return home. He seems to have taken time to recover from the effects of the loss of Jinji and the extinction of the Government he had set up there, while the feud between Dhanā Jādav and Santā’s son Rānuji Ghurparé made a combined effort impossible for the present.* In September the Maratha

* In May 1699, Dhana was out in the Bidar district. On 4th June he passed by 22 miles of the imperial camp on his return via
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Rajah's envoy Anāji visited an imperial minister with a letter from him begging for peace; but nothing came of it. Some of his followers at this time deserted his service in despair and joined the Mughals.

§ 12. Rajaram's doings during 1699.

Early in 1699 Rajaram set out on a tour of inspection in Konkan, visiting all his forts, and returned to Satārā at the end of June, whence he went to Basantgarh about 20th July. In September he began to form plans for setting out on an extensive raid through Khandesh and Berar, in imitation of his father and elder brother. When the campaigning season opened in October, Aurangzib left Islāmpuri (on the 19th) to undertake the conquest of the famous hill-forts of Maharashtra in person; and in less than a week from that date Rajaram sallied out of Satārā.

Evidently Aurangzib's intention to besiege this fort first had leaked out, for, immediately after his starting from Islāmpuri, Rajaram removed his family from Satārā to Khelnā and himself coming out of Satārā halted 8 miles outside it. Here two envoys of Bakht Buland, the rebel Gond Rajah of Deogarh, met him and invited him to Gondwānā to cause a diversion in the Emperor's rear. The Maratha king had long been intriguing with the Gond chiefs; and now, setting aside the advice of Dhanā Jādav and Dādo Malhār to flee to Jinji once again, he decided upon making a bold counter-stroke by a raid into Berar and Gondwānā.

From the environs of Satārā, Rajaram sent one of his confidential servants back to the fort to fetch his turban-jewel (kalagi) and some other ornaments. On the return

Haidarabad; a few days later Chin Qalich Khan and Zabardast Khan came up with him near Bhalavani, and after heavy casualties on both sides captured 200 mares and some flags and drums from him [Akhbarat.]
journey the man was killed and the jewels plundered. Taking this incident as an unhappy omen, the Rajah returned to the fort, but that very day a fire broke out there and burnt some houses. Finally, on 26th October, he left Satārā in order to escape falling into the Emperor’s hands. Dhanā Jādav, Rāmchandra, Dādo Malhār and other generals, with 7,000 cavalry escorted him to Chandan-Wandan, while Rānuji Ghorparé (the son of Santāji) was posted at the foot of Satārā with 4,000 troopers.

§ 13. Last expedition of Rajaram.

After a three days’ halt at Chandan-Wandan, Rajaram on 31st October left for the Adarki pass, n. e. of Chandan, where he was joined by 12,000 men, and took the route to Surat.

The Emperor immediately sent urgent orders to Bidār Bakht to pursue and defeat this hostile force. The prince, who had arrived at a place 20 miles west of Miraj, on his way to Panhālā, immediately turned aside and leaving his family and baggage in Miraj, rapidly advanced on the enemy’s track. Nasrat Jang was ordered to reinforce him by forced marches; and so also was Chin Qalich Khan (then in the Aurangabad district). But neither of them arrived in time to take part in the first battle.

Four miles beyond the fort of Parendā, Bidār Bakht came upon the Marathas. Rajaram himself stopped in safety 8 miles further east, while he sent back his generals under Dhanā to check the prince’s advance. After a bloody fight, the Marathas were broken and driven towards Ahmadnagar, (13th or 14th November). Two days later the prince was joined by Chin Qalich Khan at Barsi, (20 m. e. of Parenda), and resuming the pursuit reached Ausā about the 22nd or 23rd. We find him, a month later, back at the Emperor’s side (26th December), and on the same date Rajaram was reported as having dismounted some 30 miles
from the imperial camp below Satārā fort and intending to go to Vishālgarh. The Maratha king’s raid into Berar had been nipped in the bud.* But one division under Krishna Sāvant plundered some places near Dhāmuni and returned. This was the first time that a Maratha force crossed the Narmadā. [Dīl. 129a.]

Meantime, battles had been fought with the other Maratha bands too. Rānuji was out near Kararabad (1st Dec.) and in the Sangulā thāna four days later. Hamid-ud-din Khan, who had been sent from the Emperor’s side at Satārā against Dhanā Jadav, left his baggage at Masur and advanced on Kararabad, fighting a vast Maratha army of five divisions which tried to envelop him. After a two days’ struggle (20th and 21st Dec.) with heavy casualties, the Khan fell back on Masur.

Shortly afterwards Nasrat Jang arrived there with his army and took up the pursuit of the elusive Maratha generals. On 9th January 1700 he fought Dhanā, Rānu and Hanumant Rao beyond Masur, and defeated them, killing 500 of their men. A few days later Dhanā attacked the outpost of Khānapur and carried off its Mughal officer, Avji Adhal. Nasrat Jang, who had been sent from the Emperor’s camp against Dhanā, arrived too late to save Avji, but on 25th January, when on the return march from Parendā, he overtook this Maratha band near the pargana of Undir-

* Bhimsen gives Zulfique Khan an important part in this defeat of Rajaram. He writes,—“Ram with a large force entered the imperial territory for doing mischief. Bidar Bakht was appointed to oppose him. The Khan Bahadur [Zulfique] was ordered to chase the enemy. Leaving his baggage at Sholapur, he met the prince near Charthana and set out to pursue Rajaram, who took to flight on hearing of it. By way of Parenda, Ram crossed the Bhima near Tamarni, and took the road to his home, sending Dhanā and some other generals against the camp at Islampuri. They made a demonstration there, .......fled before Zulfique........were defeated near Basantgarh. .......” (Dīl. ii. 129.)
gaon (19 m. s. of Parenä) and repulsed it, after slaying about a hundred men.

In the meantime the Emperor’s siege of Satärä continued and battles took place in its environs between the Mughal invaders and the Maratha field armies. On 27th December 1699 Hanumant Rao had attacked a patrolling party under Ikhläs Khan, only four miles outside the siege-camp, and slain the Khan and his son Muhammad Yar with many imperial soldiers, and carried off the elephants and baggage of this force. [Akhbarat, Nasrat Jang’s campaign in Dil. ii. 129.]

§ 14. Death of Rajaram.

On 2nd March 1700, Rajaram died at Singhgarh, of a fever which was most probably caused by the hardships of his raid and the vehement pursuit by the Mughals. His family was then in the fort of Vishālgarh. His favourite natural son Karna was immediately afterwards crowned as king by his ministers, with the help of Dhanā Jādav, but died of small-pox in three weeks. Then, his legitimate son by his wife Tārā Bāi was placed on the throne as Shivāji III, with the support of Rāmchandra, ‘the Regent of the West.’*

§ 15. Tārā Bāi, widow of Rajaram.

An internecine quarrel now broke out in the Maratha Court between Rajaram’s surviving widows, Tārā Bāi and Rājas Bāi (the mothers of Shivāji III, and Shambhuji II,

* This date of Rajaram’s death is given by Akhbarat. The death of his immediate successor, of small-pox, on 24th March, is mentioned in Akhbarat (1st and 4th April), M. A. 420, and Dilkasha, ii. 130a, but the Maratha records are entirely silent about the event. Karna is named by Dil. as this king for three weeks, while the other two Persian sources simply call him ‘Shivaji’,—which title was also assumed by his legitimate half-brother and successor, the son of Tara Bai. The latter Shivaji did not die in three weeks.
respectively) each standing up for her own son, and being supported by a faction among the officers and generals. But the ability and energy of Tārā Bāi, the elder wife, gave her the supreme power in the State in that hour of extreme confusion and danger.†

Immediately after learning of her husband’s death, Tārā Bāi offered submission to the Emperor through Ruhullah Khan, asking for a 7-hazari mansab and the deshmukhi rights over the Deccan for Rajaram’s legitimate son, and proposing to supply a contingent of 5,000 men for service under the imperial viceroy of the Deccan, and to cede seven forts, including Panhālā, Satārā, Chandan-Wandan, and Parli. The Maratha king was to be exempted from personal attendance on the Emperor, as the great Shivaji had been and the Maharana of Udaipur always was. [Akh. 12th March 1700.]

Aurangzib refused this offer, and demanded all the forts of the enemy. We read of another fruitless overture for peace, in the Akhbarat. Towards the end of May, Rāmchandra’s agent Rāmāji Pandit and Parashuram’s agent Ambāji visited Prince Azam and begged him to intercede with the Emperor for sparing Rajaram’s young son in return for the surrender of the Maratha forts. These overtures seem to have been insincere; the Emperor suspected the envoys of spying, and after keeping them under arrest for some months, released them on furnishing security. (22nd Dec. 1700.)

† A false rumour reached the Mughals about this time. On 11 March—“A desai of the country below the Ghats then serving under Ramchandra, on being ordered to go to Parli, refused to march unless the arrears of salary due to him and his men were paid. Hot words followed between them, and at last the desai stabbed Ramchandra to death with his dagger.”
§ 1. *The Land of Konkon: its features and divisions.*

The Sahyādri range or Western Ghāt, running parallel to the western coast of India, cuts off a long narrow strip of country from the Deccan plateau. Moving southwards from Surat along this tract, we have first the Surat Agency States of the present day, covering a wild broken and jungly country, the original home of the predatory Bhil and Koli tribes,— whence its Marathi name of Kolvan or the Koli country,— the two chief States here being Rāmnagar (modern Dharampur) and Jawhar, the last of which is in the same latitude as Nāsik across the Ghats. This Kolvan occupies only the inland or eastern portion of the long narrow strip, while the sea-coast was, in the late 17th century, covered by Portuguese possessions stretching from Dāman (almost the same latitude as Chāndor) downwards to Bassein (26 miles north of Bombay), and including many places which have now come to the British through the intervening Maratha conquerors.

South of Kolvan begins Konkan proper, its northern part forming the modern Thāna and Kolābā districts, from some distance north of Kaliān Junction (opposite Junnar, on the tableland across the Ghats) to Mahād close to the southern frontier of the Kolābā district (near Māhabaleshwar). In other words, North Konkan is the coast tract parallel to the Punā and Nāsik districts which lie east of the mountain chain. South Konkan is formed by the Ratnagiri district, which stretches parallel to the Satārā and Kolhāpur districts of the Deccan plateau, till the coast is broken near about Vīngurlā by the territory of the ancient
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Maratha family of Sāvants of Vādi (or Desais of Kudal, as they were popularly called in the 17th century) and, immediately south of it, the Portuguese province of Goa. Still further south begins Kanārā, with the Kārwar district along the coast, and the Sundā and Bednur States in the interior, far to the east, leading into the Mysore plateau.

The strategic bearings of the different points in this coastal region should be carefully remembered if Maratha history is to be intelligently followed. North of Dharampur and east of Surat, the Western Ghats sink near the Khan-desh city of Nandurbār,* before they run into the Sātpurā range stretching west to east at right angles to them. Through this natural gap, the Tapti river rushes down to meet the western ocean near Surat. A Maratha force which had advanced beyond Dharampur, could either sack Surat and Broach (37 miles north of Surat) by going due north; or easily enter northern Khandesh by swerving eastwards and marching through this gap, past the city of Nāndurbar, and then make a wide sweep, raiding the whole of Khan-desh and Berār and returning home southwards and westwards through the north Golkondā territory.

Again, from the nearest north-eastern corner of the Koli country, another but more difficult route led, through the Babhulnā pass and skirting the forts of Sālhir and Mulhir (in Baglānā, or the broken country immediately east of the Ghats and north of the Chāndor range), into West Khan-desh, or turning south and crossing the Chāndor range into the rich plains of the north Nāsik district and further east to the neighbourhood of Aurangabad, the capital of Mughal

* Sultanpur-Nandurbar was a most important military charge (faujdari) in the Mughal scheme of the defence of the empire, and was entrusted by Aurangzib only to the ablest officers. They have now lost their wealth and importance. Sultanpur is 30 miles north-east of Nandurbar (sometimes mis-spelt as Nazarbar).
Deccan, without having to overcome any natural obstacle on the way. Similarly, from Kalian in the heart of the Thāna district (30 miles north-east of Bombay), an army can march north-east, cross the western range by the Tal Ghāt, and thus enter the Nāsik district through its south-western corner, or by marching due east enter the Punā district in its extreme north, near Junnar, by the Nānā-ghāt pass. Southwards the Western Ghāts along their entire length are pierced by numberless passes, more or less difficult, which shorten the journey from any part of the Konkan plain to places immediately east of them on the highlands across the mountain barrier.

§ 2. History of Konkan under Shivaji.

Konkan, both North and South, had been an outlying province of the kingdom of Bijapur. The great Shivaji had conquered the country round Kaliān (i.e. the modern Thāna district) in 1657 and then worked his way southwards into the Kolābā district down to Mahād. Between 1655 and 1660 he completed his annexation of Konkan by conquering the Ratnagiri district. The Koli country (in the extreme north) was brought under his control between 1670 and 1673. His possession of Konkan* remained unchallenged till his death, in 1680.

With the accession of Shambhuji the scene changed. The flight of the rebel prince Muhammad Akbar to the Maratha Court forced Aurangzib to march to the Deccan to watch this new danger to his throne and to personally guide the operations of his troops. He arrived at Aurangabad on 22nd March 1682, and soon began a well-planned and vigorous offensive against the Maratha power.

* Excluding the territories (mostly bordering the ocean) of the Siddis of Janjiva and the Portuguese of Daman, Bassein, Salsette, Karanja and Chaul.

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§ 3. *First Mughal descent into Konkan, 1682.*

Nāsik and Punā were in his hands. From Jūnnar his general Hasan Ali Khan descended into the Thāna district by the Nānāghāt pass, early in January 1682 and entered the city of Kaliān, the seat of the governor, towards the end of that month. His army was reported to be 20,000 horse and 15,000 foot, and his progress was marked by the burning of all Maratha villages on the way, together with some eight or nine villages in Portuguese territory by mistake. This sudden incursion of the Mughals diverted Shambhuji from the siege of Janjira and he fled to his strong hills (February). Kaliān itself was occupied by Ranmast Khan, the lieutenant of the Mughal general. But in May next, Hasan Ali withdrew from the province, to save his horses from the heavy rainfall of the west coast, and Konkan had no Mughal force left in it.

In April and May the imperial forces immediately east of the Ghats were absorbed in the futile siege of Rāmsij, (7 miles north of Nāsik), which was finally abandoned in September or October. But late in November Ranmast Khan, now in independent command, again marched down into Konkan through the Mahjé pass, [*Dīl. i. 178*], and reoccupied Kaliān. Shambhuji had sent Rupā Bhonslé, Kesho T. Pinglé and Nilo M. Pinglé (his Peshwā) to oppose him, and they fought many battles with heavy slaughter. Ranmast lay in Kaliān for some months. Afterwards, Ruhullah Khan, descending through Kolvan, reinforced him (April 1683), and withdrew the Mughal garrison from Konkan, under orders of the Emperor. Evidently he had to cut his way through the Marathas. According to a Marathi chronicle, Rupā Bhonslé opposed the march of the Mughal

* The Mughals had invaded Konkan, burnt Kalian, Titvala &c., and laid the villages waste early in 1675 also. See Fryer’s *New Account.*
army near Titvālā (7 m. n. e. of Kaliān) and captured Padam Singh, a Rajput chief in the imperial service, but “in the stress of the battle Rupājī slew Padam Singh and many other high officers.” [J. S., Dil. i. 172-3 supports.]

But the Mughal possession of Kaliān did not mean the occupation of all North Konkan, nor even of the entire Thāna district. The invaders merely held the cities of Kaliān and Bhivandi, and a few miles of land round them. The rest of the country, especially the forts, remained in Maratha hands, as the country was very broken, the forts numerous and strong by Nature, and the Mughal army too small to besiege and hold all of them.

In June 1683, Shihāb-ud-din Khan was recalled from Junnar to the Emperor’s side. When the campaigning season opened again, early in November, he occupied Punā, and next month crossed the Devghāt (Devasthali pass) and looted Nizāmpur near the centre of the Kolābā district (27 Dec.). Prince Azam was posted to Nāsik, in November.


In December a Maratha army reoccupied Kaliān, from which they ravaged all the Portuguese country between Bassein and Dāman. From this time till six years later, Konkan remained in undisturbed Maratha possession. True, the coast-villages in Maratha territory were subject to depredation by landing parties from the Siddi fleet in alliance with the Mughals. But the inland parts were safe. Here the Marathas, at the end of Shambhuji’s war of 1685, came to an understanding with their Portuguese neighbours for mutual aid against the Mughals. Here they repaired and strengthened their numberless old forts, and here most of the leading Marathas placed their families for safe refuge, as their old homeland on the plateau east of the Ghats was ravaged by warfare or occupied by Mughal forces. In this Thāna district, Shahji had found his last stronghold
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when pursued by Shah Jahān’s forces in 1636. Here the great Shivaji had built many forts. In Konkan lay Rāigarh, the real capital of Shivaji and Shambhuji.

In January 1685, Shihāb-ud-din Khan had made a dash from his post of Pūnā, crossed the Bhorghāt and penetrated to Gārgoli, but Kavi-kalash had met and repulsed him there. [J. S.] Throughout 1684 and the next three years the Mughals had to concentrate their forces in the south and south-east for the conquest of Bijapur and Gol-kondā, and could spare no troops for the occupation of Kaliān.

The situation changed in the last year of Shambhuji’s reign (1688), when vast Mughal forces were set free by the fall of the last independent Sultanate of the Deccan and the Maratha king was overwhelmed by civil war and sunk most deeply in his own vices.

§ 5. Matabar Khan’s victories in Nāsik district.*

Matabar Khan, a Sayyid of the Navaiyat clan of Arabs long settled in Kaliān, was at first employed in the subordinate capacity of a thanadar in the Nāsik district. Even there his enterprising spirit and far-sightedness had inspired him to enlist about a thousand hill-infantry (Kolis, Bhils, and Mavlés) of the Western Ghats and to bring many of the zamindars round Pattā and other Maratha forts over to the imperial side by lavish bribes. An influential local Maratha leader, Harji Jākhre, had left Tarbiyat Khan (the Mughal thanadar of Nāsik) in anger and was living at Sonambā (a village six miles s. w. of Sinnar and 9 miles n. e. of Pattā). But Matabar Khan gave him a large cash subsidy, a horse and a robe, and sent him at the head of the above-mentioned force to capture Pattā, one of

* Career of Matabar Khan, based upon the letter-book of his secretary, Jethmal entitled Karnamah (I. O. L. MS.)

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the most valued forts of the Marathas, where Shivaji had sought refuge in his last year and which he had renamed Vishrām-garh.

At first the enterprise failed through Tarbiyat Khan's jealous opposition. But at the end of 1687, Matabar was placed by the Emperor in charge of the Nāsik district, as thanadar, and on the 11th January following he sent a second and more successful expedition against Pattā. A force composed of imperial troops and his own retainers scaled the walls of that fort by means of rope-ladders at midnight, 17th January, 1688. This was the first great Mughal success in that quarter. Pattā is a large fort with many other enemy forts in its vicinity.

Matabar had spent Rs. 45,000 of his own to effect its capture; but the Emperor gave him in return Rs. 2,000 only, with a robe of honour, an elephant, and a promotion of 500 in his rank (zat).

Matabar next turned against Kulang (9 miles s. e. of Igātpuri railway station), where Shivaji had built lofty palaces for himself, and against the smaller forts in that neighbourhood, such as Bābhar, Tabāka and Ratangarh (9 miles s. of Kulang). But "Kulang is loftier than Daulatabad fort by some 450 yards, and steeper in its scarped sides, so that it cannot be captured by blockade or escalade." The Mughal general, therefore, found out through his spies that the wives and children of the Kulang garrison were living in concealment in the skirts of the hill crowned by Prabal* fort in Konkan. A detachment of 1,000 infantry captured them by a night attack with heavy slaughter on both sides. Another detachment surprised some of the smaller forts. Then the garrison of Kulang capitulated and also gave up the forts dependent on it. Undhā Kāwani, Harish (4 miles s. of Trimbak), Tringal-

* Also called Muranjān, three miles west of Matheran.
vādi* (12 miles s. of Nāsik), Madanghar, and Murdānt were next besieged and taken.

To crown all, the famous hill-fort of Trimbak was invested by a force of 2,000 men, who constantly patrolled round it for six months, so as to cut off its grain supply. But a prolonged siege in that region always involved the risk of Maratha bands raiding the other parts of the district which were denuded of troops. Matabar Khan, therefore, bribed the qiladar with Rs. 80,000 in cash and kind and the offer of high rank in the Emperor’s service and induced him to yield the fort (8 January 1689). Telang Rao and Shyāmṛāj, the commandant and civil officer of the fort, were high officers of Shambhuji, and had often commanded his field armies independently.

Trimbak was so important a place that Matabar Khan rightly expected and demanded that the Emperor should reward him and the Maratha qiladar on the same lavish scale that he had adopted when he secured Sālhīr by bribing its qiladar Asuji (1687). But, though Matabar had spent 1,20,000 out of his own pocket on these enterprises, the Emperor in return granted him only a quarter of this amount, and even then the grant was not actually paid for years afterwards. He, however, received a promotion of 500 in rank.

§ 6. Final Mughal conquest of N. Konkan.

The triumphant thānadār of Nāsik now crossed the Ghāts and descended into Konkan. At this time came the cheering news of the capture of Shambhuji, the terror of the Mughals in the Deccan. The north Konkan plain now lay at the invader’s mercy, without any defender worth a

* Tringalvadi fell after the surrender of Trimbak, the garrison of the former holding out in order to see what bribe was paid to the men of Trimbak for its capitulation.
thought. In this region the most important fort was Mahuli (18 miles n. e. of Kaliān), while the cities of Kaliān and Bhivandi were the chief seats of government and trade respectively. Further south, Zulfiqār Khan was soon to penetrate with an army and lay siege to Rāigarh, the Maratha capital, which actually fell, after a ten months’ siege, on 19 October 1689.

On 11th March 1689, Matabar Khan received the Emperor’s order to march against Māhuli. He immediately issued from Nāsik, but had to halt for some days outside the city, in order to allow the neighbouring thanadars and other officers appointed to his force sufficient time to join him with their forces,—his own contingent being only 1,000 strong. Resuming his march on 3rd April, by way of the Kāshtighāt (4 miles n. n. e. of Birvādā) and Birvāda (4 miles n. e. of Atgaon railway station), he reached Khadri, 9 miles north-east of Māhuli, on the 17th. “The country was desolate and lacked water and fodder, while no grain could be had locally. Provisions for the invaders had to be ordered from Surat.

Between Khadri and Māhuli lies a difficult pass, which a party of Marathas from Māhuli held against the advancing Mughals, but they were put to flight after a three hours’ struggle. Matabar's force, however, was too small, as only a few of the officers ordered to reinforce him had actually joined him, and he had not with him artillery munition, gunners, musketeers, rocket-men, farriers, water carriers, sappers and pioneers adequate to the siege of a fort like Māhuli. So, he wrote to the Court for these necessaries and turning away from Māhuli arrived at Kaliān on the 27th, and then laid siege to Dugadi, a fort overlooking Kaliān.

The capture of Māhuli by attack appeared impossible to Matabar Khan, in view of the limited force and time at his disposal and his utter lack of gunners and gun materials. As he wrote in his despatches, “Māhuli was the seat of the
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governor of the Konkan plain under the Ahmadnagar dynasty. It is well provisioned. Five to six thousand infantry are required for investing it completely, and its siege will cost much money and time.” It stands on the top of a hill range with two other strong fortified peaks close to it, namely Palāsgarh and Bhandārgarh on the north and south. Matabar, therefore, set himself to gain the fort by corruption. Through Narso Mahādik he opened negotiations with Dwārkoji, the havaldar of Māhuli, and other leading officers of the place, promising them high ranks in the imperial army if they submitted. They asked for an imperial letter formally granting them these terms. Such a letter addressed to Dwārkoji reached Kaliān on 28th July 1689.

§ 7. More hill-forts taken by Matabar.

While the plan for buying Māhuli was maturing, Matabar Khan was not inactive. At midnight, 17th July, in the midst of a severe storm of wind and rain, a party of 900 Kolis and Bhils, sent by him under Rāghuji and Kākāji, silently scaled the fort of Prabal.* The Maratha garrison fought till dawn, and then laid down their arms. His next acquisitions were Karnālā, Mukut-garh, Malang-garh, Chanderi, Khatudā, Mānikgarh, Sankī and Dugad. With the fall of Māhuli all North Konkan, from the Koli country southwards to the latitude of Bombay, passed into the possession of the imperialists, while the capture of Rāigarh (October 1689) was followed by the Mughal occupation of much of South Konkan including the ports of Chaul and Rajapur.

Matabar Khan’s achievements brought lustre to the Mughal arms in that quarter. As his Secretary writes in the introduction to his letter-book, “The Khan captured

* It was a most important fort, and used to have a garrison of 5,000 in Shivaji’s time.
about 50 forts which Shivaji had seized in his lifetime. He cleared the hills from Aurangabad to the sea, especially the Nizām Shāhi Konkan plain and the district of Junnar, from the impure dust of the presence of the infielders. The thana of Kaliān and other parganas in North Konkan had been ruined by twenty years' unbroken Maratha predominance. These he recovered, strengthened, colonised, and caused to be cultivated again, and beautified with new mansions, gardens, canals etc.” [Kārnāmah, 3-4.]

After these arduous and successful campaigns extending over more than a year, Matabar Khan returned to Kaliān (1690) and gave himself up to repose and pleasure for a few years. He beautified this city by building a governor’s mansion, a private residence (haveli), a mosque, a Turkish bath, a garden, a porticoed hall (iwan), and a terrace with a reservoir of water and fountains in the middle. A fort was also built near the village of Barhā and a lofty hall of audience for public ceremonies. Here his wife died suddenly at the age of 56, and was buried in a magnificent tomb, built near the tank of Saniālā at a cost of a lakh of rupees.

§ 8. Revival of Maratha activity, 1693.

But early in 1693, the military position was reversed. The execution of Shambhuji, the capture of his capital with his entire family, and the helpless flight of his successor Rajaram to the Madras coast, in 1689, had for a time stunned the Marathas and effaced all opposition to the Mughal power in Maharashtra. But within two years from this the Marathas recovered from the blow; they organised a large force and sent it to the East Coast, where it raised the siege of Jinji and closely blockaded the Emperor’s army and son there (Jan. 1693). This signal success reacted on the military situation in the western theatre. The Mughals
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lost their dominant position there and were driven to assume the defensive. Roving Maratha bands harried Mughal territory in the Deccan on all sides and began to recover the forts recently acquired by the imperialists but slenderly held.

Konkan served the Marathas as an excellent base for organising these operations, as the Western Ghats formed a screen in their front, while the possessions of the friendly Portuguese along the western coast afforded a safe refuge to the wives and children of their fighters even when the enemy descended into the eastern belt of Konkan. The Ghats, with their countless forts and intricate pathways, were the most suitable place for launching expeditions from, being equally convenient for surprising the Mughals and evading their strong outposts. Thus the natural strategic value of Konkan was heightened by the present distribution of the rival forces.

In such a situation Matabar Khan was not the man to rest in idleness. He bade adieu to his hard-earned repose in the newly-built palaces and gardens of Kaliän and once more took to campaigning.

§ 9. Matabar Khan's new campaigns.

Sidhgarh (11 miles s. e. of Murbād and 29 miles s. e. of Māhuli) was the refuge of the Marathas of that quarter. Matabar gave an assurance of imperial favours under the grand wazir's seal to Lomānji [or Gomāji] and other Māvlé leaders and incited them to capture this fort. After six months of watching for a suitable opportunity, they gained the fort by escalade on 20th October 1693. On hearing of this loss, Khāndoji Kadam and Dāmāji Narayan, two generals of the Maratha king, issued in force from Rajmāchi and blockaded Lomānji in Sidhgarh, by occupying the village (machi) below the fort. Reinforcements hurried up by
Matabar under Kākāji and Rāwat Mal Jhāla, stormed the village and expelled the enemy after a bloody fight.

But the situation was now complicated by the entrance of a new actor on the scene. The local Portuguese governor was bribed by the Marathas to give them shelter and to supply provisions to their forts and villages. Matabar Khan sums up the offences of the Portuguese Government thus:—

"I have been here for four years. In the first, I reassured and conciliated the ryots who had fled to Jawhār and Rāmnagar owing to the former Maratha disturbances, and induced them to return to their original homes, thus repopling 600 villages in Konkan. In the second year, the Portuguese gave shelter to the families of the Maratha officers of Rajaram and helped them in attacking our fort Vaikunthgarh (?). In the third year they surprised fort Karnālā from us, and constantly sent supplies and reinforcements to the forts belonging to Rajaram. Hence, all our ryots have fled and taken refuge in Portuguese territory. The recovery of Pattā by the Marathas emboldened the Feringis still further, and Tristan de Melo,* their general of Salsette, summoned Shyamji Moro-dev, an officer of Rajaram, from the island of Khanderi and harboured him and his 1,500 infantry in the Portuguese village of Thāna, agreeing to co-operate with him in attacking the fort of Māhuli and the village of Bhivandi held by the Mughals."

§ 10. Mughals attack Portuguese of Bassein.

Matabar Khan, as we might have expected from his character, forestalled the enemy and struck the first blow. A strong detachment of his troops invaded Portuguese Konkan, drove the peasants to the Mughal side of the bor-

* Gemelli Careri speaks of him as "General of the North," resident at Bassein, who murdered admiral Antonio Machado de Brito on 30th December 1694. (Churchill's Voyages, iv. 199.)
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der, and made prisoners of the enemy’s families wherever found. The Portuguese offered fight, but were routed after a severe contest. The Mughals chased them up to the fort of Bassein, set fire to their church outside it, and then halted at Bahadurpura*, appealing to the Emperor for some large pieces of artillery and reinforcements to aid them in attacking Bassein and other forts, as “the Feringis were the source of the mischief, and unless they were expelled the idolators (Marathas) could not be entirely rooted out.” Siddi Yaqut, the governor of Dandā-Rājpuri and Mughal admiral of the Western Ocean, co-operated with him by sea.

The domestic enemies of the Portuguese took advantage of their distress. The inhabitants of Uran (a small island, due south of Elephanta) betrayed to the Mughal general the existence of three pearl beds there which the Portuguese had jealously guarded by sentries and whose very existence they had carefully kept concealed from the great Muslim kings of the Deccan. “Through many years’ abstention from fishing, countless pearls have accumulated in these beds. Only on dark nights some men have stealthily fished some small pearls on this coast.”

The defeat of the Portuguese was complete. The viceroy of Goa now sent a most submissive letter to the Emperor with presents for his ministers and servants. He worked so well on the Emperor’s feelings, possibly with the assistance of Christian priests and Armenian traders in the imperial camp and Matabar’s jealous rivals among the

* Khafi Khan (ii. 402—403) briefly describes the campaign thus: “Matabar Khan made a surprise attack and took two of the small forts of the Feringis. Most of them fled to Daman and Bassein, because they are weak in fighting on the plain and use no weapon except the musket and a short sword looking like a spitt, and do not ride chargers. Many Feringis with their women were captured. At this a great terror seized them.”
courtiers, that Aurangzib peremptorily ordered the cessation of the war and the restitution of the prisoners and booty carried off from the Portuguese villages, as a quarrel with the Europeans hindered trade and diminished his customs revenue. Matabar tried in vain to explain his conduct and clear his enemies' misrepresentations at Court. The captives had to be released.

§ 11. *Last years of Matabar Khan.*

We may here complete the life of this able general and administrator and carry the history of North Konkan to the end of Aurangzib's reign.

The news-letters of Aurangzib's Court contain many examples of Matabar's vigilant care for his charge, his strict maintenance of efficiency by removing negligent or drunken officers and recommending the promotion of his abler subordinates, and his efforts to induce the Emperor to post the most useful men under him.

In May 1695, the powder-magazine in Māhuli fort exploded, destroying Matabar's stores, worth Rs. 18,000 lodged there. In November 1700 the Mughal position in S. Konkan was further improved by Siddi Yaqt's capture of Anjanvel fort, after defeating a relieving army of Marathas sent by Ramchandra. Matabar usually co-operated with the Siddi of Janjirā in the military operations for upholding the Mughal power and defeating any Maratha bands that might enter the district. Thus, he rendered valuable service at the Emperor's siege of Khelnā (1702) by guarding the route to the north-west of that fort.

On 13th February 1704, an order was issued to him to raise a thousand infantry for service with the Emperor, for whose equipment and bounty Rs. 8,000 were paid to him. Probably the faithful servant could not carry out this last command of his master, as death overtook him at the end of
the month; (the report of the event reached the Emperor at Tornā on 9th March).

Matabar Khan, though a mere thanadar and without influential relatives at Court, rose by sheer merit to be a commander of 2500 in rank with the same number of troopers (zat and sawar), and enjoyed this high mansab for about ten years before his death. He left no issue of his own, but only an adopted son named Abu Muhammad Khan, and some nephews (sister's sons), to whom the Emperor gave offices.
§ 1. *Aurangzib’s arrangements on leaving Islāmpuri.*

On 19th October, 1699, Aurangzib started from Islāmpuri on that campaign against the great Maratha strongholds which was to occupy the next six years of his life. One by one the famous hillforts of Satārā, Parli, Panhālā, Vishālgarh (Khelnā), Kundānā (Singhgarh), Rajgarh, and Tornā were captured by him, besides five places of lesser note. But it should be remembered that with the sole exception of Tornā, none of these was taken by assault; all capitulated after a time and for a price; their garrisons were permitted to march out with their personal effects, and their commandants were given costly rewards for ceasing resistance. The first, namely Satārā, was long and obstinately defended. And so also was the last, the Berad capital Wāgingerā (1705). The capture of Wāgingerā forms a chapter by itself (ch. lvi.) A minute account of the siege of Satārā, based on the details supplied by the daily Court-bulletins, has been published by me in the *Proceedings* of the Indian Historical Records Commission, 1922, and may serve as an example of Mughal sieges at the end of the 17th century. It is, therefore, unnecessary to describe here the sieges of the Maratha forts except in outline.

During the Emperor’s stay for 4½ years at Islāmpuri with his family, officers and main army, his camp had grown into a city. Houses of a more permanent structure had in many cases replaced the tents, and a small stone fort had been built in 1698, which sheltered the Emperor’s residence. Around the whole camp an earthen wall, five miles in circuit, was now run up in fifteen days, as a pro-
tection from the Maratha light horse. [M. A. 388, 408.] We shall, following the Persian histories,\* henceforth designate it as the Base Camp.

Here he left his wife Udipuri and her son Kām Bakhsh, and his daughter Zinat-un-nisā, with all the surplus baggage and unnecessary officials, and the families of his soldiers and camp-followers. The wazir Asad Khan remained in charge of them with a suitable force. Princes Azam and Bidār Bakht joined the Emperor on the way; but Bidār Bakht was soon afterwards detached to pursue Raja-ram, who was making a dash for Khandesh and Berār. Zulfiqār surnamed Nasrat Jang, who was coming up from the Madras side, joined the prince near the village of Chārthānā (45 m. east of Jālnā), but was afterwards given a roving commission, being charged with the special duty of fighting the Maratha field armies that hovered round the siege camp or threatened the Base at Islāmpuri. Another division, under Ruhullah and Hamid-ud-din, was sent to ravage the country between Satārā and Panhālā [M. A. 408-409; Dil. ii. 129a.]

§ 2. Aurangzib begins the siege of Satārā.

After marching south-westwards from Islāmpuri to Miraj, as if he were going to invest Panhālā, the Emperor made a sharp turn to the north and reached Masur (21 miles south of Satārā) on 21st November. A detachment under Tarbiyat Khan, the chief of artillery, went in advance and quickly put his guns in position for bombarding Basantgarh,\* a fort 6 miles south-west of Masur. At the Emperor’s approach the garrison lost heart and fled away in the night of the 24th. The imperialists entered the fort the next day and named it the “Key to Victory” (Kīlid-i-
As a happy omen of their success in the ensuing campaign. [M. A., 411.] Some buried treasure, weapons, and provisions were seized by the victors here.

Marching thence, the imperialists arrived before Satārā on 8th December. Aurangzib took up his quarters at the village of Karanjā, a mile and a half to the north of the fort-walls. Azam’s division was posted to the west, on the way to Parli, Tarbiyat Khan opposite the northern wall, and Ruhullah Khan on the south side.

The Mughal army with its followers and transport animals was concentrated in one spot, five miles round, and this encampment was walled round to keep out the Maratha raiders. A body of musketeers patrolled round it thrice daily.

Siege operations began on 9th December, the different nobles being given different sections round the fort to entrench.

From his position opposite the Mangalai or northern gate of the fort, Tarbiyat Khan, the Chief of the Mughal Artillery, made a covered lane, and arriving 13 yards from the gate, began to build a raised battery opposite the tower guarding the gate. The rocky soil made digging a very slow and difficult work. The garrison fired upon his men day and night without cessation with every kind of missile. The marksmanship was bad on both sides, and not much loss was done by the firing.

But the lines of investment were not complete. The enemy entered and issued from Satārā almost to the end of the siege, Prince Azam being suspected of conniving at their efforts to provision and reinforce the fort.

§ 3. Fighting before and around Satārā.

The garrison made frequent sorties, all of which were repulsed with more or less loss. But the greatest danger to the Mughals came from the Maratha field forces, which
practically reduced the besiegers to the position of a beleaguered city. Foraging parties could leave the Mughal camp only under very strong escorts, led by the foremost nobles. Dhanā, Shankarā, and other enemy leaders spread through the Mughal possessions, raiding villages, cutting off outposts, and closing the roads to the grain-dealers (banjārās.) Ghorī Khan, the faujdar of Karārābad, was captured by Dhanā (19 Dec.) but rescued by Hamid-ud-din three days later near Masur, though with heavy losses on both sides. On the 27th, Ikhlās Khan, when patrolling only four miles from the camp, was enveloped by Hanumant and slain with his son and many followers, and all his property was looted. The enemy appeared here, there, and everywhere, round the camp. On 10th January 1700, Nasrat Jang, Bahramand, and Hamid-ud-din attacked Dhanā Jādav, Hanumant Nimbālkar, and Ranuji Ghorparē, and after a pitched battle six miles beyond Rahmatpur, repulsed them with slaughter. By order of the Emperor, a pyramid was built with the severed enemy heads (500.) On the 22nd, Dhanā captured the thanadar of Khānāpur.

Enemy activity stopped the coming of grain and foraging in the vicinity of the Mughal camp, and produced scarcity. Rāmchand, the thanadar of Khātáu, received lavish rewards for bringing a convoy of grain into the imperial camp (10 Jan.), as also did some other local officers. On 3rd Feb. 8,000 oxen loaded with grain were escorted into the camp, which gave some relief.

Tarbiyat Khan raised his gun-platform 24 yards high, to the level of the bastion of the fort gate. "In procuring materials for it, not a tree was left standing within thirty or forty kos of Satārā." [M. A. 414.] Eight thousand sacks were taken from the grain market and filled with sand to form a bulwark round it. Three hundred oxen were set to transport timber for the battery. But the stones showered down by the enemy made further progress impossible.
Orders were then issued to fill the empty chests of the public treasury and of the money-changers with stone and sand and line the battery with them.—150 water-carriers being posted there to put out fires promptly.

§ 4. Attempts to storm Satārā fail.
Tarbiyat Khan by hard labour dug a mine 24 yards long and carried it under the fort-wall. But assault by breaching was deemed inadvisable. Then, a surprise escalade was attempted by 2,000 Māvlés in Mughal pay,—who were experts in hill-climbing,—on 23rd January, an hour before dawn. Three years' salary was paid to them in advance to inspire them to the deed of daring. But the garrison were warned by some friends outside and the attempt failed.

Then Ruhullah Khan carried another mine under the fausse braye (rauni) of the fort, on the other side of the gate. On 13th April the two mines were fired. The first killed many of the garrison and buried the havaldār Prāgji Prabhu under the debris of the wall, but he was dug out alive. The second exploded outwards with disastrous consequences to the Mughals. A tower was blown up and fell upon the Mughal troops densely assembled at the foot of the wall for the assault. Nearly two thousand of them, including 500 Māvlés, perished.

This explosion made a breach in the wall, 20 yards wide. Some brave imperialists, notably Baji Chāvān Dāflé, the son of Satvā Dāflé (the founder of the State of Jath in the Bijapur district), ran up to the top of the wall, shouting to their comrades, "Come up! there is no enemy here!" But none followed them; the men in the Mughal trenches who survived were too dazed and alarmed by the catastrophe to stir outside. The garrison now recovered from their surprise, and rushing up to the breach, slew the gallant forlorn hope.
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The huge raised platform had collapsed and its guns lay overturned on the hillside. The Māvlé infantry, saddened by the loss of 500 of their kinsmen and comrades and unable to recover their bodies from under ‘that hill of stone and clay,’ at night set fire to the entrenchments, which were entirely made of wood, so as to ensure the Hindu form of funeral for their dead! The fire burnt for a week and these costly siege-works were reduced to ashes. [M. A. 419.]

§ 5. Satārā capitulates, 21st April, 1700.

Meantime Rajaram had died (March) and his minister Parashurām offered submission to the Mughals. Tarbiyat Khan had demolished 70 yards of the fort walls, 400 of the garrison had been killed by the mines. Considering all these facts, Subhānji, the qiladar of Satārā, lost heart and made terms with the Emperor through Prince Azam. On 21st April he hoisted the imperial flag on his fort and vacated it with the garrison the next day. Subhānji was taken into the Emperor’s service as a 5-hazari zat (2,000 troopers) with a cash reward of Rs. 20,000, besides many presents. His relatives and followers were also enlisted.*

The fort was renamed Azamtārā in honour of Prince Md. Azam.

§ 6. Parli besieged.

Satārā fell on 21st April, 1700. On that very day Fathullah Khan was sent in advance to open trenches before Parli, six miles west of Satārā. This fort had been the seat of Shivaji’s guru Rāmdās Swāmi and it was serving as the head-quarters of the Maratha Government while Satārā was invested by the enemy. The siege materials used at Satārā were quickly transferred to Parli, and the Emperor

* M. A. 410-420; Akhbarat (years 43 and 44); Ahkam (my ed.)

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arrived before the fort on 30th April. The Mughal lines of
investment encircled the hill.

Parashurām, the chief revenue officer of the Maratha
Government, being disheartened by the death of Rajaram
and the fall of Satārā, escaped from Parli and sent to beg
for terms of peace. Parli, however, continued its resistance
under his subordinates, with whom he frequently corres-
ponded from outside.

But the invaders suffered terribly from excessive rain
and the scarcity of grain and fodder. Aurangzib held grimly
on. Fathullah's covered way having reached the foot of a
big sloping rock in front of the smaller gate of the fort, his
men scaled it with ladders on 4th June. The general wished
to hold the top of the rock, mount guns there, and batter
down the fort-gate. A few of his men had entered the fort
pell-mell with the fugitives, but they were killed, and the
garrison, soon recovering from the panic, shut the door and
shot down the Mughals standing unsheltered on the rock.
They also blew up a mine previously laid by them under
the road leading from this rock to the gate. Fathullah had,
therefore, to abandon his gain after losing 60 or 70 men.
Terms were now made with the qiladar of Parli, and he
evacuated the fort (on 9th June) for a bribe. The old and
neglected mosque built within it during the Bijapuri occupa-
tion was restored and used again for prayers, while the
new temple of Shivaji's reign was demolished. "Thus was
verified," as the pious official chronicler writes, "the Quranic
verse, Truth came and falsehood disappeared." The fort
was newly named Nauras-tāra. (M. A. 428, Hamid-ud-din's
Ahkam § 17.)


These two sieges had caused an enormous waste of men,
horses and transport animals in the imperial army. The
treasury was empty, the soldiers were starving at their
pay being in arrears for three years. Heavy and unprecedented rain began to fall early in May and continued till the end of July. The army was eager to withdraw to a place of greater comfort and plenty. On 21st June the return march towards Bhushangarh commenced, but the sufferings of the miserable soldiers were only aggravated by the change.

All transport animals had perished during the siege, and, as the official historian humorously describes the situation, “the gypsies of the army had to load their household goods on their cocks.” No camel was left alive in the army, on account of the excessive rain and the unsuitability of the climate for these animals. The few cart-oxen and even the elephants that survived had nothing but their skins and bones left. Only a small part of the property of the Emperor and the nobles could be loaded on these weak elephants, half-dead bullocks, day-labourers and paupers from the charity-kitchen. Much had to be left in the forts or burnt. Many of the elephants and bullocks under their excessive burdens fell down dead and blocked the roads. Many persons of noble birth had to walk on foot through the mud for mile after mile. [M. A. 429; K. K. ii. 472-73; Dil. ii. 1336.]

One march was followed by two days’ halt, in order to allow the stragglers time to come up. Only three miles were covered by a day’s march. The Krishnā was in such high flood that the opposite bank could not be seen from this. Great difficulty was felt in crossing such a huge army over the swollen river. Only seven half-broken and clumsily-patched up boats were available for ferrying the men across. The people in their struggle to get seats in them took to their swords, and thus every day some men were killed or wounded at the ferry. Some Turāni soldiers seized two boats by attacking them sword in hand, and then made much money by charging one gold mohar instead of the
normal Rupee, as ferry-fee from every passenger that they
took on board. Many thousands of the poorer people were
left behind and died there. [K. K. ii. 473.]

Then, by way of Sābitgarh, the army reached Bhushan-
garh* on 25th July, having taken 35 days to cover some
45 miles! Here a month’s halt was made, during which the
rain ceased and the camp again “breathed at ease.” The
generals were dispersed to various fertile comfortable
places to recuperate their war-worn men. Prince Azam was
sent to Khandesh to refresh, the other nobles to their jagirs,
if within 10 or 12 marches, or to Bijapur and other cities.
Orders were sent to the provincial governors to send fresh
troops to the Emperor’s side. Bidār Bakht, who was
guarding the Base, was deputed with Nasrat Jang to attack
Panhālā.

§ 8. *Imperial camp at Khawāspur flooded.*

After five weeks’ rest at Bhushangarh, the imperial camp
was shifted (on 30th August 1700), to Khawāspur,† 36
miles off, where food-stuffs and grass were abundant.
Khawāspur stands on the left bank of the Mān, a small
waterless stream at that point. The tents of the army
covered both its banks and even its dry bed, which in that
season presented “only the mirage of water.” But in the
night of 1st October, while the men were fast asleep, a high
flood caused by heavy and untimely rainfall on the hills,
came suddenly sweeping through the river bed, overtopped
its banks and spread over the plains beyond, “turning the
land into one sheet of ‘water.” Many men and animals
perished; many more, including even the nobles, were left
absolutely poor and naked; nearly all the tents and pro-

* 7 m. s. of Aundh, 10 m. s. of Vaduj, and 30 m. s. e. of Satara in
a straight line. [Atlas, 440 N. W.]
† Khawaspur (17.30 N. 75.1 E.) on the Man river (Atlas, sheet
40 N.E.); 36 m. east of Bhushangarh, and 14 m. s. e. of Mhasvad.
property were damaged. Happily, the water went down early in the morning, otherwise "not one man would have survived." [M. A. 431, K. K. ii. 475.]

When the flood first struck the camp, a little before midnight, and the tents began to fill with water, men tried to run to safety, but could see no path of escape in the darkness, only waves on all sides. A loud cry arose throughout the army. The Emperor was in his privy when this universal outcry reached his ears. Imagining that the Marathas had burst into the camp, he rose in alarm, but stumbled and dislocated his right knee. The doctors failed to set it properly, and he remained a little lame for the rest of his life.* The Court flatterers used to console him by saying that it was the heritage of his ancestor Timur the Lame and a token that he would repeat the victories and success of that world-conqueror! [K. K. 476, Storia, 255, Dil. ii. 134a.]

But vigorous efforts were made to replenish his army. Orders were sent to the governors of Northern India to enlist strong men and buy good horses in every province and send them to the Deccan. Two thousand horses were bought in Kabul, and 2,000 mares locally, besides the remounts purchased in other provinces. The new recruits began to arrive in January 1701.

The Marathas put the misfortunes and weakness of the imperialists to the best account. In addition to their normal raids, Hanumant Rao† plundered the thana of Khātāū and killed its Mughal officer Rāmchand (a Maratha), 18 August, 1700. The Berad chief, Pidiā Nayak, posted his infantry all over the Bijapur district levying chauth, while

* He took his bath of recovery, on leaving the sick-bed, on 30th November. [Akhbarat.]

† His adopted son Anantaji died of wounds received in this battle, and Hanumant himself was soon afterwards taken ill of dropsy (swelling of the body.) [Akhbarat.]
the Marathas plundered up to the very tank of Shāpur, outside Bijapur city, (c. 15th Nov.) Ranuji killed the Mughal thanādar of Bāgehwari (30 m. s. e. of Bijapur) and looted that outpost as well as Indi (north-east of Bijapur city).

The camp was broken up on 16th Dec. 1700, and the city of Miraj was reached on 1st January 1701. Here the Emperor spent the month of fasting (20th Jan.—27 Feb.) and received during the interval the new recruits and materials sent up from the provinces.* The imperial Paymaster Mukhlis Khan (a grand-nephew of the prime minister of Persia) died on 3rd January and was buried in the tomb-garden of the saint Sayyid Shams-ud-din in Miraj. [M. A. 434.]


Panhālā was the next point of attack. An advanced force under Bidār Bakht had been sent to that region in the autumn of 1700; the prince lay encamped at the foot of the fort, while his lieutenant Nasrat Jang besieged its western (or Konkani) gate. [Dil. 134b.] The Emperor himself arrived there on 9th March 1701 and formed a complete circle of investment, fourteen miles in length, round Panhālā and its sister fort of Pavangarh. A mobile force under Nasrat Jang was sent out to “chastise the robbers wherever they should raise their heads.”

Tarbiyat Khan, the chief of artillery, worked hard in running lanes and raising gun-platforms. In a short time five towers of the fort were battered down to half their heights. A mine, large enough for three armed men to walk abreast erect, was gradually carried under the tower and outer breast-work of the fort-gate. It was a most elaborate

* Akh. 2, 3 Aug. 1700, 11 Jan. 1701. Horses were ordered to be bought in Kabul and Surat.
structure, with a chamber for 20 soldiers furnished with windows on both sides for admitting air and light and musketry-holes for firing at the ramparts. But in that stony region the progress of mining was necessarily very slow, and the dreaded rainy season was approaching. In addition to the notorious rivalry between his two highest generals,—Nasrat Jang and Firuz Jang,—which made it impossible to employ both at the same place, there now broke out a bitter jealousy between Tarbiyat Khan and Fathullah Khan and another between the older officers in general and a very able upstart from Gujrat named Muhammad Murad.

The Emperor had summoned Fathullah from Aurangabad and charged him to lay a mine from Kâm Bakhsh's position. Working incessantly in rivalry with Tarbiyat, he carried his mine to the foot of the gate in one month. Tarbiyat, on his part, in order not to be outdone, pushed his covered lane further onwards. But the mutual jealousies of the generals made true co-operation among them impossible. They secretly thwarted one another, and thus spoiled their master's business and prolonged the siege. [K. K. 488; M. A. 437.]

Muhammad Murād, a petty officer (faujdār) of Godrā in Gujrat, had suddenly risen in the Emperor's favour by coming to his side in his need with 500 well-mounted recruits raised at his own initiative, while his superior, the subahdar of the province, had pleaded inability to enlist a single soldier in the province and had even tried to hinder recruitment by Md. Murād. At the siege of Panhālā, Murād was given charge of the attack on Pavargarh. [K. K. 478, 485.]

Midway between Panhālā and Pavargarh there is a lower hill, with some enemy houses on its top, sheltered by the guns of the two forts. One day Murād chased up the hill a party of the enemy who had descended from it to carry off some camp cattle out grazing there. Arriving at
the top, he planted his flag there, sat down in a shelter of the rock, and sent to beg for reinforcements planks and trenching tools in order to entrench and hold the position gained.

The Emperor wrote to Ruhullah and Hamid-ud-din with his own hand, ordering them to go and help Murād. These two arrived at the foot of the hillock, but sent word to Murād saying that he had made an inadvisable advance and that it was impossible to send up succour to him where he was; so that if he wanted to entrench on the top he must do so by his unaided efforts, or else he must inform the Emperor and abandon the position. The day was wasted in this exchange of messages.

Murād refused to come down and persisted in his demands, but the other two generals taunted him, saying "Do you expect us to act as your subordinates and do you wish to nullify all the exertions of Tarbiyat Khan and other nobles up to this time?" Then Ruhullah (the imperial Paymaster) reported to Aurangzib that the hill-top was untenable, and a night attack on it by the enemy might lead to a disaster. So, the Emperor censured Murād for having made a rash advance, whose only result was disgrace to his arms. The courtiers took up the cue, and were now loud in their blame of Murād, whom they had been extolling above all other generals only a few hours before, when his flag was first hoisted on the hillock!

Next day Murād was received in audience and highly praised. Tarbiyat Khan, was urged to deliver an assault, but he ironically replied, "The preparations for an assault are complete. Please order Md. Murād, who has done such heroic deeds, to support us on the day of storming." [K.K. 485-489.] With this spirit animating Aurangzib's generals, it was only natural that all his efforts came to nothing. A few attempts at escalade were made, but failed with loss,
and the siege dragged on for two months, without success seeming to come any nearer.

§ 10. *Panhālā* gained by bribery.

The terrible loss caused by the exploded mine at Satārā and in the failure of the assault on that fort, had effectually damped the spirit of the Mughal army. Two mines had been completed at Panhālā, but the generals shrank from firing them, as no soldier could be depended upon to rush to the breach and face the enemy’s fire or even show himself in the open within range of the fort guns. So, the Emperor, after this heavy loss of money, time and labour in mining and bombardment, was at last driven to bribery for gaining the fort before the rains began. Through Tarbiyat Khan secret negotiations were opened, a large bribe was paid to Trimbak, the qiladar, and he delivered the two forts on 28th May, 1701, the garrison being allowed to depart with their lives and property. Sir William Norris, the English ambassador, witnessed the scene.

When its defeated commandant Trimbakji went to the royal minister Rāmchandra in Vishālgarh, the latter charged him with treachery, saying “You turned faithless to your master’s salt and gave the fort up to the Mughals.” Trimbak retorted, “My artillery munitions ran short, and yet you did not care to inquire about my state. I had therefore to give up the fort.” For this he was put in prison. [*Akhbarat*, 7th June.]

§ 11. Maratha activities during the siege of Panhālā.

We shall now describe the efforts of the Marathas to relieve the siege of Panhālā. On 23rd January, Dhanā Jādav appeared two miles from the imperial camp, and a fierce battle raged all the day, the entire imperial army being engaged. There were heavy losses, and the Mughals had
to entrench their position at night. Two days later, on hearing that Nasrat Jang was coming up from Panhālā, Dhanā Jādav fell back four miles; Hamid-ud-din followed him, but the Marathas fought while fleeing, inflicting a heavy slaughter and drawing this Mughal force 22 miles away from its camp. Next day there was another pitched battle towards Rāibāgh (in the east), and yet another battle on the day following. Then Dhanā rapidly retreated and the Mughal general returned to the Emperor’s side (29th January), [Akhbarat and Dil. 134b.]

The pursuit of Dhanā was continued by Nasrat Jang, who drove him back after an attack on him 12 miles beyond Chikodi (40 m. s. e. of Panhālā), and then fell back on Panhālā. Dhanā then resumed his activity and sent Krishnā Malhār with 10,000 horsemen to raid the highway near Panhālā,—evidently to cut off the grain supply and communications of the besiegers (4th Feb.) Dhanā himself tried to intercept some Mughal heavy guns which had reached Kararabad, while Krishnā Malhār attacked the outpost of Khātāu, and Ramchandra and Dādo Malhār descended into Konkan to fight Siddi Yaqut of Dandā-Rājpuri (4th Feb.). A little later, while Ramchandra was trying to convey provisions under escort of 2,000 foot-musketeers to beleaguered Panhālā, Nasrat Jang came upon him, slew many of his men and looted most of the provisions. Ramchandra, however, succeeded in entering the fort, (24th Feb.)* Before the fall of Panhālā, the elusive Dhanā Jādav was roving here and there, vainly pursued by Nasrat Jang, who could not keep pace with him and constantly lost troopers and horses through forced marches. On 20th April

* Nasrat Jang also rescued and safely escorted to the siege camp a party of banjaras whom Ramchandra had invested in Kolhapur, 10 miles from Panhala. [Dil. 135a.]
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Ranuji was reported as coming towards the fort at the head of 20,000 men, and Baharji as having been captured by the imperialists. Dhanā now halted for some time in Singhgarh, with only 400 men, while the main division of his army (15,000 strong) was sent under Dādo Malhār to raid Mughal territory.

The day after the fall of Pānhālā, Aurangzib began his return from it (29th May, 1701), wishing to encamp in the safer and more fertile region of Khātāū (25 miles east of Satārā and on the left bank of the Yerla river). Quick as the departure was, it had not been made soon enough. A cyclone passed over the camp “blowing away tents and sheds like paper. Kings and beggars had to sit down in the sun. Veiled ladies became exposed to the public gaze.” [K. K. 490; Akh. has 17 May 1703.]

Fathullah Khan, highly promoted and created a Bahadur, was sent ahead to take Wardhangarh (8 m. n. w. of Khātāū) and three other forts in the neighbourhood. Wardhan was vacated by the enemy on 6th June; it was renamed Sādiqgarh after Fathullah’s original name of Md. Sādiq. The Khan Bahadur next took Nandgir (6th July), Chandan, and Wandan (6th Oct.).

The wazir Asad Khan was recalled to the Emperor’s side, arriving there on 28th August, while Firuz Jang, who had been recalled from Berar, took his place as defender of the Base Camp at Islāmpuri.

§ 12. March to Khlenā.

When the campaigning season reopened in October 1701, the Emperor set out for the conquest of Khlenā (or Vishālgarh). This fort stands thirty miles west of Pānhālā, on the crest of the Sahyādri hill, 3,350 feet above the sea and overlooking the Konkan plain lying on its west. The district is wet and cool, and the hills were thickly covered
with trees and dense underwood in the 17th century.* Even now, though most of the timber has disappeared, there are still fine groves and stretches of hill-side closely covered with brushwood. The scenery is wild and picturesque. The fort stands on an isolated spur jutting into Konkan and is joined to the Sahyādri range by a narrow neck of land. The easiest means of reaching it is by the Ambā pass, five miles north of it, and some 35 miles n. w. of Kolhāpur. [Bombay Gaz. xxiv. 2–5.]

The road to Khelnā passes through Mālkāpur, fifteen miles north-west of Panhālà. Eight miles further on begins the head of Ambā pass. These eight miles leading to the defile were very difficult ground. There was in that age no road here for wheeled traffic and the ups and downs were so sharp and the path so narrow that even horses could not use it with ease or safety.

Leaving Wardhangarh (8 m. n. w. of, Khātāu) on 7th Nov. 1701, the Emperor arrived near Mālkāpur† in 12 marches. Here he halted for a week, while pioneers were set to make a road ahead. Bidār Bakht, who had cantoned for the rainy season in the Gokak-Hukri region (Belgāon district, in the south-east), here joined the Emperor, after taking some Maratha forts and burning some enemy villages on the way. On 6th December [23rd ?] the Emperor encamped on a high and broad open space on the side of the Sahyādri, seven miles north of Khelnā.

* The Masir-i-Alamgiri (458) writes, "The hills and soil of this tract are wonderful: there is no trace of hill or land, you only see herbs and flowers. ... There is not a tree that does not cause some gain [to man.] It has no flower that does not charm the brain with its fragrance. Every particle of this wide plain can supply the revenue of kingdoms from its fruits and aromatic roots. ... It was a frontier fort, ... and the vast provinces of Konkan Upland and Lowland were annexed to the empire through its conquest." Khafi Khan, as usual, gives a mere paraphrase of the Masir.

† On 15 Dec., according to Akhbarat.
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But the Ambā pass itself had yet to be made fit for the passage of an army. This was a formidable task. "In all the paths of this hilly region there are impregnable forests and dense thorny jungles through which the sun cannot peep. Lofty and stout trees abound on all sides. The branches were so intertwined that even an ant could hardly pass through them. The track was difficult even for footmen. The defiles and pits were deep, the rocks firmly rooted in the soil." [M. A. 448-449.]

But Fathullah Khan after one week's incessant toil with an army of pioneers and stone-cutters, made a broad level road through the pass. Then Asad Khan was detached on 26th December to begin the siege. His vanguard under Fathullah and Hamid-ud-din forced the defile before sunrise. A hillock overlooking Khelnā had been fortified by the enemy and was held in force. Fathullah charged up its side and drove the defenders away from the top. In their attempt to escape to Khelnā through the valley on the left, these Marathas fell into a Mughal ambuscade planted there and were forced by its matchlock fire to run into the woods, where most of them were captured and put to death by being flung into the chasms with stones tied to their waists. Next day the Mughals captured another hillock from which arrows could be shot into Khelnā. Guns were mounted here and began to set fire to the houses of the garrison. A covered lane was also begun.

On 16th January 1702, the Emperor's tent was pitched a mile from Khelnā. His followers suffered terrible hardship and loss in crossing the pass and bringing his camp and equipage to the foot of the fort.


Bidār Bakht was posted to guard the environs of Panhālā and keep the road to Khelnā open, while Md. Amin Khan descended into the lowlands of Konkan and ravaged
the country up to the Konkani gate on the further (or western) side of Khelnā, trying to close the enemy’s grain supply to the fort through that side. The head of the Ambā pass was held by Hamid-ud-din.

The siege dragged on for five months (January-June 1702). During this year Nasrat Jang with his mobile division marched in pursuit of the Maratha field forces* nearly 6,000 miles and fought 19 great battles with them, besides numberless skirmishes. The details of his doings fill ten pages in the memoirs of his eulogist, Bhimsen. [*Dil. 129a—138b, 141a.*] It will be enough to say here that he passed fighting and chasing all the time, by way of Parendā, Chārthāna, the lake of Lonār (in pargana Mehkar, Berār), to 20 miles from Elichpur, Nander, Maloni, Kaulas (in Haidarabad territory), Bidar, Maloni again, Mudgal (on the Banganga), Maloni and Nander† again. No wonder that Bhimsen, a sharer in these campaigns should write of the result as, “This year much forced marching was done. All the troops became worn out and distracted in mind.” And again, “The enemy were kept in rapid movement for eight successive months.... The horses of the imperialists

* The Marathas in Khandesh and Berar mustered nearly 60,000 men in concert with the local zamindars. Nasrat Jang’s strength at one time sank to 2,500 only [*Dil. 137a.*] The imperial subahdar of Berar at first durst not leave his capital Elichpur for joining Nasrat Jang, lest his small force should be cut off by the enemy in the open.

† *Parenda*, 2 m. e. of the Sina, (18.15 N. 75.31 E.) *Charthanah*, 45 m. e. of Jalna, and 25 m. s. of Lake Lonar, (20 N. 76.33 E.), which is 12 m. s. e. of Malkapur in Berar. *Nander*, on the Godavari, 80 m. s. e. of Lonar. *Maloni* is either *Billoli*, 35 m. s. e. of Nander and 30 m. n. of Kaulas, or *Banouli*, 11 m. s. e. of Mudhol. *Mudgal* is said to be a dependency of Nander and situated on the Bānganga. There is a smaller Mudgir 11 m. e. of Nander (on the Sitaba) and a much larger Mudhol, 40 m. e. of Nander but on a river unnamed in map. *Kaulas* is 30 m. n. of Bidar, and 65 m. s. of Nander. [*Atlas, Sh. 56.*]
were so worn out as to be unable to walk, and many of our troopers had to march on foot.... The elephants became lame and weak.... I too lost my horses and camels.” [Dil. 135b, 132b.]

§ 14. *Fathullah’s heroic efforts: fall of Khelnā.*

Meantime, the siege of Khelnā went on. Fathullah advanced his covered lane to the ditch in front of the fausse braye (*rauni*) of the fort, in the face of a terrible fire from the walls which did heavy loss to the sappers and soldiers working there. “He spent *mohars* like *cowries*, and worked day and night with pickaxe and hammer in his hand, like one of the labourers.” [K. K. 496.]

The enemy in the *rauni* demolished the first ladders that Fathullah had planted in front of the end of his covered lane, reaching up to the height of the level ground below the fort-gate. But the Khan made more ladders, and by driving rafters (*dhāb*) into the hard rock where the ladders ended, he reached the waist of the tower, but could advance no further. The Mughal artillery beat in vain against the solid rock of the walls of Khelnā; only a few stones were loosened from the tower, and success seemed as far off as ever.

On the other hand, the catapults of the garrison showered huge stones (“100 to 200 maunds in weight”!) upon the advancing siege-works. They also raided the trenches at night. One day Fathullah himself was struck on the head by the flying splinters of a plank of the covering of the lane, smashed by a Maratha stone, and so severely injured that he could not leave his bed for a month afterwards.

In fact, Fathullah was the hero of this siege. “He was of the same age as Aurangzib and a Turani (Central Asian) by race like him. Therefore, the Khan was fearless in speaking to the Emperor. When he was recovering from these injuries, a eunuch was sent by the Emperor to repri-
mand him for the folly of exposing himself to danger so recklessly. The grey-haired veteran replied. 'Tell His Majesty that when a wise man reaches the age of 80 or 90, his intellect suffers decay, his five senses do not remain unimpaired. I am a soldier, and therefore a hundred stages behind the prudent man, being as thoughtless now as on the day of my birth!'" [K. K. 498.]

But all his valiant exertions were thrown away against that impregnable rock. No better success was achieved at the Konkani (or western) gate of the fort. Here Muhammad Amin Khan had stormed the fortified hillock opposite this gate and commanding its rauni (4th March). Bidār Bakht, who replaced the Khan, delivered an assault led by Jai Singh, the young Rajah of Amber, on 27th April, and captured the rauni, in spite of heavy losses. The next step was to drag big guns up to the position and batter down the Konkani gate with them.

But the terrible monsoon of the Bombay Coast now burst on the heads of the devoted Mughal army. The rain fell incessantly for weeks on end. There was a race among the nobles for the capture of the fort by bribery, every one of them sending a private message to the qiladar Parashurām,* offering him a large sum of money if the key was surrendered through his hands, so that in the official history he might be described as its captor! [K. K. ii. 500.] Bidār Bakht seems to have bid the highest. On 4th June the Maratha commandant planted the prince’s banner on the ramparts, and in the night of the 7th the garrison evacuated the fort. By the Emperor’s command, none hindered them.

* On 9 March 1702 [copyist of Akhbarat wrongly writes 20 Shaban year 45 — 19 March 1701], we have this entry in the Court news-letter,—“Spies report that Parashuram, the head assistant (peshdast) of Ramchandra; is in Khelna and wished to cede the fort to the Emperor. Hearing of it, Trimbak Inglé and other officers of the enemy have arrested and imprisoned him.”
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[M. A. 457.] The Mughals lost at this siege six thousand mansabdars, according to Manucci, [iii. 419.]

§ 15. Sufferings of Mughal army during return from Khelnā, 1702.

In fear of the malarious climate of Konkan during the monsoons, the Emperor beat a hasty retreat from its neighbourhood, on 10th June, only three days after the fall of the fort. But the rain had already begun with tropical fury and the Mughal army underwent terrible hardships in crossing the dreadful Amba pass again in this weather. "The camels refused to set foot on this path. The elephants, in a dazed condition, tried to carry the loads, but sank into the mud like donkeys. The only goods carried were on the heads of porters." [M. A. 463; Dil. 142b.] A sudden rise of a nālā on the way, "running like a race-horse," cut the imperial army into two, and many were drowned. Nālās in a similar condition intersected the path of retreat at three places. Grain sold at one Rupee a seer. "Fodder and firewood appeared in the isolated camp only by mistake." Many men also perished of cold amidst the incessant rain, from having no tent or change of clothings left to them. Even the princes and nobles could not always get tents to shelter their heads in. At some stages only a small canvas cover was all that could be pitched for the Emperor himself. [M. A. 464-466; K. K. 503-505.]

One day the prime minister, after crossing a nala, could not find a single dry spot on which to pitch a tent for himself. He set up a small square canopy* (raoti); but at night it rained heavily and the canopy twice came down on the wazir’s head; and for the rest of the night his servants stood holding the canvas sheet up by the ropes and thus saved him from being smothered to death. It was impossible to cook anything. "The condition of poorer men can be imagined from this," as Khafi Khan says, (ii. 505).
In this condition, after covering 30 miles in 38 days the miserable army arrived near Panhālā (17 July 1702).* Then the sun reappeared, after having been hidden by the clouds for 3½ months, as also had been the moon. The remnant of the people revived. Food and porters began to come from all sides.

After a halt of five days here, the march was resumed on 23rd July and Vadgaon (13 miles east of Panhālā) was reached on the 30th. Here a month’s halt was made, while a suitable camping ground was being searched for. It was decided to cross the Krishnā near Miraj (40 m. e. of Panhālā). The river was in high flood. The incessant rain had turned the roads into quagmires. The 18 miles leading to the river’s bank took 16 days to traverse, and many men and beasts sank down in the mud before reaching it. The Krishnā was crossed in eight days (19-26 September). Then, by way of Miraj, Dāflapur, Bhalāvani, Akluj, and Indāpur, the army reached Bahadurgarh or Pedgaon on the northern bank of the Bhimā, on 13th November.

§ 16. Siege of Kondānā (Singhgarh) 1703.

But even here there was no rest for Aurangzib’s army. After a stay of only 18 days, he set out on 2nd December to capture Kondānā (Singhgarh), which was reached on 27th [M. A. 469.] The imperial family, offices, and heavy

* The above account of the return journey from Khelna is based upon the Akhbarat, year 46. M. A.’s dates are incorrect and self-inconsistent. Aurangzib’s itinerary was the following:—Khelna (departure 10 June)—Ambaghat (5 days’ halt)—Malkapur (20 June)—two nalas—near Panhala (17 July, 5 days’ halt)—Bāṅsgāon—Vathar—Vadgaon (30 July) — ... —Krishna crossed near Miraj—Idgah of Miraj (25 Sep.)—Malgaon—Dhulgaon—Dāflapur (5 Oct.)—Pratap-pur—Jujharpur—Najira (on the Man)—Yaqutpur—Vaki—Bhaiaavani—Velapur—Akluj (24 Oct., three days’ halt)—Baura—Babulgaon—Indapur—Kalthan—Warkuti—Palasdev (on the Bhima)—Jiti—Pedgaon (13 Nov.) [Ak. year 46.]
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baggage were removed from the Base Camp at Islāmpuri to Bahadurgarh, and the former post was made Nasrat Jang's cantonment. Bidār Bakht was sent to Aurangabad as viceroy (arrived 15 Nov.) and later (Feb. 1703) given the subahdari of Khandesh in addition, [M.A. 461, 471, 470], the last-named province being governed by his deputy.

The Mughals began the siege of Kondānā in their usual manner with entrenching and cannonade from a hillock opposite the tower of the fort. They lost many men. But there was no life in the work of the besiegers, and success seemed as remote as ever. Three months were wasted in this way. The rainy season was now approaching. So, the Emperor's servants secured the fort on 14th April 1703, by heavily bribing the qiladar.* [K. K. 510, Dil. 145a.]

From Kondānā the army marched back to Puna in a week (1 May), in the neighbourhood of which it spent nearly seven months, before setting out against Rājgarh and Torna.

The excessive rainfall of 1702 had been followed by a drought in 1703-4, and there was famine throughout Maha-rashtra, with its natural companion, pestilence. Large numbers of the poorer classes perished,—two millions, according to Manucci [iv. 96.] But nothing could bend Aurangzib's obstinacy. On 10th November he issued for fresh conquests [M.A. 477.]

§ 17. Capture of Rājgarh and Tornā, 1704.

From the neighbourhood of Punā, the Mughal army reached Rājgarh in 18 days, and began its siege on 2nd

* This act of bribery is cleverly hinted at in the official history, which says, "Kondana was newly named Bakhshenda-Bakhsh, or the Giver's gift. Truly, it is so strong a fort that nothing save the gift of God could have led to its capture." [M. A. 474.] The qiladar had died during the siege [Akh. 10 March 1703], and the fort was surrendered by his subordinates.
December, 1703. The entire hill, 24 miles in circuit, is really one stronghold. To borrow the hyperbole of the Persian chronicler, "Imagination cannot estimate its height. The wind alone can cross its thorny jungles and spectre-haunted chasms." [M.A. 478.] So vast a position could neither be invested, nor its food supply from outside stopped. The Mughals bombarded it for two months, and then captured the first gate by assault on 6th Feb. 1704. The garrison under their chiefs Firangji and Hamanjji retired to the inner citadel, and kept up the resistance for ten days more, during which the Mughal troops in their unsheltered newly-won position suffered heavy losses from the enemy's fire. At last the qiladar made terms, hoisted the imperial flag on his town, and fled away at night (16 Feb.) [M.A. 484-485, K. K. 513.]

Extreme scarcity had been raging in the Mughal camp all this time; even grass sold at two seers, for a Rupee. A desolating Maratha raid into Berar and Mālwa had been repulsed with great difficulty by Firuz Jang.

But Aurangzib blindly persisted in following his own plans. He next laid siege to Tornā, eight miles from Rājgarh, on 23rd February. In the night of 10th March (which was the Emperor's 89th lunar birthday), Amānullah Khan with only 23 Māvié infantry silently scaled the fort-wall by means of rope-ladders, blew his trumpets, and charged the enemy. Other Mughal generals, drawn by the noise, followed him. Those of the garrison who resisted were put to the sword, the rest fled to the citadel and cried for mercy. They were permitted to go away without their arms. This was the only Maratha fort that Aurangzib captured by force without resort to bribery. No wonder then that it was named by the pious Emperor as Fatūh-ūl-Ghaib or 'Victory from the Invisible.' [M.A. 487, K. K. 521-523.]

From Toranā the imperial camp set out on its return (on 15th March) and after arriving at Khed (7 miles north
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of Chākan, and 25 m. n. of Puna, — on the left bank of the Bhimā) encamped there for six months, from 17 April to 21 October, 1704. From this place the Emperor started on 2nd October for Wāgingerā, the Berad capital, some 250 miles south-eastwards, which was reached after a slow march of three and a half months, on 8th February 1705, and immediately besieged. This was the last campaign of Aurangzib.
§ 1. Ramchandra Nilkantha, the Regent of the West, 1689-1697.

When Rajaram, the newly crowned king of the Marathas, fled away to the Madras coast (July, 1689), affairs in the Maharashtra country were left to his ministers. Ramchandra Nilkantha was created Regent of the West, with the title of Hakumat-panāḥ, and he guided the fortunes of this virtually kingless State with remarkable wisdom and tact. He checked the progress of the Mughals, organised raids into imperial territory, sent succour repeatedly to his master who was then shut up in the far-off fort of Jinji, and—what was more difficult than all these,—he succeeded in keeping peace among the intractable and mutually jealous Maratha generals, each of whom felt himself to be his own master. Letters, no doubt, passed between the king and his Regent in the West, but the route was long and often unsafe and Rajaram could not exercise any real control over Ramchandra, who enjoyed full initiative and supreme authority in the homeland during the nine years of the king’s absence.

Rajaram, in addition to being plunged into debauchery in the Karnatak, was naturally weak-minded. His position made him powerless. He was a king without an army or treasury of his own, or subjects under his undisputed rule. Cooped up in a fort, he had to be all things to all men, and could not say No to anybody, nor enforce discipline among his servants. Any Maratha captain who could get together a thousand or even five hundred men of his own, could dictate the terms of his obedience to his nominal king.
§ 2. Rajaram’s policy and doings at Jinji.

Rajaram was, therefore, profuse in his gifts of titles and unconquered lands.* “All the Maratha sardars went to the king at Jinji, and he gave them titles, army commands, and grants for the different districts where they were to go, loot the country, and impose the chauth. They were to go there, take shelter in the woods, and establish their rule by acting like Paligais, avoiding battles ... and employing the men of their contingents in work, ... so that the kingdom would increase ... All his ministers and captains [thus] began to prosper and became happy.” [Chitnis, ii. 35.]

Rajaram’s political impotence is best illustrated by his duplication of offices and titles at a time when his kingdom was shrinking to nothing. He could not afford to disoblige any of his proud and selfish chiefs. If we can accept Chitnis’s statements, public offices like the Amātya-ship, the chief command etc., changed hands very frequently during his short reign: a man was appointed to a high post one year, and next year some one else, more powerful or more influential, cajoled or coerced the king into giving him that very post, and the first incumbent was reinstated a year or two later! To provide posts for all his most influential servants, the normal council of eight ministers was expanded by adding two more men,—the Hakumat-panah and the Pratinidhi. Another office of ministerial rank was the Rājājnā, which though created by Shambhuji rose to first rate importance in Rajaram’s government.

At Jinji Rajaram created Pralhād Nirāji his Pratinidhi (king’s proxy), who eclipsed the nominal prime-minister or Peshua Nilkantha Moreshwar Pingle. We have a parallel to this in the action of Bahadur Shah I., the weak suc-

* Streams of people from Maharashtra flocked to Jinji to get offices, titles and lands or to renew the title-deeds of their ancestral property or rights as hereditary village officers,—as is illustrated in the contemporary documents printed by Rajwadé.
cessor of Aurangzib, who could not help appointing Munim Khan as his wazir (prime-minister) and at the same time felt bound to oblige his foremost noble, Asad Khan, by giving him an equally high position as wakil (or king’s proxy),— with the result of friction between the two. The office of Senāpati (commander-in-chief) was changed five times in Rajaram’s short reign of eleven years; and, in addition, five officers at one time enjoyed titles varying in terminology but all meaning “leader of the army”* and all being entitled to the rank banner and other paraphernalia of the Senapati! [Chitnis, ii. 40-41.]

§ 3. Maratha system of guerilla warfare.

But this decentralisation of authority was exactly suited to the situation in Maharashtra. The Maratha captains, each acting on his own account, carried on a guerilla warfare (as described in Chitnis, ii. 43-45), and caused the greatest loss and disturbance to the Mughal territories. The imperialists did not know what point to defend, nor where to find a vital enemy position for their attack. The extremely mobile Maratha bands covered long distances and delivered attacks at the most unexpected quarters; and such roving bands were countless. The result was universal unrest throughout the Deccan. In addition to the (regular) divisions under the three generals (totally 60 to 70 thousand cavalry), and the king’s own contingent of 10,000,— there were roving bands of 15 to 20 thousand, who fought their way to Maharashtra, levied chauth from the provinces, drove out the imperial outposts, and strengthened their own strategic points (nākē jāgā) and forts.

Fortifying out-of-the-way places, they remained encamp-

* The titles of Senapati, Sena-sahib-subah, Sari-lashkar, Saradurandhar, and “with honour equal to the Senapati.” It would be incorrect to call four of these divisional commanders, as they were declared to be equal to the Senapati (c-in-c) and in no way subordinate to him.
ed in the shelter of woods and cut off Mughal detachments.” [Chitnis, ii. 43.]

At this stage the Marathas avoided pitched battles — except when they had to relieve a fort, nor did they stay long within easy reach of the Mughal armies. Their encampments during the rainy months were in obscure and inaccessible places. Their bands did not hold together all the year round, but dispersed to their several homes after the campaigning season of six months (October to April) was over.


Ramchandra’s task was no easy one. For one thing, many of his best forts and most of his fertile country were in Aurangzib’s hands. He had, besides, to control generals who were inclined to pay him little obedience though Raja-ram had publicly proclaimed that the Hakumat-panâh’s orders were not to be upset even by the king. [Chitnis, 40.] The distribution of territory for plunder made by Ramchandra among his generals was not always respected by them, and hence they frequently came to blows among themselves over the booty or the fields of their raids.

There was mutual jealousy among the ministers left in Maharashtra as well as at the Court of Jijji. Parashurâm Trimbak formed a faction of his own and drew Santâji Ghorparé into it. The natural consequence was that Dhana Singh Jâdav was backed by Ramchandra. Santâ’s in-subordination proved unbearable; he would not obey the Regent of the West, nor co-operate in any national enterprise (like the relief of Panhala in 1693) planned by him, preferring to conquer an independent estate for himself. Ramchandra had, therefore, to secure the king’s consent to Santâ’s dismissal and even refused for a month together to grant him an interview [Chit. 34.] Then another minister Shankarâji Malhâr took Santâ under his wing, formed a
plan of co-operation and division of spoils with him and
sent him to Madras with an earnest request to serve the
king more faithfully than he had done in the West. Another
refractory and selfish general of great power was Nimā
Sindhiā, but he rose to prominence after the death of
Rajaram. [J.S.]

Ramchandra struggled against these difficulties as best
he could, and on the whole he succeeded fairly well. As the
acute observer Bhimsen remarks about the year 1697,
"Among the Marathas not much union was seen. Every
one called himself a sardar and set out to raid and plunder
[for himself]" (Dilkasha, ii. 122a).

The rivalry between Santā Ghorparé and Dhanā Jādav
precipitated a civil war in 1696, as we have seen [Ch. 52,
§ 8 and 9.] Three battles were fought between them,
Dhanā being supported by the king's authority. The first
encounter was a mere demonstration, in the second Santā
was victorious, and in the last one Dharfā. The murder of
Santā (June 1697) created a blood-feud between his son
Ranuji and his brother Baharji (surnamed Hindu Rao)
on one side and Dhanā's party on the other, which took
long to heal. But this internal discord among the Marathas
gave the Mughals only a brief respite.

Ramchandra cleverly provided shelters for the families
for the Maratha combatants in South Konkan and the
Portuguese territory of Daman, which had not yet been
penetrated by Mughal armies, and also in the Berad çoun-
try and the north-western corner of Mysore, which the
Emperor was not yet free to invade. Many Marathas also
lived unknown for years in the Mughal cities, even at
Aurangabad, with the secret sympathy of local residents
(many of whom were kin to them).

§ 5. Tara Bai rules as queen-mother; her character and
policy.

A change took place at the Maratha headquarters when
Rajaram returned home in March 1698. Nominally the king assumed the authority, but in fact Ramchandra still continued to guide the operations and issue the orders. This state of things, however, lasted for only two years. When Rajaram died, on 2nd March 1700, and then his natural son Karna after a three weeks’ reign, Tārā Bāi crowned her own (legitimate) son Shivaji, a boy under ten years, and ruled with the help of Parashuram Trimbak.

Thus a second regency ensued in the Maratha kingdom; but it was of a different kind from the earlier regency of 1689-1697. There was no longer a grown-up king or regular Court, as a final authority and source of reference, even in distant Jinji. The new king was a minor, a mere child; nor was his right undisputed among his subjects, as his half-brother Shambhuji II was set up as rival for the throne. The supreme guiding force in Maharashtra now was not any minister but the dowager queen Tārā Bāi Mohité. Her administrative genius and strength of character saved the nation in the awful crisis that threatened it in consequence of Rajaram’s death, the disputed succession to his throne, and Aurangzib’s unbroken victories from 1699 to 1701. Already in her husband’s lifetime she had displayed masculine energy and intelligence, and begun to draw the threads of the administration into her own hands. The hostile Muslim historian Khafi Khan is constrained to call her wise, enterprising, expert in administration, and popular with the army. The entire Mughal camp had exulted on first hearing the news of Rajaram’s death, “as if the roots of the Maratha disturbances had been thereby cut away. Alas! they knew not God’s will. Under Tārā Bāi’s guidance,* Maratha activity began to increase daily.” [K. K. ii. 469.] “She took into her own hands the control of all affairs,—such as the

* We have seen in Ch. 52 how she was at first diffident and had proposed terms of submission to Aurangzib.
appointment and change of generals, cultivation of the country and planning raids into Mughal territory. She made such arrangements for sending troops to ravage the six subahs of the Deccan, nay even up to Sironj and Mandesar in Malwa, — and winning the hearts of her officers, that all the efforts of Aurangzib against the Marathas down to the end of his reign failed.” [ibid., 516.]

Immediately after the death of Rajaram, Parashurām Trimbak, out of jealousy for the other ministers then in Satara, came out of his own fort of Parli and offered to join the Mughals. But he did not definitely enter their service nor did the Emperor fully trust him. Tārā Bāi won this supremely able officer over to her interest by creating him Pratinidhi. She also appointed Shankara Narayan Gandekar as Sachiv, after removing Shankara Malhar Nargundkar from the post. “Ramchandra continued as Amātya and, seemingly the supreme head of the administration, but Parashurām enjoyed the queen-mother’s favour most.” [Chit. ii. 71.]

§ 6. Internal dissensions in the Maratha State.

But it was only after a hard struggle that Tārā Bāi’s supremacy was established. “Some of the generals obeyed her, some did not. Rājas Bai [the junior wife of Rājārām and the mother of Shambhuji II.] began to quarrel with Tārā Bai and form her own faction.” [ibid., 72] There was a third party among the Maratha leaders, who wanted to secure national unity by placing Shahi on the throne, as he represented the elder branch of Shivaji’s descendants.

These dynastic quarrels were complicated by the cross-currents of personal rivalry among the Maratha generals. Dhana Jādav, as we have seen, had defeated Santā Ghorparé in 1697, and thus driven Santā’s son Ranuji and brother Baharji into armed opposition to him. Late in December 1700 the two factions fought a battle ten or twelve miles from Islampuri, both sides losing heavily in
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this fratricidal contest. Krishna Malhar sided with Dhanā, and the Ghorparés were defeated and fled towards Ahirwari. Three weeks later (16 Jan. 1701) we hear of Ranuji staying at Jagjivani and forming plans for avenging his defeat on Dhanā. [Ahirwari, 13 m. s. of Sholapur, Jagjivani 24 m. n. of Bijapur.]

On 11th Sep. 1701 it was reported to the Emperor that another battle had been fought between Dhanā (with Dādo Malhar) and Hanumant Nimbālkar (his former ally) near Fachuni (? Jejuri or Chincholi) on the left side of the Nīrā, in which Hanumant was taken prisoner. [Akh.]

Some time later Dhanā visited Ranuji near Firuzabad (20 m. s. of Kulburgā) to make up their quarrel and form an alliance for the future. [Dīl. 130b.] In September 1701, Ranuji and Baharji made an offer to join the Mughal service, and Dhanā a similar proposal in July 1703, but all these overtures were insincere and solely prompted by the temporary pressure of rivals at home. Nothing resulted from them. The internal discords of the Marathas in 1707 will be described in Ch. LVII.

§ 7. Shāhu’s captive life, 1689-1707.

Shāhu, the eldest son of Shambhuji, had become a prisoner of the Mughals at the age of nine, when Raigarh surrendered in October 1689, and was kept under strict watch, though kindly treated, close to the Emperor’s tent and within the circle of the red canvas screen (gulāl-bār) of the imperial quarters.* With him were his mother Yesu

* “The Emperor ordered that suitable tents should be pitched within the gulal-bar for Shambhuji’s mother and other relatives, and they should be made to alight there with all respect and privacy. Close to the camp of the wazir, the camp of the Raani’s bazar was located, for her servants and dependents to live in. Annual pensions were settled on them all, according to their position. Shahu was given the mansab of 7-hazari (zat and sawar) and the title of Rajah ... and with his younger brothers ... made to live with his grand-mother and mother.” [M.A. 332.]
Bai and his half-brothers Madan Singh and Madhu Singh. At the capture of Jinji (Jan. 1698), four wives, three sons, and two daughters of Rajaram were taken, and they were brought to the Emperor’s camp and lodged near Shāhu [M.A. 407.] On the 10th September of this year, Shāhu’s half-brother Madhu Singh died. [Akh.]

In 1700 Shāhu had a severe attack of illness, which seems to have left his body and mind shattered for the rest of his life. The Court news-letter gives the following account of it:—

Rajah Shāhu came to the audience on 26th August and made his bow. The Emperor after looking at him remarked that his colour had turned entirely yellow, and asked the reason for it. Hāfiz Ambar (eunuch) replied that the rajah did not eat any cooked dal, bread or rice, but only sweets (pakwān), on the ground that Hindus must not eat cooked food in prison, and he regarded himself as a prisoner. The Emperor replied, “Tell the rajah to visit Hamid-ud-din, who will talk to him.”*

As difficulties thickened round Aurangzib and the Deccan tangle seemed insoluble, he began to form plans for settling the contest with the Maratha generals through Shāhu. First, on 9th May 1703, he sent Hamid-ud-din Khan to urge Shāhu to become a Muslim,† as the heirs to some other Hindu thrones had already been tempted to do in this reign. [Akh.] But Shāhu refused to apostatize. Next, the Emperor tried to create a division among the Marathas by releasing Shāhu. The terms of his release were to be settled by treaty with the leading Maratha generals,

* [Akh. Brief mention in M. A. 433; Chitnis 69 simply records his fever.] This dyspepsia, leading to fever and jaundice, seems to have troubled him long, as we read of his having taken the bath of recovery on the 4th June preceding. [Akh.]

† Rajaram’s wife’s brothers Khande Rao and Jagjivan, when prisoners of war under Aurangzib, were induced to become Muham-madans with the names of Abdur Rahim and A. Rahman, in return for their liberation. [Akh. 27 May, 22 July 1700.]

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through the mediation of Prince Kām Bakhsh. For approaching the national leaders and winning them over. Raibhān the son of Vyankoji Bhonslé of Tanjore, was taken into the Emperor’s service, created a 6-hazari, and sent to visit Shāhu (10th July 1703.)

On 27th November Shāhu was removed from the gulāl-bār or enclosure of the Emperor’s residence and sent to lodge near Kām Bakhsh’s tents. Here some of the Maratha generals were expected to come and see him.* But the move failed. As Bhimsen bluntly puts it; — “The prince repeatedly sent his men to Dhana. But, as the Marathas had not been vanquished, and the entire Deccan had come into their possession like a deliciously cooked pudding, why should they make peace?... The envoys of the prince returned in disappointment. Rajah Shāhu was again placed under surveillance in the gulāl-bār.” Further details of these negotiations are given by Khāfi Khan (ii. 520); — Dhana Jadav proposed terms of peace of behalf of all the authoritative Maratha generals, viz. that the Emperor should issue farmāns reassuring all the chief officers of Tara Bai and calling them. On their arrival, Kām Bakhsh with Rajah Shāhu should meet them ten miles in advance of the imperial camp; the Maratha chiefs would first wait on Shāhu and would then be presented to the Emperor by the prince. The Emperor ordered 80 such farmāns to be written; but in the end he distrusted the tricky Marathas and declined the proposal. Sultan Husain (Kām Bakhsh’s officer and intermediary in these negotiations) had to fight his way back through the Marathas to the imperial camp.

On 29th Nov. 1703, it having been settled to marry Shāhu to the daughter of Bahadurji (the son of Rustam

* Akh., M. A. 473, Dil. 145b, 147a. “Aurangzib tries to sow dissenision among the Marathas by releasing Shahu, granting him the chauth [of the Deccan], and leaving Kam Bashkh as governor of Bijapur, Golkonda and the two Karnataks, and himself retiring to Delhi.” [Storia, iii. 499.]
Rao), the latter was ordered to bring the girl from his estate to Court for the ceremony. [Akh. 29 Nov. 1703; M.A. 482.] In January 1704, two captive daughters of Rajaram were married to Shamshir Beg (grandson of Aghar Khan) and Rajah Neknam of Deogarh (a Muslim Gond), and a daughter of Shambhuji to Md. Muhi-ud-din (the son of Sikandar Adil Shah.)*

Aurangzib felt himself utterly helpless. In the last year of his life (1706) he decided to make another attempt at peace with the Marathas. Shāhu was transferred from his own camp to that of Nasrat Jang (25 Jan.) Raibhān, too, was posted under him in the hope of his being able to persuade the Maratha generals to make terms with the Emperor as the price of the release of Shāhu. Nasrat Jang wrote conciliatory letters to the Maratha generals and invited them to come and join Rajah Shāhu. But it was to no effect. A civil war had indeed broken out among the Marathas, Rājas Bai trying to seize Tārā Bai and thwarting all her plans; but the Emperor’s hope of taking advantage of it and creating a further division by bringing Shāhu into it, failed. [Dil. ii. 154b-155a, M.A. 511.] It was only after Aurangzib’s death that Prince Azam, then marching towards Agra, connived at the escape of Shāhu to the Deccan. [Dil. ii. 163a.]

§ 8. Notable Maratha chiefs on Aurangzib’s side.

It is not true that all the leading Maratha families were on the national side during the struggle with Aurangzib. Many of them served the Mughal Government, and for various reasons.

The noble house of Jādav Rai of Sindhkhed, in which the

* M. A. 480, 482; Akh. 24th and 25th Jan. 1704. On 5th Feb. 1704, a report reached the Emperor’s camp that a boy slave had administered poison to the son of Rajaram and that son’s mother, as well as to five maidservants, and that the maidservants were dead already and the prince and his mother were dying. [Akh.]
great Shivaji's mother had been born, entered the Mughal army early in Shah Jahan's reign (1630), after the murder of Lakhji Jādav Rao,* and they remained on the imperial side for several generations. But in Aurangzib's time, this family, though enjoying its wealth and honours, did not hold any high command or position of importance. This was probably due to the intellectual and moral decay which usually seizes old aristocracies. The Mughal official records do not mention any member of the family of Chandra Rao Moré (of Jávli), though some of them had joined the Emperor's party in 1665, as we learn from Jai Singh's letters. They seem to have returned to the national cause or sunk into obscurity.†

Kānhoji Shirké and his sons, to whose family Rajaram's mother belonged, had been persecuted by Shambhuji and had fled for refuge to the Mughal Emperor, who gave them high posts. The Shirkés as well as Nāgoji Mané (the thanadar of Mhasvad and a Mughal partisan from 1694) remained consistently loyal and rendered long and meritorious service to the Mughals. In 1705, Kānhoji for his gallant exertions at Wagingerā was promoted to the second class of the Mughal peerage, as a commander of six thousand. [Akh.]

Three other devoted servants of the Emperor were Avji Adhal (thanadar of Khānāpur) who was made captive by the Marathas on 23rd Jan. 1700, Ramchandra (thanadar of Khätāu) who was mortally wounded when fighting at

* Lakhji had deserted Malik Ambar for the Mughal side in 1620 and received a high mansab. Later, about 1630, he came back to his old master the Ahmadnagar king, by whom he was put to death at an audience. [Abd. Hamid, I.A. 308—310.]

† The despatches of Muizz-ud-din written by Madhuram mention a Moré as opposing the Mughals at the siege of Panhala in 1693. Vyankat, son of Chandra Rao (Moré?), the Mughal qiladar of Shah-bandar, was captured by the Marathas in Nov. 1694, and in consequence dismissed by the Emperor from the rank of a hazari. [Akh.]