ADJECTIVES IN DRAVIDIAN

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Adjective is a part of speech and the term is very common in Western grammars though a correct corresponding term is not found in the Tamil traditional grammars. Of course in modern Tamil grammars the term peyar aṭai (M. Varadarajan, 1947: 210) is very frequently used and the concept of adjective is also well known. In Malayalam it is known as na:ma vise: šaṇam and in Kannada and Telugu we have the terms guṇava: caka and vise: šaṇam respectively.

In traditional grammars of Tamil we find fourfold classification of words, viz. peyar ‘noun’, vinai ‘verb’, iṭai ‘particles’ and uri and many nouns and a few iṭai and uri are used as various attributes.

1 veḷḷaip pacu ‘white cow’
2 paccaik kili ‘green parrot’
3 taṭak kai ‘long hand’
4 taṭan to:ḷ ‘broad shoulder’
5 muN vi:ṭu ‘front house’
6 piN vi:ṭu ‘back house’

Adjectives are generally used as modifiers of nouns and in Tamil and other Dravidian languages they occur in the attributive position before noun and they are always in construction with the nouns they modify. Words like nalla, nalla, oḷḷe, manci etc. are considered as adjectives and they are found to be modifiers of various nouns.

7 Ta. nalla paiyan good boy
8 Ma. nalla kuṭṭi ”
9 Ka. oḷḷe huḍuga ”
10 Te. manci abba:yi ”

Adjectives can be considered as a syntactic class rather than a morphological one. It compares of items which have similar syntactic function and mere resemblance in form will not help much to identify whether a word is an adjective or not. The mere form of a word does not necessarily indicate its syntactic function. The term veḷḷai can be a noun as well as an adjective in Tamil and this is also the case with nalla which can be used as a predicate as in avai nalla ‘they are good’ and adjective as in atu nalla pacu ‘That is a good cow’. Similarly various forms which are different from each other in forms can be used as adjectives also.

11 Ta. niṉṭa kayiRu long rope
12 Ka. ubbida de:ka fat body
13 Ma. veḻutta kuṭṭi white boy
14 Te. paṇḍina paṇḍu riped fruit

In Tamil we find not only niṉṭa kayiRu but various other forms as well to denote the same thing.

15 periya kayiRu long rope
16 niṉṭuk kayiRu ,,
17 niṉṭak kayiRu ,, 
18 niṉḷak kayiRu ,, 
19 niṉḷama:Na kayiRu ,, 

Though they are different in form they are understood in the same way and they are all considered as adjectives. In forms like

20 Ta. karum kaṭal black sea
21 Ta. ciRu malai small hill
22 Ka. kiRu veṭṭu small hill
23 Ma. perum ka:RRə wild wind
24 Te. cen daːmara red lotus

we find only the base forms. But we can also have as in (11-14) the so-called relative participle form. Yet this cannot be considered as relative participle.
Another instance can also be found in forms like

25 Ta. karu niRam black colour
26 Ta. ven ta:marai white lotus
27 Ta. veḷḷai pacu white cow
28 Ta. veḷḷutta paiyan white boy

where we find the base (ven), noun (veḷḷai) and the relative participle (veḷḷutta) forms.

Mention also has to be made about forms like

29 Ta. ni:ḷama:na kayiRu long rope
30 Ka. udda:da hagga ,,
31 Te. poḍuguayina ta:ḍu ,, and

32 periya vi:ṭu big house
33 valiya vi:ṭa ,,
34 doḍḍa mane ,,  
35 a. pedda illu ,, 

where we find the complex forms ni : ṭam+a:na udda+a:da podugu+a:yina and the simple forms like periya etc. Though we find different forms like the above they are understood in the same way and they are all considered as adjectives.

Though we find various relative participle form like veḷḷutta 'white', kaRutta 'black', ni:ḷa 'long', ubbida 'fat', paṇḍina 'ripe' etc., we do not use other tense forms like veḷḷukkum 'which will become white', kaRukkum 'which will become black', ni:-ḷum, veḷḷukkiRa, kaRukkiRa etc. as adjectives. But as relative participles the above forms with constrasts in tenses are made use of where the tense distinction is very clearly maintained. But this is not the case when the so called past tense forms are used as adjectives.

Adjectives, as already mentioned, generally occur in the attributive position.

36 Ta. nalla icai good music
37 Ma. nalla kuṭṭi good boy
Adjective can be modified by intensifiers like mika (Ta.), vaḷare (Ma.), bahaḷe (Ka.), ca:la:(Te.), 'very' etc.

38 Ta. \( \{ \text{ rempa } \} \) nalla icai very good music mika

39 Ma. vaḷare nalla sangi:tam “

40 Ka. bahaḷa cenna sangi:ta “

41 Te. ca:la:manci sangi:tam “

It is also to be mentioned that not only adjectives but adverbs as well take intensifiers.

42 Ta. rempa \( \{ \text{ nalla } \} \) ceyta:n he did it very well nanku

43 Ma. vaḷare nallata:yiṭṭu ceytu “

44 Ka. bahaḷa cenna:gi ma:dida “

45 Te. ca:la: ba:ga : ce:sćiːḍu “

46 Ta. rempa ve:kama:ka paṭitta:n he read very fast

\begin{align*}
47 \text{Ma. vaḷare} & \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\text{ ve:gattil} \\
\text{ ve:gam} \\
\end{array} \right\} \text{ paṭiccu} \\
48 \text{Ka. bahaḷa} & \text{ ve:gava:gi o:dida} “ \\
49 \text{Te. ca:la:tondaraga:cadivściːḍu} “
\end{align*}

Adjectives can also occur in the predicative position and this can be best seen in Tamil though in other Dravidian languages the situation is slightly different.

Expressions like

50 Ta. kaṭal peritu the ocean is big

51 Ta. po:r aritu the war is difficult

are very common in Tamil with appellative finite verb forms as predicate though this type of construction is very limited in Malayalam.

52 Ma. kaṭal valuta:ṇo the ocean is big

53 Ma. pe:na ciRuta:ṇo the pen is small
In Kannada we find only forms like *olleyvanu* 'one who is good', *doḍdavanu* 'one who is big', *doḍḍaḍu* 'one which is big' and these can be equated with the forms like *nallavan*, *periyavan*, *periyatu* etc. in Tamil which are considered as appellative conjugated nouns rather than appellative verb predicates. In Telugu also we find expressions like:

54 Te. samudram nallatidi the ocean is black
55 Te. adi ceḍadi that is bad

These predicates can also take intensifiers and expressions like:

56 Ta. kaṭal mikap peritu the ocean is very big
57 Ta. avan mikap periyaN He is very big

which are very common.

It is true that *karitu*, *aritu* etc. are considered as appellative verbs (*kuRippuvINai*) by Tamil grammarians and *nalla*, *kariya* etc. are considered as a appellative relative participle (*kuRippu peyareccam*). Kerala paṇiniyam, a 20th century grammar of Malayalam, also considered these as a kind of (*peyareccam*) relative participle.

By *kuRippu vinai* the Tamil grammarians mean not only forms like *karitu*, *initu* 'sweet-it' etc. but forms like *uṭalye:N* 'have-I', *kaiyaN* 'one who possesses hand' etc. and though we agree with them we make a distinction between them. By adjective we mean only the items like *karitu* etc. and *uṭaiye:N*, *kaiyaN* etc. are not considered as adjectives. Though all adjectives are considered as appellative verbs, all appellative verbs are not considered as adjective by us.

It has been shown by many generative grammarians that adjective in English are also verbs as both of them share many common properties. Lakoff (1970: 115-133) and others have convincingly argued that both adjectives and verbs are members of a single category which be calls 'VERB'. The true verb is marked as
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
+ & V \\
- & ADJ
\end{bmatrix}
\]

and the adjective is marked as
\[
\begin{bmatrix}
+ & V \\
+ & ADJ
\end{bmatrix}
\]

It is not our intention to enumerate here the arguments advanced by him and Postal (quoted by Lakoff, 1970 : 15) and we agree with them in many respects. As already mentioned words like nal 'good', peru 'big' etc. are rightly considered by Tamil grammarians as appellative verbs which are considered as a kind of verb. The surface behaviours of appellative verbs are such that traditional grammarians were able to understand very easily the similarities of verbs and appellatives which they call a verb kuRippu viNai.

Like verbs, the appellative verbs can also be predicates.

58 Ta. avan vanta:n he came
59 Ta. avan nallan he is good
60 Ta. atu ti:tu that is bad

Like verbs, the appellatives can also take adverbial constructions, though in a limited way.

61 Ta. avan ennaiviţa o:ţuva:n
   He runs faster than me

62 Ta. avan ennaiviţa nallan
   He is better than me

As verbs, appellatives can also undergo the relativization rule and can be used as modifiers.

63 Ta. paiyan vanta:n the boy came
      = > vanta paiyan the boy who came
64 Ma. kuţti vannu = > vanna kuţti
65 Ka. huduga banda = > banda huduga
66 Te. abba:yi occçi:du = > occina abba:yi
67 Ta. pe:na peritu pen big
      = > periya pe:na: big pen
68 Ma. pe:na valuta:ņo = > valiya pe:na
Conjugated nouns are also formed from appellative verbs as in the case of pure verbs.

69 Ta. ceytavan one who did something
70 Ta. vantavan one who came
71 Ma. vannavan ,, 
72 Ka. bandavanu ,, 
73 Ta. periyavan one who is big
74 Ma. valiyavaN ,, 
75 Ka. doddavanu ,, 
76 Te. peddava:du ,, 

It may be possible to add some more to the list and this shows that the appellative verbs and verbs have many common features and this justifies that they may be grouped under one category called ‘VERBS’.

Generative grammarians are also of the view that certain attributive adjectives are to be derived form predicative adjectives and if it is not done so we may have to repeat various specifications both for attributes and predicates. Phrases like ‘the quiet child’ is derived from the phrase

the child who is quiet
which in turn is derived from

[ [ the child₁ ] [ the child₁ is quiet ] ]

NP NP NP S S NP

where we find a noun phrase which is modified by a sentence in which we have the predicate adjective ‘quiet’. This undergoes various transformations and finally we get the phrase ‘the quiet child’.

This is also the same case in Tamil and noun modifiers like nalla ‘good’, periya ‘big’ etc. can be derived from appellative predicates like nallatu ‘good-it’, peritu ‘big-it’ etc. Though the predicate and the modifier are syntactically two different grammatical categories, the semantic relationship that exists between the noun and the predicate on the one hand the noun and the modifier on the other seem to be one and the same.
Both of them denote one and the same thing though in a slightly different way. When one says

77 Ta. paiyan nallan the boy is good
78 Ta. nalla paiyan the good boy

both of them are understood in the same way and therefore there is nothing wrong in deriving one from the other.

It is also to be noted that expressions like

79 Ta. vanta paiyan the boy who came
80 Ma. vanna kuṭṭi ,,
81 Ka. banda huḍuga ,,  
82 Te. occina abba:yi ,, 

e tc. are derived from sentences like

83 Ta. paiyan vanta:n the boy came
84 Ma. kuṭṭi vannu ,,  
85 Ka. huḍuga banda ,,  
86 Te. abba:yi occi:du ,, 

and this also supports the view that certain adjectives are also to be derived from predicates of the sentences which are used as modifiers.

Adjectives also behave, in many respects, like relative participle and it will not be out of place to mention one or two here. It is well known now that there are two kinds of (relative participles) relative clause, viz., the restrictive and non-restrictive relative clauses and this nomenclature can also be seen in the case of adjective. Consider the following:

87 Ta. periya malai big hill
88 Ma. valiya mala ,, 
89 Ka. doḍḍa veṭṭu ,,  
90 Te. pedda koṇḍa ,, 

e tc. In the above expressions we find the attributes periya, valiya, doḍḍa, pedda modifying the noun and the expressions denote only a certain sub-set of things referred to. When someone says something about periya malai he refers to only a hill which is big in size and thereby restricts his remarks only to
that type of hill alone. The attribute big therefore isolates that kind of hill from all other types, say small and medium and therefore these attributes may be called ‘restrictive adjectives’.

But this is not the case with the attributes found in expressions like

91 Ta. ciRiya ke:raḷam small Kerala
92 Ma. ceRiya ke:raḷam “
93 Ka. cikka ke:raḷa “
94 Te. cinna ke:raḷa “

etc. where the attribute ciRiya etc. do not make any sub-sets of the noun it modifies; ke:raḷam is a unique noun and the modifier just says something about the size of the state and does not separate one Kerala from the other. It just mentions that Kerala is small in size. This is also the case with attributes forming expressions like

President Tito
Professor Householder
famous Niagara

etc. and these attributes are generally called non-restrictive attributes.

The distinction is known for sometime in English and yet only very recently the grammarians have attempted to understand such constructions in transformational terms. Though grammarians like Jespersen (1958 : 112) have talked about non-restrictive adjective, it has got its importance only after the generative grammarians have taken up the matter. Despite there is no agreement among the grammarians with regard to the deep structure of this class of attributes there is agreement that the restrictive and non-restrictive clauses and attributes will have different deep structures.¹

It is to be noted that the relative participle constructions like

vanta paiyan the boy who came

are derived from the structures like
\[
\left[ \left[ \text{paiyan}_i \right] \right] - \left[ \text{paiyan}_i \text{ vanta:n} \right] \]
\[
\text{NP boy}_i \quad \text{S boy}_i \quad \text{came} \quad \text{S NP}
\]

and this simplifies the grammar a great deal. This also supports the view that adjectives are also to be derived from similar structures where we find adjective predicates.

It is true that all verbs can be found as predicate whereas this is not the case with the appellative. Items like \textit{ma}: 'big', \textit{am} 'beautiful' etc. cannot occur as predicate. In English also we find examples like

\begin{itemize}
\item utter fool
\item nuclear scientist
\end{itemize}

etc. which cannot be derived from the predicate adjective. But words like \textit{peritu} 'big-it', \textit{ciRitu} 'small-it' etc. can occur as predicates.

Appellatives behave differently from the verbs in that the former generally exists in stative relation whereas the latter in many other relations.

\begin{tabular}{lll}
95 & Ta. & maram peritu \quad \text{the tree is big} \\
96 & Ta. & periya maram \quad \text{big tree} \\
97 & Ma. & maram valuta:na \quad \text{the tree is big} \\
98 & Ka. & mara doḍḍatu \quad \text{the tree is big} \\
99 & Ka. & doḍḍa mara \quad \text{big tree} \\
100 & Te. & ceṭṭu peddadi \quad \text{the tree is big} \\
101 & Te. & pedda ceṭṭu \quad \text{big tree}
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{ll}
\multicolumn{2}{l}{s also another kind of adjective which we find in} \\
\multicolumn{2}{l}{s like}
\end{tabular}

\begin{tabular}{lll}
102 & Ta. & ve:kama:na kutirai \quad \text{fast horse} \\
103 & Ta. & ve:kama:na ka:rRu \quad \text{fast wind} \\
104 & Ma. & ve:gata uḷḷa kutira \quad \text{fast horse} \\
105 & Ka. & ve:gava:da kudure \quad \text{fast horse} \\
106 & Te. & ve:gamga:parigette:gurram \quad \text{the horse which} \\
& & \text{runs fast} \\
107 & Te. & ve:gamga:vi:ce:ga:li \quad \text{Strong wind}
\end{tabular}
Though these adjectives are used with the nouns they are not really ascribed to the nouns absolutely, but only to the verb which denotes the action performed by the agentive noun. The verb may be easily understood from the adjective and the noun. When it is said

\[ \text{ve:kama:na kutirai (102)} \]

etc., it means

108 Ta. \[ \text{ve:kama:ka o:țukiRa kutirai} \]
the horse which runs fast

109 Ma. \[ \text{ve:kattil o:țunna kutira} \]

110 Ka. \[ \text{ve:gava:gi o:țuva kudure} \]

and by

\[ \text{ve:kama:na ka:RRu (103)} \]
it is meant

111 Ta. \[
\begin{align*}
\text{ve:kama:ka} &\quad \text{\{vi:cu} \\
&\text{ukiRa} \quad \text{ațikk i} \\
&\text{Ra} \quad \text{varukiRa} \quad \text{etc.} \\
\end{align*}
\]
the wind which \[ \text{\{blows} \quad \text{\}} \quad \rightarrow \text{fast} \]
\[ \text{\{comes} \quad \text{\}} \quad \rightarrow \text{fast} \]

etc.

These verbs are decided by the co-occurrences of the adjective or the adverb and the noun, and the verbs are considered as ‘family of verbs’ (Vendler, 1968 : 92) and this concept of family of verbs is also applicable at many points.⁹

Though in phrases like

\[ \text{ve:kama:na kutirai} \]
\[ \text{ve:kama:na ka:RRu} \]

the adjective \text{ve:kama:na} is in construction with the noun \text{kutirai 'horse'} in the surface level it is quite clear that in the deep structure we have to posit the adverb \text{ve:kama:ka 'fast'} which needs a verb like \text{o:țu 'run'}. The phrases like \text{ve:kama: Na kutirai} are to be derived from \text{ve:kama:ka o:țukiRa kutirai} by deleting the verb \text{o:țukiRa} and changing the adverb into adjective.
ve:kama:ka o:ụkiRa kutirai

'fast' by which runs horse

ve:kama:na kutirai

Similarly

112 Ta. poRumaiya:na paiyan  patient boy
113 Ta. kavanama:na paiyan  careful boy
114 Ta. niya:ma:na aracan  just king

e etc. are also to be derived from

115 Ta. poRumaiya:ka ceykiRa paiyan
      the boy who does patiently
116 Ta. kavaNama:ka ceykiRa paiyan
      the boy who does carefully
117 Ta. niya:ma:ka a:jukiRa aracan
      the king who rules justly

Note that in Telugu it is very difficult to find an expression equivalent to ve:kama:Na kutirai 'fast horse' with the adjective and this is always expressed as ve:gamga:parigatte:
gurram (106) which has an adverb plus a verb. This is also the same case with expressions like niya:yama:na aracan 'just king' which is expressed as

118 Te. nya:yanga paripa:lince:ra:ju
      the king who rules justly

and this can be shown as an evidence for the derivation of certain adjectives from adverbs. This class of adjectives yield readily transformations like

119 Ta. kutirayin ve:kama:na o:ṭṭam
      fast running of the horse
120 Ma. kutirayuṭa ve:gattilulļa o:ṭṭam
121 Ka. kuduraya ve:gava:de o:ṭṭa
122 Ta. paiyanin poRumaiya : na ceyal
      patient action of the boy
123 Ta. aracanin niya:yama:na a:ṭci
      just rule of the king

124 Ka. niya:yava:de a:ḍalita
      "
125 Te. nya:mayina paripa:lane
      "
etc. This shows that these adjectives behave different from adjectives like periya ‘big’, ciRiya ‘small’ etc.

It is now clear that adjectives like ciRiya etc. are directly ascribed to the nouns they modify whereas adjectives like ve:kama:na ‘fast’ etc. are directly ascribed to the verbs. They are in the deep level only adverbs. But it has been shown that ciRiya etc. are to be considered as verbs [+Adjectival] and they resemble, in many ways, the relative participles. It is well known that relative clauses are derived from sentences and the same is followed in the case of adjectives also.

Adjectives like periya etc. are derived from something like the following:

\[
\begin{align*}
  & \text{NP} \quad \text{S} \quad \text{S} \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{NP} \\
  & \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{S} \quad \text{NP} \\
  & \quad \text{NP} \quad \text{VP} \\
  & \quad \text{N} \quad \text{Ap.V} \\
  & \quad \text{malai}_1 \quad \text{peritu} \quad \text{malai}_1 \\
  & \quad \text{‘hill’} \quad \text{‘big-it’} \quad \text{‘hill’}
\end{align*}
\]

Several transformations are involved in generating the surface structure and the most important transformation may be the ADJECTIVIZATION transformation which operates on the predicative adjective changing it into attributive adjective. This transformation changes the predicate into attribute and makes the structure be ready to undergo another important transformation called EQUI-NP DELETION which deletes the identical noun found in the constituent sentence. Mention has to be
made that the identical noun *malai* in the constituent and matrix sentences are the deep structure nouns and this can be considered as one of the conditions for the structures of relative clause and adjective constructions as well.

After the application of the Equi. NP deletion we get the intermediate structure something like the following:

```
127
NP
   /
  /\  
 S   NP
   /
  /\  
 VP  N
   /
  /\  
 Ap.V.a
     /
    /\  
 peritu  malai
   'big-it'  'hill'
```

Note that the embedded S node in 127 no longer has branches and therefore it is deleted. S NODE DELETION operates on (126) as in many derivations-verbal participles, relative participles etc. and the importance of the rule is well known. This rule provides another intermediate structure.

```
128
NP
   /
  /\  
 VP  NP
   /
  /\  
 Ap.V.a
     /
    /\  
 peritu  malai
   'big-it'  'hill'
```
On this intermediate structure ADJECTIVIZATION transformation is applied which converts the predicate into adjective.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{peritu} + \text{ADJ} & \Rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
\text{peri-m} \\
\text{per:r} \text{ periya}
\end{array} \right.
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{peri} + \text{m} & \Rightarrow \text{perum} \\
\text{peri} + \text{a} & \Rightarrow \text{periya}
\end{align*}
\]

The operation of all these rules will give the following surface structure.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{NP} \\
\text{Adj.} \\
\text{periya} \quad \text{malai} \\
\quad \text{‘big’} \quad \text{‘hill’}
\end{array}
\]

periya malai is often interpreted as

130 Ta. perita:ka irukkiRa/ulla malai  
‘bigly’ ‘which is’ ‘hill’  
the hill which is big

and this is also the same case with ceRiya pe:Na ‘small pen’ etc. which is connected with

131 Ma. ceRiyata:yi:tulla pe:Na  
the pen which is small

The same can be found in Kannada and Telugu also

132 Te. peddatiga:unna konda  
the hill which is big

133 Ka. do:dada:gi iruva be:tta  
the hill which is big
All these expressions in turn are connected with

134 Ta. malai perita:ka irukkiRatu
    the hill is big

135 Ma. pe:Na:ceruta:yiṭuṇṭe
    the pen is small

136 Te. koṇḍa peddatiga:undi

137 Ka. beṭṭa doḍḍata:gi ide
    the hill is big

etc. If they are all connected, what will be the deep structure for these expressions? And the most important question is whether the copula we find in items (130-137) viz., iru/uḷḷa, unṭa, unna, ide etc., is to be posited in the deep structure.

Those who maintain that adjectives are verbs consider the copula as a surface phenomenon only as otherwise it would be incompatible. Lakoff (1970) rightly considers this as a surface phenomenon and this is used only as a bearer of inflectional features like tense etc.

It is true that the copula plays a very prominent role in many natural languages and its role in Dravidian syntax cannot also be minimised. Kothandaraman (1972: 15-27) has also very ably shown its existence and importance in Dravidian syntax.

It is also to be mentioned that sentences like

malai peritu (126) the hill is big
are considered as a truncated form of

malai perita:ka irukkiRatu/uḷḷatu the hill is big(ly)
where we find the copula iru and uḷḷ and the so called adverbial form perita:ka. This poses another question whether the attributive adjectives are to be derived from this kind of adverbs.

It is also to be mentioned that various predicative adjective constructions are expressed by making use of adverbial copula constructions. Expressions like

138 It is hot
is expressed as
139 Ta. itu cu:ta:ka irukkiRatu
or
140 Ta. itu cu:tu
in Tamil. Unlike in Tamil it is expressed is Telugu only as:

141 Te. itu ve:qiga:undi it is hot
and we find many forms like

142 Te. itu eraga:undi it is red
143 Te. itu mettaga:undi it is soft

All these indicate the important role played by the copula. But yet it does not seem that it has to be set up in the deep structure.

Turning to adjectives found in expressions like ve:kama: na kutirai ‘fast horse’ it has to be mentioned that while we find derived adverbs in (134-137) we find adverbs in the deep structure itself in the case of (108-110) etc. In case like (126) only a noun and the adjective are set up in the deep level whereas in (108-110) a noun, adverb and a verb are found. Since these constructions fall in line with regular relative participle the deep structure will look something like the following:

[Diagram of tree structure indicating the syntactic relationships between the words given in the text.]

ADJECTIVES IN DRAVIDIAN
Several transformations are made use of to obtain (102). Firstly, relative participle transformation which operates on the above structure and it changes the predicate finite verb into relative participle in Tamil:

\[
o:\text{tukir}(atu) \rightarrow o:\text{tukir}(atu) + \text{R.P.}
\]

'runs' 'runs' which

Second, the Equi. NP deletion transformation operates and it deletes the identical noun \textit{kutirai} in the constituent sentence and we get:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{NP} \\
\text{S} & \quad \text{NP} \\
\text{VP} & \quad \text{N} \\
\text{Adv.} & \quad \text{V} \\
\text{ve:kama:ka} & \quad o:\text{tukiRatu} + \text{RP} & \text{kutirai}
\end{align*}
\]

On the above intermediate structure another transformation \textit{S. Node deletion} operates which is followed by another transformation \textit{Verb reduction}. This deletes the verb \textit{o:tu\textit{kiRatu}} and leaves R. P. alone.

\[
\text{ve:kama:ka} + o:\text{tukiRatu} + \text{RP} \rightarrow \text{ve:kama:ka} + \text{RP}
\]

Another transformation deletes the adverb marker—\textit{a:ka} and joins RP with \textit{ve:kam} and makes it \textit{ve:kama:na}

\[
\text{ve:kama : ka} + \text{RP} \rightarrow \text{ve:kama:na}
\]

fastely + RP fast

and finally we get

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The point is that certain adjectives are derived from adverbs. This shows that expressions like *veːkamaːna kutirai* 'fast horse' is derived from expressions like *veːkamaːka oːtukiRa kutirai* 'the horse which runs fast':

\[
veːkam + Adv. + oːtukiRa kutirai \quad \Rightarrow \\
veːkam + Adj. kutirai
\]

It is true that in Telugu such transformations do not take place and the idea must be expressed only by *veːgangaːparigatteː gurram* 'the horse which runs fast'. This is another evidence in favour of the present analysis.

This kind of operation is very useful to explain many cases like

- **Ta.** paŁutta paḻam \(\leftrightarrow\) paḻuttu uḷḷa paḻam
- **Te.** paṇḍina paṇḍu \(\leftrightarrow\) pandi unna paṇḍu
  - 'ripe fruit'
  - 'having riped which is fruit'
- **Ta.** utainta paːnaː \(\leftrightarrow\) utaintu uḷḷa paːnai
- **Te.** pagilina kunda \(\leftrightarrow\) pagili unna kunda
  - 'broken' pot
  - having broken 'which is pot'
- **Ta.** aLakaːna paiyan \(\leftrightarrow\) aLakaːka uḷḷa paiyan
- **Te.** anandamayina
  - abbaːyi \(\leftrightarrow\) anamdanga unna abbaːyi
  - beautiful boy
  - 'beautifully' 'who is' 'boy'

Mention also has to be made that both adjectives and adverbs can take intensifiers and this is also taken as an additional argument for such derivations.
We ran very fast.

The horse ran very fast.

The verbal relation can also be seen in adjectives like kaśṭama:na, praya:sama:ya, kaśṭava:de, kaśṭamayina etc. which can be seen in phrases like:

147 Ta. kaśṭama:na ka:riyam difficult thing
148 Ta. kaśṭama:na po:R difficult war

149 Ma. pRaya:sam \( \{ a::ya \} \) yuddham ,,;
150 Ka. kaśṭava:de yuddha ,,;
151 Te. kaśṭamayina yuddhdham ,,;

Here we need certain verbs or family of verbs to denote the action of some unknown agent which is not overt in the phrase. In this case not only verbs like cey 'do' are posited but the agentive nouns like na:m 'we' or makka! 'people' etc. as well as are posited.

152. Ta. na:m ceyvataRku kaśṭama:Na ka:riyam difficult thing to do for us
153 Ka. na:mage ma:dvatakke kaśṭava:de ka:yra
154 Ma. namukka ceyya:n prayasam \( \{ u:\|a \} \) \{ a::ya \} ka:riyam

155 Te. manaki ceyya:da:niki kaśṭam \( \{ unna \} \) \{ ayina \} pâni etc. show the transformational possibility of (147-152). Though these phrases resemble very much (102-105) there is marked difference between them. The difference lies in the fact that while heads of the noun phrases in (102-105) are the agents
(subjects in the surface) of the relevant verbs, the heads in (147-152) are only the objects of the verbs cey 'do', ma:du 'do', puri 'wage' etc. The war does not wage, but some one wages the war. Though we find sentences like:

156 Ta. po:r ceyvataRku kaštam

The war is difficult to wage

157 Ma. yuddham \[\{\text{ceyya:N} \}\]

\[\text{ceyyunnatiNɔ} \]

\[\text{praya:sama:ŋə} \]

158 Ka. yuddha ma:duvadakke kaštə

""

159 Te. yuddham ceyyeđa:niki kaštam

""

160 Ta. po:R kaštama:natu The war is difficult

161 Ka. yuddha kaštava:daddu

""

162 Te. yuddham kaštamayinadi

""

where we find the nouns po:R etc. are used as subjects and they are only surface subjects.

It is true that in 156-162 po:r etc. are used as the subjects in the surface level. But they are really the objects in the deep level which can be seen in sentences like:

163 Ta. avanai aṭippatu kaštam

It is difficult to beat him

Beating him is difficult

164 Ka. avannanu hoçeuyuvdu kaštə

""

165 Te. vaṇṇi koṭṭadam kaštam

""

166 Ta. po:r ai ceyvatu kaštam It is difficult to wage the war

Waging the war is difficult

167 Ma. yuddham ceyyunnata

\[\text{praya:sama:ŋə} \]

168 Ka. yuddha ma:duvadu kaštə

""

169 Ka. yuddhavannu ma:duvadu kaštə

""

The so called subjects in 156-162 are only derived subjects and they are gotten by the operation called OBJECT RAISING. This rule operates on 170 and as the result 171 is gotten.
Ta. po:r ceytal kaṣṭam po:r
Te. yuddham ceyyaḍam kaṣṭam yuddham
‘war’ ‘doing’ ‘difficult’ ‘war’
After the OBJECT RAISING, another transformation called DATIVISATION which adds the dative case marker -*ku* (Ta.), -*ki* (Te.) etc. to the verbal noun. This is followed by yet another transformation called VERB ADJUNCTION which adjoins the verb of the constituent sentence with the VP. As the result we get (172):

172

```
NP
  S  NP
    NP  VP
      N  Dat.  Ap.Va  N
  Ta. po:r  ceyvataRku  kaštam  po:r
  Te. yuddham  ceyyada:niki  kaštam  yuddham
  'war'  'to do'  'difficult'  'war'
```

When several transformations like ADJECTIVALISATION, EQ. NP DELETION, VERB DELETION etc. take place we finally get (173).
There are many cases in which the adjectives are ascribed to other categories like locative and instrumental. Consider the following:

174 Ta. kašţama:na ammi difficult grinding stone
175 Ka. kašţava:de ammi ,,
176 Te. kašţamayina ro:lu ,,
177 Ta. kašţama:na vi:ţu difficult house
178 Ka. kašţava:de mane ,,
179 Te. ? kašţamayina illu ,,
180 Ta. iNiya pa:yal sweet bed

All these need certain verbs like araJ 'grind', va:L 'live,' paţu 'sleep' etc. in order to explain the full meanings of them. It is true that the first two are ambiguous and they have at least two senses each. One is exhibited by positing the above verbs which show the locative relation between the verb and the noun and thereby between the adjectives and the noun. This can be clearly seen in:
181 Ta. araippataRku kaštama:na ammi
The grinding stone on which difficult to grind

182 Ka. arayuvudakke kaštava:de ammi

183 Te. dampada:niki kaštamayina ro:lu

184 Ta. va:LuvataRku kaštama:na vi:ṭu
The house in which it is difficult to live

185 Te. uṇḍada:niki kaštamayina illu

186 Ta. ammi araippataRku kaštam
The grinding stone is difficult to grind

187 Te. illu uṇḍaanikkki kaštam
The house is difficult to live

where we find the verb *ara* ‘grind’ and *va:L* ‘live’ overtly present.

It is to be noted that these expressions are very well related to:

188 Ta. ammiyil araippatu kaštam
Grinding on the grinding stone is difficult
It is difficult to grind on the grinding stone

189 Ka. ammiyalli araivadu kašta

190 Te. roṭilo:dampaḍam kaštam

191 Ta. vi:ṭṭil va:luvatu kaštam
Living in the house is difficult
It is difficult to live in the house

192 Te. inṭlo:uṇḍadām kaštam

where we find locative markers -*il*, -*alli* and -*lo*. These expressions clearly show that the so called subject in (186, 187) are only derived ones and they are gotten by LOCATIVE
RAISING to the position of subject of the matrix sentences as shown below:

193

Ta. ammiyil araippatu kašṭam ammi
Ka. ammiyalli'araivadu kašṭam ammi
Te. ro:tilo dampingkašṭam ro:lu

After Locative raising many other transformations like DATIVISATION, VERB ADJUNCTION take place and we get the following:
When several other transformations like ADJECTIVALISATION, EQUI-NP DELETION, VERB DELETION etc. take place, we finally get (195)
As mentioned earlier the positing of verbs like tůyil 'sleep' is necessitated to understand the noun phrase fully and unless this is done logically it may not be possible to explicate the full meaning of the phrase. Though in many cases the verbs are not found in the noun phrases in certain cases they are also mentioned, as in the case of

196  tůyil in pa:yal ‘sweet bed to sleep’ ‘sleep’ ‘sweet’ ‘bed’

This shows the rightness of the analysis shown above.

It is true that we find expressions like the following in Tamil:

197  maram pa:ṛppataRku paccai
     The tree is green to see

198  kaṭal pa:ṛppataRku karitū
     The sea is black to see

The above expressions look very similar to (156—158). But their derivational history is quite different and, this may be seen from the ungrammaticality of

199  *marattai pa:ṛppatu paccai
     *Looking at the tree is green

200  *kaṭalai pa:ṛppatu karitū
     *Looking at the sea is black

etc. But this is not the case with (175) and (181). The transformational possibilities that we find in

201  avanaik ka:ṛppatu eḻitu
     Seeing him is easy
     It is easy to see him

202  avan ka:ṛppataRku eḻiyтан
     He is easy to see

203  avan ka:ṭcikku eḻiytan
     He is easy to see

204  avano:ṭu paLakutal initu
     It is sweet to move with him

205  avan paLakuvaRku iniyan
     He is sweet to move with
206 avan paLakkattirku iniyan
    He is sweet to move with
    literally, he is sweet for close movement
207 inta kattiyar:1 veṭṭuvatu kaṭinam
    Cutting with this knife is difficult
208 inta katti veṭṭuvataRku kaṭinam
    This knife is difficult to cut with

etc. cannot be seen in the case of (163-167) and (180-196). This
shows that (163-67, 180-196) they cannot be equated with
(95-101), though they look very similar.

In this paper only a very few features of adjectives have
been studied and many more have to be done and further
research will unfold many interesting phenomena of this
grammatical category.

NOTES

1 It is very gratifying to note that in Tolka:ppiyam we find a reference
of non-restrictive adjective inaccuṭṭu illa:paṇṇu "adjective, which
does not distinguish one object from the other of the same kind".
The reference is found in cuṭra

  iNaccuṭ ṭilla :p paṇṇukol peyarkkoṭai
  vaLakka:Ralla ceyyu la: Re: [18]

  which is generally interpreted as

  "the use of adjectives which are not restrictive in character is
  allowed only in poetry".

  Though the present author differs from others in detail he perfectly
  agrees with them that in the above cuṭram Tolka:ppiyam speaks about the
  non-restrictive adjective. Tolka:ppiyar was able to understand the differences
  between these two kinds of adjectives, one distinguishing one set of things
  from another set of things of same kind and the other just giving some
  more information about the noun which is modified.

  All the commentators are of the opinion that this kind of usage is
  allowed only in poetry and not in ordinary speech. vaLakka:Ralla ceyyula:
Re: is interpreted as 'it is not in the ordinary speech; but only in the poetry'. But one can very often find expressions like

ni:lakkaṭal  blue sea
velai tantam  white tusk

etc. even in ordinary common speech where adjectives like ni:lam 'blue', velai 'white' are used as non-restrictive adjectives.

vaLakka:Ralla ceyyulua:Re:really means "adjectives are customarily used to distinguish one member from the other member of the same kind of items but the use of non-restrictive adjectives is something not customary. It is used to say something poetically or emphatically". If this interpretation is accepted one can account for such usages in ordinary speeches also. It is very gratifying to note that the earliest extant grammar of Tamil was able to note such a minute differences between these two grammatical categories and considers it as to be incorporated in the grammar.

2 Tolka:ppiyar also said something very near to this. Dealing with cases he says :

"ve:RRumaip porulai virikkum ka:lai
i:RRunin RiyaluN tokaivyaiN pirintu
palla:Ra:kap porulpuṇaṁ ticaikkum
ella:c collum uriya veNpa"

"When one wants to explicate the meanings of the cases mentioned above it is said that all words [verbs] which give appropriate meaning must be considered".

Commentators give the following examples :

kutirai te:r  horse chariot

chariot  \{ dragged \} by horses etc.

kulaik ka:tu = ear with rings

ear  \{ worn with \} rings etc.

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This paper is a revised version of my paper with the same title that I presented at the Seminar on Dravidian Linguistics-V held at the Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics, Annamalai University from 28th February to 2nd March, 1975.
WORD-FORMATION AS A
LINGUOSTYLISTIC CATEGORY

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Morphology is firmly established as the science of the system of morphological oppositions, proper to a given language, that is, the system of its grammatical categories. Derivation and composition form the "lexical" part of morphology. At present, although we possess vast amounts of descriptive information, neatly arranged into types, patterns, etc., there is still plenty of controversy as far as the problems of lexical morphology are concerned. In spite of the enormous amount of work done, the relationship between the facts of a given language, the proposed categorizations, and the methods of investigation has not been properly explained.

It is difficult to find a linguistic trend not concerned, one way or another, with questions of lexical morphology, or word-formation. It is also a well-known fact that there exists a large number of papers and monographs where the relevant basic theoretical questions are discussed in detail, such as: the place of word-formation among other linguistic disciplines; the problem of productivity of word-building patterns; the relationship between morphological segmentability (clemimost') and derivational capacity (proizvodnost'); the principles of morphemic (morfemnyj) analysis as distinct from those of derivational (slovoobrazovatel'nyj) analysis, and many others.

However much may have already been said and written on the subject of "patterns" and "productivity" within different trends and directions of modern linguistic science, the problem still stands out. There is every reason to believe that neither the so-called "traditional" investigations, nor the newest struc-
turalist approaches to lexical morphology have arrived at anything that could be regarded as really conclusive. It is, therefore, worth-while to repeat here Morris Halle’s pronouncement made in his report to the Eleventh Congress of Linguists: “In spite of its obvious importance morphology, as this part of a grammar is traditionally called, has up to the present remained relatively unexplored”*. Thus even the above-mentioned distinction between “segmentability” and “derivational capacity”, although clear enough theoretically, is hardly ever applied to actual research⁸.

Let us take, for example, three nouns all belonging to the same structural pattern: over-reacher, swimmer, butler—and try to analyse them from the point of view of word-formation. Now, over-reacher is obviously an “occasional” or nonce-word. It is (1) readily segmentable into over-reach- + -er (morphological segmentability), (2) thus proving the unlimited derivational capacity of the pattern. The word swimmer is different from over-reacher in the sense that it is not a nonce-formation: it is firmly established as part of the language’s word-stock. When using the word swimmer (which happens very often) the speaker takes little or no notice of its inner form, of its morphological structure, while in the case of over-reacher the inner form of the derivative cannot fail to impress itself both on the speaker and the hearer. Nevertheless, there remains the obvious fact that swimmer consists of swim- + -er. As for butler, it is decomposable into [ bʌtə ] [ ə : ] as a result of back-formation. The fact that a ‘butler’ can be said to “buttle” shows, as it very well should, that an absolutely productive pattern works both ways.

The problem is further complicated by lack of one-to-one correspondence between the Russian and the American English metalanguages. In the latter tradition (since the publication of Leonard Bloomfield’s “Language”) there have been assumed to exist three basic categories, or models of linguistic description, including lexical morphology: (1) IA—item and arrangement (c/enimost’); (2) IP—item and process (proizvodnost’); (3) WP—word and pattern (slovo i model’). Thus three instead of the Russian two.
"Item" here stands for morpheme, the smallest meaningful unit of the language. This unit or element is combined with other elements according to certain rules of "arrangement". When morphemes are "arranged" according to certain rules, the result is regarded both as a "static" entity (IA), and as a process (IP). There is also the third member of the triad.

The introduction of the term "word" requires additional explanation. It must always be borne in mind that however freely we may speak of morphemes, they only occur within words, as part of already existing or previously coined words. Patterns and lexical-morphological productivity, therefore, should never be discussed in the abstract, but only against the background of the already existing lexis, or vocabulary, of the language. This put us in mind of Morris Halle whose work in the field of word-formation seems to open up new vistas—especially as far as the development of lexical-morphological theory in the USA is concerned. According to Halle⁴, we require not only a list of "formatives" (or morphemes) + a system of morphological rules (which together determine the potential words of a language), but also (3) a dictionary of the already existing lexemes. The complete picture can then be presented in the following diagram:

```
List of morphemes   Rules of word-formation   Dictionary of actual words
```

Bringing in the already existing lexemes is most important because linguistics cannot be divorced from philosophy: linguistic analysis must always go hand in hand with the philosophical study of the facts of a given language. Derivational analysis cannot be confined to a mechanical "cutting up" or segmentation of words into morphemes (mexaniceskaja krojka morfem, as V. V. Vinogradov called it): the ultimate aim of the analysis is to get an insight into the unfathomable depths of meaning which is hidden behind the seemingly clear and transparent morphological structure of derived words⁵.
Philological investigation always implies the study of texts. Thus, for instance:

"Yes," sighed Hannah, "that's the main trouble with having money. It makes people want to say "Pooh". And mostly they are a little too decent to say it, but they keep thinking it and wanting to say it until their mouths and noses get a sort of poohy expression."

(L. Douglas)

If we merely segmented "poohy", the only thing that would immediately strike the eye would be the fact that the adjective is formed by means of the productive suffix "-y", but the root-morpheme in this case is neither nominal nor verbal, being represented by the interjection "pooh", so that the pattern turns out to be extended to include interjections and not only nominal or verbal stems.

Interesting as all these considerations may be, they do not give us even an approximate idea of what is the actual meaning or "philological value" of the nonce-word "poohy"? The text tells us that although the interjection "pooh" usually expresses something like: "What does all this matter to me?" or "I don't care", "poohy" does not simply mean "haughty and contemptuous". The word is used here not to convey matter-of-fact information—that is, describe a person as haughty and contemptuous,—but to express a certain evaluative-emotional "content", to describe the speaker's attitude, and at the same time to draw the reader's attention to the unusualness of the form and thus enhance the intended stylistic effect.

Examples of this kind could be multiplied indefinitely: it is not difficult to show the ease with which speakers and writers use different (but always highly productive) word-building patterns to "invent" occasional words. Thus, for instance:

Years of association with her had left him with no doubt as to his Aunt Hermione being a pretty hard-boiled egg, but he had never suspected her of quite such twenty-minutes-in-the-saucepan-ness as this.

(P. G. Wodehouse)
P. G. Wodehouse freely draws upon the potential resources of the substantival pattern in "-ness", forming an occasional word with a word-combination ("twenty minutes in the saucepan") for a stem. The comic effect produced by the nonce-formation is due not only to its unusual form, but also to the fact that it serves to sustain a humorous metaphor: "a pretty hard-boiled egg" is Bertie Wooster's favourite way of describing this relative, but indignation at her petty and tyrannical nature called for something more expressive than the usual phrase.

Professor Pringle was a thinnish, baldish, dyspeptic-lookingish cove with an eye like a haddock...

(P. G. Wodehouse)

—not merely "dyspeptic-looking", but with something of that quality, with "-ish" all along to mollify the attributes.

There was the dining-room, solidly, port-winily English, with its great mahogany tables, its eighteenth-century pictures—family portraits, meticulous animal paintings.

(Aldous Huxley)

Obviously, this nonce-formation can be correctly understood (as is always the case when textual / philological / reality is the subject) only if the reader is able to appreciate the particular and peculiar "vertical context".

Everyone who is familiar with English fiction knows very well that in works of literature the very productive, mobile, easily reproducible patterns can be and are not only used, "neutrally", for straightforward purposes of intellectional information, but also for specific stylistic and aesthetic purposes. How, then, should formations of this kind be treated within the problem of "patterns and productivity"? Can we be allowed to go on refining the methods of structural description disregarding the functional aspect of derivational processes and, worse still, neglecting altogether the sociolinguistic aspect of the problem? Patterns are dead, their study is sterile and profitless if only the more formal, morphosyntactic aspect of the problem is taken into account. In formations like,
for example, "poohy" or "twenty-minutes-in-the-saucepan-ness" it is not the morphosyntactic, but the functional aspect of the derivational process that comes to the fore. Otherwise stated, when studying a natural human language, our attention should be focused on the way this or that word-building model functions in actual speech. This is especially important in the investigation of productive patterns, because the productivity of a pattern is most clearly manifested on the level of speech, as part of what is now described by the formally "barbaric", but essentially very useful term "speechology". It follows that in cases of this kind special methods of linguistic study are required, which have already been laid down in the well-known works of V.V. Vinogradov and G.O. Vinokur. The main idea, the basic principle on which the whole approach is based consists in distinguishing between two functions of speech and, accordingly, between two levels of analysis: the semantic level and the metasemiotic one.

On the semantic level the function of linguistic units consists in passing on information; it is based on the principle that each unit of expression is indissolubly connected with a corresponding unit of content. On the metasemiotic level the functioning of linguistic units (and speech in general) is completely different. Whereas on the semantic level we understand words as such, as a certain expression and a certain content making one global whole, on the metasemiotic level both the expression and the content of the word as used on the semantic level become expression for a new content— the metacontent.

The complex relationship between the semantic and the metasemiotic levels of linguistic analysis was first discovered and explained by leading Soviet linguists. Thus, according to G.O. Vinokur and V.V. Vinogradov, the question of the metasemiotic function of speech is of particular importance when we think of the specific character of fiction and more generally—the artistic creation as based on verbal art. This question was discussed in Vinogradov's and Vinokur's works in connection with the problem of the creative process in literature, literature
as an art, as the specific kind of reverberation of reality which takes the form of images. Let us take the following example:

He needed a shave. Steinfelt and Morgan were *dressers*, John was quite a *dresser* too.

What is a *dresser*? Not simply a person who dresses, somebody who simply gets up in the morning and puts on his or her clothes. What it really means is that the people mentioned were mindful of the clothes they wore and in general of the way they looked; they thought highly of wearing fashionable clothes, were well-dressed people. Evidently, in this case it becomes apparent that it is no longer just *dress* + *er*, but something that is very complex, very subtle and elusive.

He found her too familiar, she found him stupidly insentient, tough and *indiarubber* where other people were concerned.

(D. H. Lawrence)

The use of the nonce-word *indiarubber* expresses *evolution*, which could not be derived as a simple arithmetical sum of the constituent morphemes. *Indiarubber* does not mean “resembling indiarubber” or “containing indiarubber”—the general “dictionary” meaning of the pattern. What the author meant is that the cares and troubles of other people rebounded from his character as they would from an object made of indiarubber.

Isobel and Kitty were “types”. Attractive, good figures, *dumb-blondish*, even though Isobel was a brunette. They had a *naïveté* which was almost too good to be true.

(John Creasey)

It is interesting to note that the author deliberately uses “blond-” to speak of a brunette. To him stupidity is associated with a certain type of “blonde”. The metasemiotic connotation is enhanced by the discrepancy.

Some more examples:

He used to stop my perambulator and pat me on the
head and kiss me: he was an inveterate pram-stopper and patter and kisser.

(Robert Graves)

I caught him snaffling my silk socks. Right in the act, by Jove! Directly I found that he was a sock-sneaker I gave him the boot.

(P. G. Wodehouse)

I will admit that Jupland is a very awkward customer—a trouble stirrer, if there was one.

(C. F. Gregg)

To return to the principles of the philological approach to derivation. Lexical morphology seeks to explain the deep and interesting possibilities which are hidden in the productive derivational structures, to understand the actual functioning of language by exploring the derivational processes as actually occurring in different registers of the oral and the written forms of a language.

This kind of analysis presupposes the "multi-level" approach to derivation: the morphological level (or morphological segmentability) as distinct from the lexicological one (that is, the problems of derivational capacity and productivity). The lexicological level, in its own turn, consists of two: the levels of semantic as against that of metasemiotic productivity.

NOTES


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ja filologiceskogo fakul’teta MGU” | , No. 5, 1948. G. O. Vinokur
focussed his attention on the segmentability of the lexical units,
whereas A. I. Smirnitsky was primarily concerned with the problem
of derivational capacity.

grammar must characterize the difference between potential and
actual words, and this difference is naturally reflected in the proposed
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388-393.
TO THE ETYMOLOGY OF CONDITIONAL VERBAL PARTICIPLES IN DRAVIDIAN

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Conditional verbal participles (CVP) are met with in Tamil, Malayalam, Kota, Kodagu, Kannada, Kuruba, Koraga, Bellari, Telugu, Kolami, Parji, Gadaba, Gondi, Konda, Pengo, Kui and Kuvi.

In Classical Tamil the CVP suffixes -in / -il are added either to the stem (to the -kk-stem in strong verbs), or to the future tense suffixes -pp-, -ip-, as, e.g., in enin / enil 'if say (s)', parkkin / parkkil 'if see (s)', iruppin 'if sit(s)', varuxipin 'if come(s)'. The modern CVP marker -a(l) is added to a past tense suffix, as in Coll. Ta. vandā<Lit. Ta. vandāl 'if come(s)'. It developed from the classical form āxīl 'if become(s)', preceded by a verbal participle, i.e. vandāl 'if come(s)' from vandi āxīl 'having come if become (s).'</p>

In Malayalam the CVP suffixes -il (classical), -āl (modern) are related to those of Tamil. The only structural difference concerns the suffix -il, which in weak verbs can be added to the both stems, like in varil / varuxil, vannāl 'if come(s)', ēṅgil, ennāl 'if say(s)'.

These are connected etymologically with the suffixes -e(n)gi in Mapila Malayalam and -ēn in Kodagu, where Map. Ma. muricce (n)gi 'if cut(s)' and Kod. bandēn 'if come (s)' may be traced historically to verbal participles (*muricci 'having cut', *bandī 'having come') followed by the CVP *ēṅgil 'if say(s)'.

The suffixes -in / -il, which underlie all these forms, are in fact the ancient Dravidian demonstrative-locative words *in / *il 'this place'. The CVPs formed by means of this suffix are in origin composite words, in which the first element (a verbal stem) determines the second element (a noun) on the analogy of
Ta. kuṛi-ōaṅűr ‘drinking water’ from kuṛi- ‘to drink’ and taṅṛir ‘water’. The semantics of the whole construction developed from the locative to the temporal and then shifted to the conditional, i.e. seyyil ‘if do(es)’<* ‘when do(es)’<* ‘(in) the place where do(es)’ on the analogy with eṇnuṁ iṛatti ‘if say(s)’ from iṛam ‘place’.

The same structure is probably to be found in CVPs in Kuruba (like, e.g., in kijjan ‘if do(es)’ from the participle kijja ‘which did’ + -aṅ<*aṅ ‘that place’) and in Classical Telugu, in which the suffix -aṅ (also comparable to *aṅ / *al ‘that place’) is added to a past tense suffix (like, e.g., in pāriṇaṅ / paḍḍaṅ ‘if fall(s)’ from the past participle pāriṇa / paḍḍa ‘which fell’ and -aṅ< * aṅ).

In Modern Telugu the CVP suffix -ē, as in cēstē ‘if do(es)’, originates (P. S. Subrahmanya, 1971, 236) from the word ēṇi(n) ‘if’ (cf. -ēṅi in Kodagu, ēṇi in Tamil), whereas the preceding portion of the word is either traced, as believed by some scholars (e.g., K. Mahadeva Sastri, 1969, 240-241), to the past second person singular (i.e. cēstē< cēsiti-v-ēṇi ‘if thou didst’ with the following generalization of meaning), or, which is more probable, coincides with the non-past verbal participle [i.e. cēstē< cēstu ēṇi(n) ‘if doing’].

In Kannada the CVP suffix -ore / -are (classical) / -are (modern) is normally added to the past tense marker: bandorē, bandare, bandare ‘if come(s)’. In earliest texts, however, some instances may be found when this suffix is also added both to the non-past and the negative markers, e.g. peṅvoṛē ‘if say(s)’; appoṛē ‘if become(s)’, āgadorē ‘if do(es) not become’, ārādorē ‘if cannot’ (B. Ramachandra Rao, 1972, 142). These forms prove that they all are based on reinterpreted in conditional sense combinations of participles with the historic postposition *ore<ōrāṅ ‘when, while, as soon as’, which still can be met with in constructions like Ka. eṅal-ōrāṅ ‘while saying’, Ta. vanda-v-uraṅ ‘when came, on coming, immediately after coming’.

This suffix is also found in the South-Western group (in the form of Be. -ḍa, On. Kor. -ṛe, Tap. Kor. -ṛe -ṛi, Mu. Kor. -ṭe,
-ța), where it is added, however, either to the present tense marker (as in Be. barkđa 'if come(s)'), or to the stems comparable with past or past perfect finite forms (as in On. Kor. kuțtugure 'if beat (s)' with kuțtugu 'she / it beat', Tap. Kor. kațțigarã, kațțageri 'if bind (s)' with kațțigi 'he bound', kațțagi 'he has bound', Mu. Kor. ojjigițe ojjigița 'if say (s)' with ojjigi 'he said').

In Tulu this suffix has still retained the status of a particle (ra ‘if’), which is freely added to any finite form in the indicative mood: kalpuvξ-țra ‘if I learn’, kalt(id)e-țra ‘if he (had) learnt’, etc. In the third person neuter singular the consonant of the particle is assimilated by the personal suffix [as in pŏnga ‘if it went’ from pŏngi ‘it went’ + ra ‘if’, pŏpungena ‘if it goes’ from pŏpungeni ‘it will go’ + ra ‘if’, tintinđa ‘if it had eaten’ from tintinđi ‘it had eaten’ + ra ‘if’], while the whole construction becomes capable of being used in the sense of a single conditional form without person-number distinctions (B. Ramachandra Rao, 1968, 79), thus demonstrating the process of developing CVPs of similar structure in Koraga.

The origin of temporal verbal participles in -ppξ / -ppo (< poźuoi ‘time’) in Colloquial Tamil and in -ccke (< samayam ‘time’) in its Brahmin dialect is quite lucid: they all developed from participle constructions like varappξ < varuxira poźuoi, varaccē < varuxira samayam ‘while coming’.

The relationship ties of CVP forms in other languages are less evident. This concerns the suffix -ē (cf. -ē in Colloquial Telugu), added to the past tense marker in Adilabad Kolami [as, e.g., in véltē ‘if ask(s)’], as well as the conditional-temporal suffixes -oď / -ođel / -ođul in Parji [as in venoď / venođel / venođul ‘when/if come(s)’] and -koř(en) / -goř(en) in (Gadaba) (as in sikoren ‘if give(s)’, sengoren ‘if go(es)’, ndgoř ‘if sit(s) down’), which are added to verbal stems and can be compared with each other (cf. Pa. -oď-el / -oď-ul, Ga. -k/g-oř-en), with the suffixes Class. Ka. -oře, Kor. -re, Be. -da, with the particle ra in Tulu and with the postposition uraŋ in Tamil.

Another group of conditional and conditional-temporal ver-
bal participles is formed by suffixes -ek in Parji (like verek ‘when/if come(s)’), -ēkē, -k’u, -ku in Gondi [like Adb. Go. vātēkē ‘when/if came’, văṅēkē ‘when come(s)’, Koya Go. at’k’u ‘if come(s)’ < a-tt-k’u, Gommu Go. tuṅtku ‘if do(es)’] and -eka in Kui [takiteka ‘if go(es)’], which are added either to the past or to the non-past tense marker (with the corresponding semantic difference) in Adilabad Gondi and to the past tense marker elsewhere.

The forms in -mēl (feasible condition), -cōtk (irrealis) in Kota (like vadmēl ‘if come(s)’ < *vanda mēl ‘after coming’, vadcōtk ‘if had come’), -ēm in Parji (like menem ‘when/if there is/are’), -ēn(a) in Konda [like vātiṅ(a) ‘if come(s)’, ḍigniṅ(a) ‘if go(es)’], -is / ihiṅ (with -ihiṅ from -is + -iṅ) in Pengo [like wātis / wāthiṅ ‘when/if come(s)’] and -ihe in Kuvi /like tōstihe ‘if demonstrate(s)/look isolated and remain unexplained. Here may be added the CVP in -t found in certain dialects of Gondi (like Chanda Go. arte ‘if fall(s)’, hite ‘if give(s)’) as its similarity with Colloquial Telugu forms in -tē is not yet explained. This is also true of temporal verbal participles in -tele / -dele (like astele ‘when caught’, kērdele ‘when sang’) in Pengo.

On the whole the review of conditional and conditional-temporal verbal participles proves that these forms are of relatively late origin and develop in various groups of the Dravidian languages in different ways.

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SANSKRIT INDECLINABLES (UPASARGAS AND NIPĀTAS) AND THEIR MEANING

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Avyaya, nipāta, upasarga, gati and karmaprasaṅgāniya are the names by which indeclinables and their varieties are known in Sanskrit. Of these, upasarga and nipāta were first treated of in Yāska's Nirukta among the works now available. These two were taken by Yāska as mutually exclusive parts of speech along with nāman (nominal stem) and ākhyāta (verb).¹ Pāṇini included upasarga and nipāta in the class of words known as avyaya. Avyayas are so called because they do not undergo any change (vyaya) of form in the process of declension. Thus Patañjali gives the following kārikā:

sadṛśam triṣu liṅgeṣu sarvāṣu ca vibhaktiṣu/
vacaneṣu ca sarveṣu yan na vyeti tad avyayam∥

'That word is known as avyaya whose form is the same in three genders and in all the case-endings and which does not vary in any number'. Yāska would call any indeclinable, other than the upasarga, a nipāta, and the indeclinables other than the upasarga and nipāta he would bring under the category of nāman.

Yāska defines the nipāta as: uccaṅcaṣeṣu artheṣu nipatanti.² Nipātās are so called because they are used (nipatanti) in various (uccāva) senses. He then notes the meanings of the nipātās, viz., iва, na, cit, nu, etc.²a The upasarga he discusses earlier. He enumerates twenty upasargas (viz., ā, pra, parā, abhi, prati, ati, su, nir, dur, ni, ava, ut, sam, vi, apa, anu, api, upa, pari and adhi) and notes their meanings.⁴

Even before Yāska there was a controversy among grammarians and etymologists as to whether upasargas had any meaning of their own. Yāska refers to two opposite views on the question—one of Śākaṭāyana and the other of Gārgya. The first view he presents thus: na nirbaddhā upasarga arthān nirā-
According to Śākaṭāyana, upasargas cannot denote any meaning being detached from the nominal stem or verb. The commentator Durgācārya clearly says under the aforesaid statement of Yāska: yathā varṇāṁ padād apagatānāṁ arthābhidhānaśaktir nāsti evam eteṣām api nāmākhyātaviyoge'rthābhidhānaśaktir nāsti: 'As letters detached from the word have no power of conveying meaning, so also these (upasargas), when separated from the nominal stem or verb, have no power of conveying meaning.' Then, how are upasargas meaningful? Yāska continues: nāmākhyātayos tu karmopasāmyogadyotakā bhavanti: 'Upasargas simply suggest (dyotaka) the very sense of the nominal stem and verb adding some speciality to it.' Durgācārya comments: yathā pradīpasāmyoge dravyasya guṇaviśeṣo'bhiyayamāno dravyāśrayo bhavati, na pradīpāśrayōḥ: 'As the quality of a substance, revealed through its association with the lamp, belongs to the substance itself and not to the lamp (so also the meaning of the nominal stem or verb suggested by the prefix belongs to that stem or verb and not to the prefix).

As opposed to this theory of Śākaṭāyana, Yāska presents the theory of Gārgya thus: uccāvacāḥ padārthā bhavantiiti gārgyāḥ: 'According to Gārgya, upasargas themselves have various meanings'. Durgācārya has clarified the theory in his commentary. He refutes the analogy of letters and the word. As a matter of fact, Durgācārya maintains, letters are meaningful, otherwise their aggregate, the word, cannot be meaningful. The pieces of thread, which are not white, cannot make a white piece of cloth. The example of lamp also is not a happy one. The quality of illumination does, in fact, belong to the lamp; otherwise it would not reveal objects. Similarly, only themselves being meaningful, upasargas can suggest the meaning of nāman and ākhyāta. Durgācārya concludes his comments on the statement in question by saying that the meaning of the ākhyāta is action in general whereas the meanings of upasargas are the particular actions (tasmād upapannam upasargasya kriyāviśeṣo'rtah kriyāsāmānyamatram ākhyātasyeti //).
In support of Gārgya’s theory Yāska presents his own Conclusion thus: *tad ya esu padarthah prāhur ime tam nāmākhyātayor arthavikaraṇam*⁸: ‘Thus upasargas express (prāhuḥ) meanings, as noted, which change the meaning of nominal stems and verbs.’ The compressed idea of the statement has been clarified by Durgācārya in his commentary: *ya esūpasargēsu svō-’nekapraṅkāro’rtha iti prāhur eva tam ime upasargāḥ padavīśeṣāḥ pṛthag api santah// koh punar asāv iti ? acyate—“nāmākhyātayor arthavikaraṇam”/* arthavikriyām ityarthaḥ | tasmād arthavanta eveti // Thus, √gam means ‘to go’, a—√gam means ‘to come’ and it is the meaning of the prefix a which contributes the change of meaning of the verb from ‘going’ (in gacchati) to ‘coming’ (in āgacchati). This is the view of Yāska. However, Yāska does not refer to any such controversy regarding nipātas in general—a controversy which developed in the later period. The addition of a prefix to a nominal stem may however, be understood as its addition to a basic root from which a noun is formed (as in saṅgama from sam—√gam, āgama from a—√gam).

After Yāska we come to Pāṇini who notes all the three terms, viz., avyaya, nipāta and upasarga. Avyaya is introduced by him as svarādiniṇipātam avyayam⁹, which commentators explain thus: Words like svar (‘heaven’) and the nipātās are known as avyayas. He also includes the following categories of words in the class of avyaya: (i) words formed with the secondary suffixes (taddhitaprayaya) to which all case-endings are not applicable; (ii) words formed with the primary suffixes (kr̥tr̥prayaya) ending in m, e and ai; (iii) words formed with the suffixes ktvā,屋顶 and kasun; and (iv) the avyayibhāva compound¹⁰. Pāṇini defines nipāta as prāgrīśvarān nipātāḥ¹¹, meaning thereby that the words enumerated after this up to rule I. 4. 97, where the sound riśvara occurs, are known as nipātas. This would include all the upasargas and the words ca, va, ha etc. (when they do not denote a substance) and another category of indeclinables known as karmapravacaniya. Pāṇini defines the upasarga as prādayah // upasargāḥ kriyāyoge//¹²—meaning thereby that the
twenty-two nipātas headed by pra are called upasargas when prefixed to a verb. They are also known as gati⁹, though in addition to the upasargas there are other gatis too—it is needless to say that they are all nipātas. The Pāṇinians enumerate twenty-two upasargas—twenty of them are the same as those enumerated by Yāska and the two new additions are nis and dus. Of course, nir and dur are only substitutes for nis and dus before vowels and soft consonants. This is why Yāska did not mention all these four, but made only one statement: nir dur ityeyayoh prātilomyam where, nir and dur may be understood as nis and dus respectively, in which case also the phonetic junction will give the same form. Karmapravacaniyas are those indeclinables, e.g., anu, upa, which bring forward the special type of relation (sambandhāvacchedahetu, as the Pradipa puts it) between the verb and the other word syntactically related to it¹⁴ as in the sentence śākalyasya samhītām anu prāvarṣat (‘it rained after [the recital of] the Śākalya Samhitā’) where anu suggests that the relation between pravarṣaṇa (‘raining’) and the (recital of the) Śākalya Samhitā is a causal one, which is determined by a verb like niśamya (‘hearing’) to be understood—the whole idea being śākalyasya samhitām anuṣrutiya prāvarṣat (devah) (‘God showered rain after hearing the Śākalya Samhitā¹⁵).

That nipātas on the one hand and gatis, upasargas and karmapravacaniyas on the other hand are not mutually exclusive has been pointed out by Patañjali who quotes the Vārttika-prāgvacananāṃ sañjñānirvṛtyartham and explains that the expression prāk in the aphorism prāgrīśvarān nipātāḥ makes it clear that upasarga, gati and karmapravacaniya (stated in I. 4. 59, 60 and 83 respectively) do not go against the class of nipāta which is a general name for all these types. Otherwise the name nipāta would be applicable only to the indeclinables ca etc. prescribed in I. 4. 57-58, and the categories mentioned later in I. 4. 59, 60 and 83, being technically anavakāśa (‘having no other scope’) would be applicable to other indeclinables covered by these aphorisms.¹⁰

The conception of the separate categories of nipāta, upasarga,
gati, and karmapravacaniya coming under the general class of avyaya is due to the fact their functions are different. Karmapravacaniyas govern different case-endings according to the Pañinian aphorisms II. 3. 8-11; gatis form various compounds and change the original accent in certain cases (for example, by VIII. 1. 70-71), and upasargas are prefixed to roots (by I. 4. 80) in order to convey various meanings of the verb. As regards the avyaya and nipāta, Patañjali raises an objection: Why are not avayayas like svar, antar, prātar included in the list of nipātas, viz., ca, va, ha, aha, etc.? The apparent solution is that, ca etc. as nipātas do not denote substance, but svar etc. denote either substance or non-substance; hence they are different. Why not call all of them nipātas instead of making two sañjñās? Patañjali answers: There will be a technical difficulty. The rule nipāta ekāj anāh (I. 1. 14), which makes a nipāta consisting of only one vowel a pragṛhya, which makes any phonetic junction with it impossible, will be applicable to words like kva (formed with the secondary suffix a [ t ], which consists of only one vowel, added to the pronominal stem kim); but this is not intended. What would be the harm if Pāñini had called all these particles avyayas and made the necessary aphorisms prāg riśrarād avyayam, svarādini and cādayo’sattve? Patañjali does not give any concrete argument against this point but draws on the authority of the vārttika—avyaye naṅkunipātānām. Since nipāta is separately mentioned here, it is obligatory to count them as such. Kaiyata tries to supply a concrete argument in his Pradiṇa: If all these particles are called avyaya, nipāta ekāj anāh has to be aphorized as avyayam ekāj anāh, and in that case any indeclinable consisting of only a single vowel (e.g., at in kva) would be a pragṛhya, which is undesirable; for the cases of the prohibition of sandhi this would be too wide. To avoid this difficulty, if the aphorism be formed as cādaya ekāj anāh, it would be difficult to apply the epithet asattvavacana (cf. cādayo’sattve—I. 4. 57) to cādayaḥ. Nāgeśa, in his Uddyota, points out that this is not a problem at all. Cādaya ekāj anāh might be split up
into two aphorisms—cādayah and ekāj anāh and asattve might be an epithet of cādayah. Nāgeśa endorses the view of Patañjali, namely, the authority of the vārttika. ¹⁷

As regards the expressiveness or otherwise of nipātas, Pāṇini does not say anything clearly. In the rule cādayo’sattve¹⁷ he mentions the indeclinables ca etc. as nipātas when they do not mean ‘substance’ (sattva or dravya). Patañjali points out that the negative particle nañ (a) in the expression asattve is a case of prasaṣjayapraṭiṣedha. Accordingly, this much is clear from the aphorism that Pāṇini did not want ca etc. to be nipātas when used to mean a substance. But whether as nipātas ca etc. would have any meaning or not, Pāṇini did not say expressly. Consequently, we do not know his own view about the expressiveness (vācakatva) or suggestiveness (dyotakatva) of nipātas. From Kātyāyana’s vārttika—nipātasyānarthakasya prātipadi-katvam, it is apparent that Kātyāyana accepted some nipātas to be meaningless and some to be meaningful. But Kaiyāṭa understands this vārttika differently. According to him, nipātas do not express any meaning but simply suggest the meaning of the associated word (they are thus dyotaka and not vācaka) and the meaningless nipātas are those which do not have even this suggestive capacity (e.g., pra in pralambate, ni in nikhañjati); for bringing these nipātas under the class of prātipadika, Kātyāyana formed the present vārttika. ¹⁸

In the Second Āhnikā of the Mahābhāṣya Patañjali raises a question, whether or not individual letters have any meaning. The prima facie view is that, roots, stems, suffixes and nipātas consisting of only one letter, e.g., eti where e represents the root, abhyām where the first a represents the stem, aupagavah where the last a represents the suffix and the nipāta a in the sense of apehi (‘keep off!’) are seen to be meaningful; hence letters have meaning. After a series of arguments and counter-arguments, Patañjali comes to the conclusion: yad dhātupra-tyayaprātipadikanipātā ekavarnā arthavantaḥ, ato’nye’narthaka iti./ svābhāvikam etat (only roots, suffixes, stems and indeclinables consisting of a single letter are meaningful, other single
letters are ‘meaningless; this is quite natural). From this it appears that Patañjali considered at least some nipātas to be meaningful. That this meaning is the expressed (abhihita) meaning is corroborated by the fact that when one says a and means apehi (‘keep off’), there remains no other expression to which this meaning may be ascribed as an expressed one. Besides, the nipāta has been mentioned along with dhātu, prātipadika and pratyaya, each of which has its own meaning. This is further supported by the fact that under Aṣṭādhyāyī II.1.6, which prescribes the avyayībhāva compound with indeclinables like adhi, upa, su in the sense of vibhakti (case-ending), samīpa (proximity), samṛddhi (prosperity), etc., Patañjali admits these meanings to be of the nipātas (su, etc.). This is clear from his concluding comment there: atha vā neme samāsārthā nirdīṣyante // kim tarhi? avyayārthā ime nirdīṣyante / eteṣu artheṣu yad avyayām vartate tat subantena sāha samasyata iti[\(^{18b}\)]

This, however, does not mean that Patañjali advocated the expressiveness of nipātas in general. For example, in the expression sumadrōḥ, sumagadāḥ etc., Patañjali would not allow the avyayībhāva compound because, as Kaiyaṭa paints out under the concluding Bhāṣya just quoted, here the sense of samṛddhi is not denoted by su, but by madra etc., su only suggests it. This is the implication of the aforesaid comment of Patañjali whereby he takes nipātas as expressive in some cases (in which cases avyayībhāva is allowed), and suggestive elsewhere. As regards upasargas, Patañjali admits only their suggestiveness. This is clear from his comments on the rule gatir gatau, which we shall discuss later on.

In the posterior grammatical literature, Bhartrihari has treated of the nipāta in the Second Kāṇḍa of the Vākyapadīya. Though he is the champion of the unique theory of sphaṭa or the eternal speech (śabdabrahman) which is indivisible and proclaims that the indivisible sentence is the unit of language, he assumes different categories of individual words for pragmatic purposes. Nipātas would come under one such category. As regards their expressiveness or otherwise in the language,
Bhartrhari admits an irregularity (anaiyatya, as Puṇyarāja puts it) in the following kārikā:

nipātā dyotakāḥ kecit prthagarthabhidhāyinaḥ /
āgama iva ke ’pi syuḥ sambhūyārthasya vācakāḥ //\*80

Some nipātas suggest a meaning (dyotaka), some are separately meaningful (abhidhāvin or vācaka) and some express a meaning only in combination with another word (sambhūya arthasya vācakāḥ) as is the case with augments (āgama). Puṇyarāja notes a different reading of the second quarter: prthag arthanī prakalpate (? prthagarthaparakalpane) and explains thus: Some nipātas are meaningful and some are meaningless. Nipātas are meaningful in the sense that they suggest a meaning and the meaningless are those which do not do so but are added to a word, like augments, to denote meaning jointly with the word (not independently, e.g., pra in pralambate). As regards upasargas in particular, Bhartrhari notes three alternatives in the following kārikā:

sa vācako viṣeṣāṇāṁ sambhavād dyotako’pi vā /
saktyādhānāya dhātora vā sahakāri prayujyate //\*8ś

Here it is stated that the upasarga may be vācaka or dyotaka or expressive of the meaning jointly with the root. In the couple of kārikās which follow immediately, Bhartrhari establishes the second and third alternatives. But earlier in kārikā 182, he says that the upasarga is practically inseparable from the root, they have to be jointly taken as one unit—evidently they are jointly responsible for the meaning. (We shall discuss this kārikā later on).

After Bhartrhari the meaning of the nipāta was discussed in detail by grammarians like Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (in his Vaiyākaraṇa-siddhāntakārikā), Koṇḍabhaṭṭa (in his Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa, a detailed commentary on Bhaṭṭoji’s Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā, and its abridgement Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasūra) and Nāgėsabhaṭṭa (in his Laghumaṅjūṣa of which the Paramalaghumaṅjūṣa is an abridgement—the original largest version Maṅjūṣa or Bhṛhanmanjūṣa is not available now). All these grammati-
rians upheld the theory of the suggestiveness (dyotakatva) of the nipāta.

When Nāgęśa wrote his Mañjūsā, the nipāta had already had a long history of its treatment in the tradition of grammarians. The suggestiveness of nipātas was a widely accepted truth. In the Paramalaghumañjūsā, Nāgęśa begins his discourse on the ‘Meaning of Nipātas’ (Nipātārthanirṇayaḥ) by referring to this point. In sentences like anubhūyate sukham (lit., ‘pleasure is felt’, i.e., one finds pleasure), sākṣātkriyate guruḥ (‘the preceptor is perceived’) the senses of ‘feeling’, ‘perceiving’, etc. belong to the roots bhū, kṛ and so on. The nipātas, viz., anu, sākṣat, etc. serve to suggest these meanings of the basic roots bhū, kṛ, etc. which are ordinarily used to denote the senses of ‘being’, ‘doing’, etc. respectively. There are two aspects of the meaning of a root (dhātvartha): (i) an action or vyāpāra and (ii) its result or phala. Nāgęśa in his discourse on the ‘Meaning of Roots’ (Dhātvarthanirūpaṇam) says: phalā-nukulo yatnasahito vyāpāro dhātvarthah: the meaning of a root consists in an action accompanied by an effort (yatna on the part of the agent) leading to a result. According to an earlier view, a root is transitive or sakarmaka if the vyāpāra and phala it denotes rest in two different loci (adhikaraṇa); if they rest in the same locus, the root is intransitive or akarmaka.

Accordingly, in the sentences under discussion, the roots bhū and kṛ denote the results, viz., feeling and perception, of the actions pertaining to sukha (pleasure) and guru (preceptor) respectively and the actions of feeling and perceiving belonging to the agent (a locus different from sukha or guru); and this makes the verbs transitive. The objects (karman) are sukha and guru, because the result of the agent’s action accrues to them. Nāgęśa’s own definition of sakarmaka and akarmaka are, however, different. In the section on the ‘Meaning of Roots’ he says: vastutas tu śabdaśāstriyakarma-saṁjñākārthānvanvyaarthakatvam sakarmakatvam | tadanvanvyaar-thakatvam akarmakatvam. A verb syntactically related to a word which is a karman in the technical sense of the term
according to the science of grammar (śabdasūstrīyakarman, which has been recorded by Pāṇini in Aṣṭādhyāyī, 1.4.46-53) is sakarmaka, a verb not related to such a word is akarmaka. According to this view also, the object or karman is the recipient of the result of action which is denoted by the root (dhātvartaphala). The point is that, the sense of anubhava or sākṣatkarā is denoted by the root bhū or kr itself, anu or sākṣat is only the suggestive element. This would justify the use of root bhū as a transitive verb.

What is dyotakatva or suggestiveness? Nāgaśa explains: To he dyotaka or suggestive is to bring forward the meaning of the word with which the relevant word is associated (svasa-mabhīvyāhṛtapadanisṭhavṛtttyudbodhaka). Thus, in anubhūyatā sukham, anu is dyotaka of the sense of ‘feeling’ insofar as it reveals this sense of the root bhū with which it (anu) is associated as an upasarga, without which the root is ordinarily used in the sense of ‘being’. In some cases the nipāta is dyotaka in the sense that it supplies (is ākṣepaka of) a particular verb (to be associated with the main verb). Thus, in prādeśam vilikhati (‘one is noting down the place’) which, actually means ‘noting down after measuring the place’, vi supplies the verb mityā (‘having measured’); in other words, vi stands for vimāya. To corroborate this, Nāgeśa quotes the authority of Kaiyaṭa who, while commenting on aighthā sabdānuṣūsanam, the opening words of the Mahābhāṣya, says that the word aighthā here supplies the verb ‘beginning’ (prārmbhakriyākṣepakatvam, as Nāgeśa puts it). In some other cases, a nipāta as dyotaka means ‘that which determines the particular relation of a word to the verb of the sentence’ (sambandaparicchedaka). This refers to the karmaprabhavaniyas, which determine the particular relation of a word, after which such a particle is placed (e.g., anu after japam in the sentence japam anu prāvarṣat—accordingly, karmaprabhavaniya is sometimes translated as ‘post-position’), to the verb of the sentence.

Now a question may arise, in anubhūyatā sukham, sākṣat-kriyate guruḥ, etc. why do we take bhū, kr, etc. as separate
roots and in order to justify their different meanings take recourse to niṇpātus as suggestive elements denying their expressive capacity? Would it not be simpler to take the whole combinations, viz., anu-bhū, sākṣāt-kṛ, etc. as the basic roots meaning ‘to feel’, ‘to perceive’ and so on? Nāgeśa gives two answers: (i) anu-bhū, sākṣāt-kṛ, etc. are not the roots simply because they are not read (apāṭhāt) in the list of dhātus as recorded by Pāṇini; and (ii) there will be difficulty in the addition of the augment (āgama) aṭ and in other grammatical operations (ādādyavavasthāpateh). By the rule luhānlṇkṣv aṭ udāttah, the particle aṭ (= a) comes just before a root when luh, laṅ or lṅ follows. This gives forms like abhūt (√bhū in luh), abhavat (√bhū in laṅ), abhaviṣyat (√bhū in lṅ). If the root be preceded by a prefix, aṭ comes after the prefix and before the root. Thus we get forms like anvabhūt, anvabhavat, anvabhaviṣyat. If we were to take anu-bhū as the basic root, the augment aṭ would have come before this entire whole and this would have given undesired forms. Further, in the perfect tense (liṭ) the basic root is reduplicated by the rule liṭi dhātor anabhyaśasya in order to give forms like anubabhūva. If anu-bhū were the basic root the whole would have been reduplicated, and this would have given undesired forms. To these two arguments of Nāgeśa, we may add a third one: If the upasarga were part of the root itself, for each separate combination with one or more of the prefixes (e.g., bhū with anu, bhū with prati, bhū with parā, bhū with sam & anu), we would have to admit a separate dhātu. This would have increased the already large number of roots to a fantastically higher number, i.e., in logical terms, we would have gauravadoṣa.

Bhartrhari, however, points out that roots are read in the Dhātupāṭha as separated from upasargas only for the sake of grammatical operations like aṭ, etc. as stated above; but since the particular action is denoted by the root and prefix jointly, they have to be understood jointly as the dhātu proper. Here Bhartrhari lays stress on the whole verb (e.g., anubhavati) instead of its constituent parts (e.g., anu & bhū). In order to
support his contention he cites the example of *saṃgrāmayati* (‘fighting’), a nominal verb formed of the word *saṃgrāma* (‘fight’) of which the forepart *sam* is an *upasarga* to the root *grāma* (of the curādi class). The past tense (*laṃ*) form of this verb is *asaṃgrāmayat* where *aṭ* is added before the prefix *sam* which is evidently taken as an inseparable part of the root, viz., *saṃgrāma*. Similarly, in the desiderative (*sannanta*) form *sisaṃgrāmayiṣate* the reduplication of the prefix *sam* has taken place. Thus, the prefix *sam* has been taken as an inseparable part of the root (*dhātvavayava*), otherwise the rule of reduplication *ekāco deva prathamasya* would not be applicable for the reduplication of *sam*. This example may, however, be criticized on the ground that when the new nominal root *saṃgrāma* is formed, the original root *grāma* and the prefix *sam* are both subordinated to it and have lost their independent value—a fact owing to which the question of their separation at any further stage of grammatical operation does not arise. This, however, does not refute Bhartrhari’s main contention as presented in the *kārikā*, II.182, namely, that the prefix and the root have to be taken as one unit. However, as we have already said, Bhartrhari discusses all these divisions (i.e., sentence into words, words into further constituent parts like stems, suffixes, etc.) absolutely from the pragmatic point of view of the *śāstrakāra*. These divisions are meaningless since the sentence is the indivisible unit of language and denotes meaning as a whole. Thus, even the question of individual words in a sentence does not arise, not to speak of their further analysis into the root, prefix, etc.

Nāgęśa criticizes the Naiyāyika’s view that *upasargas* are *dyotaka* and other *nipātas* are *vācaka*. The Naiyāyika contends that in the *Amarakośa*, *pratyakṣa* (‘direct’ or ‘visible’) and *tulya* (‘comparable’) have been given as the synonyms of *sākṣāt* (*sākṣāt pratyakṣatulyayoh*) which clearly means that the word *sākṣāt*, which is a *nipāta*, expresses these two meanings. Further, in the expression *devāya namah* (‘obeisance to the god’) *namas* is understood as meaning ‘obeisance’ (*naskāra*),
whereas in the expression gave namaḥ (‘homage to the cow’), used in the context of ritual gift, namas is understood as meaning ‘homage’. These meanings are obtained from the equivocal word namas itself by its power of expression.

In conformity with his view on the expressiveness of nipātas, the Naiyāyika defines a sakarmaka (transitive) verb thus: A verb is sakarmaka if it denotes an action (vyāpāra) having a substratum (adhikaraṇa) different from that of the result (phala) denoted either by the root itself (sva) or by the nipāta (e.g., sākṣāt in sākṣātkriyate guruḥ) accompanied by the root (svasamabhivyāθtaṇipāta). Karman (object), the existence of which makes a verb sakarmaka, denotes that which gets the result of the action (phalaśālin)—result which is denoted either by the root (dhātvarthaphala) or by the nipāta, which is accompanied by the root (dhātusamabhivyāθtaṇipātārthaphala).

Nāgęśa’s refutation of this view proceeds as follows: There is no ground for this disparity that some of the nipātas are vācaka and some are dyotaka. So far as the grammatical structure is concerned, anubhāyate and sākṣātkriyate show no difference. Furthermore, the meaning of a nominal stem (nāmārtha), which is quite different in nature from that of a root (dhātvarthā), cannot be directly related (sākṣādanvayābhāvaḥ) to the meaning of the root; it can be so related through the meaning of the case-ending (vibhaktyarthā), e.g., karma (object), karaṇa (instrumentality), etc. And as regards the meaning of the nipāta, it cannot at all be related to the meaning of the root, because in such a case we cannot even take recourse to the meaning of the case-ending—case-ending being absent in the case of indeclinables. Consequently, the Naiyāyika’s contention—svasamabhivyāθtaṇipātārthaphalavysadhikaraṇavyāpāra-vācaka—is not possible. The relation between dhātvarthā (i.e., the vyāpāra denoted by ५क्त and nipātārtha (i.e., sākṣātkāra—or ‘perception’, the result or phala), as proclaimed here, being absurd, we cannot get the connected sense of the root, namely sākṣātikārāniyuktaṇaṁvyāpāra (‘action leading to perception’). Furthermore, even if we admit the karman as the receptacle of
the result or phala denoted by the nipāta (instead of the root), it cannot be called karman unless related to the meaning of the root. Had it been so, says the Commentary Jyotsnā, in the sentence prayāgāt kāśīm gacchati devādattāḥ (‘Devadatta is going to Kāśī from Prayāga’), Prayāga would have been the karman, because it is the receptacle of the result, viz., separation (vibhāga), of the action leading the agent to a distant land. But under the aforesaid condition, Prayāga is not the karman because the result (vibhāga or ‘separation’) is not the meaning of the root. (The meaning of the root gam is uttaradeśasamyo-gānukālavyāpara or ‘an action leading to contact with a distant piece of land’—separation from the point of starting, which is caused by this action, does not belong to the meaning of the root). Similarly, even if the result ‘perception’ (sākṣāt-kāra) be considered to be belonging to the sense of sākṣāt, the nipāta, its receptacle guru cannot be the karman, simply because the said result is not the meaning of the root (kṛ.), but of the nipāta (sākṣāt), according to the Naiyāyika himself. In order to avoid this difficulty, the grammarian would attribute no meaning to the nipāta, but the whole meaning (the action as well as the result) to the root.

When the Naiyāyika says that upasargas are dyotaka, one may ask, how can he say so when he himself does not accept vyañjanā or ‘suggestion’ as a separate function of word (vṛtti)? It should be pointed out that by claiming dyotakatva of nipātas the Naiyāyika does not admit their vyañjanā vṛtti, but simply says that the upasarga just reveals the expressive capacity (sakti) of the root for denoting a particular meaning. Śaṅkara Šāstrin, commentator of Koḍabhaṭṭa’s Vaiyākaraṇa-bhūṣaṇasāra, where the Naiyāyika’s position has been criticized in a similar manner, rightly paraphrases dyotakatva as: svasamabhivyāḥṛtapadagataśaktyunnāyakatvam. Thus, in pratasthe the meaning of ‘departure’ belongs to √sthā itself, pra only reveals the capacity of √sthā for denoting this meaning. In other words, √sthā means ‘to depart’ in association with the prefix pra, which itself has no meaning.
Some grammarians, such as Kṣaṇabhaṭṭa who discusses the same topic in his Vaiṣṇavaśāhṣāna (वैष्णवशाहस्न), raise further objection against the view that nipātas are expressive. If this theory were accepted, we could say sobhanaś ca in place of sobhanah samuccayah (‘a good collection’) and gaṭasya ca in place of gaṭasya samuccayah (‘the collection of jars’), because ca would express the meaning of samuccaya (‘collection’). But no one says sobhanaś ca for sobhanah samuccayah or gaṭasya ca for gaṭasya samuccayah.\(^{80}\) Nāgeśa, however, does not endorse this argument. By the very nature of the nipāta, its meaning may be a qualifying factor (viśeṣaṇa) and not a qualified one (viśeṣya). Hence there is no argument for qualifying ca by sobhana. For the same reason we cannot say gaṭasya ca. Sambandha (relation) rests on two objects which are mutually related, and it is expressed by the sixth case-ending which is added to the viśeṣaṇa, and not to the viśeṣya, as in rājñah puruṣah (‘the king’s agent’) where rāja is viśeṣaṇa and puruṣa is viśeṣya.\(^{81}\) If we say gaṭasya ca, gaṭa would be a viśeṣaṇa to the nipāta ca; this is absurd. Furthermore, in the sentence gaṭaṁ pataṁ ca paśya (‘see the jar and the cloth’), gaṭaṁ (‘jar’) is related to the verb paśya (‘see’) as its object, and hence assumes the second case-ending. The verbal cognition takes this form: gaṭaṁ samuccayavantam pataṁ paśya. Of this relation of samuccaya or ‘combination’, gaṭa or ‘the jar’ is pratiyogin. Samuccaya is related to paṭa or ‘the cloth’ not directly, but indirectly (bhedena). The maxim nāmārthayor abhedānvayo vyutpānṇah\(^{82}\) (‘the meaning of two nominal stems are directly related’) does not apply to the nipāta (nipāṭātīrītavīṣaya). In the present example (gaṭaṁ pataṁ ca paśya), we have, for samuccaya, simply the nipāta ca to which no nominal stem can be directly related. (Of course, if we accept Yāska’s division of words, the very question of the applicability of the said maxim to nipātās would not arise, because according to Yāska, nipāta and nāman are mutually exclusive). Thus, it is not a case of paṭa’s being viśeṣaṇa to samuccaya unlike the case of paṭasya samuccayaḥ. Hence there cannot be the sixth case-ending in paṭa either. This refutes the
argument of a group of grammarians that if nipātas were vācaka, we would have unwanted use of the sixth case-ending.

Nāgėśa then comes back to his original point of discussion, viz., that nipātas are not vācaka. One may ask, if nipātas have no meaning of their own, how can they be prātipadikas? In order to be a prātipadika, a combination of letters must have a meaning. Without being a prātipadika it cannot be a pada and without being a pada it cannot be used in language.\(^8\) Nāgėśa's answer to this question is simple: Nipātas are meaningful in consideration of their suggested meaning (dyotyārtham ādāya arthavattvam). The meaning of a word may be expressed by its primary power (abhidhā or śakti) or indicated by its secondary power (lakṣanā, which, however, is considered by the grammarian to be an extension of the primary power itself, i.e., aprasiddhā śakti) or suggested by the tertiary power (vyañjanā). It is the suggested meaning which makes a nipāta prātipadika, and we have already noted that nipātas which do not have even the suggested sense are rendered prātipādikas, by the vārttika—nipātasyānar-thakasya prātipadikattvam.\(^6\) In the naṅ-compound like abrāhmaṇa ('non-brahmin') the predominance (prādānaya) of the meaning of the second member (e.g., brāhmaṇa in abrāhmaṇa) is proclaimed in consideration of the suggested meaning of the first member, i.e., naṅ (=a). Otherwise the statement uttarapadāṛtha-pradhānas tātipurasah\(^6\) ('in the tatpuruṣa compound the meaning of the final member is predominant') would be meaningless. Similarly, in pratiṣṭhate ('one is departing') the meaning of 'departing' belongs to the root sthā itself (which is ordinarily used to mean 'to stay'), the prefix pra only serves to suggest this meaning out of many meanings of the root. There is a grammatical maxim: anekārthā hi dhātavaḥ ('roots have various meanings'). This is based on the Mahābhāṣya. Under pāñjini's rule bhūvādayo dhātavaḥ (I.3.1), Patañjali admits various meanings of roots and cites the example of tiṣṭhati and pratiṣṭhate. Kaiyaṭa clearly explains that since roots have various meanings, the verb tiṣṭhati itself denotes the sense of motion, pra simply
suggests it. Nāgeśa cities, after Patañjali, the example of pratiṣṭhate in order to show how the prefix can bring forward even the opposite meaning of a root (like ‘departing’ as contrasted with ‘staying’). It has to be remembered that though a root is said to have various meanings, it is ordinarily used in one or a few meanings only (which are mentioned in the Dhātupātha, e.g., bhū sattāyām, edha vṛddhau, etc.), whereas the other meanings may be brought forward by upasargas in different contexts. This, however, depends absolutely on usage—after all, grammar is a practical science.

Since the upasarga has no meaning of its own but suggests the meaning of the root, the grammarian has arrived at the conclusion that the root is first related to the case (sādhana or kāraka), i.e., takes the necessary conjugated forms in accordance with cases like karman, kartṛ, etc. and then it is added to the upasarga. In support of this, Nāgeśa cites a passage from the Mahābhāṣya: (nanu) pūrvaṁ dhātur upasargena yujyate paścāt sādhananeti / pūrvaṁ dhātuh sādhanena yujyate paścād upasargena / (kim kāraṇam ?) sādhanam hi kriyāṁ nirvartayati, tām upasargo viśinaṣṭī, (abhinirvṛttasya cārthasyopasargena vīseṣah sākyo vaktum / ) satyam evam etat yas tvasau dhātupasargayor abhisambandhas tam abhyantare kṛtvā dhātuh sādhanena yujyate / avaśyam caitad evam vijñeyam / yo hi manyate—pūrvaṁ dhātuh sādhanena yujyate paścād upasargenaḥ, āsyate gurūnetyakarmakaḥ, upāsyate gurur iti kena sakarmakaḥ syāt ? The prima facie theory is that the root is first connected with the upasarga and then this whole verb is related to the case. Patañjali opposes this by giving his own view that the root is first related to the case and then connected with the upasarga. The reason for this is that it is the case or kāraka which presents the verb as such. In sa ghaṭam karoti (‘he is making a jar’), it is the third person singular agent saḥ which is responsible for the third person singular verbal form karoti (‘is making’). Similarly, in the passive voice tena ghaṭah kriyate, it is the third person singular object ghaṭah which is responsible for the third person singular verbal form kriyate
(is being made’). Once we get the verb, it can be particularized (viśisyate) by the prefix for the special meaning of the verb to be suggested by it as in sah anukaroti ghaṭam· (‘he is imitating the jar’). Here the verbal form karoti is presented by the agent sah, and then to this verb anu is prefixed in order to suggest the sense of ‘imitation’ of the root kṛ (which ordinarily means ‘to do’). This is true, but there is something more in the process. Even before the root is related to the case, the connexion of the root with the prefix is taken into consideration. In other words, the special meaning of the verb (e.g., ‘imitation’ in the case of √kṛ) brought forward by the prefix is understood in the very beginning. Otherwise it cannot be related to the relevant case. When the verb is thus presented with its relevant meaning, the upasarga is actually added to it. This process must be admitted, otherwise, what makes the verb (√ās) transitive (sakarmaka) in upāsyate guruḥ (‘the preceptor is worshipped’) whereas the same verb is intransitive (akarmaka) in āsyate guruṇa (‘the preceptor sits’)? Obviously, it is the particular meaning of the verb (‘to worship’) which makes it transitive and it is the prefix which suggests this meaning. Thus, if the verb’s subsequent connexion (bhābin yoga) with the prefix is not considered beforehand, guruḥ cannot be related to the verb as its object or karman, and, consequently, the construction of the whole sentence fails.

In order to support this contention, Nāgęśa cites two kārikās from Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadiya and explains them:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{dhātoḥ sādhanayogasya bhūvinah prakramād yathā /} \\
\text{dhātutvam karmaḥbhāvaś ca tathānyad api drśyatām //} \\
\text{buddhisthād abhisambandhāt tathā dhātūpasargayoh /} \\
\text{abhyantarikṛto bhedah padakāle prakāṣate //**}
\end{align*}
\]

As a root is known as such in consideration of its future relation to kāraka (in actual use in a sentence) (because by the rule bhūvādayo dhātavah, roots are those which denote an action and an action cannot be understood as such unless it is related to a kāraka), or, as in the case of the desiderative suffix san
intended to be added to a root, the root is taken as an object to the verb ‘to wish’ (iṣikarman) in consideration of the possibility of its being so elsewhere in an expression like gantum icchati (we say ‘being iṣikarman elsewhere’, because if we already use gantum as object to icchati, the question of adding san does not arise—instead, san is added when there is such a possibility elsewhere). Similarly, the future connexion of the root with the prefix (to occur actually after its relation to the case) is considered beforehand in order to get the relevant meaning of the verb. This is the meaning of the first kārikā quoted by Nāgeśa. The next kārikā quoted by Nāgeśa is actually the next second kārikā occurring in the Vākyapadiya. The intervening kārikā (II. 187) runs thus:

bijakāleśu sambaddhā yathā lākṣārasādayah /
var,ādipāriṇāmena phalānām upakurvate //

This kārikā, which just presents a simile, is necessary to understand the next one in question because they are related by the correlative yathā......tathā. As the fluid of red dye and other things applied at the time of sowing the seed produce colour etc. to the fruits of the tree, similarly, the particular meaning of a root, accessible through the connexion of the root with the prefix borne in mind in the very beginning, reveals itself to the listener when the prefix is actually added to the root for forming the full verb. The meaning of this verbal form belongs to the root itself; but since to the listener it is presented with the prefix, to him it appears that it is the prefix which is added to the root first in order to give the verb its relevant meaning. The implication of the common view that the root is first connected with the prefix is that, the so-called meaning of the prefix is included in the meaning of the root itself. Further elaboration of this point is to be found in the Laghuśānjaśā.

Thus, Nāgeśa propounds the theory of the dyotakatva of the nipāta. After this, he takes up three nipātas—iva, naḥ and eva, and explains the different meanings they suggest.

One may ask—what is at all the necessity of the dispute as to whether nipātas are expressive or suggestive of meaning. At
any rate, like any other word a nipāta also is used in a sentence to convey a particular meaning, and when the use or omission of a particular word in a sentence becomes responsible for the presence or absence of a meaning, that meaning should be attributed to that word. There is no ground for making nipātas an exception to this principle. Thus, the sense of samuccaya would belong to ca, because in an expression like rāmah śyāmat ca, the sense of ‘combination’ can be understood only when ca is there; when it is replaced by vā, the sense of ‘alternation’ is understood in place of ‘combination’—the other parts of the meaning of the whole sentence remaining the same. Why, then, can we not say sobhanaś ca in place of sobhanaḥ samuccayāḥ? The simple answer would be that, the idiom of the language does not permit such a use. All languages of the world have certain idioms which the speaker has to observe. Thus, in English we say ‘drinking water’, but ‘taking tea’, in German for ‘going on foot’ we use the verb gehen, but for ‘going by car’ we use fahren, and so on.

The answer to this objection is not far to seek. The grammarian admits the word, meaning and their relation as eternal (nitya or siddha). Nipātas are used to convey various meanings. Yāska aphorizes: uccāvacesv artheṣu nipatanti. If these various meanings belong to individual nipātas, for a single nipāta, we have to admit several relations to meanings. But if nipātas have no meaning of their own, there cannot be any question of their fixed relation to any meaning and no problem with regard to sabdārthasambandha arises.

An objection may be raised here: If the burden of various meanings is removed from nipātas, it will naturally fall on the associated words. Thus, in candra iva mukham (‘the face is similar to the moon’), if the meaning of ‘similarity’ does not pertain to iva, it must go to candra, which ordinarily means ‘the moon’. How can we, then, solve the problem of various meanings and relations? The grammarian would answer: True that candra means ‘the moon’ and nothing else, but by lakṣaṇā (which is, of course, not a separate function of word, but an
extension of the primary function—aprasiiddhā tākti) candra means here ‘similar to the moon’ and iva simply suggests this meaning.44 Thus there arises no problem with regard to the basic contention siddhe sabdārthasambandhe, the internal relation between the word candra and its primary meaning ‘the moon’ remaining intact.

As regards the Naiyāyika, he does not think of an eternal relation between the word and its meaning. Words, nay, sounds represented by individual letters themselves are not eternal. A sound is produced in the first moment, remains in the second moment and perishes in the third. How is, then, the combination of sounds possible? Nāgeśa notes three explanations: (i) In each letter uttered, the immediately preceding letter exists through an impression of the previous utterance; (ii) the preceding letters linger until the utterance of the last letter through a series of sound-waves; (iii) the last letter is heard along with an impression left by the auditory perception of the preceding letters.45 When the complete word is thus obtained, meaning is understood from it. Each time a word is separately produced and conveys a meaning. There cannot, therefore, be any question of a permanent relation of a permanent word to a meaning. But at the same time the Naiyāyika admits the upasarga to be dyotaka, evidently because he found it difficult to separate the meaning of the prefix from that of the root. This is quite logical. In a verb like anubhavati, if the meaning of ‘feeling’ belonged to the prefix anu, we would expect the same meaning from the verb anugacchati as well. Nor can we say that the meaning pertains to bhavati and that anu has no function at all. Had it been so, we would have understood the same meaning from bhavati, and in place of sukham anubhayate we could say sukham bhayate, which is not permitted by usage. If we take anu-bhā as the basic root and do not at all raise the question of its separation, there will be technical difficulties in the past tense and perfect tense forms involving augment and reduplication. Hence it is logical to conclude that the meaning belongs to the root itself,
but the upasarga is necessary to make this meaning accessible. Where the upasarga does not even do this, we can safely omit it as in the case of upajāyate/jāyate (‘grows’). Up to this the grammarian would agree with the Naïyāyika. But he extends the same theory to nipātas in general. The reasons offered for proving upasargas as dyotaka are applicable, according to the grammarian, to nipātas in general. Nāgeśa, Bhaṭṭoji and his commentator Koṇḍabhaṭṭa—all have laid stress on this point.\textsuperscript{44}

It is often loosely said that nipātas have various meanings. By the various meanings of nipātas, actually their suggested meanings are implied. Certain meanings of a particular nipāta noted in dictionaries are only a few instances (nidarṣana) of the various meanings generally suggested by that nipāta. Thus, Vardhamāna, a grammarian of the 12th century and author of the Gaṇaratnamahodadhi, cites the following kārikā from an old tradition:

\begin{quote}
nipātāś copasargāś ca dhātavāś ceti te trayah
anekārthāḥ smṛtāḥ sarve pāṭhas teṣāṁ nidarṣanam
\end{quote}

Here he speaks of the illustrative meanings of upasargas, nipātas and dhātus. The kārikā cited here follows the tradition of Yāska insofar as it notes the nipāta and upasarga as separate categories.\textsuperscript{45a}

That nipātas, including upasargas, are simply suggestive and have no meaning of their own can be justified by actual uses found in literature. The root yuj means ‘to join’; with the prefix ni it means ‘to employ’. But in the very opening verse of the Kirāṭārjuniya, Bhāravi has used the root yuj without ni in the sense of ‘employing’. The verse runs thus:

\begin{quote}
śṛtyah kurāṇāṃ adhipasya pālanīṁ
prajāsu vṛttāṁ yam ayuṅktai veditum /
sa varṇilingī viditaḥ samāy ayau
yudhiṣṭhirāṁ dvaitaveṇe vanecaraḥ
\end{quote}

(‘The forest-dweller ascetic, whom Yudhiṣṭhira had employed in order to know the conduct of the lord of the Kurus toward his subjects that had protected his royal fortune, came [back] to
him [i.e. Yudhiṣṭhira] in the Dvaita forest, being well-informed’). Here, *ayukta* (aorist form) of the root *yuṣ*, means ‘employed’ (*niyuktavān*, as paraphrased by Mallinātha). The form expected is *nyayukta*. The question arises: How can the poet use *ayukta* in the sense of *nyayukta*—*yuṣ* in the sense *ni-yuṣ*? The only answer possible is this: *Yuṣ* and *ni-yuṣ* are not different in meaning. *Ni* has no meaning of its own, but simply serves to bring forward the meaning of ‘employing’—one of the various meanings of the root *yuṣ*. If we can get this meaning of the root by some other means, the purpose of the prefix *ni* is served thereby. In the present case, the very setting of the verse in the particular context claims that *ayukta* cannot mean anything but ‘employed’ (the meaning of ‘joining’ or the like is not applicable to the spy). The point may be clarified by a simile. Light cannot create an object in a dark room; it can only illuminate and reveal the object, if it really exists there, to a person searching the same. But a person may also be able to know the object existing in the dark room without the help of light by some other means. Similar is the case with the *nipāta* suggesting a particular meaning. If the meaning be accessible by some other means (e.g., context), the *nipāta* may not be used. This is true not only of *upasargas*, but of *nipātas* in general. There are plenty of examples to prove this; only a few will suffice for our purpose.

In the *Kumarasambhava*, when Brahmā says to the gods—

*mayi śṛṣṭir hi lokānām rakṣā yuṣmāsv avasthitā.*

(‘I am responsible for the creation of the [three] worlds, [it is] you [who] are entrusted with their protection’), what is actually meant is *rakṣā yuṣmāsu eva avasthitā*—the meaning of *eva* here is *anavyogavyavaccheda* (‘exclusion of association with something else’). Brahmā wants to exclude himself from the responsibility of protecting the universe and does not find any reason why the gods should come to him after he has offered his creation to them for protection. Thus Mallinātha rightly comments: *lokarakṣeṇe yuṣyam eva kartāra ityāha—mayi lokānām śṛṣṭiḥ / rakṣā yuṣmāsv avasthitā, atas tadartham api*
nāsti madapekṣetyarthah/ Eva is omitted because even without it
the sense of anyayogavavaccheda is available from the context.
Similarly, ca is omitted when the lord of the mountains says to
the sages: ete vayam amī dārāḥ kanyeyāṁ kulajīvitam67 (‘here
am I, here is my wife, [and] this is my daughter, the life of the
race’). Likewise, when the sages speak to Himālaya—

astotuḥ stūyamānasya vandyasyānanyavandinah /
sutasambandhavidhinā bhava viśvaguror guruḥ 68

(‘By means of matrimonial relation of your daughter, be
father [even] of the lord of the universe who is eulogized [by
all], but himself eulogizes none, worshipped [by all], but him-
self worships none’), an emphatic api has to be understood
after viśvaguroḥ. The implication of this is clear in the com-
mentary of Mallinātha where the omitted word api has been
supplied: yo nānyāṁ staute na vandate tasyāpi tvāṁ stutyo
vandyāḥ cetyaho tava bhāgyavattvam. In other words, it
is a great fortune on the part of Himālaya that he is to be
eulogized and worshipped even by one who (as the lord of
the universe) eulogizes and worships none. These and other
similar cases of omission of the nipāta cannot be justified if
nipātas are taken as expressive of meanings. Since the
relevant meanings do not belong to the nipatas but are only
suggested by them, the nipātas are often omitted when the sense
is available otherwise.

That the indeclinable particles like the Sanskrit nipātas have
no meaning of their own is not exclusively a characteristic of
the Sanskrit language only. We can easily understand the
same nature of similar particles in other languages also. Who
can say what exactly are the meanings of the English pre-
positions at, to, in, of, etc. or of German zu, auf, aus, etc.? In
different sentences they are used to convey different ideas. Thus
in the sentence ‘He is throwing the ball at the boy’, at gives the
sense of ‘direction’, whereas in the sentence ‘He will stay at his
office’, at gives the sense of ‘locus’. In the German sentence
‘Das Buch liegt auf dem Tisch’ (‘the book lies on the table’),
auf gives the sense of ‘position’ and hence governs the dative
case, whereas in the sentence ‘Ich liege das Buch auf den Tisch’ (‘I place the book on the table’), auf gives the sense of ‘motion’ and hence governs the accusative case. One has always to learn the use of these prepositions, not their meanings as such. The same is the case with the Sanskrit nipātas.

NOTES

(Including bibliography and abbreviations)

1. tad yānyetāni catvāri padajatāni namākhyate copasarganipataś ca tāntmāni bhavanti // —Nirukta (Niruktam with the Commentary R̄jvartha by Durgācārya, Venkatesvara Press, Bombay, Śaka era 1847 : N ), I.1.8.


3. N, I.4.2

3(a) Ibid., I.4.3—1.11.3

4. Ibid., I.3.7.—22

5. Ibid., I.3.3

6. Ibid., I.3.4

7. Ibid., I.3.5

8. Ibid., I.3.6

9. Aṣṭadhyāyī, I.1.37. See Kaśika on it and Siddhāntakaumudi, rule No. 447.

10. taddhitaś casaravibhaktih // kṛṇ mejantah // ktvātosunkasunah // avyayibhavai ca // —Aṣṭadhyāyī, I.1.38-41

11. Ibid., I.4.56

12. Ibid., I.4.58-59

13. gati ca //. Ibid., I.4.60. Other gatis are enumerated in I.4.61-79


16. /*// prāvyacanam saṁjhā'niyṛtyartham /*//

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18. nipātanāṁ dyotakatvād abhidheyārthābhāve’pi dyotārthhasadhāvad yēṣam arthavattvām teṣaṁ siddhyāteva saṃjña | yasya tu dyoṭoṣyartho nāsti tadartham vacanam ||


18 (b). Ibid., Vol. I, Part 2, p. 360, Col. II.

18 (c). Vākyapadīya, II. 194 (Kāṇḍas I & II with the Prakāśa of Punyarāja, Benares Sanskrit Series Nos. 11, 19 & 24, 1887. The authenticity of the Prakāśa on Kāṇḍa I, has, however, been challenged).

18 (d). Ibid., II 190. It is interesting to note that this karika (with the reading sa bhave dyotako’pi va) is cited by Bhojarāja in his Śrīgāra-prakāśa, Ch. VIII (G. R. Josyer’s edition, Part I, Mysore, 1955 : Ś. P., p 303), where it is coupled with another karika, in support of his theory that upasargas are of six types : vācaka (expressive), dyotaka (suggestive), sahābhidhāyaka (expressive jointly with roots), viśeṣaka (those which regulate the conjugation of the root and / or addition of the suffix or meaning of the root and / or meaning of the suffix), kārtyārtha (those having a particular effect, e.g., cerebralization, on the whole formation) and nirarthaka (meaningless). It is evident that the classification is mutually overlapping. It may be incidentally noted that Bhoja sticks to Pāṇini’s classification of indeclinables, though he speaks of several sub-varieties in Ch. I of the Ś. P. He admits nipātas and karmaprvacantyas to be dyotaka and gatis to be vācaka: gatānāṁ tava sadasadādinaṁ adarānādgrādādivācyanirdeśenaiva gatisaṃjñāvividhānāṁ anirdīṣṭavacanānāṁ aprāyādīnāṁ vācakatvameva gamyate| upasargas tu vācakāḥ dyotākāḥ viśeṣakāḥ sahābhidhāyakāḥ kārtyārthā nirarthakāḥ ca bhavanti | karmaprvacantyāḥ punar nipātavat dyotākā eva | (Ś. P., Ch V, p. 186).


20. Ibid., p. 85.

22. Ibid., p. 100


24. This has been clearly explained by Kāyaṭa in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya under karmapraṇavacantyaḥ. See Note 15.

25. bhūvadayo dhatavaḥ ///—Aṣṭādhyaṭī, I.3.1.

26. Ibid., VI, 4. 71.

26(a). Ibid., VI, 1. 8

27. adina dvirvacanaśamgrahaḥ ///—Jyotsna on PLM, p. 115.

28. aṣṭādynam vyavasthāṁ prathaktvena vikalpanam | dharūpasargayoh śāstre dhatur eva tu ādyāḥ ///—Vākyapadya, II. 182

Pūṇyarāja in his Commentary Prakāśa has clarified the point:

aṣṭādīvṛvacana vā kāṣṭhāṃ kevalaṃ dhatavaḥ prathag upadiṣṭaṃ vastutaḥ puṇar viśīṣṭakriyāvacanaṃ eva ta iti sopasargatam eva dhatuvam ///

29. tatha hi samgrāmayateḥ sopasargad vidhiḥ smṛtaḥ / kriyaviśeṣāḥ samghataḥ prakramyante tathāvādāḥ /// —Vākyapadya, II. 183.

29(a). Aṣṭādhyaṭī, VI. 1. 1.

29(b). See Vākyapadya, II. 7-10 and Pūṇyarāja’s commentary on them.


30(a). P. 368 (Poona edition, as noted below).

30(b). Cf. kīṃ ca prādīnāṁ vācakarve bhūyān prakāraḥ kṣātro niṣcaya itivad bhūyān pra kṣātro nir itiṣṭi syāt / asmanātmā prāder anarthakatvān na tadānīṣṭa ityata eva dyotakatā teṣām syād iti sādhaṃkāntaram abhipretyāḥa viśeṣatī / śobhanaḥ samuccaya draṣṭavyā iṣṭaḥ chobhanāḥ ca draṣṭavyā ityasyāppattes tulyaṃadheṣyavād iti bhavaḥ ///—Vaiśākaraṇabhūṣaṇaṣṭara (Anandārama Series, No, 135, Poona, 1957 : VBS) under Niṣṭārtanābhāṣya, pp. 374-75.

31. Cf. * saṣṭhī teṣa iti ced viśeṣasya pratiṣedah * ///

saṣṭhī teṣa iti ced viśeṣasya pratiṣedho vaktaivyāḥ / "rājñāḥ puruṣa ityatra rāja viśeṣaṃ, puruṣo viśeṣaḥ / tatra prātipadikārtho vyātirikta iti kṛtvā prathamā na prāṇoti /
tātra śaṣṭhi syāt tasyaḥ pratishedho vaktavyaḥ // — Mahābhāṣya, under śaṣṭhi seṣe (2.3.50).-MBh, Vol. I, Part II, p. 519, Col. II.

32. See PLM, p. 104

33. Cf. arthavat adhātur apratyayāḥ prātipadikam // —Aśṭādhyāyī, I. 2. 45 ;
   āyāppātipadikāt // svaujas......// Ibid., 4. 1. 1-2 ;
   suptiṁantaṁ padam // Ibid., I. 4. 14 ;
   avavyād āpsupaḥ // Ibid., II. 4. 82

   This process is necessary in order to use a word in language : nām padam śāstre pravyuṣṭa.

34. See Note 18.

35. Siddhāntakaumudi of Bhaṭṭoji Dikṣita (published by Motilal Banarsidass, Banaras, Vol. II, 2nd Edition, 1949) : Sec 22, Sarvasamāsaśeṣa-prakaraṇam, p. 186. Bhaṭṭoji, however, points out that the statement and other similar statements about other compounds are prāyo'bhiprāya, i.e., not strictly applicable in all cases. But it is certainly applicable in the case of the naṁ-samāsa.

36. pro'yaṁ dṛṣṭāpaścaraḥ ādikaranāṁ vartate / na cedam naṁstī — bahvarthā
   api dhātavo bhavantī / tad yathā—vapiḥ prakirṇaṁ dṛṣṭāḥ chedane cāpi
   vartate—keśasamārū vapattī......evam ithi tiśṭhatīr eva vrajādeśām āha
tiśṭhatīr eva vrajādeśāyāṁ nivrūtītum // —Mahābhāṣya Kaiyata explains:
   pro'yaṁ iti / anyatraṁ prayogetic / tataś cāṇātrāsya yorthe dyatyah sa evāha-
pīpītyanti / anekārthavād dhārināṁ tiśṭhatīr eva gativāctti nṛṇyāyāḥ //

37. Under gatir gatau (VIII. 1. 70) : MBh, Vol. III, pp. 346-47. The bracketted portions are missing in the PLM. Besides, Nāgėśa puts iti after viśnāstī, before the third bracketed portion, evam between hi &
   manyate after avaśyam caitaṁ evam vijñeyam / yo—and tasya after paścād
   upasārgṁeti, before āṣye / gurūṇetāyakarmakaḥ.

38. Vākyapadīya, II. 186, 188. The other theory is presented by Bhartṛhari in II. 185. However, as we have already pointed out, Bhartṛhari's own position was different. Since he did not admit any real division
   of the sentence as such, the whole dispute would be meaningless for him.

39. Strictly speaking gantum cannot be taken as object to the verb
   icchaiti ; it is object only in consideration of the meaning : kārmavatām
   samānakartṛkarvaṁ ca dhātor arthavadārakam / —Kāśika under dhātoḥ
   kārmaṁ samānakartṛkād icchāyaṁ va (III. 1. 7).

40. Cf. siddhe śabdārthasambandhe—first vārttika of Kātyāyana, MBh,
   Vol. I, p. 47 (of Part 1); also, nityaḥ śabdārthasambandhāḥ samānnāta
   mahārṣibhiḥ / sūtraṁ samuṣṭantraṁ bāṣyāṇā ca praṇetibhiḥ // —Vākyapadīya,
   I. 23.
42. Cf. candra iva mukham ityādau candrapadasya svasādyāśe prasiddhā 
śaktir eva lakṣaṇaḥ / "nātvavuktam anayasādyāśhādkikaraṇe" iti nyāyāt / ivapadaḥ tūtparyagrāhakam / tūtparyagrāhakatvam ca svasamabhītvāḥtya- 
padasyārthāntaraśaktidoyakatvam ityāgatam ivapiṭasya dyotakatvam / 
—Nāgāra, PLM, p. 120.

43. varṇām anityatve 'pi uttarottararavgraṇe pūrvapūrvavarṇavarṇavattvam 
avayavāhitottaravasambandhena samākāravāśād gṛhyate iti padasya pra- 
yaksabāvāc chādbaddobhāh / yad va pūrvapūrvavarṇaśaḥ šabādā śabdajayā 
śabdanyāyena caramavarṇapratyakṣaparyantam jayamānena eva saṁtāti na 
padapratyakṣānupapattih / yad va pūrvapūrvavarṇanubhavānyaśaṃkāra- 
sadhṛtecinacaramavarṇānubhavataḥ śabdabodha ityāh / —PLM, p. 67.

44. Thus Nāgāra says : vaiṣamye bjābhāvāt, anubhūyate ityanena 
sākṣātkriyate ityasya samatvāt / PLM, p. 115. He also offers further con- 
crete arguments which we have already explained.

Bhaṭṭoṣi says:

dyotakāḥ prādayo yena nipātāṁ cūdayas tathā / 
upāsyetē hariharau lakāraḥ dṛṣyate yathā / 
tathāntara nipaṭē'pi lakāraḥ karmavācakaḥ / 
vīṣṇūdyayogopī prādivac cūdeke saṃaḥ / 
(Valyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikās, 42-43)

For Kṣṇḍabhaṭṭa's detailed commentary on these. see VBS, 
pp. 368-76.

45. Vardhamāṇa's Gaṇaratnamahodadhi, (ed. by J. Eggeling, Motilal 
Banarsidass, Delhi, Varanasi, Patna, 1963) : Ch. I, p. 43.

45 (a) Elsewhere Vardhamāṇa notes the etymological significance of 
the word nipāta after Yāska : ete coccāvaceṣu artheṣu nipatanti nipātaḥ / As 
regards the meaning of nipātas, he says, some (ca, va etc.) are suggestive, 
some (śaṭvā, kūvit &c.) are expressive, some (kaṁ, im &c.) are meaning-
less and some (na ha vai, na khalu &c.) are meaningful only in a combina-
tion : tatra / 

ke'pyeṣāṁ dyotakāḥ kepi vācakāḥ ke'pyanarthakāḥ / 
āgama iva kepi syah sambhūyārthasya sādhakāḥ /

tatra dyotakāḥ cāvahālāvādayah ; vācakāḥ śaṭvā kūvit prāhṛte praga 
ityādayah / anarthakāḥ kam im id ityādayah / sambhūyārthasya sādhakāḥ na 
ha vai na khalu mūsmyādayah / (Ibid., p. 31) Here he is following the 
tradition of Bhaṭṭhari, though by referring to ke'pyanarthakāḥ he seems 
to have followed Kātyāyaṇa too. At any rate, the dyotakatva theory was 
accepted by Vardhamāṇa, at least partially.

46. II. 28. C-D.

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47. Ibid., VI, 63. A-B.
48. Ibid., VI, 83.

N. B. A gist of this paper was presented in the Section on Indian Linguistics of the 27th Session of All-India Oriental Conference at the University of Kurukshetra in December 1974. The author is highly grateful to Principal Bishnupada Bhattacharya of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta for kindly revising the whole paper and to Professor Dr Bimal Krishna Matilal of the University of Toronto (Canada) for his valuable suggestions.
ON LANGUAGE AS A SYSTEM

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Modern linguistics has indisputably come to look upon language as a system of closely interrelated and interacting elements and facts.

It is this viewing of language as an integral entity, as an organic whole the coexisting facts of which are in causal interdependences, that has given rise to the urgent need of system analysis and description of the subject under study.

System analysis is a method of research which makes it possible not only to bring out the structure of any one unit of a given language but also to explain the nature of its structure. In other words the method in question makes it possible to give a complete and adequate description of a concrete language.

The basic principles, fundamentals and tasks of system analysis have been largely made the subject of discourse ever since the first World Congress of Linguists (1928). However, viewing language as an integral entity has acquired specific prominence but of late, with the spread of contrastive-comparative linguistics, with the growth of the investigation of the typological features of separate languages and language groups, with the imminent need of settling problems of language universals, etc. ¹

Yet the principles and tasks of system analysis as regards

separate concrete languages have not been realized quite satisfactorily till this day. The same can justly be said of the Bengali language. Most likely the reason lies in there being insufficient information concerning single facts that make up the whole of the language. The complete analysis of the Bengali language as a system becomes more complicated because here we deal with very complex language structure.  

The main components of the Bengali system are its subsystems or variants, known as sādhu bhāṣā (SB) and calit bhāṣā (CB). Besides, there is still another subsystem in Bengali that needs mentioning, i.e., the Sanskrit subsystem, peripheral to the system of Bengali at large, yet closely linked with it.

The difference between SB and CB, on the one hand, and the system of Bengali proper, made up of these two of its variants (SB and CB) and the Sanskrit subsystem, on the other hand, is based on the structural differences of the word, i.e., on phonological and morphological differences. They are seen in the course of the functioning of the language, in its relationship with different styles of speech, such as: colloquial, fiction (which consists of the prosaic and poetic substiles), publicistic writing, scientific and official.

The interaction of elements and facts of the language finds realization both inside the given subsystem and between elements belonging to different subsystems. The lines of interdependencies are equally observed inside one and the same level (phonetics and phonology, morphology, syntax), and between language facts of different levels.

Here follow several illustrations to the above:

1. One of the specific features of the Bengali language is the semantic capacity of the verbal lexeme. Typologically this -

2. The description of the Bengali language as a complex language structure has been made much of by the scholars of Bengali. I shall here mention but one of the latest works on the subject: Suhas Chatterjee, "A study of the relationship between written and colloquial Bengali", thesis submitted to the Hartford Seminar Foundation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy; Hartford, Connecticut, May, 1962.
fact can be interpreted as a set of negative markers or a set of indistinctions (= lack of distinctions). The main types of indistinctions are:

1. The lack of transitive-intransitive distinction (in a certain group of verbs): *gôra* 'to build', 'to create' and 'to be created', 'to appear'; *bhângô* 'to break' (tr., intf.).

2. The lack of aspect and action-art distinctions (the category of aspectuality at large) in all Bengali verbs.

3. The lack of statics-dynamics distinction: *suwô/sowô* 'to lie' and 'to lie down'; *ghumânô / ghumono* 'to sleep' and 'to fall asleep'; *dhôra* 'to keep', 'to hold' and 'to take', 'to seize'.

4. The indistinction of the meanings of action or process (perception etc.), on the one hand, and of the result of the action or process, on the other hand: *pôra* 'to put on' and 'to wear' (clothes); *janâ* 'to get to know', 'to find out' and 'to know', 'to be aware'; *dêkôra* 'to look' and 'to see'; *sunô / sonô* 'to listen' and 'to hear'.

5. The indistinction of directed-undirected action (in a certain group of verbs: *udâ/udà* 'to fly' (in a certain direction and in no certain direction).

These and a few other semantic specifications of the Bengali verbal lexeme proceed from the morphological structure of the verbal stem, i.e., they result from the scantiness of means of verbal word-formation.

Hence, to the comparatively small number of verbs in Bengali and to the fact that the greater part of means bearing verbal meanings lies outside the verbal stem, belong tense forms, reduplicated impersonal-verbal forms, a variety of verbal-nominal and verbal-verbal phraseological units, and combinations with auxiliary verbs.

Thus, in combinations, called compound verbs, it is the auxiliary verb that bears the semantic implications, which the verbal stem is devoid of; they possess three different functional meanings:

3. The number of verbs in the "Calantika" dictionary slightly exceeds eight hundred; cf. S. K. Chatterji, ODBL, p. 872.
(a) that reflects the characteristics of proceeding of action in space (cf. phirā/phera 'to return' and phire jawā 'to return' from here there, phire ata 'to return' from there here);

(b) that brings out the qualitative characteristics of action (its intensiveness, manners of action or action-art, emotional evaluation; cf. khaawā 'to eat' and kheyhe phaela 'to eat', 'eat up' the whole, to the end or 'to devour', 'to gobble down';

(c) that indicating transitive-intransitive action (cf. gorā, both of transitive and intransitive meanings and gole tola which means only transitive action 'to build', 'to create' etc., but gore othā is restricted to 'to arise', 'to be built' etc.) or supporting the meanings of transitiveness or intransitiveness, the category already implied in the semantics of the sense verb (cf. bhorjov dewā 'to fill' and bhor othā 'to get filled'; in such instances the function of the transitive-intransitive marker merges with one of the first two functions of the auxiliary verb."

2. The morphological and semantic structure of the verbal stem in Bengali also finds reflection in some peculiarities of the nominal word categories. Thus, for example, the fact that there are no distinctions between concrete spatial meanings and their is no static-dynamic opposition in the verb-semantics is interwoven with indistinctions of concrete spatial meanings in the case forms. Such is the instrumental-locative case, which apart from the place of action or apart from location indicates direction of action. Such indiscriminate application "where" and "where to" in expressing spatial meaning can be similarly observed in adverbs of place: kothay, 'where' 'where to', okhāne, sekhāne 'there' and 'in that direction'. The same is characteristic of postpositional combinations which have come

4. On some other specifications of the morphological structure of the verbal stem and verbal semantics, see E. M. Bykova, "The Semantic Classification of the Bengali Verb" in "Problems of Semantics, the Thesis of reports." (Discussion at the enlarged session of the philological section of the Scientific Board of Institute of Oriental Studies; Febr., 1971), Moscow, 1971, pp. 29-35.
to being on the basis of nominal units; e.g., jānlar kāche 'at the window', 'by the window', and 'towards the window'. Therefore, the combinability of nouns in the instrumental-locative case and adverbs of place with verbs of diverse semantics (as to their place in the semantic classification of verbs); cf. combinations of verbs of being (substantive verbs): ghore thāka 'to be in the room' and those of directed action: ghore dholā 'to come into the room', etc.

3. Lack of prefixation is a typical feature of the Bengali language (we here mean the Bengali vocabulary proper, tadbhava words); therefore, the morphological structure of the verbal stem in itself is indicative of the whole of the Bengali word-forming system. The lack of nominal, pronominal and adverbial negative forms, on the one hand, as well as the structure and application of negative sentences, on the other hand, are also determined by this typical feature of the word-forming system.

4. The peculiarities of Bengali word-formation, and certain specific features of verbal forms (the specific character of active-passive opposition, vague aspect indication in conjunctive forms, indistinctions in the semantics of verbal lexemes, discussed above) have largely determined the formation of the Sanskrit subsystem inside the Bengali language system. The inter-action between the Sanskrit subsystem and the Bengali system proper is also fully dependent on the very same facts of the Bengali language indicated above.

Thus, for example, the diffusive nature of the verbal noun in -a, -no grammatically (it is the noun-action and the noun-participle, whose active or passive meaning is independent of its form, but very closely linked with the semantics of the given verbal lexeme and the context that is meant), is one of the reasons of the high frequency of constructions with Sanskrit past participles in their passive meaning.

Besides, grammatical peculiarities and the application of Bengali verbal forms proper influence the functioning of elements of the Sanskrit subsystem. Thus, predicative combinations with a verbal noun as the subject are of great importance.
in the Bengali language. Here are some of them: dekhā ḍhebe ‘we’ll meet’, āmar khāwā hoyeče ‘I have eaten’. Possibly it is constructions of this type that determine the frequent usage of predicative combinations with Sanskrit de-verbative nouns as the subject + the verbs howā, thātā, āch, etc. For example, tār / tāg holo / ‘He / got angry’ (lit. ‘his / anger happened’).

The scantiness of verbal lexemes in Bengali (see above) is one of the reasons why verbal-nominal combinations (largely including Sanskrit nouns), e.g., proboš korā ‘to enter’, agomān korā ‘to come’, ghoraṇā korā ‘to declare’, ‘to announce’, etc., are so numerous.

The list of illustrations to the points singled out at the beginning of the article can be continued. Moreover, through a consistent study of all the interdependences inside the language, we could achieve a complete description of the whole system of the Bengali language. However, this exceeds the limits of the article. We here intended but to stress the importance of viewing language as an integral entity, trying to prove the immense power of system analysis in language learning.

In conclusion I should like to state that the very fact of this kind of description of the Bengali language was made possible not only by the general trend of development of linguistics, but, first and foremost, by the works of S. K. Chatterji. His ODBL remains an infinite source of ideas. It is S. K. Chatterji, who in his ODBL was the first to single out and bring to light some causal interdependences, those of diachronic value. See, for example, p. 870 of the work, where the author dwelling on the simplification of the verbal system as a whole, states that it was replaced “by newer formations (i.e., by the development of the compounded verbs, and the use of particles and help-words). The syntax too has altered, to help in fixing the language in its new and altered environment”. See also p. 1049 on the diachronic interdependences between the character of the verbal stem and word combinations with auxiliary verbs (Compound Verb or ‘Group Verb’ constructions).